The Modest, or Quantificational, Account of Truth

  • Wolfgang Künne Department of Philosophy, University of Hamburg
Keywords: truth, non-nominal quantification

Abstract

Truth is a stable, epistemically unconstrained property of propositions, and the concept of truth admits of a non-reductive explanation: that, in a nutshell, is the view for which I argued in Conceptions of Truth. In this paper I try to explain that explanation in a more detailed and, hopefully, more perspicuous way than I did in Ch. 6.2 of the book and to defend its use of sentential quantification against some of the criticisms it has has come in for.

Published
2008-08-14
How to Cite
Künne, W. (2008). The Modest, or Quantificational, Account of Truth. Studia Philosophica Estonica, 1(2), 122-168. https://doi.org/10.12697/spe.2008.1.2.01