Explaining Away Intuitions

  • Jonathan Ichikawa Arche Research Centre, University of St. Andrews
Keywords: intuitions

Abstract

What is it to explain away an intuition? Philosophers regularly attempt to explain intuitions away, but it is often unclear what the success conditions for their project consist in. I attempt to articulate some of these conditions, taking philosophical case studies as guides, and arguing that many attempts to explain away intuitions underestimate the challenge the project of explaining away involves. I will conclude, therefore, that explaining away intuitions is a more difficult task than has sometimes been appreciated; I also suggest, however, that the importance of explaining away intuitions has often been exaggerated.

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Published
2010-02-18
How to Cite
Ichikawa, J. (2010). Explaining Away Intuitions. Studia Philosophica Estonica, 94-116. https://doi.org/10.12697/spe.2009.2.2.06