The unattainability of the true world: the Putnamian and Kripkensteinian interpretation of Nietzsche’s The History of an Error
In this article I am interpreting Friedrich Nietzsche's piece of writing "How the "True World" finally became a fable - The History of an Error" in the context of 20th-century analytical philosophy of language. In particular, I am going to argue that the main theme in this text - the issue of abolishing "the true world" - can be interpreted as (1) Hilary Putnam's model-theoretic arguments against external realism and (2) Saul Kripke's Wittgensteinian (or Kripkensteinian) arguments against truth-conditional meaning theories. Interpreting this Nietzsche's text with the help of these arguments gives rise to two options determining Nietzsche's own position. The perspective of Putnam's argument seems to push Nietzsche to the quietist camp - the view that significant metaphysical debate between external realism and its opposite is impossible or inexpressible. On the other hand, the Kripkensteinian perspective gives us reasons to interpret Nietzsche as an adherer of the pragmatic account of semantics, which explains meaning through the use of language.
Copyright (c) 2016 Henrik Sova
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