Wittgensteinian Perspectives on the Turing Test

  • Ondřej Beran University of West Bohemia, Plzeň, Czech Republic
Keywords: Turing test, artificial intelligence, AI, thinking, Wittgenstein


This paper discusses some difficulties in understanding the Turing test. It emphasizes the importance of distinguishing between conceptual and empirical perspectives and highlights the former as introducing more serious problems for the TT. Some objections against the Turingian framework stemming from the later Wittgenstein’s philosophy are exposed. The following serious problems are examined: 1) It considers a unique and exclusive criterion for thinking which amounts to their identification; 2) it misidentifies the relationship of speaking to thinking as that of a criterion; 3) it neglects the “natural” course of the development in semantics. However, these considerations suggest only that it is problematic to label a successful chatbot as a “thinking entity” without further qualifications, but not necessarily and once and for all incorrect. Philosophy has only little to say about the technical possibility of creating such an effective program.


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How to Cite
Beran, O. (2014). Wittgensteinian Perspectives on the Turing Test. Studia Philosophica Estonica, 7(1), 35-57. https://doi.org/10.12697/spe.2014.7.1.02