

# LIVONIAN-DANISH RELATIONS IN THE FIRST HALF OF THE 16TH CENTURY

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The first half of the 16<sup>th</sup> century was a tumultuous period in north-eastern Europe, and also in relations between Livonian territories and Denmark. This period has earned only little special attention in studies of Livonian-Danish relations.<sup>1</sup> The current paper concentrates on political

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<sup>1</sup> Periods of Danish rule in Northern and Western Estonia in the 13<sup>th</sup> to 14<sup>th</sup> and 16<sup>th</sup> to 17<sup>th</sup> centuries have received much more attention than the first half of the 16<sup>th</sup> century, cf. Mihkel Mäesalu and Stefan Pajung, *Danish-Livonian Relations in the Middle Ages*, Studies from the Museum of National History at Frederiksborg 6 ([Hillerød]: Museum of National History at Frederiksborg, 2022); Mihkel Mäesalu and Stefan Pajung, “Not Just the Northern Crusades: History Writing on Danish Estonia and Danish-Livonian Relations in the Middle Ages”, *Forschungen zur baltischen Geschichte* 16 (2021), 125–144; *Denmark and Estonia 1219–2019 – selected studies on common relations*, ed. by Jens E. Olesen, Studien zur Geschichte der Ostseeregion, 1 (Greifswald: Universität Greifswald, 2019); Stefan Pajung, “Estonian Clergymen and Denmark during the Middle Ages”, *Collegium Medievale* 34 (2021), 167–202; Volker Seresse, *Des Königs ‘arme weit abgelegene Vntterthanen’: Oesel unter dänischer Herrschaft 1559/84–1613*, Kieler Werkstücke, 2 (Frankfurt am Main; New York: P. Lang, 1996). On the Livonian War see: William Mollerup, *Daenemark’s Beziehungen zu Livland vom Verkauf Estlands bis zur Auflösung des Ordensstaats (1346–1561)* (Berlin: Siemenroth, 1884); Knud Rasmussen, *Die Livländische Krise 1554–1561*, Studier, 1 (København: Københavns universitet, slavisk institut, 1973); Sven Tode, “Zu den Livlandbeziehungen Herzogs Adolfs von Schleswig-Holstein-Gottorf”, *Deutschland – Livland – Russland. Ihre Beziehungen vom 15. bis 17. Jahrhundert*, ed. by Norbert Angermann (Lüneburg: Verlag Nordostdeutsches Kulturwerk, 1988), 159–174. Some studies also focus on the 15<sup>th</sup> century: Juhan Vasar, *Taani püüded Eestimaa taasvallutamiseks 1411–1422* (Tartu: Mattiesen, 1930); Hain Rebas, *Infiltration och handel: studier i senmedeltida nordisk Balticumpolitik. 1, Tiden omkring 1440–1479* (Göteborg: Göteborgs universitet, 1976); Hain Rebas, *Sukeldumised: 16 etüüdi Läänemere ruumi ajaloost* (Tartu; Tallinn; Göteborg: Eesti Üliõpilaste Seltsi Kirjastus, 2022); Mihkel Mäesalu, “The Communication of the Master of the Livonian Branch of the Teutonic Order with the King of Denmark and the Grand Duke of Lithuania during the 15th century”, *Ordines Militares Colloquia Torunensia Historica. Yearbook for the Study of the Military Orders* 26 (2021), 139–177. An exception that discusses relations with the town of Tallinn between 1510 and 1561: Alfred Ritscher, *Reval an der Schwelle zur Neuzeit. Teil 1: Vom Vorabend der Reformation bis zum Tode Wolters von Plattenberg (1510–1535)*, Historische Forschungen (Bonn: Kulturstiftung der deutschen

communication between Livonia and Denmark before that time, namely from the 1510s to the 1540s, relying mostly on Livonian-related sources. Thus, a mostly Livonian perspective is presented here. The main attention is on the following questions: what kind of relations did Danes and Livonians have; who were the main correspondents and what were the main topics discussed in the correspondence; which role did Denmark play in Livonian political affairs; and also, how was Denmark perceived by Livonians – was Denmark seen or depicted as an important and benevolent ally, or a threatening foreign power like the Grand Duchy of Moscow,<sup>2</sup> or perhaps a distant realm that did not play any significant part at all?

The sources on Livonian–Danish relations from the first half of the 16<sup>th</sup> century are mostly unpublished. Some of them have been published by Lars Sjödin in *Handlingar till Nordens historia*.<sup>3</sup> Summaries (*regesta*) of documents pertaining to the contacts of Margrave Wilhelm of Brandenburg-Ansbach, the coadjutor (1530–1539) and last Archbishop of Riga (r. 1539–1563), and his allies with Denmark are available in *Herzog Albrecht von Preussen und Livland* for the years 1525–1570.<sup>4</sup> Numerous unpublished

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Vertriebenen, 1998), 37–62; Alfred Ritscher, *Reval an der Schwelle zur Neuzeit. Teil 2: Vom Tode Wolters von Plettenberg bis zum Untergang des Deutschen Ordens in Livland (1535–1561)*, Historische Forschungen (Bonn: Kulturstiftung der deutschen Vertriebenen, 2001), 15–27. As another exception, I have discussed interplays of Livonian and Danish internal conflicts in both regions in the 1530s: Madis Maasing, “Saare-Lääne vaenus ja Krahvivaenus”, *Läänemaa Muuseumi toimetised* 19 (2016), 67–96.

<sup>2</sup> On Livonian rhetoric regarding the Russian threat see Anti Selart, “Political Rhetoric and the Edges of Christianity: Livonia and its Evil Enemies in the Fifteenth Century”, *The Edges of the Medieval World*, ed. by Juhan Kreem, Gerhard Jaritz, CEU Medievalia, 11 (Budapest: Central European University, 2009), 55–69; Madis Maasing, “Infidel Turks and Schismatic Russians in Late Medieval Livonia”, *Fear and Loathing in the North*, ed. by Cordelia Heß, Jonathan Adams (Berlin etc: de Gruyter, 2015), 347–388.

<sup>3</sup> *Handlingar till Nordens historia 1515–1523. I, 1515 – Juni 1518* (henceforth *Handlingar* 1), ed. by Lars Sjödin, *Historiska handlingar* 1 (Stockholm: Norstedt, 1967); *Handlingar till Nordens historia 1515–1523. II, juli 1518 – december 1519. 1, juli – december 1518*, ed. by Lars Sjödin, *Historiska handlingar* 2.1 (Stockholm: Norstedt, 1977); *Handlingar till Nordens historia 1515–1523. II, Juli 1518 – december 1519. 2, 1519* (henceforth *Handlingar* 2.2), ed. by Lars Sjödin, *Historiska handlingar* 2.2 (Stockholm: Norstedt, 1979); *Handlingar till Nordens historia 1515–1523. III, Januari–december 1520*, ed. by Lars Sjödin, *Historiska handlingar* 3 (Stockholm: Norstedt, 1979).

<sup>4</sup> The first three volumes of this seven-volume publication are used here: *Herzog Albrecht von Preussen und Livland (1525–1534): Regesten aus dem Herzoglichen Briefarchiv und den ostpreussischen Folianten* (henceforth HA 1), ed. by Ulrich Müller, Veröffentlichungen aus den Archiven Preussischer Kulturbesitz, 41 (Köln etc: Böhlau, 1996); *Herzog Albrecht von Preussen und Livland (1534–1540): Regesten aus dem Herzoglichen Briefarchiv und den ostpreussischen Folianten* (henceforth HA 2), ed. by Stefan Hartmann, Veröffentlichungen aus den Archiven Preussischer Kulturbesitz, 49 (Köln etc: Böhlau, 1999); *Herzog Albrecht von Preussen und Livland (1540–1551): Regesten aus dem Herzoglichen Briefarchiv und*

sources are in the archives around the Baltic Sea and have been used here to a certain degree.<sup>5</sup>

### *Livonian-Danish relations from the beginning of the 16<sup>th</sup> century to the beginning of the 1530s*

In the beginning of the 16<sup>th</sup> century, Livonian political powers, and especially the local branch of the Teutonic Order, probably had mixed feelings towards Denmark. During the 15<sup>th</sup> century, the Danish king had been an ally of the Order during the Thirteen-Year War in Prussia (1454–66), but that did not help the Order much against Poland, while it had burdened the Livonian branch with uncomfortable financial demands.<sup>6</sup> Additionally, Denmark had also intervened in the internal conflicts of the Bishopric of Osilia during the 1440s and 1460s, and had acted against the interests of the Order.<sup>7</sup> Nevertheless, the Order had hoped to win Denmark as an ally against the Grand Duchy of Moscow in the 1490s, but since King Hans (r.

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*den ostpreussischen Folianten* (henceforth HA 3), ed. by *ibid.*, Veröffentlichungen aus den Archiven Preussischer Kulturbesitz (Köln etc: Böhlau, 2002).

<sup>5</sup> The sources are mostly preserved in the following sub-collections of the German Chancellery, Foreign Division of the Danish State Archives (*Rigsarkivet, Tyske Kancelli – udenrigske afdeling*): Livland: Akter og dokumenter vedrørende det politiske forhold til Livland (1228–1560), URL: <https://www.sa.dk/ao-soegesider/en/other/index-creator/138/35775/19852677>; Livland: Breve, til dels med bilag, fra den Tyske Ordens landmestre i Livland til Christian III og Frederik II samt enkelte andre (1534–1562), URL: <https://www.sa.dk/ao-soegesider/en/other/index-creator/138/35775/19852669>; Livland: Breve, til dels med bilag, fra Wilhelm af Brandenburg, ærkebiskop af Riga, til Christian III og Frederik II samt enkelte andre (1533–1565), URL: <https://www.sa.dk/ao-soegesider/en/other/index-creator/138/35775/19852671>; Livland: Akter og dokumenter vedrørende godset Kolk (1527–1544), URL: <https://www.sa.dk/ao-soegesider/en/other/index-creator/138/35775/19852679>. Registrants of the Bishopric of Osilia are also available online: <https://www.ra.ee/dgs/explorer.php?tid=76&tbn=1&lev=yes&hash=039714814b4dcf4b0714e3a4fc3e734e> (accessed 12 July 2022). For Livonian sources from the 16<sup>th</sup> century in Prussian Privy State Archives (henceforth GStA PK): Madis Maasing, “Livonica aus dem Ersten Hälfte des 16. Jahrhunderts im Geheimen Staatsarchiv Preußischer Kulturbesitz. Ein Archivbericht”, *Forschungen zur baltischen Geschichte* 17 (2022), 1–26. For Swedish State Archives, see for example: Riksarkivet, Stockholm. Livonica I 1299–1621. A. Ordensmästarens arkiv. folders 30, 41 and 42. Danish-related materials in the Tallinn City Archives are used in Alfred Ritscher, *Reval an der Schwelle*, part 1–2.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. Mäesalu, “The Communication,” 152–156.

<sup>7</sup> On these conflicts and also the role of Denmark: Juhan Kreem, “Über die Streitigkeiten um den Bischofsstuhl von Ösel-Wiek im 15. Jahrhundert”, *Saare-Lääne piiskopkond: artiklid Lääne-Eesti keskajast = Bistum Ösel-Wiek: Artikelsammlung zum Mittelalter in Westestland*, ed. by Ülla Paras (Haapsalu: Läänemaa Muuseum, 2004), 245–255.

1481–1513) cooperated with Grand Prince Ivan III of Moscow (r. 1462–1505) against Sweden, these hopes were not fulfilled.<sup>8</sup>

Danish-Livonian relations did not improve greatly at the beginning of the 1510s either. In those years, Livonians grew wary of Danish naval campaigns on the Baltic Sea, which were directed against both Sweden and the Hanseatic League. Especially the clashes between Denmark and Lübeck at the beginning of the 1510s had given rise to fears that the Danes might treat Livonian Hanseatic towns as enemies, and some of Tallinn's ships were actually arrested in Denmark in 1510.<sup>9</sup> These events probably helped to revive the narrative of the Danish threat and especially the fear that the Danish king would want to reclaim Northern Estonia, which the king had possessed in 1219–1346 – except for the years 1227–38 when it was in the hands of the Livonian Brothers of the Sword – and sold to the Teutonic Order. In 1347, the Grand Master of the Order had delegated the administration of the region to the Master of the Teutonic Order in Livonia.<sup>10</sup> In the beginning of the 1510s, a conflict flared up between the influential nobleman Hermann Soye (d. 1516) and his fellow vassal Hans von Rosen. Soye sought support against Rosen from abroad, including Denmark. Rosen claimed that Soye tried to play Livonia into the hands of the Danish king. His accusations were taken seriously, as the Order imprisoned Soye and even sentenced him to death. Nevertheless, he was pardoned after he had promised not to seek any foreign aid for himself. Yet he broke this promise in 1514 as he allied himself with another ambitious Livonian nobleman: Dean Johannes Wetberg of Osilia, who aspired to Osilia's episcopal seat, and had become entangled in a conflict with the Livonian Master. In the same year, Soye and Wetberg fled from Livonia and tried to seek help from Denmark, Sweden, Poland-Lithuania, and the Papal Curia. They mostly attempted to gain support from the Curia, however, and after Soye's death, Wetberg fled to Sweden.<sup>11</sup>

<sup>8</sup> Mäesalu, "The Communication", esp. 156–158; Mollerup, *Daenemark's Beziehungen*, 29–34; Stefan Pajung, "The dream of a Baltic Empire? Danish efforts to reclaim Estonia 1346–1559", *Danish-Livonian relations in the Middle Ages*, 297–327 (316–319).

<sup>9</sup> Ritscher, *Reval and der Schwelle*, part 1, 37–38. In 1511, the City council of Tallinn ordered the repair of a part of town's wall, reportedly due to the threat from Danish privateers. *Die Quellen des Revaler Stadtrechts*. vol. 2, ed. by Friedrich Georg von Bunge (Dorpat: Kluge, 1847), 129–130.

<sup>10</sup> Juhan Kreem, *The Town and its Lord. Reval and the Teutonic Order (in the fifteenth century)*, Tallinna Linnaarhiivi Toimetised, 6 (Tallinn: Ilo, 2002), 28–31.

<sup>11</sup> About Soye: Hermann Zöge von Manteuffel and Eugen von Nottbeck, *Geschichte der Familie Zöge von Manteuffel ehstländischer Linie* (Reval: Wassermann, 1894), 26–35. On Wetberg: Madis Maasing, "Johannes Wetberg ja Saare-Lääne piiskopitool", *Läänemaa Muuseumi toimetised* 24 (2022), 89–117.

On the other hand, the Order and Denmark entered into a new alliance in the 1510s. Grand Master Albrecht, Margrave of Brandenburg-Ansbach (r. 1511–1525) desperately sought help against Poland, and as King Christian II (r. 1513–1523) sought to gain the support of the Order and also of all Livonian rulers for his attempts to conquer Sweden, he was ready to form the alliance. On other hand, he saw no substantial benefits to be gained from becoming directly involved in conflict with Poland, and thus the Order received minimal actual assistance.<sup>12</sup> The Livonian branch of the Order had to at least partially follow the Grand Master's policy, which meant that the Livonian Master had to seek good terms not only with the King of Denmark but also with the Grand Duke of Moscow, who had also become an ally of the Grand Master.<sup>13</sup> On the other hand, especially the town of Tallinn was on good terms with the Swedes and rather tended to support them.<sup>14</sup> But when the storm-stricken Danish flagship *Maria* – which had participated in Christian II's unsuccessful attempt to conquer Stockholm – arrived at Tallinn in the autumn of 1518, the town had to help with its repairs, as the Grand Master repeatedly urged the Livonians to aid the ship and its crew during the winter of 1518/1519.<sup>15</sup>

Yet a third topic in Danish-Livonian relations also gained prominence in the 1510s, namely the ownership of Kolga estate in Northern Estonia. The estate had already belonged to the Cistercian monastery of Roma (Ruma, also Gudvalla or Guthnalia) on Gotland probably since the 1220s. It had strategic importance, since it was the largest estate in the region and its manor house was also fortified as a small castle.<sup>16</sup> By 1511, the Cistercian hold

<sup>12</sup> Christian sent some provisions and allowed mercenaries to depart to Prussia. Kurt Forstreuter, "Die Preussische Kriegsflotte im 16. Jahrhundert", *Beiträge zur preussischen Geschichte im 15. und 16. Jahrhundert*, Studien zur Geschichte Preußens, 7 (Heidelberg: Quelle & Meyer, 1960), 73–164 (93–96); Sjödin, *Handlingar* 1, 821–837.

<sup>13</sup> Cf. Maike Sach, *Hochmeister und Großfürst: die Beziehungen zwischen dem Deutschen Orden in Preußen und dem Moskauer Staat um die Wende zur Neuzeit* (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2002). Relations between the Prussian and Livonian branches became increasingly complicated as their interests clearly diverged and the Prussian central branch became increasingly weaker since the 15<sup>th</sup> century. Johannes Götz, "Die Wahl des livländischen Meisters: Ein Indikator für das Verhältnis zwischen Zentrum und Provinz im Deutschen Orden", *Forschungen zur baltischen Geschichte* 14 (2019), 11–70 (46–52). Nevertheless, the Livonian branch supported the Grand Master in his war against Poland (1519–21), cf.: Maasing, "Livonica", 7–11.

<sup>14</sup> Ritscher, *Reval an der Schwelle*, part 1, 40–41, 44–47.

<sup>15</sup> On *Maria* in Tallinn, see the paper in this volume: Juhon Kreem, "The Royal Danish Ship *Maria* in Tallinn 1518–19", *Ajalooline Ajakiri* 2/3 (2022).

<sup>16</sup> Paul Johansen, *Die Estlandliste des Liber Census Daniae* (Reval: Wassermann, 1933), 368–70, 457, 784–785; Enn Tarvel, *Lahemaa ajalugu* (Tallinn: Eesti Raamat, 1983), 21–22, 39–44; Kersti Markus, "Misjonär või mõisnik? Tistertslaste roll 13. sajandi Eestis", *Acta*




Figure 1. Kolga manor, copy from an image from the travelogue of Anton Goeteer, beginning of 17<sup>th</sup> century. AM \_ 8519:2 F 14955, Eesti Ajaloomuseum SA, <http://www.muis.ee/museaalview/2353829>

over Kolga seems to have weakened. At the time, Knight Henning Passow (d. 1516) – a former captain of Swedish mercenaries as well as a vassal of the Order in Northern Estonia and also a burgher of Tallinn – resided in Kolga, at least temporarily.<sup>17</sup> Eight years later, the Cistercian Brother Val-

*Historica Tallinnensia* 14:1 (2009): 3–30, here 17–21. There is an engraving of the ruins of the medieval manor from 1615, which shows two stone houses (Figure 1). The bigger one had a round cannon tower, the smaller one a dansker. On the fortified manor: Ants Hein, *Stenhus'id, arx'id, torne'd: Eesti mõisaarhitektuuri vanim kihistus = Stenhus, arx, torne ...: die älteste Schicht der Gutshofarchitektur Estlands*, ed. by Heiki Valk, *Õpetatud Eesti Seltsi kirjad*, 11 (Tartu: Õpetatud Eesti Selts, 2016), 34–36; Villu Kadakas, Erki Russow, "Archaeological Studies on the Site of the Former Cistercian Grange Kolga", *Archaeological Fieldwork in Estonia. Arheoloogilised Välitööd Eestis* 2016 (2017), 131–146. The whole manorial complex was always called Kolga, but from 1488 to 1511, there are many sources where the main residence of Kolga's lands is called Purkulle/Purkul/Purkel. Cf. Johansen, *Die Estlandliste des Liber Censur Danicae*, 369–370; Tarvel, *Lahemaa ajalugu*, 41–42.

<sup>17</sup> *Est- und livländische Brieflade: Eine Sammlung von Urkunden zur Adels- und Gütergeschichte Est- und Livlands in Uebersetzungen und Auszügen. Erster Theil, Dänische und Ordenszeit. Erster Band*, ed. by Friedrich Georg von Bunge, Robert von Toll (Reval: Kluge und Stroehm, 1856), no. 748. On Passow: Juhan Kreem, *Ordu sügis. Saksa ordu 16. sajandi Liivimaal*, Tallinna Linnaarhiivi toimetised, 17 (Tallinn: Tallinna Linnaarhiiv, 2022), 157–158; Kadri-Rutt Hahn, *Revaler Testamente im 15. und 16. Jahrhundert*, Schriften

entin, who had been administrator of Kolga for at least a quarter of a century, complained that some time earlier, Swedish brigands had looted the lands of Kolga.<sup>18</sup> It remains unclear if the looting was somehow connected with Passow's stay in Kolga, but it was very probably connected with the fact that Kolga belonged to the monastery, which was situated in Danish-controlled Gotland.<sup>19</sup>

By that time, the Cistercians of Roma had probably decided to give up Kolga. In February of 1517, Bishop of Tallinn Johannes Blankenfeld (r. 1514–1525)<sup>20</sup> – who was also General Proctor of the Teutonic Order in Rome (1512–1519) – wrote to the King of Denmark and asked him for a favour. He said that the monastery of Roma had an estate and possessions in Livonia which were far from the monastery, but close to the Bishop's estates, and asked for the King's assistance to annex these possessions to the Bishopric of Tallinn.<sup>21</sup> Obtaining Kolga would have significantly enhanced the Bishop's position, since the Bishopric of Tallinn held only minor and scattered landholdings in Northern Estonia and had no princely powers – unlike other Livonian bishops.<sup>22</sup> Blankenfeld's patron, the Grand Master Albrecht, supported his plan. In 1519, Albrecht's ambassadors proposed to King Christian

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der Baltischen Historischen Kommission, 19 (Berlin: LIT, 2015), 647; Roland Seeberg-Elverfeldt, *Revaler Regesten. Bd. 3., Testamente Revaler Bürger und Einwohner aus den Jahren 1369 bis 1851* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1975), no. 113.

<sup>18</sup> Handlingar 2.2, no. 853. On Valentin, see also: *Est- und livländische Brieflade*, nos. 672, 748; *Liv-, Est- und Kurländisches Urkundenbuch*, part 2, vol. 1, ed. by Leonid Arbusow Sen. (Riga; Moskau: Deubner, 1900), nos. 457, 726, 896; *Liv-, Est- und Kurländisches Urkundenbuch*, part 2, vol. 2, ed. by Leonid Arbusow Sen. (Riga; Moskau: Deubner, 1905), no. 690.

<sup>19</sup> Ritscher, *Reval an der Schwelle*, part 1, 43.

<sup>20</sup> Blankenfeld later became Bishop of Tartu (1518–1527) and Archbishop of Riga (1524–1527). See Wilhelm Schnöring, *Johannes Blankenfeld: ein Lebensbild aus den Anfängen der Reformation* (Halle: Verein für Reformationgeschichte, 1905); Christiane Schuchard, "Johann Blankenfeld († 1527) – eine Karriere zwischen Berlin, Rom und Livland", *Berlin in Geschichte und Gegenwart* (2002), 27–56; Anti Selart, "Johann Blankenfeld und Russland", *Die baltischen Länder und Europa in der Frühen Neuzeit*, ed. by Norbert Angermann, Karsten Brüggemann, Inna Pölsam-Jürjo, Quellen und Studien zur baltischen Geschichte, 26 (Köln, etc.: Böhlau, 2015), 105–129.

<sup>21</sup> Rigsarkivet (henceforth: DRA), Livland: Akter og dokumenter vedrørende det politiske forhold til Livland (1228–1560), cadre 80. URL: <https://www.sa.dk/ao-soegesider/en/billedviser?epid=19852677#261326,48886855> (accessed 18 July 2022).

<sup>22</sup> On the Bishopric of Tallinn see Klaus Neitmann, "Bistümer Reval", *Die Bistümer des Heiligen Römischen Reiches von ihren Anfängen bis zur Säkularisation*, ed. by Erwin Gatz, Clemens Brodtkorb, Helmut Flachenecker (Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 2003), 614–622; Madis Maasing, "Alati mõjukate isandate tahte täitja? Tallinna piiskopi roll markkrahv Wilhelmi kirjavahetuses (1530–1561)", *Piiri peal. Võim, usk ja kirjasõna siin- ja sealpool Rootsi aega*, ed. by Katre Kaju, Rahvusarhiivi toimetised. Acta et Commentationes Archivi Nationalis Estoniae, 4 (Tartu: Rahvusarhiiv, 2021), 9–41.

II to exchange Kolga in return for his possessions in Skåne, and then to sell Kolga to Blankenfeld.<sup>23</sup> The King accepted the offer<sup>24</sup> and made a deal with the abbot and the monastery of Roma in the autumn of that same year, according to which the lands had to be exchanged by the summer of 1520.<sup>25</sup> However, the second phase of the plan was not executed and Kolga remained in the hands of the King. The main reason for this was probably the plain fact that Blankenfeld lacked financial resources. In 1518, he had also become the Bishop of Tartu, and to achieve this, he had borrowed 1,000 Hungarian guildens (or 3,000 Riga marks) from the Grand Master. Since the Grand Master launched his war against Poland (1519–21), he was unable to provide Blankenfeld with further financial support,<sup>26</sup> and it turned out that Blankenfeld was unable to repay this debt before his death (1527).<sup>27</sup>

The fact that strategically important Kolga remained in the hands of a powerful foreign ruler was certainly not in the interests of the Livonian branch of the Order. During the 1520s, the Livonian Master strengthened his position in Northern Estonia when he paid the Grand Master 24,000 Horngulden and took over all lordship rights in the area. This transfer was concluded in the beginning of 1525 – only months before Grand Master Albrecht secularised the Order's possessions in Prussia and became its first Lutheran Duke (r. 1525–1568).<sup>28</sup> In the meantime, the vicar of Christian II in Kolga had pawned the estate to Gert Simons, a merchant of Riga. Simons had already been in the service of the King in 1515, when he had tried to obtain sable furs from the Grand Duchy of Moscow for the Queen of Denmark. Simons's enterprise ultimately failed because he had violated

<sup>23</sup> Handlingar 2.2, no. 867.

<sup>24</sup> Handlingar 2.2, no. 939a.

<sup>25</sup> Handlingar 2.2, no. 1077.

<sup>26</sup> On the contrary, Albrecht attempted to gain support from Blankenfeld, but to no avail as the latter complained that his resources were meagre (cf. GStA PK, Ordensbriefarchiv, Nos. 22858, 23071, 23983, 24173, 24174, 24246, 24391, 24403, 24404, 24598, 24610, 24725, 24895, 24896, 24925, 24929, 24932, 24956, 25005, 25617, 25898, 26468; OF 46, f. 43r-v, 49r-v; Ordensfolianten 49, f. 34v-35v, p. 71; Das virtuelle Preußische Urkundenbuch. URL: <http://www.spaetmittelalter.uni-hamburg.de/Urkundenbuch/> (accessed 25 January 2023), DH 308, 310; Sjödin, Handlingar 2.2, Nos. 1481, 1535–1536, 1631, 1635, 1650).

<sup>27</sup> Blankenfeld's debt was discussed many times not only during his lifetime, but also after his death, when Margrave Albrecht demanded the money from Blankenfeld's successors in Riga and Tartu (HA 1, nos. 4, 10, 12, 13, 31–33, 143, 145, 160, 232, 333).

<sup>28</sup> Although the everyday administration of Northern Estonia was in the hands of the Livonian branch, the region's estates swore allegiance to the Grand Master, who had many opportunities to intervene in the affairs of the region. The Livonian branch had already been attempting to obtain the overlordship for itself since the middle of the 15<sup>th</sup> century: Juhan Kreem, *The Town and its Lord. Reval and the Teutonic Order (in the fifteenth century)*, Tallinna Linnaarhiivi toimetised, 6 (Tallinn: Ilo, 2002), 28–36.



the terms of Hanseatic trade and Tallinn confiscated his goods. This led to a conflict that lasted for years between the town and the merchant, during which Christian II supported Simons. The problem was not solved until 1524, when Simons was already dead and his patron had been deposed. Tallinn paid 1,000 Riga marks to the widow of Simons as compensation.<sup>29</sup> Interestingly, it was also in that same year when the Livonian branch of the Order agreed to pay the widow 10,000 marks to obtain the mortgage of Kolga and a house in the large castle of Tallinn (on Toompea).<sup>30</sup> Kolga's transfer into the hands of the Order was probably facilitated by the deposing of Christian II in 1523. The new king of Denmark Frederik I (r. 1523–1533), who had to focus on securing his rule, initially had hardly any opportunity to turn his attention to a distant fief.

Perhaps one of the most serious problems for Frederik was the fact that Emperor Charles V (r. 1519–1556), the brother-in-law of Christian II, considered the new king a usurper, and many German princes shared this view. Livonian rulers likewise tended to support the Emperor's viewpoint on that matter as Livonian connections with the Holy Roman Empire intensified and the Empire's affairs became increasingly relevant for Livonians.<sup>31</sup> But there was an additional reason for the Teutonic Order in Livonia not to accept Frederik I as the rightful king: in 1526, the former Grand Master, Duke Albrecht of Prussia, married Princess Dorothea, a daughter of the new Danish king. Albrecht was the principal adversary of the Order after 1525 and actively tried to undermine the Order's positions in Livonia.<sup>32</sup> Thus, the marriage alliance between two 'usurpers' was certainly seen

<sup>29</sup> Ritscher, *Reval and der Schwelle*, part 1, 41–43.

<sup>30</sup> *Livländische Güterurkunden (aus den Jahren 1501 bis 1545)*, vol. 2, ed. by Hermann von Bruiningk (Riga: Gulbis, 1923), no. 410.

<sup>31</sup> In 1521, all Livonian bishops became Imperial Princes (*Reichsfürsten*), and the Livonian Master followed suit probably in 1526, after which Livonians started participating in discussions and decision-making at Imperial Diets (*Reichstage*) and Imperial supreme courts: the Imperial Chamber Court (*Reichskammergericht*) and the Aulic Court (*Reichshofrat*). On Livonian-Imperial relations see: Mihkel Mäesalu, *Liivimaa ja Püha Rooma keisririik 1199–1486* (Tartu: Tartu Ülikool, 2017); Madis Maasing, "Livland und die Reichstage (1520–1555)", *Livland – eine Region am Ende der Welt? Forschungen zum Verhältnis zwischen Zentrum und Peripherie im späten Mittelalter. Livonia – a Region at the End of the World? Studies on the Relations between Centre and Periphery in the Later Middle Ages*, ed. by Anti Selart and Matthias Thumser, Quellen und Studien zur baltischen Geschichte, 27 (Köln, etc.: Böhlau, 2017), 283–312.

<sup>32</sup> Cf. Hans Quednau, *Livland im politischen Willen Herzog Albrechts von Preußen: ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des Herzogtums Preussen und des preussisch-livländischen Verhältnisses 1525–1540*, Deutschland und der Osten: Quellen und Forschungen zur Geschichte ihrer Beziehungen, 12 (Leipzig: Hirzel, 1939); Madis Maasing, "Die Reichstagsteilnahme des livländischen Deutschordenszweiges und seine Beziehungen mit dem deutschen

unfavourably by the Livonian branch: in 1526, the Livonian Master Wolter von Plettenberg (r. 1494–1535) called Frederik I ‘the Duke of Holstein who calls himself the King of Denmark’ in his instructions to his envoys to the Emperor and lamented over the aforementioned marriage of his daughter.<sup>33</sup> This marriage alliance did indeed have lasting effects on alliances in the Baltics, as Prussian-Danish cooperation also continued during the reign of Frederik’s son Christian III (1534–1559).<sup>34</sup>

In the mid-1520s, the Danish naval leader Sören Norby (d. 1530) further complicated the situation on the Baltic Sea. Norby had already led successful privateering warfare during the 1510s and in doing so, his ships had also plundered Livonian ships sailing to and from Sweden. Thus, especially the town of Tallinn developed a decidedly negative attitude towards him.<sup>35</sup> Norby was a staunch supporter of Christian II and his viceroy of Gotland, who continued to recognise Christian II as the rightful king after 1523. Initially, he managed to retain his position on Gotland and continued privateering, soon targeting the shipping of all Baltic regions. The Livonians were in a difficult position since they on the one hand suffered from the raids carried out by Norby’s ships, but were on the other hand accused by Frederik I and others of supporting Norby. The Order in Livonia later denied cooperating with Norby and tried to debunk rumours that Norby’s ships found a safe haven in some of the Order’s ports.<sup>36</sup> However, until 1524, the Grand Master as well as the commander of Memel (Klaipėda) maintained close relations with the deposed King Christian II and also supported Norby, while the Livonian Master allowed Norby’s ships to take provisions from Livonia in 1523.<sup>37</sup> Norby also had personal relations in Livonia since he was in extensive correspondence with Bishop Johannes Kievel of Osilia (r. 1515–1527), and also communicated with Tonnies Ubelacker, the Order’s bailiff (*Vogt*) of Maasilinn Castle (r. 1517–1524).<sup>38</sup>

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Zweig (ca. 1520–1560)“, *Ordines Militares Colloquia Torunensia Historica. Yearbook for the Study of the Military Orders* 26 (2021): 179–222; Kreem, *Ordu sügis*, 258–276.

<sup>33</sup> HA 1, no. 24, appendix.

<sup>34</sup> Forstreuter, “Die Preussische Kriegsflotte”, 118–129.

<sup>35</sup> Cf. Ritscher, *Reval an der Schwelle*, part 1, 56–62.

<sup>36</sup> Juhan Kreem, “Maasilinna foogt ja mereteed”, *Eesti Meremuuseumi toimetised* 3 (2002), 23–30 (27); Arnold Süvalep, *Narva ajalugu. I, Taani- ja orduaeg* (Narva, 1936), 159–160.

<sup>37</sup> Lars J. Larsson, *Sören Norby och Östersjöpolitiken: 1523–1525*, *Bibliotheca historica Lundensis*, 60 (Lund: C. W. K. Gleerup, 1986), 44–59. On Norby’s ship in Livonian waters see *ibid.*, 46.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*, 45–47, 90, 118.

Frederik I and his allies decisively defeated Sören Norby in a naval battle near the coast of Blekinge in August of 1526. Norby then fled to the waters of Livonia, where he offered to enter into the service of local lords but was rejected. It might be that at the same time, Norby's men managed to capture a Swedish ship near the castle of Virtsu on the coast of Western Estonia, and Swedes who had fled to the castle were handed over to Norby by a liegeman of the Bishop of Osilia. This caused friction between King Gustav I of Sweden (r. 1523–1560) and the bishopric, and in 1527, Bishop Georg von Tiesenhausen (r. 1527–1530) had to excuse his liegeman in Virtsu and explain that the Swedes had to be given to Norby because he would otherwise have looted the castle's surroundings.<sup>39</sup> In any case, Norby did not receive any firm support from Livonia in 1526 and he moved on to the mouth of the River Narva. He managed to gain support from the commander of the Moscovian castle of Ivangorod and continued privateering, especially harming merchants of Tallinn. Thus, the town led a naval expedition against him in October of 1526 and managed to defeat him. Nevertheless, Norby remained in Moscow and caused Livonians to fear that he might attack again. It was not until 1528 that he left for Germany and entered the service of Charles V. Norby died two years later.<sup>40</sup>

After Norby's defeat, the position of Frederik I had improved significantly. This was precisely the time when he decided to assert his hold over Kolga. In September of 1527, the king mentioned Hermann Pul (Poll) in his letter of enfeoffment of Kolga to a Pomeranian nobleman, Hans Natzmer of Ritzow.<sup>41</sup> Frederik had reportedly enfeoffed Kolga to Pul at some earlier time, but he had forfeited those rights because of Pul's treacherous behaviour. It is possible that Frederik had given Kolga to Pul between the years 1523 and 1527, but the transaction was not actually enforced. At the same time, one also cannot rule out the possibility that Pul had been the same vicar of Christian II in Kolga who had pawned it to Simons, and perhaps had tried to reobtain his position in Kolga from Frederik I. In any case, Frederik I regarded Pul as a traitor in the autumn of 1527 and decided to

<sup>39</sup> Michael von Taube, *Die von Uxkull. Teil 2, Genealogische Geschichte der Gesamtfamilie von Uxkull (Stammhaus Schloss Fickel): 1229–1936* (Tallinn: Estländische Druckerei, 1936), 162.

<sup>40</sup> Juhan Kreem, "Stadt im Seekrieg: Revaler Expedition gegen Sören Norby im Jahre 1526", *Rund um die Meere des Nordens. Festschrift für Hain Rebas*, ed. by Michael Engelbrecht, Ulrike Hanssen-Decker, Daniel Höffker (Heide: Boyens, 2008), 145–153; Sävalep, *Narva ajalugu*, 156–160.

<sup>41</sup> Tyske Kancellis udenrigske Afdeling Speciel Del, Livland. A II 5. 1527–58 og udat. Akter og dokumenter vedr. godset Kolck. unpaginated, cadres 2–4. On Natzmer see also *ibid.*, cadres 7–9. On Pul and Denmark see Kreem, "The Royal Danish ship", 176.

enfeoff Kolga to Natzmer. But since the estate was actually in the hands of the Livonian branch of the Teutonic Order, the pawn sum had to be repaid to the Order, which the King also promised, while asking the Livonian Master to help Natzmer in obtaining Kolga. One can assume that the Order was not overly excited to give the estate into the rather hostile hands of a Danish liegeman, and the King had to repeat the enfeoffment in May of 1528. Thereafter, the Order probably gave up Kolga, as the Livonian Master mentioned to King Christian III in 1538 that although Kolga rightfully belonged to the Order, along with the whole of Northern Estonia, he had given the estate to Natzmer as an act of ‘friendly love’ towards the King.<sup>42</sup> The actual reasons why the Order decided to give up Kolga are unclear, but one could assume that Master Plettenberg did not want to make the most powerful ruler of Northern Europe his direct enemy. In any case, obtaining Kolga was probably not cheap for Natzmer, as he took a loan of 4,500 Riga marks from Tallinn and had to pawn his house in the town in return; formerly, the same house had belonged to the Roma monastery.<sup>43</sup>

The relations between the Livonian branch and most of the Livonians on the one hand, and the Danish king on the other hand, still remained strained after Natzmer took over Kolga. In 1529, Thomas Schöning, the Archbishop of Riga (r. 1528–1539), decided to take Margrave Wilhelm of Brandenburg-Ansbach as his coadjutor.<sup>44</sup> This was a direct move against the Order, since Wilhelm was a younger brother of Duke Albrecht of Prussia, the main enemy of the Order. The Archbishop actually aspired to enhance his position in Livonia at the expense of the Order in alliance with the Duke.<sup>45</sup> To advance their plans, the Duke and the Archbishop sought support from various foreign rulers, especially those whom Emperor Charles V had appointed imperial protectors of the Livonian bishoprics in 1521.<sup>46</sup> One of them was the King of Denmark, who had already become an imperial protector of the Archbishopric of Riga in 1366. Although the Emperor

<sup>42</sup> HA 2, no. 963.

<sup>43</sup> Ritscher, *Reval an der Schwelle*, part 1, 50, 156.

<sup>44</sup> He was a coadjutor with the right to become successor of the Archbishop (*coadjutor cum jure succesionis*); see also Philipp Hofmeister, “Von den Koadjutoren der Bischöfe und Äbte”, *Archiv für katholisches Kirchenrecht* 112 (1932), 369–436.

<sup>45</sup> Cf. Paul Karge, “Die Berufung des Markgrafen Wilhelm zum Koadjutor des Rigaschen Erzbischofs: ein Beitrag zur Reformationsgeschichte”, *Baltische Monatsschrift* 61 (1906): 117–156; Quednau, *Livland im politischen Wollen*; Thomas Lange, *Zwischen Reformation und Untergang Alt-Livlands: Der Rigaer Erzbischof Wilhelm von Brandenburg im Beziehungsgeflecht der livländischen Konföderation und ihrer Nachbarländer*, 2 vols., *Hamburger Beiträge zur Geschichte des östlichen Europa*, 21 (Hamburg: Kovač, 2014).

<sup>46</sup> *Monumenta Livoniae Antiquae*, vol. 5 (henceforth MLA 5), ed. by Karl Heinrich von Busse (Riga, Leipzig: E. Frantzen, 1847), no. 1; HA 3, no. 1249/1.

did not acknowledge Frederik I as the rightful king, Archbishop Thomas Schöning still claimed that he had the right to seek help from Frederik as his rightful protector and also urged Duke Albrecht to seek support from Denmark.<sup>47</sup> The Order's attempt to convince Frederik not to support the politics of Thomas Schöning was unsuccessful.<sup>48</sup> After coadjutor Wilhelm arrived in Livonia in 1530, he continued to ask for backing from the Danish king based on the latest protectorship bestowed on the King by the Emperor in 1521.<sup>49</sup> In 1531–32, Christian II attempted to regain his thrones but in spite of initial success in Norway, he was ultimately imprisoned by his uncle, Frederik I, in Copenhagen and jailed to the end of his long life (1559). During these events, Livonians were quite clearly divided into two factions. The ones that leaned towards the Duke of Prussia – especially his brother Wilhelm and the town of Riga – enthusiastically supported Frederik I; Riga even wanted to form an alliance with him.<sup>50</sup> Most of the other Livonians, however, sided with the Order, since they feared that if the pro-Prussian party were to become too powerful in Livonia, the liberties and privileges of Livonia would be infringed upon and the land might fall under the direct influence of the Duke and his foreign allies, including Frederik I.<sup>51</sup> Thus, they instead sympathised with Christian II.<sup>52</sup> The town of Tallinn even sent some supplies to him, although when Christian's failure became obvious, Tallinn quickly tried to appease Frederik I and his ally, Gustav I of Sweden.<sup>53</sup> It is also noteworthy to mention that a servant of the Order's bailiff (*Vogt*) of Bauska was present in Copenhagen when Christian II was imprisoned by Frederik I.<sup>54</sup> It seems that the Livonian Master had maintained relations with the deposed king and there were even rumours

<sup>47</sup> Support for the plan was usually sought from the kings of Denmark and Poland, as well as other foreign rulers who could be presented as protectors of the Archbishopric: MLA 5, nos. 6, 8, 15, 19, 32; HA 1, nos. 45 and appendix, 48, 52, 57, 76–77, 81–82, 84–85, 93, 131.

<sup>48</sup> HA 1, no. 87.

<sup>49</sup> HA 1, nos. 131, 226, appendix 3, 231, 235, appendix 11.

<sup>50</sup> HA 1, nos. 233, 238, 240, 262–264, 269, 272, 307, 329. The planned alliance between Frederik I and Riga would have been similar to Riga's treaties with Lutheran powers inside Livonia, as well as with the Duke of Prussia. *Akten und Rezesse der livländischen Ständetage, Bd. 3 (1494–1535)* (henceforth AR 3), ed. by Leonid Arbusow sen. (Riga: Deubner, 1910); nos. 293–294, 296, 299–300, 318.

<sup>51</sup> Cf. Lange, *Zwischen Reformation und Untergang*, 24–101; Madis Maasing, *The Role of the Bishops in the Livonian Political System (in the First Half of the 16th Century)*, *Dissertationes Historiae Universitatis Tartuensis*, 37 (Tartu: Tartu Ülikooli kirjastus, 2016).

<sup>52</sup> At least according to the information of Margrave Wilhelm's courtiers (HA 1, nos. 242, 273–275, 280).

<sup>53</sup> Ritscher, *Reval an der Schwelle*, part 1, 63–64.

<sup>54</sup> HA 1, no. 295.

that he wanted to form an alliance with him.<sup>55</sup> After King Frederik I had secured his position and imprisoned Christian II, he showed his displeasure to the Livonian branch, which had to excuse itself and assure Frederik that it had no sinister intentions towards him.<sup>56</sup>

### *The two feuds in the 1530s*

In the autumn of 1532, a conflict known as the Feud of Osilia (*Wieksche Fehde*, 1532–36) began. Previously, the nobility of the Bishopric of Osilia had emerged victorious from a conflict with the Bishop and obtained a series of privileges from him in 1524 and 1528.<sup>57</sup> Bishop Reinhold von Buxhoeveden (r. 1530–1541, d. 1557) refused to recognise all the new privileges since they limited the Bishop's political power and put a serious financial burden on the bishopric.<sup>58</sup> Thereafter, powerful vassals of the mainland part of the bishopric (Läänemaa) offered to support the ambitious Margrave Wilhelm as the new bishop. He accepted their invitation and conquered Läänemaa in November of 1532. Bishop Reinhold, however, managed to hold Saaremaa with its main castle Kuressaare. Neither side had a clear advantage against the other, albeit the majority of Livonians (who opposed the Prussian faction) sided with Reinhold.<sup>59</sup> Thus, Wilhelm had to seek help from outside Livonia. Aside from his brother in Prussia, his main hopes were pinned to Denmark. These were not unfounded since Danish kings had been involved in Osilia's internal affairs during the 15<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>60</sup> Wilhelm had already actually made plans to seek help from Danish and Polish kings

<sup>55</sup> HA 1, no. 287.

<sup>56</sup> HA 1, no. 315, appendix; 325.

<sup>57</sup> The privileges of 1524 and 1528: AR 3, nos. 169, 251. See also: Madis Maasing, "Rahutu Saare-Lääne piiskopkond: piiskopid, aadelkond ja kapiitel 1520.–1540. aastatel", *Läänemaa Muuseumi toimetised* 15 (2012): 22–42.

<sup>58</sup> Friedrich von Stackelberg, "Die Verwaltung des Bistums Oesel-Wiek im XVI. Jahrhundert", *Sitzungsberichte der Gesellschaft für Geschichte und Altertumskunde zu Riga. Vorträge zur Hundertjahrfeier am 6.–9. Dezember 1934* (1936), 36–51.

<sup>59</sup> On the feud: Quednau, *Livland im politischen Wollen*, 96–151; Magnus von Hirschheydt, "Der Krieg, der nie stattgefunden hat. Markgraf Wilhelm von Brandenburg-Ansbach, Reinhold von Buxhövdén, die Öselsche Bischofsfehde und das Problem der fehlenden Kriegslegitimation", *Geistliche im Krieg*, ed. by Franz Brendle and Anton Schindling (Münster: Aschendorff, 2009), 345–371; Madis Maasing, "Die Wieksche Fehde (1532–1536) und Markgraf Wilhelm von Brandenburg", *Forschungen zur baltischen Geschichte* 5 (2010), 11–35; Madis Maasing, "Propagandasõda Saare-Lääne vaenuse aegsel Liivimaal (1532–1536)", *Läänemaa Muuseumi toimetised* 18 (2015), 123–174.

<sup>60</sup> Cf. Vasar, *Taani püüded*; Kreem, "Über die Streitigkeiten"; Mollerup, *Daenemark's Beziehungen*, 13–14, 26–28.

in the summer of 1532 before his invasion of Läänemaa.<sup>61</sup> He stressed the importance of securing help from the rulers of Denmark, Poland, and Sweden right after he arrived in the bishopric.<sup>62</sup> Wilhelm felt quite certain of the goodwill of the first two monarchs, with whom he had close relations (the Polish king was his maternal uncle and the Danish king was the father-in-law of his brother), but he was more wary of the stance of the Swedish King, since Bishop Reinhold had some connections in his kingdom and had sent his envoys to the king at the end of 1532.<sup>63</sup> But it is also interesting to mention that Wilhelm claimed in his letter to the Pope that alongside Moscow and Sweden, Denmark was a potential threat to Osilia, and that he had to take over the bishopric to ensure its protection.<sup>64</sup>

Wilhelm's close relations with Denmark made the majority of Livonians uneasy. There were even rumours in the beginning of 1533 that Prussia, Denmark, and Sweden had formed an alliance against the Order.<sup>65</sup> Although there was no official alliance against the Livonians, Wilhelm and his brother had indeed asked the Danish king to threaten the Livonians to close the Øresund for Livonian ships if they oppose Wilhelm in Osilia,<sup>66</sup> and also asked for military support to capture the castle of Kuresaare.<sup>67</sup> Frederik I did intervene and accused the Livonians, and especially the Order, of being hostile towards him and insulting him.<sup>68</sup> Thereafter, the Order seemed to have actually feared a Danish intervention and undertook serious efforts to deescalate the situation, including sending an envoy to the King in March of 1533.<sup>69</sup> It is also very likely that the pressure from the Danish king was the main reason why Master Wolter von Plettenberg decided to form an alliance (or rather conclude a treaty) in Cēsis with Margrave Wilhelm on 1 April 1533.<sup>70</sup> According to the treaty, both sides had to avoid violence, solve the feud in Osilia in a peaceful manner, and not look for help outside of Livonia. Thus, the Order aimed to minimise the influence of Wilhelm's foreign supporters. It seems that at that moment, the

<sup>61</sup> HA 1, no. 282.

<sup>62</sup> HA 1, nos. 309, 310.

<sup>63</sup> HA 1, nos. 322, 325.

<sup>64</sup> HA 1, no. 324, appendix.

<sup>65</sup> HA 1, nos. 347, 351.

<sup>66</sup> HA 1, no. 336.

<sup>67</sup> HA 1, nos. 375, 379.

<sup>68</sup> HA 1, no. 365; MLA 5, no. 81; HA 1, no. 374, appendix.

<sup>69</sup> On the Order's diplomacy in the beginning of 1533 see HA 1, nos. 327, appendix 2, 373, 374, 376, 391, 394; MLA 5, nos. 81, 87, 89.

<sup>70</sup> AR 3, no. 324; HA 1, no. 386. See also Quednau, *Livland im politischen Wollen*, 101–111; Maasing, "Die Wieksche Fehde", 19–21.

Order and other Livonian powers were actually prepared to accept Wilhelm as the ruler of Osilia if he would have given up his further ambitions by strengthening his position with foreign help.<sup>71</sup>

This beneficial situation did not last long for Wilhelm. King Frederik I died in April, only ten days after Wilhelm had formed his alliance with the Order. At the same time, some officials of the Order, as well as Northern Estonian estates (the town of Tallinn and the nobility of Harju-Viru) had opposed the alliance with Wilhelm even before the death of the king.<sup>72</sup> But the fact that Frederik's son, Duke Christian of Schleswig and Holstein, was not immediately elected as King of Denmark – instead the election was postponed by a year – meant that Wilhelm lost most of his Danish support. The majority of other Livonians felt quite relieved by the disappearance of the threat of a possible Danish intervention.<sup>73</sup> It was certainly very beneficial to Wilhelm's opponent, Bishop Reinhold, who launched a series of raids on Läänemaa in the summer of 1533. Although Wilhelm was able to fight back to some extent, Reinhold's troops were more numerous and successful.<sup>74</sup>

The outnumbered Wilhelm also continued to seek help from kingless Denmark. He turned to the State Council (*Rigsrad*) as well as the viceroy of Gotland, Heinrich Rosenkranz, who was a strong supporter of Duke Christian.<sup>75</sup> His pleas for help were at least partially answered, since Duke Albrecht decided to provide his brother with two warships, which had previously been in Denmark helping Frederik I.<sup>76</sup> The Duke of Holstein, the viceroy of Gotland, and Count Johann von Hoya, the commander of Viborg in Swedish Finland, sent additional ships. Thus, Wilhelm had five warships with many cannons and much ammunition at his disposal in the autumn of 1533.<sup>77</sup> Moreover, the State Council of Denmark threatened

<sup>71</sup> Cf. HA 1, nos. 394, 411, 414, 418, appendix 2, 427, appendix 4; MLA 5, nos. 94, 95, 97; Quednau, *Livland im politischen Wollen*, 112–114.

<sup>72</sup> Cf. AR 3, no. 325; Quednau, *Livland im politischen Wollen*, 114–116.

<sup>73</sup> Cf. HA 1, nos. 406, 411, 414, 417.

<sup>74</sup> HA 1, nos. 427, 442, 449, 450, 453, 457–459, 467, 469; MLA 5, nos. 102, 103; Maasing, “Propagandasöda”, 136–137. According to Duke Albrecht, Reinhold's attacks were possible only because of the death of King Frederik I (HA 1, no. 425).

<sup>75</sup> Duke Albrecht already asked Gotland for help from the beginning of 1533 (HA 1, no. 379), and Wilhelm quickly followed suit. For Wilhelm's pleas to Denmark and Prussia in 1533, see also HA 1, nos. 427, 431, 435, 436, 466, 472, 474.

<sup>76</sup> HA 1, no. 448. On naval cooperation between Frederik I and Duke Albrecht see Forstreuter, “Die Preussische Kriegsflotte”, 106–111.

<sup>77</sup> On the assistance from Holstein see HA 1, nos. 501, 518, 523, 551; from Gotland: HA 1, nos. 435–436, 450–451, 460, 479; from the Count of Hoya: HA 1, no. 562. See also: Forstreuter, “Die preussische Kriegsflotte”, 114–117.



to close Øresund for ships from Tallinn and Tartu if they continued to be hostile towards Wilhelm.<sup>78</sup>

This continued foreign assistance, mostly from Denmark, was perhaps one of the main reasons why other Livonians preferred not to intervene directly in the Osilian Feud and why Bishop Reinhold did not dare to attack Läänemaa again. Duke Christian of Schleswig and Holstein continued his support in 1534.<sup>79</sup> Nevertheless, the majority of Livonians expressed their increasing diplomatic support for Bishop Reinhold in 1533 and early 1534, which culminated with the Diet of Viljandi (February 1534), where all Livonian rulers demanded that all Reinhold's rights as Bishop of Osi-  
lia had to be restored, albeit via peaceful methods.<sup>80</sup> In this complicated situation, Wilhelm saw Duke Christian as his main hope, as he expressed in many letters in early 1534 stating that if Christian would become King of Denmark, then it would still be possible for him to win the feud and become bishop.<sup>81</sup> To this end, he asked his brother to arrange for Prussian envoys (who were to be sent to Denmark in the summer of 1534 to be present during the election of the king) to also represent his interests before the new king.<sup>82</sup>

These plans and hopes of Duke Albrecht and Margrave Wilhelm were shattered in May of 1534 when Count Christopher of Oldenburg and the town of Lübeck (the latter was led by Jürgen Wullenweber) attacked Denmark and specifically Holstein, thus starting the conflict known as Count's Feud (*Grevens fejde*, 1534–36).<sup>83</sup> Since the end of May, news about the feud started reaching Livonia,<sup>84</sup> and the Livonians were again divided in their opinions on the events in Denmark. Margrave Wilhelm and his local allies gave their wholehearted support to Duke Christian,<sup>85</sup> while Duke Albrecht

<sup>78</sup> HA 1, nos. 520, 568, 571. Also, the Bishop of Roskilde wrote to Tallinn on this matter. Ritscher, *Reval an der Schwelle*, part 1, 64.

<sup>79</sup> HA 2, nos. 606, 662. Wilhelm argued that he was entitled to request and receive assistance from Denmark because Danes had brought Christianity to Northern and Western Estonia (HA 2, nos. 629, 639).

<sup>80</sup> Cf. Maasing, "Propagandasöda", 138–146. The decision in Viljandi: AR 3, no. 333; HA 1, no. 588.

<sup>81</sup> HA 2, nos. 596, 613, 647, 664.

<sup>82</sup> HA 2, nos. 641, 659, 661.

<sup>83</sup> See e.g.: Lutz Sellmer, *Albrecht VII. von Mecklenburg und die Grafenfehde (1534–1536)*, Kieler Werkstücke, 22 (Frankfurt am Main; New York: P. Lang, 1999).

<sup>84</sup> HA 2, nos. 667–669, 671, 673. It is interesting to mention that the Duke of Prussia also collected news on the Count's Feud from Riga; at least partially, news might have travelled more quickly to major port towns in Livonia than to Prussia (see e.g.: HA 2, nos. 667, 675, 685–686, 694, 696, 698, 728, 750, 784).

<sup>85</sup> See e.g., HA 2, nos. 667, 689.

became one of Christian's most important allies, alongside King Gustav I of Sweden. On the other hand, the Count's Feud abruptly ended Wilhelm's earlier hopes of forming an alliance with Lübeck.<sup>86</sup> The majority of Livonians tended to sympathise with Lübeck (which officially proclaimed that it would reinstate Christian II as King of Denmark) but did not openly join the alliance against Duke Christian, since they wanted to avoid open hostilities, and moreover, the town of Tallinn had some unsolved problems with Lübeck.<sup>87</sup>

Initially, the Count of Oldenburg and the town of Lübeck captured most of the territory of the Kingdom of Denmark. This gave rise to pessimistic sentiments in Wilhelm's party, and there was increasing fear that other Livonians would still forge an alliance with Lübeck.<sup>88</sup> As far as it concerned Bishop Reinhold, these fears were not unfounded. The Bishop had many acquaintances in Lübeck, probably due mostly to his extensive grain trade.<sup>89</sup> Even before the beginning of the Count's Feud, Wilhelm already worried that Reinhold would use his connections in Scandinavia and Northern Germany, and might form an alliance with Lübeck, Sweden, and the Duke of Kleve. He feared that perhaps some other northern German princes and the Order would also ally against him.<sup>90</sup> His fears took more concrete shape in June and July of 1534, when there were reports of Lübeck helping Bishop Reinhold and having perhaps already sent some warships to Kuressaare.<sup>91</sup> Reportedly, more substantial aid with troops from Lübeck was hampered only by the fact that the Bishop lacked money for their upkeep, although there was a suggestion that Reinhold might pawn the Castle of Kuressaare to the Order and thus obtain the financial resources needed.<sup>92</sup>

<sup>86</sup> HA 1, nos. 375, 521; HA 2, no. 602.

<sup>87</sup> See HA 2, no. 671; Ritscher, *Reval an der Schwelle*, part 1, 64–66.

<sup>88</sup> HA 2, nos. 684, 690, 696, 698, 707.

<sup>89</sup> On mercantile activities of Osilian bishops in the 16<sup>th</sup> century see Vilho Niitemaa, *Der Binnenhandel in der Politik der livländischen Städte im Mittelalter* (Helsinki: Suomalainen tiedeakatemia, 1952), 144–145; Jorma Ahvenainen, *Der Getreidehandel Livlands im Mittelalter* (Helsinki: Societas Scientiarum Fennica, 1963), 198–209; Jüri Kivimäe, "Piiskop ja hansakaupmees: Reinhold von Buxhövdens ja Johann Selhorst kaubasuhestest 1530. aastate algul", *Sõnadesse püütud minevik: in honorem Enn Tarvel*, ed. by Marten Seppel, Priit Raudkivi (Tallinn: Argo, 2009), 138–158; Carsten Jahnke, "Reval als Schnittstelle zwischen dem Groß- und dem Einzelhandel im Spätmittelalter", *Vana Tallinn*, XX (XXIV) (2009), 56–77 (69–73). Hans Selhorst, the main mediator of Reinhold's mercantile adventures, had many contacts in Lübeck: Carsten Jahnke, "Zum Nutze der guten Stadt Reval. Hans Selhorst, ein Revaler Kaufmann und Ratsherr zu Beginn des 16. Jahrhunderts", *Vana Tallinn* XVI (XX) (2005), 88–107.

<sup>90</sup> HA 2, nos. 628, 647.

<sup>91</sup> HA 2, nos. 675, 685–686.

<sup>92</sup> HA 2, no. 698.

Thus, Margrave Wilhelm was well-justified in his fear of a Lübeck-assisted attack against Läänemaa.<sup>93</sup> Since his brother Albrecht was deeply involved in the Count's Feud,<sup>94</sup> he was unable to support Wilhelm. Yet he consoled Wilhelm by claiming that things were going increasingly poorly for Lübeck and in favour of Duke Christian.<sup>95</sup> Duke Albrecht's assessment was undoubtedly correct in the long run, but that did not help Wilhelm. In September of 1534, Bishop Reinhold attacked Läänemaa with the support of ships and troops from Lübeck, and probably also from the Order's bailiff (*Vogt*) of Maasilinn. After capturing the castle of Virtsu, which defended the coast of southern Läänemaa, resistance virtually collapsed. Margrave Wilhelm had to retreat to the Archbishopric of Riga, and was thereafter only able to use diplomatic means to claim the title of Bishop of Osilia.<sup>96</sup> Bishop Reinhold's cooperation with Lübeck also continued thereafter since his bishopric was used as a base for Lübeck's privateering in the autumn of 1534.<sup>97</sup> However, after a ship from Lübeck was finally captured by the Swedes, Bishop Reinhold asked for additional help from his confidant Carsten König from Lübeck, as he feared that he might be attacked by sea.<sup>98</sup>

The success of Christian III (elected as King of Denmark by the nobility of Jutland in July of 1534) since the autumn of 1534 seemed to justify the fears of Bishop Reinhold. However, Christian's adversaries still put up stubborn resistance and were able to hold Copenhagen until the summer of 1536, which meant that neither he nor Duke Albrecht were able to help Margrave Wilhelm in Osilia.<sup>99</sup> Thus, there was increasing fear amongst the pro-Prussian party in Livonia that Lübeck might be able to form an alliance with Livonia and the other Hanseatic towns.<sup>100</sup> Lübeck's envoys indeed visited Livonia and agitated for an alliance at the end of 1534 and the beginning of 1535.<sup>101</sup> And moreover, the stance of the town of Riga – which had leaned on Duke Albrecht since the end of the 1520s – was changing.

<sup>93</sup> HA 2, nos. 693, 706.

<sup>94</sup> Forstreuter, "Die Preussische Kriegsflotte", 118–129.

<sup>95</sup> HA 2, no. 691.

<sup>96</sup> HA 2, nos. 708, 713, 715, 734, appendix I–II, 822. On the key role of Virtsu see Madis Maasing, "Millal rajati ja purustati Virtsu linnus?", *Läänemaa Muuseumi toimetised* 20 (2017), 31–52.

<sup>97</sup> A warship belonging to the Lübeck burgher Carsten König used Virtsu as its base and captured at least one of Margrave Wilhelm's vessels, which was brought to Lübeck (HA 2, nos. 738, 776, 778).

<sup>98</sup> HA 2, nos. 776, 778. Reinhold also sent his chancellor Thomas Gabler to Germany to obtain additional aid, and asked Carsten König for 200 guilders (HA 2, nos. 778, 779).

<sup>99</sup> On the final phase of the Count's Feud see Sellmer, *Albrecht VII.*, 212–361.

<sup>100</sup> HA 2, no. 791.

<sup>101</sup> HA 2, nos. 777, 784, 794.

The anti-Prussian and pro-Order party increasingly gained ground in the town since the turn of 1535, culminating with a coup in the summer, when the most prominent supporter of Prussia, the town's syndicus Johann Lohmüller, had to flee from Riga. Thereafter, the town mainly adhered to the Order's political line.<sup>102</sup>

Lübeck did not resort solely to diplomatic means in Livonia. In the spring of 1535, privateers from Lübeck attacked the Danish fief of Kolga and kidnapped the king's vassal Hans Natzmer, who was brought to Lübeck, where he was allegedly executed.<sup>103</sup> This was possibly a demonstration of strength by Lübeck aimed at influencing Livonians, and especially the Livonian branch of the Teutonic Order, to side with Lübeck. Perhaps Lübeck also hoped that the Order would use the opportunity to seize the estate from the Danish king. It is certain that the Order would have liked to recapture Kolga, since Master Hermann von Brüggenei (1535–1549) stated in his letter to Christian III in 1538 that the monastery of Roma actually had no right to give Kolga to the king, and that it should be returned to the Order.<sup>104</sup> Christian III did not heed the Master's suggestions, however, and reconfirmed Hans Natzmer – who had actually survived his captivity in Lübeck – as his vassal in Kolga.<sup>105</sup>

<sup>102</sup> On internal conflicts in Riga since the 1520s see Paul Karge, "Die religiösen, politischen, wirtschaftlichen und sozialen Strömungen in Riga 1530–1535", *Mitteilungen aus der livländischen Geschichte* 23 (1924–1926), 296–371; Thomas Lange, "Zwischen Unterwerfung und Konfrontation. Die Reformation in Riga im Spannungsfeld zwischen der Stadt und ihren Herren", *Preußen und Livland im Zeichen der Reformation*, vol. 28, Tagungsberichte der Historischen Kommission für ost- und westpreußische Landesforschung (Osnabrück: Fibre, 2014), 211–240; Madis Maasing, "Reformatsioon, kirikuvarad ja võim – tüli Riia peapiiskopi ja linna vahel 1520.–1550. aastatel", *Õpetatud Eesti Seltsi aastaraamat* 2019 (2020), 111–143. On Lohmüller see Ulrich Müller, *Johann Lohmüller und seine livländische Chronik 'Warhaftig Histori': Biographie des Autors, Interpretation und Edition des Werkes*, Schriften der Baltischen Historischen Kommission, 10 (Lüneburg: Verlag Nordostdeutsches Kulturwerk, 2001).

<sup>103</sup> HA 2, nos. 798, 800, 807.

<sup>104</sup> HA 2, no. 963.

<sup>105</sup> DRA, Tyske Kancellis udenrigske Afdeling, Speciel Del, Livland A II. 5, cadres 9–10. URL: <https://www.sa.dk/ao-soegesider/da/billedviser?epid=19852679#261328,48887180> (accessed 11 November 2022). Natzmer was also mentioned by Tallinn's town council in 1538 and 1543: *Regesten aus zwei Missivbüchern des XVI. Jahrhunderts im Revaler Stadt-Archiv*, ed. by Gotthard von Hansen, Archiv für die Geschichte Liv-, Est- und Curlands, series 3, vol. 4 (Reval: Kluge, 1895), 100, 112 (nos. 32, 105). It is quite likely that Christian III had enfeoffed Kolga to Natzmer even earlier, perhaps in 1536 (see DRA, Livland A II. 5, cadres 16–17; other copies of the same letter seem to be *ibid.*, cadres 8–9 and 11–12, the dating of the last two letters might also be 1534 or 1544), but perhaps the Order was able to prevent Natzmer's return to Kolga before 1538.

In any case, the Livonians were not keen to enter into a formal alliance with Lübeck in 1535. By then it was quite clear that Lübeck would probably lose the Count's Feud, and the Livonians may have wanted to avoid any possible attacks on Livonia by Lübeck's adversaries. Nevertheless, the Livonians gave Lübeck some material help. According to the interrogation protocol of Lübeck's former leader Jürgen Wullenweber in 1536, it appears that the towns of Tallinn and Riga, and the Order in Livonia had supported Lübeck with 1,000 lasts of rye and 20,000 Riga marks.<sup>106</sup> This information is supported by a letter from Margrave Wilhelm from April of 1534, right before the beginning of the Count's Feud, stating that the Order had sent a couple of hundred of lasts of crops to Lübeck.<sup>107</sup> At the end of the summer of 1534, Johann Lohmüller reported that the Order promised Lübeck credit in the form of crops and money.<sup>108</sup> Moreover, in the beginning of 1535, Tallinn promised to support Lübeck financially.<sup>109</sup>

In the diplomatic field, the majority of Livonians followed the line of Emperor Charles V and thus opposed Christian III. This was perhaps most clearly expressed by Master Hermann von Brüggenei at the end of 1535, when he acknowledged Dorothea, a daughter of Christian II who had married Count Palantine Friedrich II of Pfalz, as the rightful heir to the Danish throne.<sup>110</sup> As the Emperor was preparing to intervene militarily in 1536 to prevent the ultimate victory of Christian III, these preparations were discussed in Livonia, and the majority seemingly longed for the Emperor's successful intervention.<sup>111</sup>

One might also think that there may have been friction between the Livonians and Denmark on religious issues, but that was probably not a very crucial factor. Frederik I had already been benevolent regarding the spread of the Reformation. Christian III was a convinced Lutheran,<sup>112</sup> as was King's Prussian ally, Duke Albrecht. The majority of the pro-Prussian party in Livonia consisted of supporters of the Reformation, and it is equally true

<sup>106</sup> Georg Waitz, *Lübeck unter Jürgen Wullenweber und die europäische Politik*, vol. 3 (Berlin: Weidmann, 1856), 494.

<sup>107</sup> HA 2, no. 648.

<sup>108</sup> HA 2, no. 707.

<sup>109</sup> Ritscher, *Reval an der Schwelle*, part 1, 65–66.

<sup>110</sup> HA 2, no. 849.

<sup>111</sup> HA 2, nos. 849, 870, 873. Even after the end of the feud, an imperial intervention was seen as a possibility (HA 2, no. 893).

<sup>112</sup> On the Reformation in Denmark, Norway, and Iceland see Jens E. Olesen, "Dänemark, Norwegen und Island", *Dänemark, Norwegen und Schweden im Zeitalter der Reformation und Konfessionalisierung: Nordische Königreiche und Konfession 1500 bis 1660*, ed. by Matthias Asche und Anton Schindling (Münster: Aschendorff, 2003), 27–106.

that at least until the 1530s, most of their adversaries opposed the religious renewal.<sup>113</sup> Nevertheless, the political alliances in Livonia did not run along religious lines: the Livonian Master Brüggenei and most of his successors sympathised with Lutheranism, but still opposed the pro-Prussian party;<sup>114</sup> there were at least some Catholics amongst the closest circle of Margrave Wilhelm;<sup>115</sup> and the town of Riga also remained staunchly Lutheran after the political coup, which alienated it from the Prussian duke in 1535.

The Count's Feud ended without the intervention of the Emperor, as Copenhagen surrendered to Christian III on 29 July 1536.<sup>116</sup> Interestingly enough, the treaty that ended the Feud of Osilia was signed in Livonia on the same day. The treaty required Margrave Wilhelm to acknowledge Bishop Reinhold as the rightful ruler of the bishopric, while Wilhelm's main supporters in Läänemaa – the most influential local noblemen – had to pay heavy fines to the bishop. The strategically important castle of Virtsu was required to remain in ruins, and the surroundings of Vigala – another eminent castle in the hands of an influential episcopal liegeman – were temporarily handed over to the Bishop.<sup>117</sup>

<sup>113</sup> On the Reformation in Livonia see Leonid Arbusow [Jr.], *Die Einführung der Reformation in Liv-, Est- und Kurland* (Leipzig: Heinsius, 1921); Joachim Kuhles, *Die Reformation in Livland: religiöse, politische und ökonomische Wirkungen* (Hamburg: Kovač, 2007); *Die baltischen Lande im Zeitalter der Reformation und Konfessionalisierung: Livland, Estland, Ösel, Ingermanland, Kurland und Lettgallen: Stadt, Land und Konfession 1500–1721*, vol. 1–4, ed. by Matthias Asche, Werner Buchholz, Anton Schindling (Münster: Aschendorff, 2009–2012).

<sup>114</sup> Juhan Kreem, “Der Deutsche Orden und die Reformation in Livland”, *The military orders and the Reformation: choices, state building, and the weight of tradition*, ed. by Johannes A. Mol, Klaus Militzer, Helen J. Nicholson, Bijdragen tot de Geschiedenis van de Ridderlijke Duitse Orde, Balije van Utrecht, 3 (Hilversum: Verloren, 2006), 43–57; *idem.*, “Der Deutsche Orden in Livland unter Hermann von Brüggenei: Bemerkungen zu Regierungspraxis und Religionspolitik”, *Ordines militares. Colloquia Torunensia historica* 16 (2011), 303–315; *idem.*, “Das Augsburger Interim in Livland. Evangelische und Altgläubige in den baltischen Landen in der Mitte des 16. Jahrhunderts”, *Historisches Jahrbuch* 134 (2014), 121–141.

<sup>115</sup> Additionally, Ulrich Müller has stated that Margrave Wilhelm himself was not a convinced Lutheran before the mid-1540s, see “Erzbischof Wilhelm von Riga und die Reformation in Livland 1535–1563”, *Preußen und Livland im Zeichen der Reformation*, ed. by Arno Mentzel-Reuters, Klaus Neitmann, Tagungsberichte der Historischen Kommission für ost- und westpreussische Landesforschung, 28 (Osnabrück: Fibre, 2014), 241–343. See also: Madis Maasing, “Die Reformationsversuche im Erzbistum Riga in den 1540er und 1560er Jahren”, *Die Kirche im mittelalterlichen Livland*, ed. by Radosław Biskup, Johannes Götz, Andrzej Radziwiński, *Ecclesia clerusque temporibus medii aevi* 5 (Toruń: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Mikołaja Kopernika, 2019), 245–272.

<sup>116</sup> Cf. Sellmer, *Albrecht VII.*, 341–361.

<sup>117</sup> MLA 5, no. 148; HA 2, no. 880. See also: Maasing, “Propagandasõda”, 158–161.

*Denmark and Livonia from the end of the 1530s to the end of the 1540s*

The end of the feuds did not lead to a *détente* in Danish-Livonian relations. In the following years, the victorious party in Livonia, and especially the Order, continued to follow the line of Emperor Charles V, who regarded the daughters of Christian II as the rightful heirs to the Danish throne. Thus, the relations of the majority of Livonians with Christian III could not be unproblematic. Additionally, the Livonians tried to minimise the influence of the Prussian faction in Livonia, and turned their special attention towards those Livonian noblemen who had shown sympathy for Prussia. This actually already began during the Osilian Feud when the holdings of some episcopal vassals who opposed Reinhold were confiscated, and the most influential nobleman of Läänemaa, Otto von Uexküll, and his allies were imprisoned in the summer of 1535.<sup>118</sup>

Thus, at least five Livonian noblemen already decided to leave in 1534. The most eminent among them was Reinhold Sachse, a liegeman of the Bishop of Osilia from the island of Saaremaa who had been the commander (*Drost*) of the episcopal castle of Haapsalu (1532–1534) and had handed it over to Margrave Wilhelm in the autumn of 1532. Sachse and other nobles sought refuge and support first from Prussia and later also from the King of Denmark.<sup>119</sup> While he was abroad, Sachse built a successful career as he became captain of a Prussian warship. He participated in naval battles during the Count's Feud. In 1536, Sachse even became the temporary commander of the Prussian naval fleet and earned the gratitude of Christian III as he helped to besiege Copenhagen.<sup>120</sup> Thus, Sachse maintained the benevolent support of both the King of Denmark and the Duke of Prussia even after the end of the feuds. He refused to return to Livonia since he feared that promises to solve his conflict with Bishop Reinhold fairly and peacefully would not be fulfilled.<sup>121</sup> Livonians in turn feared that Sachse would use violence and attack Osilia, and that the poorly armed and manned castle of Kuressaare could perhaps fall into his hands. At least this was used as a pretext when the Order and the Bishop of Tartu decided

<sup>118</sup> On the siege of Vigala and the imprisonment of the noblemen see HA 2, nos. 795, 807, 808, 811, 819, 826, 829, 838, 846, 875; Mihkel Aitsam, *Vigala kihelkonna ajalugu* (Kivi-Vigala: Vigala Vallavalitsus, 2006), 185–187.

<sup>119</sup> On Sachse and other nobles who fled abroad see Maasing, "Rahutu Saare-Lääne piiskopkond", esp. 27–30.

<sup>120</sup> Forstreuter, "Die Preussische Kriegsflotte", 121–129.

<sup>121</sup> Cf. HA 2, nos. 880, 918, 920, 940, 945; HA 3, nos. 1071, 1075/2.

to temporarily take the command of the castle from the hands of Bishop Reinhold in the spring of 1540.<sup>122</sup> In the summer of that same year, Sachse indeed arranged a naval attack against Läänemaa. He managed to kidnap the *Stiftsvogt*, the most important episcopal official of the region, whom he brought to Prussia. This shocked all Livonian rulers, who demanded that Duke Albrecht withdraw his protection from Sachse, and again promised Sachse a peaceful resolution if he would return to Livonia.<sup>123</sup> After long negotiations, Sachse and the Bishop finally reached an agreement in the spring of 1541, according to which the nobleman was compensated with corn and money.<sup>124</sup> Only a couple of months later, the Order and the Bishop of Tartu forced Bishop Reinhold to transfer rule of the bishopric to Bishop Johannes von Münchhausen of Curonia (r. in Curonia 1540–1560, in Osilia 1541/42–1560) because they claimed that Reinhold was unable to effectively rule the tumultuous bishopric.<sup>125</sup>

The noblemen who had remained in Livonia, or had returned there earlier than Sachse, did not fare as well as he did. In March of 1537, Master Hermann von Brüggenei imprisoned Dietrich Butler, a leading Curonian nobleman who was an avid supporter of Duke Albrecht.<sup>126</sup> In April, Butler was interrogated. He testified that he had had connections with Reinhold Sachse and that he had been ready to participate in violent actions against Livonia.<sup>127</sup> Butler's confinement was soon followed by the imprisonment of several Northern Estonian and Osilian noblemen, including Otto von Uexküll of Vigala and Andreas Deken from Northern Estonia. Deken had been among the noblemen who fled abroad in 1534 and sought refuge in Prussia.<sup>128</sup> By 1536, however, he had returned to Livonia and obtained

<sup>122</sup> HA 2, nos. 1061, 1065, appendix 3.

<sup>123</sup> HA 3, nos. 1071, 1080, 1087.

<sup>124</sup> HA 3, no. 1110/1. Afterwards, the nobleman was in the service of Archbishop Wilhelm of Riga, but later served the Order and was executed after the Battle of Härgmäe/Ērgeme by the Russians in 1560. Leonid Arbusow Sen., "Livlands Geistlichkeit vom Ende des 12. bis ins 16. Jahrhundert (Dritter Nachtrag)", *Jahrbuch für Genealogie, Heraldik und Sphragistik* 1911, 1912, 1913 (1914), 1–432, (181); HA 5, no. 2708; Hanns-Albert von Buxhoeveden, *Familiengeschichte Buxhoeveden: Grafen und Barone von Buxhoeveden (de Bekeshovede auf Bexhövede)*, vol. 1 (Hamburg, 1962), 229.

<sup>125</sup> Maasing, "Rahutu Saare-Lääne piiskopkond", 30–32.

<sup>126</sup> Butler had already been a confidant of Duke Albrecht at the end of the 1520s. Karge, "Die Berufung", 140–145. In 1532, he led a faction of Curonian noblemen who formed an official alliance with the Duke: AR 3, no. 300. On his imprisonment see HA 2, nos. 914–915, 920, 922; Quednau, *Livland im politischen Wollen, 152–156*.

<sup>127</sup> HA 2, no. 930, appendix 1.

<sup>128</sup> HA 2, nos. 653–654.



Kolga as a pawn from Hans Natzmer, who was still abroad at that time.<sup>129</sup> In 1537, Deken and his subordinates in Kolga, including Marten Eggbrecht, a nobleman from Pomerania, were accused of making Kolga a centre of hostile actions against Livonia, including using the port of Kolga as a naval base for an invading navy. According to the Order's accusations, this was part of a larger conspiracy: the mercenary Siegfried von Northam (or Ham), whom the Order had captured near Kolga and who had no permission to stay in Livonia, and the nobles with whom he had met (including Uexküll and Deken) were accused of planning to participate in a joint Danish-Swedish attack with the supposed aim of conquering both Osilia and Northern Estonia.<sup>130</sup>

Deken and his subordinates, as well as Butler and Uexküll, were kept in harsh conditions, and they were probably also tortured.<sup>131</sup> Their relatives and supporters asked foreign potentates for help. Their pleas received positive answers from Duke Albrecht of Prussia, his wife, Princess Dorothea of Denmark, Dorothea's younger brother, Duke Johann von Schleswig, and also her older brother, King Christian III, who asked the Order to release the prisoners.<sup>132</sup> Nevertheless, the requests had no effect. Butler and Deken died in confinement, probably in late 1537.<sup>133</sup> Thereafter, as mentioned above, Hans Natzmer again held Kolga as a vassal of the Danish king until his death in about 1543.<sup>134</sup>

Around the same time as Natzmer died, the conflict between Emperor Charles V and Christian III escalated, and war broke out between Habsburg Netherlands and Denmark, a fact that especially concerned Livonian Hanseatic towns such as Tallinn.<sup>135</sup> However, on 23 May 1544, Emperor

<sup>129</sup> Deken paid Natzmer 24,000 marks for Kolga. Johansen, *Die Estlandliste*, 368.

<sup>130</sup> HA 2, no. 930, appendix 2.

<sup>131</sup> Trial of Otto von Uexküll and another Osilian vassal named Reinhold von Ungern: HA 2, no. 930, appendix 3. On the prolonged imprisonment of Butler, Deken, and other nobles see *ibid.*, nos. 925–928, 932.

<sup>132</sup> On Duke Albrecht, his wife, and the Duke of Holstein, see HA 2, nos. 926, 933–939, 941–943, 945. On Christian III, HA 2, nos. 955, 961.

<sup>133</sup> In the beginning of 1538, the Curonian nobleman Claus Francke planned to complain to the King of Denmark about the poor treatment of Butler and Deken, which had caused their death, see HA 2, no. 971. Deken's death was also confirmed by the fact that in 1538, his widow was mentioned. *Regesten aus zwei Missivbüchern*, no. 32 (100).

<sup>134</sup> Natzmer had arrived in Livonia probably at the end of 1537 and presumably held Kolga even before his reconfirmation by the King in the summer of 1538. *Regesten aus zwei Missivbüchern*, 100, no. 32. He was last mentioned in the sources of Tallinn in 1543, see *ibid.*, 113, no. 105.

<sup>135</sup> The conflict between the Emperor and the King of Denmark was already discussed earlier, e.g. by Archbishop Wilhelm in 1540. HA 3, no. 1084/1. In 1543, Tallinn thanked the Emperor for the information concerning the start of the war between him and

Charles V and King Christian III entered into a treaty, according to which the Emperor acknowledged Christian as the rightful ruler of Denmark. This treaty was especially important for Livonia since the Master of Livonia was also included in the treaty, and the Danish king promised not to attack him and *vice versa*.<sup>136</sup> Nevertheless, this did not solve all the problems between the King and the Order, which was especially true concerning Kolga.

One problem that was closely connected with Kolga occurred concurrently with détente between Charles V and Christian III. In the years 1543 and 1544, the whole Pomeranian nobility together with relatives of Martin Eggbrecht raised complaints in Livonia, Denmark, and Prussia, claiming that the commander (*Komtur*) of Tallinn had either mistreated or even murdered Eggbrecht somewhere around 1537 or 1538.<sup>137</sup> One of the strongest arguments they presented against the Order was that Eggbrecht was imprisoned in Kolga – a fief of the King of Denmark where the Order should not have any jurisdiction.<sup>138</sup> The Pomeranians also tried to impose sanctions on Livonia: in 1539, they had already asked the King of Denmark to arrest goods of Livonian merchants, and at the end of 1544, Eggbrecht's brother asked Duke Adolf of Holstein and Duke Albrecht of Prussia to do the same.<sup>139</sup> The Order claimed that Eggbrecht's death was an accident, that Kolga as part of Northern Estonia was actually under its rule, and that the commander of Tallinn was ready to defend himself in the courts of the Holy Roman Empire.<sup>140</sup> Since there is no information about embargoing Livonian goods, or of judicial processes in the higher courts of the Empire, the conflict was probably solved between the Pomeranians and the commander at the local level.

In 1544, the ownership of Kolga changed, as Natzmer's heir sold it to Gottschalk Remlingrode, a merchant from Tallinn who had a very colourful

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Christian III. *Regesten aus zwei Missivbüchern*, 112, nos. 100, 101. On 28 June of that same year, Tallinn wrote to Christian III that it cannot help him since the town as well as its immediate master, the Order, are both subjects of the Emperor. *Ibid.*, 113, no. 107. Nevertheless, correspondence between Christian III and Tallinn continued. *Ibid.*, 113–114, nos. 108, 111, 112.

<sup>136</sup> *Deutsche Reichstagsakten, Bd. 15: Der Speyrer Reichstag von 1544*, ed. by Erwein Eltz (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 2001), 94; cf. HA 3, no. 1277. The Master of Livonia already knew about the coming treaty in the beginning of May. *Ibid.*, no. 1245/2. The Archbishop of Riga also followed the peace process between the Emperor and the King (*ibid.*, nos 1233, 1239, 1241/1) and expressed his joy when it was achieved (HA 3, no. 1259).

<sup>137</sup> HA 3, nos. 1218/2, 1252 and appendices, 1255, 1273.

<sup>138</sup> HA 3, no. 1252/3.

<sup>139</sup> HA 3, no. 1273.

<sup>140</sup> HA 3, nos. 1252/3, 1252/5; *Regesten aus zwei Missivbüchern*, 115, no. 121.

past.<sup>141</sup> Since the end of the 1520s, he was in conflict with Antwerp over a warrant for his sunken ship, and since he did not obtain a satisfactory solution from the courts of law, he started privateering against ships from the Netherlands, thus alienating himself from the Emperor, but finding support firstly from Lübeck, and later from Denmark and Mecklenburg. It is very probable that due to his earlier connections with Christian III, he was confirmed as royal vassal in Kolga soon after he had purchased the estate.<sup>142</sup> Remlingrode's time in Kolga was far from being unproblematic. In 1546, he imprisoned a Portuguese merchant in Kolga who had connections with his adversaries in the Netherlands. This caused conflict with Tallinn, which wanted to free the merchant and tried to win the King of Denmark to his side, but Christian III decided to support Remlingrode.<sup>143</sup> Additionally, Tallinn also quarrelled with Remlingrode over the rights to fell trees in Kolga – a right that the town had also asserted before Remlingrode's time.<sup>144</sup> However, Remlingrode had far more serious problems. Firstly, he had been unable to pay Natzmer's heirs the whole sum for Kolga. The heirs continued to demand money from him and tried to use the King of Denmark to apply pressure on Remlingrode.<sup>145</sup> Moreover, the heirs of Andreas Deken as well as some burghers of Tallinn also had certain demands on Remlingrode because of Kolga and asked the Master of Livonia for help.<sup>146</sup> In 1549, Remlingrode had to pawn Kolga for 21,000 Riga marks because of his financial problems, with permission from Christian III.<sup>147</sup>

<sup>141</sup> On the sale for 25,700 marks see DRA, Livland A II 5, cadres 9–10, 12–15, 17–20. URL: <https://www.sa.dk/ao-soegesider/da/billedviser?epid=19852679#261328,48887180> (accessed: 11 November 2022); on Remlingrode see Dieter Heckmann, "Gottschalk Remlinckradt der Mittlere: ein Opfer herzoglich-preußischer Livlandpolitik?", *Preußenland* 41, 1 (2003), 14–25.

<sup>142</sup> DRA, Kolk, Livland A II 5, cadre 10. URL: <https://www.sa.dk/ao-soegesider/da/billedviser?epid=19852679#261328,48887181> (accessed: 11 November 2022).

<sup>143</sup> A year later, Remlingrode's cook killed one of his nephew's servants, and thus had to appear before the town council of Tallinn. Heckmann, "Gottschalk Remlinckradt", 22.

<sup>144</sup> Ritscher, *Reval an der Schwelle, Teil 2*, 46; Heckmann, "Gottschalk Remlinckradt", 21–22.

<sup>145</sup> Heckmann, "Gottschalk Remlinckradt", 21–22. There are many letters in DRA from Natzmer's heirs and from Remlingrode to the King concerning Kolga (e.g., DRA, Livland A II 5, cadres 21–28, 30–33, 41–42. URL: <https://www.sa.dk/ao-soegesider/da/billedviser?epid=19852679#261328,48887192> (accessed: 11 November 2022)).

<sup>146</sup> Cf. DRA, Livland A II 5, cadres 29–30, 36–40. URL: <https://www.sa.dk/ao-soegesider/da/billedviser?epid=19852679#261328,48887200> (accessed: 11 November 2022). It is probable that debt owed to Deken's heirs and burghers of Tallinn already originated from Natzmer's time, at least partially.

<sup>147</sup> DRA, Livland A II 5, cadre 146.

While Christian III backed his vassal Remlingrode, the conflict evolved into a dispute between the Order and the King on the question of whose jurisdiction these cases concerning Kolga belonged to. Probably in direct connection with this dispute, Christian III also claimed in 1549–50 that Danish Crown had not renounced its rights over Northern Estonia, and questioned Order's right of possession.<sup>148</sup> Finally, the King backed down, and the Livonian Master Johann von der Recke (r. 1549–1551) tried to solve the conflict between Remlingrode and his opponents but no effective solution was reached and Master Recke died in May of 1551.<sup>149</sup> Thereafter, in June of 1551, Remlingrode gave up Kolga and Christian III enfeoffed Christoffer von Münchhausen – a brother of Bishop Johannes Münchhausen of Curonia and Osilia – with Kolga and all of Remlingrode's rights to the fief. The conflicts between Remlingrode and his opponents were not solved until 1556.<sup>150</sup>

In addition to connections with Kolga and the Order, King Christian III had quite intense relations with the new Archbishop of Riga, Margrave Wilhelm (r. 1539–1563), in the 1540s. At the time, Wilhelm sought to regain the co-lordship together with the Teutonic Order over the town of Riga, which the Archbishop of Riga had lost in 1524. This was part of Wilhelm's general policy of strengthening his position and weakening the position of his main rival, the Order.<sup>151</sup> To this end, Wilhelm asked for help from several foreign rulers, including the Danish king,<sup>152</sup> and considered taking one of Christian III's brothers or sons as his coadjutor, which would have drastically strengthened his ties with Denmark.<sup>153</sup> Christian III not

<sup>148</sup> Pajung, "The dream of a Baltic Empire?", 319–321.

<sup>149</sup> Cf. DRA, Livland A II 5, cadres 190–288. URL: <https://www.sa.dk/ao-soegesider/da/billedviser?epid=19852679#261328,48887361> (accessed: 11 November 2022); Mollerup, *Daenemark's Beziehungen*, 5, 43–45.

<sup>150</sup> DRA, Livland A II 5, cadres 289–291. URL: <https://www.sa.dk/ao-soegesider/da/billedviser?epid=19852679#261328,48887460> (accessed: 11 November 2022); Mollerup, *Daenemark's Beziehungen*, 45. Dieter Heckmann states that Remlingrode had already died before 1549, as Johann von der Pale, the Stiftsvogt of Turaida, claimed that he had obtained the right to become the next vassal at Kolga since Remlingrode was dead. Heckmann, "Gottschalk Remlickradt", 14–15. However, Pale's letter is only published as a regest (HA 3, no. 1475), and the meaning of the source could be that Pale obtained the right in the event of Remlingrode's death, which probably did not happen for a long time. This is supported by the sources where Remlingrode is also mentioned during the years 1549–51 and it is not indicated that he is not the father but rather the son; instead, it seems that he was still the same person, cf. e.g., DRA, Livland A II 5, cadres 289–291.

<sup>151</sup> Cf. Müller, "Erzbischof Wilhelm", 263–266, 272–278, 308–322.

<sup>152</sup> Cf. HA 3, nos. 1082/2, 1104, 1176/2, 1189/2, 1191, 1194, 1202, 1203, 1203/3, 1206, 1207/2, 1209, 1221, 1221/1, 1227/2, 1242, 1249, 1259, 1270, 1286, 1309, 1315, 1320/4, 1332/3, 1332/4, 1344, 1353/1, 1376/1.

<sup>153</sup> HA 3, nos. 1199, 1203/1, 1213, 1332/2, 1332/4.

only supported this plan but also showed initiative in 1546,<sup>154</sup> and backed Wilhelm diplomatically regarding the question of Riga.<sup>155</sup> The conflict was finally solved by way of a compromise between the Archbishop and the Order in 1546, according to which Wilhelm obtained co-lordship over Riga, but had to give up his plan for taking a princely coadjutor (including a relative of Christian III) for himself.<sup>156</sup>

During the 1550s, Archbishop Wilhelm nevertheless took a princely coadjutor: Duke Christoph of Mecklenburg (1537–1592). This was not a solitary decision of the Archbishop, but rather the King of Poland and the dukes of Mecklenburg and Prussia were behind this so-called coadjutor plan.<sup>157</sup> These princes hoped to involve Christian III in their Livonian undertakings since they thought that the Danish king wanted to regain Northern Estonia. Namely, Christian III was embroiled in a conflict with the Order in Livonia in 1554–55, during which he emphasised his rights over Northern Estonia. But actually, the King only wanted to solidify his position over Kolga.<sup>158</sup> Therefore, the King was content with the current status of Livonia and did not support the politics of the allies of Archbishop Wilhelm, which could potentially have caused Livonia to fall under the influence of the Polish king. Thus, when the conflict culminated with the Coadjutor's Feud (1556–57), during which the Archbishop and his coadjutor were imprisoned by the Order, the envoys of Christian III tried to broker a treaty in support of the main goals of the Order – namely, that Wilhelm would have to give up the position of Archbishop.<sup>159</sup> Even though the feud ultimately ended much more favourably for the Archbishop and the Polish faction in Livonia, the majority of Livonians thereafter considered Denmark as a possible ally, which might help to maintain the integrity of Livonia. This may have been the main reason why most Livonians tried to

<sup>154</sup> HA 3, no. 1332/2.

<sup>155</sup> HA 3, nos. 1183–1184, 1220, 1242, 1277, 1286, 1329, 1332/1, 1332/2.

<sup>156</sup> Cf. "Livländische Urkunden, welche Herr Heinrich von Tiesenhausen der ältere, seiner zu Berson im Jahr 1575 vollendete und handschriftlich hinterlassenen Geschlechtes-Deduction beygefüget hat", *Neue Nordische Miscellaneen* 7–8, ed. by August Wilhelm Hupel (1794), 227–354 (330–340); MLA 5, no. 176; HA 3, nos. 1342, 1364.

<sup>157</sup> For further literature on the coadjutor plan and the ensuing coadjutor feud see: Stefan Hartmann, "Neue Quellen zur livländischen Koadjutorfehde 1555/6", *Aus der Geschichte Alt-Livlands: Festschrift für Heinz von zur Mühlen zum 90. Geburtstag*, ed. by Bernhart Jähnig, Klaus Milizer (Münster: Lit, 2004), 275–306; Madis Maasing, Dmitryi Weber, "Die Gerüchte über den Tod des Erzbischofs Wilhelm von Riga im Sommer 1556", *Acta Historica Tallinnensia* 25:1 (2019), 3–18.

<sup>158</sup> Mollerup, *Daenemark's Beziehungen*, 45–49.

<sup>159</sup> On Denmark's position in the Coadjutor's Feud see Rasmussen, *Die Livländische Krise*, 38–45, 59–62, 77–82.

seek support from the Danish king at the beginning of the Russo-Livonian War (1558–1561/62), which also enabled Duke Magnus of Holstein (1540–83) to obtain the bishoprics of Osilia and Curonia.<sup>160</sup>

### *Conclusions*

Over the first half of the 16<sup>th</sup> century, Livonian-Danish relations were multifaceted and ambiguous. The political situation changed rapidly due to tumultuous events such as the deposing of Christian II and internal feuds. There were also conflicting political factions in both Livonia and Denmark. Nevertheless, some constant factors shaped mutual communication between these two regions on opposite shores of the Baltic Sea. One of the most important of these constant factors seems to have been Prussia and its ruler, Margrave Albrecht, who already sought cooperation with Christian II in the 1510s, and was later in a very close relationship with Frederik I and Christian III. As Grand Master of the Teutonic Order, Albrecht was initially the superior of the Livonian Master, who at least partially had to follow his political course. Nevertheless, there were also complications in relations between the Livonian Master and the Danish king in the 1510s, since the Danish king bought the estate of Kolga, and the topic of a Danish threat to Livonia was brought up due to the privateering warfare on the Baltic Sea. After 1525, Denmark became the most important supporter of Duke Albrecht – the main adversary of the Teutonic Order in Livonia. This had a direct impact on Livonia's politics, as the pro-Prussian faction led by Margrave Wilhelm regarded Frederik I and Christian III as belonging to its most important allies, at least until 1547.

The rich and strategically important estate of Kolga had aroused interest in many powers. These also included the town of Tallinn and the Bishop, as well as numerous individuals who wanted Kolga or held it as a fief or a pawn. Nevertheless, only the Livonian branch of the Teutonic Order and the Danish king were able to claim jurisdiction over it. Its jurisdiction remained disputed because although the estate was the property of the Danish king after 1519/1520, neither he nor the Order was able to secure absolute and lasting control over it. The king often had to deal with affairs

<sup>160</sup> On the Danish position in Livonia at the beginning of the Livonian War, see especially: Rasmussen, *Die Livländische Krise*. On Duke Magnus: Andres Adamson, *Hertsog Magnus ja tema 'Liivimaa kuningriik'* (Tallinn: Tallinna Ülikool, 2009); Ursula Renner, "Herzog Magnus von Holstein als Vasall des Zaren Ivan Grozny", *Deutschland – Livland – Russland. Ihre Beziehungen vom 15. bis 17. Jahrhundert*, ed. by Norbert Angermann (Verlag Nordostdeutsches Kulturwerk, Lüneburg 1988), 137–158.

that were more important than a remote estate, which enabled the Order to actually control the estate for some years in the 1520s and perhaps also during the 1530s. However, the Order did not oppose the king directly, and allowed the monarch's vassals to take over Kolga, albeit begrudgingly. But since the estate and its holders were closely related to Livonian affairs, the question of whose jurisdiction was higher concerning Kolga (e.g., the cases of Eggbrecht and Remlingrode) often arose. A special study could be conducted in the future of the legal status of Kolga estate (e.g., whether the King might have considered the estate as an allodial landholding), as well as disputes over it, since there are many unpublished sources concerning Kolga in the Danish State Archives.

The pro-Prussian party in Livonia often brought up the fact that the Emperor had named the King of Denmark as the protector of the Livonian bishoprics. The party claimed that the protectorship justified Danish support for Margrave Wilhelm's coadjutorship at the end of the 1520s, but also during the Osilian Feud of the 1530s. The party used the same argument again during the 1540s, when Wilhelm became Archbishop and sought support against the Order. Thus, it is ironic that this argument was employed during the period when the Emperor did not acknowledge the reigning kings of Denmark as legitimate rulers. Nevertheless, Danish diplomatic interventions were most effective during the end of the reign of Frederik I, as the king had imprisoned Christian II and was at the height of his military might. Frederik's threat to intervene in Livonian affairs in early 1533 was perhaps the most exemplary case of Danish influence in Livonia during the first half of the 16<sup>th</sup> century, as it led to the willingness of the majority of Livonians, including the Livonian Master, to accept Margrave Wilhelm as the ruler of Osilia. Nevertheless, when Frederik died and Denmark fell into internal strife, the forces opposing Wilhelm and the pro-Prussian party emerged as victorious. One might even say that the start of the Count's Feud in Denmark was decisive for the outcome of the Osilian Feud, as Wilhelm's foreign supporters were unable to pay much attention to his problems in Livonia. At the same time, his adversary Bishop Reinhold managed to obtain the support of most Livonians, as well as the town of Lübeck in the autumn of 1534 – at the most crucial moment of the feud.

The Order countered the pro-Prussian party by sticking to the position of Emperor Charles V that Denmark was not ruled by a legitimate monarch after 1523. The claim that the Danish throne should belong to the heirs of Christian II was used by both Masters Plettenberg (1528) and Brüggenei (1535). Moreover, most Livonians supported the Emperor's position until the signing of the peace treaty between Charles V and Christian III in 1544,

which also included the Livonian Master. Nevertheless, Livonians never opposed either Frederik I or Christian III directly. Their actual adversaries were the brothers Albrecht and Wilhelm, along with their local supporters in Livonia. The Livonians probably did not want to directly oppose the greatest maritime power of the Baltics.

To conclude, the analysis has shown that Denmark was regarded in Livonia as an important force to be reckoned with, both positively and negatively. Compromises were usually possible between the Danes and every Livonian political power. There is also great potential for further research of the relations between the Danish monarch and Livonians – especially the Order and the Archbishop – as dozens of letters from their correspondence are preserved in the Danish National Archives and other archives in the lands around the Baltic Sea.

KEYWORDS: medieval Livonia; Denmark; Livonian-Danish relations; Prussia

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### KOKKUVÕTE: *Liivimaa ja Taani suhted 16. sajandi esimesel poolel*

Artikkel käsitleb Liivimaa poliitiliste jõudude ja Taani kuningriigi vahelisi suhteid 1510.–40. aastatel, keskendudes suhtluse iseloomule ja põhilistele suhtlustemadele. Samuti uuritakse, milline oli Taani roll Liivimaa poliitikas ning kuidas Liivimaal Taanisse suhtuti. Asjaolu, et nii Taani Riigiarhiivis kui ka teistes Läänemere-äärsete riikide arhiivides on Taani ja Liivimaa suhete kohta hulgaliselt seni kasutamata allikaid, annab head võimalused selle teema edasiseks uurimiseks.

Nii Liivimaal kui ka Taanis valitsesid nendel kümnenditel poliitiliselt heitlikud olud ning see mõjutas olulisel määral ka nendevahelisi suhteid. Olulise mõjurina tõuseb Liivimaa ja Taani suhetes esile Preisimaa, mille

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valitseja Brandenburg-Ansbachi markkrahv Albrecht otsis Taanist tuge nii Saksa Ordu kõrgmeisteri (1511–25) kui ka Preisimaa hertsogina (1525–68). Ordu Liivimaa haru suhe Taaniga oli muutlikum, sest 1525. aasta järel sai Preisimaast Saksa ordu Liivimaa haru üks peamisi vastaseid ning seetõttu halvenesid ka ordu suhted Taani kuningaga, kellest sai 1526. aastal Preisimaa hertsogi äi. Juba varem olid ordu ja teistegi liivimaalaste suhteid Taaniga komplitseerinud viimase aeg-ajalt esitatavad taotlused Eestimaa tagasisaamiseks, mida ajuti peeti ka tõsiseks ohuks. Peale selle omandas Taani kuningas 1519.–20. aastal Kolga mõisa, mida ta siiski pidevalt kontrollida ei suutnud ning mille valdus- ja kohtuvõimu üle vaidlesid kuningas ja ordu kuni 1550. aastateni. Ordu ja Taani suhteid muutsid keeruliseks ka suhted keisriga, kuna 1523. aastal kukutatud Christian II oli Karl V õemes ning keiser ei tunnustanud kuni 1544. aastani Taanis võimul olevaid kuningauid. Ordu järgis keisri poliitikat ning aeg-ajalt nimetas ta Taani valitsejaid otse sõnu mittelegitiimseteks.

Liivimaal oli alates 1520. aastate lõpust ka Preisimaa-meelne leer, kes lootis toetust Taani kuningalt. Leeri olulisim esindaja oli Preisimaa hertsogi vend Wilhelm, Riia peapiiskopi koadjuutor (1529–39) ja peapiiskop (1539–63). Taani kuninga diplomaatiline tugi parandas Wilhelmi positsioone Saare-Lääne vaenuse (1532–36) alguses, kui ta lootis saada sealseks piiskopiks. Taanis puhkenud Krahvivaenus (1534–36) ei võimaldanud Wilhelmi välismaistel toetajatel teda aga olulisel määral abistada, mistõttu lõppes Saare-Lääne vaenus Preisimaa-meelse leeri kaotusega, ehkki Krahvivaenus oli võidukas just Wilhelmi toetajatele. 1544. aastal tunnustas keiser Christian III-t Taani legitiimse kuningana ning seda tegi ka Liivimaa orduharu. 1547. aastal suri Preisimaa hertsogi Taani printsessist abikaasa, misjärel lõdvenesid Preisimaa ja tema toetajate sidemed Taaniga oluliselt. Seevastu paranesid ordu ja teiste liivimaalaste suhted Taaniga, nõnda et Liivimaa sõja alguses nähti kuningriiki perspektiivikaima liitlasena.

MÄRKSONAD: Liivimaa; Taani; Liivimaa-Taani suhted; Preisimaa

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