The Logic of Truth in Paraconsistent Internal Realism

  • Manuel Bremer University of Düsseldorf
Keywords: truth, modal logic, paraconsistency, internal realism

Abstract

The paper discusses which modal principles should hold for a truth operator answering to the truth theory of internal realism. It turns out that the logic of truth in internal realism is isomorphic to the modal system S4.

References

Bremer, M.(2005). An Introduction to Paraconsistent Logics, Peter Lang Publishing, Bern.

Bremer, M. (2008). Internal realism, in P. Hannah (ed.), Anthology of Philosophical Studies, Athens.

Hughes, G. E. and Cresswell, M. J. (1968). An Introduction to Modal Logics, Methuen, London/New York.

Meyer, J.-J. C. and vander Hoek, W. (1995). Epistemic Logic for AI and Computer Science, Cambridge.

Priest, G. (1979). The logic of paradox, Journal of Philosophical Logic 8: 219-241.

Priest, G. (2006). In Contradiction, 2nd edn, Oxford.

Tennant, N. (1987). The Taming of the True, Oxford.

Thomason, R. (1980). A note on syntactical treatments of modality, Synthese 44: 391-395.

Published
2008-08-14
How to Cite
Bremer, M. (2008). The Logic of Truth in Paraconsistent Internal Realism. Studia Philosophica Estonica, 76-83. https://doi.org/10.12697/spe.2008.1.1.04