• Penelope A Rush The University of Tasmania
Keywords: language, meaning, relativism


I argue that one in particular of Crispin Wright’s attempts to capture our common or intuitive concepts of objectivity, warrant, and other associated notions, relies on an ambiguity between a given constructivist reading of the concepts and at least one other, arguably more ‘ordinary’, version of the notions he tries to accommodate. I do this by focusing on one case in point, and concluding with a brief argument showing how this case generalises. I demonstrate why this ambiguity is unacceptable and also that its resolution undermines the aim it serves: to account for and accommodate our ordinary conception of (at least) objectivity, warrant (or justification) and truth.


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Wright, C. (2004b). Warrant for nothing (and foundations for free)?, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary LXXVIII: 167-212.

How to Cite
Rush, P. (2012). Objectivities. Studia Philosophica Estonica, 1-16. https://doi.org/10.12697/spe.2012.5.1.01