Dependence and Fundamentality
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.12697/spe.2014.7.2.02Keywords:
dependence, fundamentality, Aristotelian metaphysicsAbstract
I argue that dependence is neither necessary nor sufficient for relative fundamentality. I then introduce the notion of 'likeness in nature' and provide an account of relative fundamentality in terms of it and the notion of dependence. Finally, I discuss some puzzles that arise in Aristotle's Categories, to which the theory developed is applied.
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References
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