Loose Constitutivity and Armchair Philosophy

  • Jonathan M. Weinberg Indiana University, Bloomington
  • Stephen J. Crowley Boise State University

Abstract

Standard philosophical methodology which proceeds by appeal to intuitions accessible "from the armchair" has come under criticism on the basis of empirical work indicating unanticipated variability of such intuitions. Loose constitutivity---the idea that intuitions are partly, but not strictly, constitutive of the concepts that appear in them---offers an interesting line of response to this empirical challenge. On a loose constitutivist view, it is unlikely that our intuitions are incorrect across the board, since they partly fix the facts in question. But we argue that this ratification of intuitions is at best rough and generic, and can only do the required methodological work if it operates in conjunction with some sort of further criteria of theory selection. We consider two that we find in the literature: naturalness (Brian Weatherson, borrowing from Lewis) and charity (Henry Jackman, borrowing from Davidson). At the end of the day, neither provides the armchair philosopher complete shelter from extra-armchair inquiry.

Author Biographies

Jonathan M. Weinberg, Indiana University, Bloomington

Associate Professor

Department of Philosophy & Program in Cognitive Science

Stephen J. Crowley, Boise State University

Assistant Professor

Department of Philosophy

Published
2010-02-18
How to Cite
Weinberg, J., & Crowley, S. (2010). Loose Constitutivity and Armchair Philosophy. Studia Philosophica Estonica, 177-195. https://doi.org/10.12697/spe.2009.2.2.10