Deflationism, Truth-Aptness and Non-Factualism

  • Massimiliano Vignolo Dipartimento di Filosofia - Università di Genova
Keywords: deflationism, non-factualism, use conception of meaning

Abstract

I will argue that the standard formulation of non-factualism in terms of a denial of truth-aptness is consistent with a version of deflationsim. My line of argument assumes the use conception of meaning. This brings out an interesting consequence since mostly the philosophers who endorse the use conception of meaning, e.g. Paul Horwich, hold that deflationism is inconsistent with the strategy of implementing non-factualism in terms of a denial of truth-aptness and thereby urge a reformulation of non-factualism.

Author Biography

Massimiliano Vignolo, Dipartimento di Filosofia - Università di Genova
Post doc, Dipartimento di Filosofia - Univesità di Genova
Published
2008-08-14
How to Cite
Vignolo, M. (2008). Deflationism, Truth-Aptness and Non-Factualism. Studia Philosophica Estonica, 84-103. https://doi.org/10.12697/spe.2008.1.1.05