

Parentheticals and the dialogicity of signs

Barbara Sonnenhauser

Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Institut für Slavische Philologie
Geschwister-Scholl-Platz 1, D-80539 München
e-mail: basonne@lmu.de

Abstract. The term ‘parenthetical’ is applied to an almost unlimited range of linguistic phenomena, which share but one common feature, namely their being used parenthetically. Parenthetical use is mostly described in terms of embedding an expression into some host sentence. Actually, however, it is anything but clear what it means for an expression to be used parenthetically, from both a syntactic and a semantic point of view.

Given that in most, if not all, cases the alleged host sentence can be considered syntactically and semantically complete in itself, it needs to be asked what kind of information the parenthetical contributes to the overall structure. Another issue to be addressed concerns the nature of the relation between parenthetical and host (explanation, question, etc.) and the question what is it that holds them together.

Trying to figure out the basic function of parentheticals, the present paper proposes a semiotic analysis of parenthetically used expressions. This semiotic analysis is not intended to replace linguistic approaches¹, but is meant to elaborate on why parentheticals are so hard to capture linguistically. Taking a dynamic conception of signs and sign processes (in the sense of Peirce, Voloshinov and Bahtin) as starting point, parentheticals are argued to render explicit the inherent dialogicity of signs and utterances. This inherent dialogicity is hardly ever taken into consideration in linguistic analyses, which take the two-dimensional linearity of language as granted.

¹ A bibliography on parentheticals and related constructions is available at <http://userpage.fu-berlin.de/~ndehe/bibl/parentheticals.html>.

1. The trouble with parentheticals

The term ‘parenthetical’ covers linguistic entities ranging from words and phrases to clauses and sentences, cf. (1):

- (1) a. И Россия, **безусловно**, [...] будет поддерживать в этом отношении Сербию. (*Pravda*, 1-22-2008)²
 ‘And Russia will, **of course**, support Serbia also in this respect.’
- b. Но попасть в этот современный мир старым методом »бури и натиска« — **к счастью для нас** — невозможно. (2-17-2008)³
 ‘But getting into this present-day world by means of the old method of “Storm and Stress” is — **luckily to us** — impossible.’
- c. Я, **если хочешь знать**, в юности в театральное поступала. (2-17-2008)
 ‘In my youth — **if you want to know** — I went to the drama school.’
- d. Тем более что Тадич — **он этого не скрывал и не скрывает** — считает стратегической целью Сербии [...] вхождение в Европейский союз. (*Izvestija*, 1-24-2008)
 ‘Especially as Tadić — **he did not and does not hide it** — poses Serbia’s joining the European Union as a strategic objective.’

This variety is captured by Burton-Roberts’ (2007: 179) rather general definition of a parenthetical (P) as “an expression of which it can be argued that, while in some sense ‘hosted’ by another expression (H), P makes no contribution to the structure of H”. Apparently, there does not seem to be any restriction as to what kinds of linguistic expression can be used parenthetically. Sometimes, however, a distinct category of parenthetical expressions is proposed. For English, Urmson (1952: 461) isolates a group of parenthetical verbs, i.e. verbs “which, in the

² Examples from journals and magazines are taken from their respective online versions. Unless indicated otherwise, the date of issue agrees with the access date.

³ Unless indicated otherwise (cf. footnote 1), examples are taken from the Russian National Corpus (www.ruscorpora.ru). The access date is given in brackets.

first person present, can be used [...] followed by ‘that’ and an indicative clause, or else can be inserted at the middle or the end of the indicative sentence”, and which cannot be used with the progressive form:

- (2) a. **I suppose** that your house is very old
- b. Your house is, **I suppose**, very old.
- c. Your house is very old, **I suppose**.
- d. I suppose — ***I am supposing**

Besides parenthetical verbs, Urmson (1952: 466) also isolates a class of parenthetical adverbs, such as *luckily*, *admittedly*, *undoubtedly*, or *possibly*, which are as loosely attached to sentences as parenthetical verbs.

For Russian, expressions like those in (3) are regarded as having parenthetical use only (Vinogradov 1960: 140):

- (3) a. Психолог же зачастую, **во-первых**, должен работать с неотобраным материалом, **во-вторых**, он ограничен в своей работе нормами морали, **в-третьих**, ему приходится решать нестандартные задачи [...] (2-10-08)
 ‘Very often, a psychologist, **first**, has to work with unselected material, **second**, he is restricted in his work by ethic norms, **third**, he has to solve unusual tasks.’
- b. Чего мы от него, **собственно говоря**, добиваемся? (2-10-08)
 ‘What do we, **strictly speaking**, obtain from him?’

In other cases, however, both a parenthetical and an integrated use are possible, as well as hypotactic constructions with *что* (‘that’):

- (4) a. И они, **очевидно**, уговорили Евгения Примакова поддерживать их идею. (9-30-2008)
 And they, **obviously**, persuaded Evgenij Primakov to support their idea.’

- b. «Николай Семенович» **очевидно** тоже смотрел в этот вечер телевизор. (2-10-08)
 ‘That evening, “Nikolaj Semenovich” **obviously** watched TV as well.’
- c. **Очевидно, что** команда должна быть одна. (2-10-08)
 ‘**It is obvious that** the party has to be united.’

Thus, parenthetically used expressions do not carry any inherent feature that marks them as parenthetical and justifies the postulation of a separate part of speech. This raises the question of how parenthetical use can be recognised by the recipient. In written discourse, parentheticality is indicated by means of punctuation. In oral discourse, intonation is assumed to play an important role (Potts 2007, for example, proposes a ‘comma intonation’ for appositions). Phonetic analyses of actual utterances, however, cast the general validity of this assumption into doubt (cf. Krause 2007, Grenoble 2004).

Burton-Roberts’ definition (see above) not only captures the variety of parentheticals⁴, it also characterises them as being hosted by other expressions. The assumption of a parenthetical being in some sense embedded in a host sentence requires a syntactic account of this embedding. It is, however, not quite clear how parentheticals are to be integrated into the overall sentence structure, since they are not immediately dominated by some other constituent of the alleged host sentence (cf. Espinal 1991: 729–735 for an overview over their idiosyncratic syntactic behaviour). Therefore, parentheticals pose problems especially for one central principle in syntactic theory, namely that hierarchical structure determined by asymmetric c-command maps uniquely to linear order (Kayne 1994: 3).⁵

⁴ Henceforth, the notion ‘parenthetical’ is used as an abbreviation for ‘parenthetically used expression’.

⁵ In his discussion of non-restrictive relative clauses as specific types of parentheticals, Burton-Roberts (1999) denies linear precedence a syntactic status and proposes to regard it as “a matter of representational, not grammatical, fact” (Burton-Roberts 1999: 50).

Trying to reconcile parentheticals with this principle, syntactic accounts assume that they are dominated by the sentence node (McCawley 1982), they regard them as orphans (Haegeman 1988), that is, deny any linguistic relation between the parenthetical and the host, or propose a three-dimensional syntax (Espinal 1991) to capture the fact that parentheticals are in some sense connected with the host, but as ‘disjunct constituents’ are not dominated by any of its constituents. Analysing parentheticals as disjunct captures the insight that the parenthetical and the ‘basic’ sentence do not form a syntactic unit (cf. also Peterson’s 1999 account in terms of non-syntagmatic relations), but does not convincingly account for the connection — if not linguistic, then at least conceptual — between the both.

From a semantic point of view arises the question what kind of information is provided by parentheticals. Suggestions include marking speaker’s attitude, providing background information, or adding some kind of metatextual commentary (cf., e.g., Vinogradov 1960).

The problems outlined in this section have been noted already by Schwyzer (1939). Facing the troubles with parentheticals, he suggests regarding parentheticals as a part of a more basic and comprehensive phenomenon of language — without, however, providing an explanation of what this phenomenon might be. From the semiotic analysis proposed in the present paper, the inherent dialogicity of signs and utterances emerges as a possible candidate.

2. Types of parentheticals

In order to account for the specific nature of parentheticals and to cope with their many possible forms and functions, various proposals have been made to classify them. Vinogradov (1960: 140–174), for instance, draws a distinction between two groups of parentheticals, which he calls *vvodnye* (‘introductory’) and *vstavnye* (‘inserted’) words, phrases and sentences. *Vvodnye* are illustrated in (5):

- (5) a. Но, **по-видимому**, они всё рассчитали [...]. (2-4-2008)
 ‘But, **apparently**, they took everything into account.’
- b. Этим, **должно быть**, и попытаются оправдать свои неудачи многие провалившиеся фавориты. (2-4-2008)
 ‘By means of that, **probably**, a lot of failed favourites will try to justify their failure.’
- c. И, **признаюсь**, спросив себя так, я не нашёл что ответить. (2-18-2008)
 ‘And, I admit, having asked myself this way, I didn’t find an answer.’
- d. Но у нас в стране, **знаете**, представления об этапе как о поезде [...]. (2-4-2008)
 ‘But in our country, **you know**, the image of this phase is like that of a train.’

Even though *vvodnye* constitute a relatively closed class (Grenoble 2004: 1956), they exhibit a considerable variety in both form (morphosyntax and lexical class) and meaning. Among the meanings listed are, just to mention a few, indication of source, reliability and emotional characterisation of information, relation of the current utterance to other utterances, and addressing the interlocutor (cf. e.g., Vinogradov 1960: 140–165). Syntactically, *vvodnye* are characterised by their non-integration in the sentence, which distinguishes them from modal words (Zybatow 1989). This distinction is indeed crucial, since modal words are modal by their very semantics, whereas there is nothing inherent in *vvodnye* that would mark them as parenthetical (cf. also Hinrichs 1983: 9). Even though modal words may very well be used parenthetically, (5b), and even though parentheticals may indeed receive a modal — predominantly epistemic — interpretation (cf. section 5), this does not justify the conflation of a semantic-syntactic category with a functionally defined class of entities of language use, and the establishment of a separate part of speech.

As regards *vstavnye*, there does not seem to be any restriction as to which kinds of expression may be used parenthetically:

- (6) a. Сцена, предвещающая падение занавеса — «Тени» — признанный мировой шедевр [...]. (*Vesti*, 1-23-2008)
 ‘The scene anticipating the falling of the curtain — “**The shadows**” — is a world famous masterpiece.’
- b. В школьные годы — **в классе пятом-шестом** — недолго занимался гимнастикой [...]. (*Izvestija*, 1-22-2008; accessed 1-23-2008)
 ‘In my school-days — **in the fifth or sixth grade** — I did some gymnastics.’
- c. Но подтверждение — **или опровержение** — этому можно добыть с помощью дистанционных методов. (*Nezavisimaja Gazeta*, 1-23-2008)
 ‘But the proof — **or disproof** — for that can be gained by means of remote methods.’
- d. Совместный проект — **автоматической и пилотируемой марсианской экспедиции** — [...] интересное решение. (*Nezavisimaja Gazeta*, 1-23-2008)
 ‘A joint project — **that of an automatic or manned expedition to Mars** — is an interesting decision.’
- e. Другие специалисты считают, что изъятие мизерной доли стока Оби (**в проекте канала шла речь о нескольких процентах от общего стока этой реки**) никоим образом не угрожает экологии сибирского региона [...]. (*Pravda*, 1-22-2008)
 ‘Other experts think, that the removal of a small part of the drain of the Ob (**in the channel project it was being talked about a few percents of the overall drain**) by no means threatens the ecology of the Siberian region.’

Vinogradov (1960: 165) analyses *vstavnye* as disrupting the sentence and adding various kinds of additional information, such as explanation, emphasis, correction etc. This type of parentheticals may also be introduced by conjunctions (Vinogradov 1960: 171), in which case they are in some sense syntactically related to this sentence (Paducheva 1996 thus distinguishes *sobstvenno-vvodnye* ‘actual-intro-

ductory’ and *vvodno-sojuznye* ‘introductory-conjunctive’ constructions).

As can be seen from the examples in (5) and (6), Vinogradov’s terms are problematic, since not all *vvodnye* appear in an introductory position, and since both types may be inserted (cf. also Grenoble 2004: 1956). They are therefore misleading to a certain degree — parentheticals cannot be classified in positional terms. Moreover, the mere listing of possible interpretations for the various sub-types of parenthetical constructions does not solve the problems mentioned above.

A distinction along other lines is proposed by Grenoble (2004). Emphasising the morphosyntactic diversity of parentheticals, she takes their “operating on a distinct discourse plane” (Grenoble 2004: 1954) as the unifying feature. Within this general function, she draws a distinction according to the kind of information contributed by the parenthetical: conceptual or procedural. These relevance theoretic notions capture the difference between representation and computation (Sperber, Wilson 1995), i.e. between delivering the conceptual information and instructions on how to integrate it. Accordingly, conceptual parentheticals “add conceptual meaning”, whereas procedural parentheticals deliver instructions as to “how the host proposition is to be interpreted, or how it is to be contextualised” (Grenoble 2004: 1973). This distinction largely, but not completely, corresponds to Vinogradov’s distinction of *vvodnye* vs. *vstavnye*, but avoids the misleading association with a specific position in the sentence.

The examples in (7), taken from Grenoble (2004: 1969–1971), illustrate the various kinds of discourse shifts possible for parentheticals:

- (7) a. Ну трудно с американцами, **я понимаю**.
 ‘Well it’s difficult with Americans, **I understand**.’
 b. Он, **видишь/понимаешь**, очень старый.
 ‘He is, **you see/understand**, very old.’
 c. Я не понимал (**теперь я понял**), что [...].

‘I had not understood (**now I understand**), what [...]’

Вот что меня удивило: там стоит велосипед.

‘**Here’s what surprised me:** a bicycle was standing there.’

Shifts in discourse encompass two groups: “shifts in the primary deictic dimensions of time, space or person” (Grenoble 2004: 1972), cf. (7a, b), and shifts in “discourse deixis” (*ibid.*) to another level of discourse making meta-statements or introducing additional information (7c, d). In the former case, both conceptual and procedural parentheticals are possible, in the latter, only conceptual ones (*ibid.*).

Another possibility of classifying parentheticals, which also relates in some sense to Vinogradov’s distinction, is provided by Hinrichs (1983, 1986). He takes as the decisive feature of parentheticals not some specific semantic characteristics, but the fact that they are there (1986: 125). Parentheticals do not have specific lexical-semantic meanings, but stand out for their indexicality (“*Verweisungskompetenz*”, Hinrichs 1983: 19). Based on this indexicality, Hinrichs distinguishes two groups of parentheticals: one group — which seems to correspond to *vvodnye*⁶ — refers to the underlying act of saying, making it thereby explicit (Hinrichs 1983); the other group — obviously corresponding to *vstavnye* — actualises a paradigm of other texts and relates them to the current text (Hinrichs 1986). He rightly emphasises that in order to properly analyse parentheticals, the distinction between a meta- and an object-level, i.e. the level of parenthetical and the level of the sentence, is crucial (Hinrichs 1983: 12). This distinction is lost, if, for instance, *vvodnye* are incorporated into the class of modal words.

Thus, both Grenoble’s and Hinrichs’ distinction of parentheticals — in terms of the information they contribute, and in terms of their referring potential — agree in that parentheticals in some sense assume a meta-position and connect two different layers of discourse, more precisely — two layers of utterances. Dealing with parentheticals, the notion of utterance is indeed of central importance. Not only can we assume that the parentheticals are inserted with respect to an

⁶ Hinrichs does not introduce specific terms.

utterance (to convey a comment etc), it is the characteristic features of utterances themselves that provide the basis for an account of the function of parentheticals.

3. Utterances and communication

Utterances as entities of language use are typically treated with respect to their functioning in communication. Depending on the concept of communication, the role of utterances varies from mere objects used to convey some message, to active players connecting speaker and hearer.⁷ These opposing views on communication, which are mainly based on different concepts of the linguistic sign, can be illustrated with the approaches of Jakobson on the one hand, and Bahtin and Voloshinov on the other.

3.1. Jakobson

Jakobson's (1971[1957]: 130) concept of communication — “[a]ny message is encoded by its sender and is to be decoded by its addressee” — is based on a dyadic model of signs as pairings of signans and signatum, and strongly influenced by Shannon and Weaver's (1949) technical communication model. This concept is problematic in that it leaves language as an object used by the speaker in order to encode a message and regards the hearer as nothing but a passive recipient of the speaker's product. Moreover, the notion of message itself proves rather problematic since Jakobson seems to use it in divergent senses.

Attempting to overcome the Saussurean dichotomy of *langue* and *parole*, Jakobson takes both code (*langue*) and message (*parole*) as “vehicles of communication”, each functioning in a “duplex manner”

⁷ Within this latter line of thought, speaker and hearer are not outside the utterance, but are an integral part of it (cf. Sonnenhauser 2008). In the present paper, the notions ‘speaker’ and ‘hearer’ are used as mere auxiliary terms.

(Jakobson 1971[1957]: 130), i.e. both can be made use of and both can be referred to at the same time. The cross-classification results in four types: *M/M* (message referring to message, e.g. indirect speech), *C/C* (code referring to code, e.g. proper names), *M/C* (message referring to code, e.g. translations) and *C/M* (code referring to message, e.g. deictic expressions). Two of these types are concerned with reference to the message, and are hence of interest for the purposes of the present paper: *C/M* and *M/M*. The former characterises the class of shifters, the latter is exemplified by the incorporation of foreign speech (Jakobson 1971[1957]: 130–132).⁸

On closer inspection, Jakobson's cross-classification turns out quite problematic, as becomes obvious especially with his elaboration of *C/M*. This type characterises shifters, a class of lexical items whose general meaning "cannot be defined without a reference to the message" (Jakobson 1971[1957]: 131). In order to apply this notion to a classification of verbal categories, Jakobson introduces the distinction between the narrated event (*En*), which every verb is concerned with, and the speech event (*Es*).⁹ Verbal categories implying a reference of *En* to *Es* constitute the class of shifters.

The transition from considering the role of *C* and *M* in the constitution of duplex types to the elaboration of shifters in terms of *En* and *Es* testifies a rather strong break in Jakobson's argumentation. Obviously, he offers two characterisations of shifters within one and the same paper: as code referring to message (*C/M*), and as a narrated event referring to a speech event (*En/Es*). Comparing both definitions one wonders how they match, or more precisely, whether they match at all. This concerns mainly the concept of the message *M* — does it comprise both *En* and *Es*, or only *Es*? Actually, Jakobson seems to use this notion in two senses: in a more comprehensive sense as one of the two vehicles of linguistic communication, and in a narrower sense in

⁸ Jakobson does not seem to be quite sure how to handle forms denoting "events known from the speaker only from the testimony of others" (1971[1957]: 131): as *M/M*, i.e. as a means to integrate foreign speech (130), or as *C/M*, i.e. as shifters (135) relating a narrated event and a narrated speech event to a speech event.

⁹ Every speech event and every narrated event include also participants.

the definition of shifters, where ‘message’ seems to pertain to *Es* only. The confusion concerning the notion of message is also found in Jakobson’s elaboration of the six functions of language (Jakobson 1971[1960b]), where ‘message’ is again used in a double sense, namely as the overall content of communication, and at the same time as a part of this overall content. Moreover, speaker and addressee are separated from the message, their interaction taking place in the speech event.

Several years later, Jakobson (1971[1968]: 703) proposes a useful distinction which, however, again questions his notion of message and the status of *En* and *Es* — the distinction between communication “which implies a real or alleged addresser” and information “whose source cannot be viewed as an addresser by the interpreter of the indications obtained”. Communication encompasses information and an addresser — in terms of Jakobson’s 1971[1957] terminology, communication encompasses both *En* and *Es*, whereas information delivers only an *En*. On the basis of these assumptions, however, defining shifters as implying a reference of *En* to *Es* as opposed to categories lacking such a reference and describing only *En* is not tenable any longer. Actually, such a distinction could be drawn only with respect to abstract entities, entities not being used in actual utterances. In utterances, i.e. in verbal communication, both *En* and *Es* are present, both are necessary for interpretation to arise.¹⁰

Despite these critical remarks, the distinction between *En* and *Es* is indeed important, but it has to be drawn in a less categorical manner. It will be argued that both are interconnected by virtue of being integral parts of a triadic sign. Being integral parts of one sign, they can be targeted, i.e. taken as an object, only from an outside (i.e. meta-) position.

¹⁰ Cf. Voloshinov’s (1993[1929]: 74f) distinction between signal and sign: a signal can be recognised, whereas a sign can be comprehended. A linguistic entity is not a self-identical signal but a constantly changing, flexible sign. The task of comprehension thus consists in understanding a sign within a given context, i.e. in understanding its novelty, and not in recognising its identity.

3.2. Bahtin/ Voloshinov

Voloshinov and Bahtin offer a concept of communication which is based on the inherent dialogicity of linguistic signs. While Jakobson remains committed to a static and dyadic concept of sign and sign system, Voloshinov's and Bahtin's views bear striking resemblance to Peirce's dynamic characterisation of the sign and the sign process (cf. section 4). It almost seems as if they provided an application of the Peircean model in their analysis of signs and utterances (for a comparison of the Bahtinian and the Peircian concept of semiotics cf. Ponzio 2000).

Bahtin and Voloshinov take the social event of linguistic exchange, manifesting itself in utterances, as the actual reality of language (Voloshinov 1993[1929]: 104). Within the overall dialogic process, utterances are but one moment, one drop in the stream of linguistic exchange (Bahtin/ Voloshinov 1930: 66), constituting a connecting element within the complex organisation of the chain of other utterances (Bahtin 2000: 261). Utterances are characterised by their addressivity (Bahtin 2000: 292), and the active role of both speaker and hearer. They are framed by a change of speakers indicating their boundaries, i.e. their completeness and their readiness to be answered (Bahtin 2000: 269). Moreover, utterances are full of the speaker's evaluations, whereas words or sentences as elements of language are neutral and do not evaluate anything (Voloshinov 1930: 48).¹¹

Bahtin (2000: 259) considers a concept of linguistic interaction consisting of an active speaker and a hearer passively perceiving and understanding an utterance as scientific fiction.¹² Rather, the hearer has to be ascribed an active role: perceiving an utterance and understanding it, the hearer assumes an active, answering position with respect to this utterance. This active, answering position consists in agreeing or disagreeing with the utterance, complementing or changing it, etc. In this way, the hearer is at the same time a speaker. The speaker in turn is

¹¹ The question of how to determine the boundaries of an utterance is central to text linguistics.

¹² This criticism applies to both 'subjective individualism' and 'abstract objectivism' (cf. Voloshinov 1993 [1929]).

geared to exactly this answering understanding: he does not expect passive understanding in the sense of mere duplication of his thoughts but some kind of reaction. Anticipating reactions and presupposing prior utterances to which his own utterance reacts, the speaker is himself an answering person. Thus the addresser is at the same time an addressee and vice versa (Bahtin 2000: 259–261).

This is another crucial difference with Jakobson's concept of communication, according to which the "alternation of the encoding and decoding activities" (Jakobson 1971[1968]: 697) takes place in temporal sequence, and linguistic analysis has to keep those two stand-points, the roles of speaker and hearer, strictly apart (Jakobson 1992 [1959]: 434). Although Jakobson grants that within linguistic exchange both directions — that of encoding and that of decoding — are present simultaneously, keeping them rigorously apart in linguistic analysis easily leads to taking them as separate in the actual utterance as well.

Since the subject matter of an utterance does not appear in this utterance for the first time, utterances constitute a meeting place for the positions of the interlocutors, for various current and previous theories, points of view, etc. An utterance is thus concerned not only with the object being talked about, but also with foreign speech about this object (Bahtin 2000: 290f), and hence addresses previous and follow-up utterances. Therefore, the speaker constructs his utterance both as a reaction to former utterances and with respect to possible reactions, i.e. future utterances (Bahtin 2000: 290f). As a consequence, utterances are full of answers, and full of anticipating reactions of various kinds.¹³ This dialogicity of utterances in the sense of being reactions to what has been said and to what will be said becomes evident with the different kinds of incorporation of foreign speech, i.e. "*речь в речи, высказывание в высказывании, но в то же время [...] речь о речи, высказывание о высказывании*" ('speech within speech, utterance within utterance, and at the same time speech about speech, utterance about utterance'; Voloshinov 1993 [1929]: 125).

¹³ That this is no contradiction will become evident with the analysis of parentheticals in section 5.

The concept of utterances as reacting and incorporating reactions opens an interesting perspective on the analysis of paranthenicals. This perspective will be dealt with in a semiotic framework, the main assumptions of which are outlined in the following section.

4. The semiotic foundation: Peirce’s triadic conception of the sign

Peirce’s concept of signs and the sign process provides a theoretic framework for the dialogicity of signs and the properties of utterances outlined in section 3.2. He defines the sign as consisting of a representamen, an object and an interpretant which is itself a sign representamen, referring again to an object and bringing about an interpretant, and so forth.

Crucially, all relations constituting the sign are to be treated on an equal level, there is no way of reducing this triadic relation into dyadic relations. The object-relation can be said to roughly correspond to the meaning of the sign as an element of a certain language. The interpretant-relation as the effect in an interpreting mind contributes the kind of meaning language users ascribe to the sign, based on the object relation. There may thus be various interpretant-relations, the decisive point being that the interpretant relates to the same object as the sign representamen (Fig. 1).¹⁴




Figure 1. Various possible interpretant relations

¹⁴ This kind of representation is taken from Kockelman 2005.

It is important that the interpretant does not merely refer to the object the representamen refers to, but also to that very relation between representamen and object. In the course of semiosis, the interpretant turns into a representamen R_2 for the sign process to continue. As R_2 for the follow-up semiosis, it takes the relation $R-O$ as object O_2 (Fig.2).




Figure 2: Interpretant I as representamen R_2 with object O_2

In this way, the interpretant becomes more and more definite in the course of the sign process, as is emphasised, e.g., in Peirce’s MS 517 (323f). If the object of I/R_2 were not ‘more’ than R ’s object on the prior level, semiosis would not continue but collapse into a circle (cf. also Schönrich 1999).

The idea that the interpretant is an improved symbol captures Bahtin’s assumption of utterances presupposing prior utterances, referring not only to a specific topic, but also to what has been said about this topic before. The fact that every sign needs to bring about an interpretant, which then turns into a representamen and so forth, captures the addressivity of the sign. Dialogicity in both directions is thus a consequence of the triadic nature of signs and the process of semiosis.

Jakobson’s E_s and E_n are incorporated in this sign concept via R and O . The sign representamen as the material part of the triadic relation corresponds to the speech event E_s . This representamen refers

to an object, the narrated matter *En*. The relation between both is established and represented by the interpretant. This interpretant turns into a representamen, which is here captured as *Es₂*, but which may equally well consist in some other effect (e.g. some kind of non-verbal action; Fig. 3).




Figure 3. Incorporation of *En* and *Es*

The Peircean concept of the sign process thus integrates *Es* and *En* as different, but at the same time intimately interconnected, entities. The relation between the two is indexical — and it has to be indexical. Otherwise, according to Peirce’s system of universal categories, the object relation of *R* would be a mere possibility or a strict necessity and hence in neither case actually existing. Since *Es* and *En* cannot be but connected by an indexical relation, indexical reference to *Es* is not a characteristic feature of shifters — the underlying speech event and the indexical relation to the narrated matter are ubiquitously present.¹⁵ Still, *Es* and *En* may be separately referred to, but this reference has to happen from an outside position, occupied, for instance, by a parentetical (cf. section 5).

¹⁵ Therefore, ‘subjectivity’ understood as the utterance’s reference to the speaker, is a tautological notion (cf. also Hinrichs 1983: 16, Sonnenhauser 2008).

Within Peirce's semiotic, there is no need to postulate a pre-established code. Instead of being given in advance, both the object and the interpretant relation are formed and stabilised by means of habits, eventually giving rise to certain expectations. Both habits and expectations arise with language use, and do not in any way exist outside or prior to it. Therefore, Jakobson's (1971 [1960a]: 573) definition of interlocutors as "actual users of one and the same linguistic code encompassing the same legisigns" is based on a misapprehension of Peirce's sign conception. This gets even more obvious facing Peirce's definition of legisign as a specific characterisation of the representamen. The notion of legisign does not say anything about the sign's object- and interpretant-relation. Moreover, speaking of a code encompassing legisigns, Jakobson seems to consider the signans-signatum dichotomy equivalent either to the representamen-object relation or to the representamen-interpretant relation (as in his adaptation of Peirce's icon, index and symbol). This is problematic in both cases, since Peirce's triadic sign may not be reduced to dyadic relations.

Indexical relations are of central importance for utterances. Within an utterance, indices serve a double function: external indices establish a relation to the utterance's situational object(s), internal indices establish the utterance's internal structure ('token-syntax', cf. Pape 2000) reflecting the structure of the situational object(s). The significance of indexical relations is elaborated, e.g., in MS 517 (309f), where Peirce emphasises that terms alone do not have any meaning. This corresponds to Voloshinov's and Bahtin's claim concerning the neutrality of words as elements of the lexicon (cf. section 3.2). Terms need to be turned into indices, i.e. be used in an actual utterance where they are related to their objects (external indexicality). The same holds for combinations such as *Socrates wise*, or *Socrates* and *is wise*, which do not have a meaning "unless there is something to indicate that they are to be taken as signs of the same object" (MS 517: 310). Included in this internal index is an icon mirroring the structure of the overall object of *Socrates is wise* (MS 517: 310).

Both external and internal indexical relations will prove important for the question of how parenthetical use of linguistic expressions can be recognised.

5. Parentheticals as indices

According to Voloshinov and Bahtin, addressivity is the basis for the dialogicity of signs and utterances, i.e. for their active relation to other signs and utterances (Bahtin 2000: 297). Addressivity manifests itself not only between two or more utterances, but also within one single utterance, namely in the incorporation of foreign speech, which is achieved not only on the thematic plane, but also signalled by syntactic means (Voloshinov 1993 [1929]: 120–134).

Relating two utterances, parentheticals exhibit a phenomenon similar to the incorporation of foreign speech. There are, however, crucial differences. Contrary to the incorporation of foreign speech by syntactic means, parentheticals incorporate ‘own’ speech, and do this without overt lexical or syntactic means. Parentheticals are not speech within speech, but speech about speech (*речь о речи*, cf. section 3.2). Both ‘speech’ and ‘speech about’ belong to one and the same speaking subject, but are located on separate levels, hence making one’s own speech, or part of it, the object of evaluation (Voloshinov 1993 [1929]: 122). In this case, a transfer of attention takes place — the speaker focuses on the speech itself, not on its topic. Voloshinov (1993 [1929]: 122) takes this change of direction to be triggered by the interests, i.e. reactions, of the hearer.¹⁶

Along these lines, parentheticals can be regarded as reactions to the hearer’s reactions. These reactions, however, are not overtly expressed, but implied by the parenthetical. Since one utterance may trigger various reactions — questions, doubts, amendments, etc. — there are various possible relations between the parenthetical and the implied

¹⁶ Note that this reaction does not imply the existence of two different speaking subjects. The ‘speaker’ is at every time also a ‘hearer’ and vice versa, cf. section 3.2.

reaction on the one hand, and the parenthetical and the utterance on the other hand (on the problem of this later kind of relations cf., e.g., Asher 2000). The difficulty of pinning down these relations is reflected in the traditional accounts that have tried to define parentheticals in terms of these relations, which has led, however, to mere listing of individual cases (like the illustrative examples in e.g. Vinogradov 1960 for Russian, or Penchev 1966 for Bulgarian).

Before turning to the functioning of parentheticals, the question of identification has to be clarified. Even though there is nothing inherent in parentheticals tagging them as a parenthetical, and even though neither intonation nor syntax unambiguously mark parentheticals, it is still possible to recognise the parenthetical use of specific expressions. It is the function of indices and the establishment of habits and expectations that play a crucial role in this.

As has been pointed out, the process of semiosis leads to the establishment of habits which in turn lead to the establishment of expectations. Expectations may be fulfilled, or they may be contradicted. If the latter is the case, a surprising fact is detected, which starts off a process of abductive reasoning. Abductive reasoning consists in a search for hypotheses based on which the surprising fact can be accounted for. In the case of parentheticals, the habits — and hence expectations — established concern the internal and external indices of utterances. With the internal token-syntax being disrupted by a parenthetical construction, these expectations are contradicted, cf. (8):

- (8) Вышедшие в финал кандидаты радикал-националист Томислав Николич и действующий президент либерал Борис Тадић идут [...] ноздря в ноздю. (Izvestija, 1-24-2008; modified by B.S.)

‘The candidates who made it to the final the radical-nationalist Tomislav Nikolić and the sitting president, the liberal Boris Tadić are racing neck to neck.’

Perceiving the utterance in (8), the recipient most probably stumbles across the expression *радикал-националист Томислав Николич и*

действующий президент либерал Борис Тадић ('the radical-nationalist Tomislav Nikolić and the sitting president, the liberal Boris Tadić') which does not quite fit into the overall structure. Since the token-syntax iconically mirrors the structure of the external object, the disruption has also consequences for the external relation of the utterance: the object of this expression is not part of the overall object referred to by the utterance.

The fact that this part of the utterance is related to the rest of the utterance in some other way than expected, is reflected in written discourse by graphic marking (dashes, brackets, or commas) displacing the parenthetical from the rest:

(8') Вышедшие в финал кандидаты — **радикал-националист Томислав Николич и действующий президент либерал Борис Тадић** — идут, что называется, ноздря в ноздю. (Izvestija, 1-24-2008)

'The candidates who made it to the final — **the radical-nationalist Tomislav Nikolić and the sitting president, the liberal Boris Tadić** — are racing neck to neck.'

In oral discourse, pauses help to mark this deviation, but not in a consistent and reliable way.¹⁷ However, intonation does seem to play some role at least. Grenoble (2004: 1961) finds an intonation contour specific for parentheticals, based on the phonetic analysis of examples such as (9), where the part in italics is intonationally set apart:

(9) А он уже сдал специальность

В да?

А специальность он уже сдал причем знаете как сдают=
 =я тоже думала что он будет финский сдавать
 а вопросыки у него были такие // [sighs]

¹⁷ Hofmann (1998) points out that especially the pause at the end of the parenthetical may very well be missing. Moreover, pauses at certain times are necessary in speaking, and hence do not in every case indicate parenthetical use.

лексика финно-угорских языков заимствование исконное

A 'He's already taken his major area exam.'

B 'Yes?'

A 'He's taken his major area exam, and moreover, do you know how they take them?

'=I had also thought he would take a Finnish exam=

and the questions he had were like this // [sighs]

the Finno-Ugric languages' lexicon's older borrowing'

Disambiguation is necessary especially with adverbs which can either be used parenthetically or can be integrated into the internal token-syntax.¹⁸ Hence, their intended non-integration has to be signalled. In written discourse, this is achieved by means of punctuation (on the disambiguating function of punctuation cf. also Krause 2007: 80)¹⁹, cf. (10), in oral discourse by means of longer than usual pauses, cf. (11) (pauses are indicated by diagonal dashes).

(10) a. На самолет [...] **конечно** опоздала (2-19-2008)

'To the plane, I was **certainly** late.'

b. он, **конечно**, опоздал на час (2-10-2008)

'he was, **of course**, one hour late'

(11) a. Вы **наверное** имели в виду Горбачева / а не Ельцина. (2-10-2008)

'You **probably** had Gorbachev in mind / not El'tsin.'

b. И всё это / **наверное** / специально и делается к этому. (2-10-2008)

'And all that / **probably** / happens specially to that.'

¹⁸ Schwyzer (1939: 40) sketches a process of weakening of short parenthetical sentences to adverbial elements, with the decisive factor being the suppression of pauses previously having framed such short parentheticals.

¹⁹ Punctuation does not necessarily reflect prosodic characteristics (Krause 2007: 80).

In (10a) and (11a), *конечно* ('certainly') and *наверное* ('probably') serve to modify *опоздала* ('was late') and *имели* ('had'), whereas in (10b) and (11b), they are not integrated into the sentence structure, i.e. used parenthetically. This confirms Hinrichs' (1983: 19) assumption that there is nothing inherent in expressions like *конечно* or *наверное* marking them as parenthetical. If parenthetical use (i.e. non-integration in the internal token-syntax) is intended, this needs to be marked.

The surprising fact arising from the part not fitting the expectations, needs to be explained by a hypothesis. One possible hypothesis is provided by the assumption that the part not fitting the internal structure takes the utterances as its object (the semiotic justification will be given in section 6). Hinrichs (1983: 21) points out that the means such as pauses or intonation — in written discourse, commas, dashes etc. — serve to signal 'otherness', and hence 'deviation'. This in turn causes the inference of reference to the speech event ("*Sagenhandlungsreferenz*"; Hinrichs 1983: 21), or to the narrated matter. That is, a transfer of attention takes place from the topic of the utterance (its object indicated by external indices) to the utterance itself. Since this inference is based on abduction, it does not have to happen or may be overridden by other assumptions — hence the varying judgments across speakers concerning the degree of syntactic integration.

Converting the direction of reference, the parenthetically used expressions take the utterance as an object, which contradicts the assumption of parentheticals being embedded in some host sentence. Since every utterance consists of both *Es* and *En*, there are two aspects that may be targeted by a parenthetical. Furthermore, like every indexical relation, the relation between a parenthetical and an utterance may be of two kinds: degenerate or genuine. Degenerate indices, such as demonstratives or proper names, do not involve an iconic component and stand directly for their object. Genuine indices, such as the deictic *I*, *here*, *now*, or definite descriptions, include an iconic component and thus deliver additional information (for the connection between the iconic component and informativity cf. Atkin 2005). This distinction grasps Grenoble's (2004) distinction of procedural parentheticals delivering mere processing instructions, and

conceptual parentheticals delivering additional information about their object.

Hinrichs' and Grenoble's accounts thus capture each one an important aspect concerning the function of parentheticals: the object of the indexical relation (*Es* or *En*) and the informativity of this relation (degenerate or genuine). The cross-classification of these parameters delivers four possible general types of parentheticals (cf. Table 1), which are based merely on functional characteristics. Each of these types in turn allows for a range of specific interpretations of the parenthetical relation. Reference to *Es* comprises Hinrich's reference to the speech event, and Grenoble's shifts of time, space and person. Reference to *En* corresponds to Hinrich's incorporation of another discourse and Grenoble's shift away from the main discourse topic. Parentheticals may either simply refer to *Es* (degenerate) or provide also additional information about it (genuine). The combination 'reference to *En*, degenerate index', marked with '∅' in Table 1, corresponds to what Grenoble (2004: 1972) calls a procedural shift away from the discourse topic, a possibility which she excludes.

Table 1. Types of parentheticals

		indexical relation to	
		<i>Es</i>	<i>En</i>
informativity	degenerate	А иначе, понимаешь , село рухнет. (10-5-2007) 'But otherwise, you see , the village will collapse.'	∅
	genuine	У меня — теперь признаюсь — опускались руки. (2-4-2008) 'I have — now I admit it — lost my courage.'	Хореографами — как художниками и композиторами — рождаются, а не становятся. (<i>Izvestija</i> , 1-20-2008) 'Choreographers — just like artists and composers — are born, and not made.'

Note that this cross-classification is not meant to imply that every parenthetically used expression is unambiguously classifiable into one of these four types. That this can hardly be the case follows from the fact that *Es* and *En* are intimately tied to each other as integral parts of a sign.

A further question to be clarified concerns the underlying cause for this change of direction, i.e. the justification for the insertion of a parenthetical construction. Voloshinov (1993 [1929]: 122) points out that the change of direction is triggered by the interests of the hearer. It is with respect to these interests of the hearer, or his reactions, respectively, that an utterance is constructed. Parentheticals thus can be regarded as being triggered by anticipated reactions to the current utterance concerning the speech event or the narrated event. The exact nature of these reactions can only be tentatively reconstructed relying on the parenthetical. Similarly, the domain of the parenthetical can be determined only after the reaction has been inferred. Here it is crucial to emphasise once again that the boundaries of an utterance do by no means coincide with sentence boundaries, but are determined by the possibility of being answered (cf. section 3.2). Hence, a parenthetical may very well refer to linguistic entities such as paragraphs or texts (cf. Hinrichs 1983: 21; Voloshinov 1993 [1929]: 122).

Reactions to utterance concern *Es* or *En*, and thus trigger respective answers manifesting themselves as parentheticals indicating *Es* or *En*. Reactions and parentheticals referring to *Es* may concern the speech event as such (including speaker and hearer, who are not categorically separate entities) or the evaluative component, which is present in every utterance (cf. section 3.2). This latter fact is confirmed also by experimental data gained by Krause (2007), showing that evaluation is independent of the presence of lexical means. The parenthetical constructions in (12) refer to the speech event and its participants, those in (13) to the evaluative component:

- (12) a. Но, **повторяю**, мы сейчас говорим о политике. (*Nezavisimaja Gazeta*, 1-23-2008)
 ‘But, **I repeat**, we are now talking about politics.’

- b. На фестивале, – **вы наверное обратили внимание**, — были совсем малыши. (2-10-2008)
 ‘At the festival — **you probably noticed it** — were entirely young kids.’

(13) a. В конце своей речи Рюккер, **правда**, признал, что [...].
 (*Pravda*, 1-22-2008)

‘**True**, at the end of his speech, Rucker admitted, that [...].’

- b. \$1 000 000 — это, **конечно**, не подарок. (10-5-2007)
 ‘\$1 000 000 — this is, **of course**, not a present.’

These examples show that reference to the speech event is carried out not just by a closed class of rather fixed expressions, but allows for considerable variation. This variation is, however, by far greater in case of parentheticals referring to *En*, cf. (14):

(14) a. Однажды к нам приехал неординарный парень — **Кристофер Уилдон** — англичанин, работающий в New York City Ballet. (*Izvestija*, 1-20-2008)

‘One day an exceptional guy — **Christopher Wildon** — came to us, an Englishman, working at the New York City Ballet.’

- b. Любой морж [...] знает, что какая бы температура воздуха ни была, вода даже при минусовой температуре (**соленая вода не замерзает при нуле**) все равно окажет согревающее воздействие. (*Nezavisimaja Gazeta*, 1-28-2008)

‘Every winter bather knows that regardless of the air temperature, water still exhibits a heating effect even with minus temperatures (**saltwater does not freeze at zero degree Celsius**).’

- c. Говорить надо не о том, нужно изучать Луну или нет, — **ответ, да, безусловно нужно**, — а о способах ее исследования. (*Nezavisimaja Gazeta* 1-23-2008)

‘We do not need to discuss whether it is necessary to study the Moon or not, — **the answer is, yes, of course, it is necessary**, — but the methods of its investigation.’

- d. На втором этапе — **и об этом подписано межагентское соглашение между Роскосмосом и Индийской организацией космических исследований** — планируется совместная экспедиция на поверхность Луны. (*Nezavisimaja Gazeta*, 1-23-2008)

‘At the second stage — **and an agreement has been signed about this between the Russian and the Indian organisations of cosmic research** — a joint expedition to the surface of the Moon is being planned.’

The parenthetical in (14a) provides an answer to an anticipated question concerning the name of that *неординарный парень* (‘exceptional guy’); that in (14b) to a question concerning the physical properties of water. (14c) is interesting since the answering character of the parenthetical is made explicit also by lexical means. The parenthetical in (14d) reacts to possible objections concerning the plan of a joint expedition to the surface of the Moon. In all these examples, the indexical relation includes also additional information. This follows from the assumption of the parenthetical providing an answer to some reaction concerning the narrated matter as such. It is hard to imagine that such an answer would provide no additional information about its object *En*.

Actually, even with respect to parentheticals referring to *Es*, it is not that easy to find mere degenerate, or procedural, cases. One instance of such a degenerate index is illustrated in (15), which is an excerpt from an interview. Even though the addressee does not change in this passage, the form of addressing in the parenthetically used expressions varies — the familiar form, i.e. second person singular, in one case, and the polite form, i.e. second person plural, in the other. This points out that in this specific parenthetic use, lexically provided information plays only a minor role, if it plays a role at all:

- (15) Они говорят / **знаешь** / вот / ээ / детская больница / которая напротив / потому что через дорогу / ээ / она всё это скупила / ээ / они снесли эти дома и построили какие-то /

ээ / корпуса. И когда они мне это сказали / **вы знаете** / я так расстроился / что я плакал хороших полчаса. (2-10-2008)
 ‘He says / **you know** (2nd sg) / well / [...] And when they told me about that / **you know** (2nd pl) / I got so angry [...].’

Having introduced reactions to the utterance as the decisive factor triggering parentheticals, this assumption needs to be justified also on theoretic grounds. Moreover, it needs to be clarified, how these reactions can be integrated into the overall communication processes modelled in sign theoretic terms.

6. Semiotic embedding

In this section, the analysis of parentheticals elaborated above will be embedded into the Peircean framework outlined in section 4. This framework allows for an integrated account of the relation between the parenthetical and the utterance, covering also the implied reactions triggering the parenthetical. Moreover, the variability in interpreting this relation can be given a straightforward explanation. Figures 4 to 7 illustrate the argumentation step by step.

The speech event *Es* as the representamen *R* of the sign triad refers to some narrated event *En* as its object *O*. At the same time, *Es* brings about an interpretant *I* as its effect, or reaction, which is related to the same object, cf. Figure 4.




Figure 4. Interpretant *I* as reaction

In the course of the sign process, the interpretant of the first level turns into the representamen R_2 for the next step of semiosis. Since the interpretant is not merely related to O , but also to the relation between R and O , its object is more specific than the object of the first level (cf. section 4): the object of R_2 is the relation $R - O$, or $Es - En$, respectively. This R_2 not only refers to O_2 , but again brings about an interpretant, I_2 , standing in the same relation to that same object O_2 , cf. Figure 5.




Figure 5. Interpretant I_2 as reaction

And again, for the process of semiosis to continue, I_2 turns into a representamen, R_3 . In this specific case, R_3 corresponds to a parentetical. That is, it is physically manifest — contrary to the reaction R_2 . This is indicated by the dotted lines in Figure 6, showing that both R_2 's object and interpretant relation remain implicit. R_3 's object is again more specific than that of the previous stage — O_3 consists in the relation of R_2 and O_2 (i.e. $Es - En$):




Figure 6. Representamen R3 as parenthetical

Just like any other representamen, the parenthetical not only has an object (O3), but brings about an interpretant I3, standing in a relation to the same object. In that way, I3 establishes the relation between the parenthetical and the utterance, cf. Figure 7:




Figure 7. Interpretant I3 as a relation between the parenthetical and the utterance

The bold face lines indicate the relations brought about by the overtly present material. As can be seen, the parenthetical relates to both the implicit reaction and the utterance. As *I*₂, brought about by the reaction *R*₂, it relates to the relation between *E*_s and *E*_n, i.e. the utterance (= *O*₂). As *I*₂/*R*₃, it has a more specific object, namely the relation of *R*₂ to the utterance (= *O*₃). In that way, the implicit reaction *I*/*R*₂ is brought in, as well as *R*₂'s relation to the utterance on the one hand, and to the parenthetical on the other (indicated by the dotted lines). This illustrates how the parenthetical refers back (to *O*₃) by implying a reaction to either *E*_s or *E*_n, and at the same time provides a reaction (*I*₃) to that implicit reaction.

The relation between the parenthetical and the utterance is established by the interpretant *I*₃. Since there may be various such interpretants, there may also be various such relations, e.g., explanations, comments, amendments, etc. What remains the same for all these possible relations is the object referred to, namely *O*₃.

Having developed the argument so far, it is now possible to explain the assumption of an implied reaction, the presence of the parenthetical, and for the conversion of the direction of reference. Since the reaction *R*₂/*I* and its relations to *O*₂ and *R*₃/*I*₂ (the parenthetical) remain implicit, it seems at first sight as if the parenthetical comes from somewhere out of space — a quite surprising fact. This surprising fact can be given an explanation by abductively inferring a triggering factor based on which the presence of the parenthetical follows straightforwardly. The most plausible triggering factor is some kind of reaction to the utterance — the implied reaction is inferred by abductive reasoning. Based on this assumption, several other factors can be accounted for. Despite the general variability displayed by parentheticals, there are restrictions concerning content and domain of application. These restrictions are determined by the specific kind of reaction that is inferred. The *prima facie* reversion of the direction of reference is a reversion only from the perspective of the current utterance — from perspective of the inferred anticipated reaction, there is no reversion, the sign process proceeds in its usual way.

This semiotic analysis thus illustrates how the parenthetical and the utterance constitute one complex sign: the parenthetical as a representamen refers to the utterance as its object, bringing about an interpretant relating both. This interpretant not only represents the indexical relation between the parenthetical and the utterance, but also iconically mirrors the complex relations inherent in this complex sign.

7. Final remarks

Based on the semiotic analysis elaborated in this paper, the function of parentheticals as relating different discourses can be derived from the dialogicity of signs and utterances.²⁰ It is this inherent dialogicity that can be identified as the more basic and comprehensive phenomenon of language that Schwyzer (1939) assumes parentheticals to be a part of (cf. section 1).

Parentheticals prove to be the central means to render explicit this inherent dialogicity. Anticipating reactions to the current utterance and at the same time reacting to these anticipated reactions by elaborating on one specific aspect of the current utterance, parentheticals illustrate how a speaking subject simultaneously acts as an addressee.

Implying some kind of reaction, parentheticals at the same time imply a change in the speaking subject, and hence indicate completeness and answerability of the utterance. Since both factors serve to

²⁰ The semiotic analysis of parentheticals proposed here is interesting also in other respects, such as the question of subjectivity and its linguistic expression. Two main assumptions concerning the linguistic expression of subjectivity are ruled out by the analysis presented: the assumption of subjectivity being related to a speaker, and the assumption of subjectivity being expressed by the lexical content of certain words. Taking the inherent dialogicity of utterances seriously allows for another view on subjectivity — one that is based on, and emerges from, the difference between ‘self’ and ‘other’. Since parentheticals make explicit both and bridge the difference by means of their interpretants, they can be said to reveal subjectivity as necessary consequence of the sign process (cf. Sonnenhauser 2008).

mark the boundary of an utterance, parentheticals can be said to anticipate the boundary of the utterance they take as objects. From the perspective of the current utterance, therefore, the parenthetical refers to the subsequent sign process. From the perspective of the parenthetical, this ‘future’ reaction is already past — in this sense, parentheticals synchronously encode both directions into which an utterance is embedded.

It is exactly this multi-dimensionality of the complex sign consisting of a ‘host’ and a parenthetical, that is so hard to capture for linguistic approaches which consider the linear precedence as the central principle for the organisation of language.

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Вставные конструкции и диалогичность знаков

Понятие «вставное предложение» используется для бесконечного числа разных явлений языка, у которых одна общая черта: их используют в качестве вставных внутри текста. В действительности, все же, не совсем ясно, что означает использование вставного предложения как в синтаксическом, так и в семантическом аспекте.

Учитывая, что большинство главных предложений, если не все, являются сами синтаксическими и семантическими единствами, возникает вопрос: какого типа информацию прибавляет вставное предложение в общую структуру?

Настоящая статья пытается объяснить основные функции вставных предложений путем их семиотического анализа. Этот семиотический анализ не призван заменить лингвистический подход (лингвистическую библиографию о вставных предложениях можно найти по адресу <http://userpage.fu-berlin.de/~ndehe/bibl/parentheticals.html>), а предназначен для объяснения того, почему лингвистический анализ вставных конструкций столь сложен. Статья исходит из динамического понятия знака и знаковых процессов (по следам

Пирса, Волошинова и Бахтина) и утверждает, что именно во вставных предложениях выражается внутренняя диалогичность знаков и высказываний. Лингвистические анализы, основной предпосылкой которых является двухмерная линейность языка, почти никогда не учитывают эту диалогичность.

Kiillaused ja märkide dialoogilisus

Mõistet “kiillaused” kasutatakse lõputu hulga erinevate keelenähtuste kohta, millel on ainult üks ühine joon: neid kasutatakse kiiluna teksti sees. Kiillaused all peetakse tavaliselt silmas mingisse pealauseesse vahele kiilutud teksti. Tegelikult on siiski ebaselge, mida kiillaused kasutus tähendab nii süntaktilisest kui semantilisest aspektist.

Arvestades, et enamus pealauseid, kui mitte kõik, on ka ise süntaktiliselt ja semantiliselt terviklikud, kerkib küsimus, mis sorti informatsiooni kiillaused üldisele struktuurile lisab? Teine analüüsiteema puudutab kiillaused ja pealause suhet (selgitus, küsimus jne) ning seda, mis neid kahte koos hoiab.

Käesolev artikkel üritab kiillausete põhifunktsioone selgitada nende semiootilise analüüsi abil. Siinse semiootilise analüüsi mõte ei ole asendada keeleteaduslikke lähenemisi (keeleteadusliku bibliograafia kiillausete kohta leiate aadressilt <http://userpage.fu-berlin.de/~ndehe/bibl/parentheticals.html>), vaid selgitada, miks on kiillausete keeleteaduslik analüüs nii keeruline. Käesolev artikkel lähtub dünaamilisest märgi- ja märgiprotsesside mõistest (Peirce'i, Voloshinovi ja Bahtini järgedes) ning väidab, et just kiillausetes väljendub märkide ja lausungite sisemine dialoogilisus. Keeleteaduslikud analüüsid aga, mille üheks põhieelduseks on keele kahemõõtmeline lineaarsus, ei võta seda sisemist dialoogilisust peaaegu kunagi arvesse.