Deflationary Truth and Truth-Biology

  • Margo Laasberg
Keywords: truth, deflationism, truth-biology


Many or almost all writers about truth seem to agree that the entailment by a more or less formal account of truth of all the instances of the so-called disquotational schema - (DQ) <p> is true if and only if p - is at least a necessary condition for this account to count as an adequate account of truth. My first task in this paper is to show that the correctness of the observation (DQ) does not by itself imply that truth lacks substance. My second task is to establish the instances of (DQ) as not only necessary but also sufficient for a characterisation of truth. Such a minimal theory of truth would seem to rob truth of all substance but going in for a more eloquent alternative as I shall attempt to show could result in an unwanted epistemisation of truth.

How to Cite
Laasberg, M. (2009). Deflationary Truth and Truth-Biology. Studia Philosophica Estonica, 1(2), 265-283.