Two-dimensional Truth
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.12697/spe.2008.1.2.04Keywords:
truth, two-dimensional semantics, possible worldsAbstract
The paper identifies two major strands of truth theories, ontological and epistemological ones, and argues that both are of equal primacy and find their home within two-dimensional semantics. Contrary to received views, it argues further that epistemological truth theories operate on Lewisian possible worlds and ontological truth theories on Wittgensteinian possible worlds and that both are mediated by the so-called epistemic-ontic map the further specification of which is of utmost philosophical importance.
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