Milleks on sotsiaalse tunnetuse uurimisvaldkonnas tarvis filosoofiat?

  • Vivian Bohl University of Tartu

Abstract

Käesoleva artikli eesmärgiks on selgitada, milline on ja peaks olema filosoofia panus sotsiaalse tunnetuse uurimisvaldkonnas. Vastustades kolme populaarset väidet, mille kohaselt filosoofiat ei ole teaduse tegemiseks tarvis, selgitan, kuidas filosoofid panustavad ning peaksid jätkuvalt panustama sotsiaalse tunnetuse uurimisse. Eraldi käsitlen mõtteliste eksperimentide rolli sotsiaalse tunnetuse uurimisel ning väidan, et kuigi klassikalised filosoofilised mõttelised eksperimendid ei sobi sotsiaalse tunnetuse valdkonna teaduslike probleemide lahendamiseks, tuleks rahvapsühholoogia uurimisel ulatuslikumalt rakendada eksperimentaalfilosoofilisi meetodeid. Väidan, et filosoofid analüüsivad sotsiaalse tunnetuse valdkonnas tehtud uurimistööd enamasti normatiivsetel eesmärkidel, kuid tarvis oleks ka sotsiaalse tunnetuse uurimistöö põhjalikumat deskriptiivset analüüsimist. Käsitlen ka fenomenoloogia võimalikku rolli sotsiaalse tunnetuse valdkonnas, selgitades, mille poolest fenomenoloogia panus erineb mittefenomenoloogilise filosoofia panusest ning milline on fenomenoloogia potentsiaal sotsiaalse tunnetuse uurimisel.  The aim of the paper is to explain what is and what should be the contribution of philosophy to the social cognition research. I refute three popular claims against the necessity of philosophy in scientific research and bring out several ways of how philosophers contribute and should continue to contribute to social cognition research. I clarify the role of thought experiments in studying social cognition and argue that although classical philosophical thought experiments are unsuitable for solving scientific problems in this area, the methods of experimental philosophy should be more widely used for studying folk psychology. I claim that whereas philosophers tend to analyse the research of social cognition in order to make normative claims, there is likewise a need for more elaborate descriptive analysis. I also analyse the possible role of phenomenology in social cognitive research and explain how does the contribution of phenomenology differ from the contribution of nonphenomenological philosophy and what is the potential of phenomenology in social cognition research.

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Published
2011-12-10
How to Cite
Bohl, V. (2011). Milleks on sotsiaalse tunnetuse uurimisvaldkonnas tarvis filosoofiat?. Studia Philosophica Estonica, 20-51. https://doi.org/10.12697/spe.2011.4.1.02
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Articles