There Are Vague Objects (in Any Sense in which There Are Ordinary Objects)

Authors

  • Jiri Benovsky

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.12697/spe.2008.1.3.01

Keywords:

vagueness, objects, metaphysics

Abstract

Ordinary objects are vague, because either (i) composition is restricted, or (ii) there really are no such objects (but we still want to talk about them), or (iii) because such objects are not metaphysically (independently of us) distinguishable from other 'extra-ordinary' objects. In any sense in which there are ordinary objects, they are vague.

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References

Heller,M. (1990). The Ontology of Physical Objects: Four-dimensional Hunks of Matter, Cambridge University Press.

Lewis, D. (1986). On the Plurality of Worlds, Blackwell Publishers.

Van Inwagen, P. (1990). Material Beings, Cornell University Press.

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Published

2008-08-14

How to Cite

Benovsky, J. (2008). There Are Vague Objects (in Any Sense in which There Are Ordinary Objects). Studia Philosophica Estonica, 1(3), 1–4. https://doi.org/10.12697/spe.2008.1.3.01

Issue

Vol. 1.3 (2008)

Section

Articles