Methis. Studia humaniora Estonica

Marko Pajević poeetilisest mõtlemisest, kirjandusest ja fenomenoloogiast

Jaanus Sooväli — 2024-12-15

„Ning minu maailmapilt laguneb hoogsalt.“ Aira Kaalu kiri Ene Mihkelsonile 6. juulil 1984 / ’And my worldview is rapidly falling apart’. Aira Kaal’s Letter to Ene Mihkelson, 6 July, 1984

Eduard Parhomenko — 2024-12-13

Ülo Matjus fenomenoloogilise mõtlemise teil / Ülo Matjus on the Paths of Phenomenological Thinking

Pille Tekku — 2024-12-13

Teesid: Käesolevas artiklis annan ülevaate filosoofiaprofessor Ülo Matjuse (1942–2023) fenomenoloogilisest mõtlemisest ja tegevusest. Kirjeldan Matjuse kujunemisteed fenomenoloogina, vaatlen tema kirjutatud fenomenoloogia-alaseid tekste, konverentsiettekandeid ning loenguid fenomenoloogilisest filosoofiast. Ülo Matjus oli 1970. aastatest alates üks esimesi fenomenoloogilise filosoofia uurijaid Balti riikides. Ta oli fenomenoloogilise ja olemisajaloolise mõtlemise maaletooja Eestis, selle tõlkija ning õpetaja. Matjuse fenomenoloogia-alane tegevus ei piirdunud aga ainult Eestiga. Ta oli 1970. aastatel seotud Riia fenomenoloogide ringiga ning pidas ettekandeid ka Saksamaal, kohtudes saksa filosoofi Hans-Georg Gadameriga (1900–2002). Ülo Matjuse fenomenoloogia-alased tõlked ja artiklid jäävad kestma ning õpetused jätkuvad tema õpilaste kaudu.

The article introduces professor of philosophy, Ülo Matjus (1942–2023) as a phenomenological thinker. Matjus was a professor of philosophy at the University of Tartu from 1992 to 2015. His research was mainly focused on Roman Ingarden’s (1893–1970), Edmund Husserl’s (1859–1938), and Martin Heidegger’s (1889–1976) philosophy, but he also investigated Estonian intellectual history and was an avid bibliophile. He prepared the establishing of the Chair of Intellectual History at the University of Tartu and also studied Estonian book history and published several articles on the topic.

This article focuses on Ülo Matjus as a phenomenologist. Ülo Matjus was one of the first phenomenological thinkers and researchers of phenomenological philosophy in the Baltic States in the 1970s and also a member of the Latvian Circle of Phenomenology in the same time period. Matjus started his phenomenological journey in the Soviet Union in the 1970s when Estonia was one of its parts. His earlier articles were written in Russian due to the Russian occupation and the restrictions posed by it in the Baltic States. These—for example the article ‘The Problem of the Being of “Material Things” in E. Husserl’s Phenomenology’ (1988) introduced Roman Ingarden’s and Edmund Husserl’s phenomenological thinking to the Soviet intellectuals. His doctoral dissertation was also written in Russian, and was concerned with Roman Ingarden’s aesthetical views on art—its title is The Problem of Intentionality in Roman Ingarden’s Aesthetics. The thesis was supervised by professor Leonid Stolovitš (1929–2013) and defended in Riga, Latvia in 1975.

Since the 1990s when Estonia restored its independence, Matjus could concentrate more on Martin Heidegger’s thinking. He had an opportunity to meet and talk with Heidegger’s student, the philosopher Hans-Georg Gadamer (1900–2002) in Bonn (in Bad Godesberg) on the symposium ‘On Heidegger’s Philosophical Relevance’ (1989). Matjus participated in the event as a scholarship holder for the Alexander von Humboldt’s Foundation and gave a presentation (Matjus [1989]2004b, 313). In 1993 Matjus also had a conversation with Martin Heidegger’s son Hermann Heidegger (1920–2020) about translation of Martin Heidegger’s Introduction to Metaphysics into Estonian (Matjus 1999, 278–280).

Matjus translated several phenomenological texts, for example Heideggers Introduction to Metaphysics and The Origin of the Work of Art into Estonian (1999 and 2002, respectively) and wrote afterwords to the translations. He also translated some articles and presentations by Heiddeger, for example ‘The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking’ (Estonian in 1989), ‘A Question about Technique’ (1989), ‘Creative Landscape. Why we Stay in Province’ (1989), ‘Spiegel’s Conversation with Martin Heidegger’ (1992) and ‘Phenomenology and Theology’ (1994). He also translated Edmund Husserl’s The Paris Lectures (1993), to which he wrote an introduction entitled ‘Edmund Husserl on the Paths of Descartes’.

Matjus taught several courses on phenomenology at the University of Tartu since the 1990s and attended conferences both in Estonia as well as in Latvia and Germany. For example, in 1995/1996–2001/2002 he gave a lecture course “The Basics of Aesthetics” (later “Aesthetics” and “Aesthetics II”) at the University of Tartu, which introduced traditional European philosophical aesthetics and Heidegger’s non-metaphysical aesthetics from The Origin of the Work of Art. In addition, Matjus gave lecture courses entitled ‘Development of Phenomenology and its Basic Problems’ in 1997/1998 and 1999/2000 and ‘Phenomenology from the Estonian Perspective’ (2012/2013, 2013/2014 and 2015/2016).

Matjus also gave presentations on phenomenological philosophy, for example, ‘On the Interdisciplinary Origin of Phenomenology’ (2014) and ‘On the Benefits and Harms of Intentionality’ (2010) at the Annual Conferences of Estonian Philosophy. Some of his students have also studied phenomenology—Margit Sutrop (b. 1963), Anne Kokkov (1960–2017) and Juhan Hellerma (b. 1986) wrote their MA theses about phenomenology.

Matjus also applied a phenomenological and open-minded attitude (i.e. an attitude without prejudice) in his life. As a professor and phenomenologist, he warned his students what to beware of, and toward which one must hold on to, which is part of phenomenological attitude, but let them stay themselves at the same time. He had respect for his students. He was very supportive and at the same time taught them that you have to find your own way. His teachings now live on through his students.

Poeetiline mõtlemine, kirjandus ja fenomenoloogia Peter Handke teadvuspoeetika näitel / Poetic Thinking, Literature and Phenomenology—on the Example of Peter Handke’s Poetics of Awareness

Marko Pajević — 2024-12-13

Teesid: Käesolev artikkel toob esile seose kirjanduse ja fenomenoloogia vahel. See rõhutab eeskätt keele tähtsust fenomenide tajumisel. Seejärel keskendub see 2019. aasta Nobeli kirjandusauhinna laureaadi Peter Handke poeetikale, kusjuures kõigepealt visandatakse lühidalt tema aistimispoeetika, et siis lühiteksti „Spliti saapapuhastaja“ („Der Schuhputzer von Split“) näitel välja tuua, mispoolest seda kirjutamise viisi võib nimetada fenomenoloogiliseks, mida seejärel süvendatakse tema poetoloogiliste mõtteavalduste varal. Sealjuures viidatakse ikka ja jälle ka minu poeetilise mõtlemise mõistele.

This article shows the relationship between literature and phenomenology, referring throughout to my concept of poetic thinking. It starts out by emphasising the importance of language for the perception of phenomena. It then focuses on the poetics of Peter Handke, winner of the 2019 Nobel Prize for Literature, first briefly outlining his poetics of perception and then using the example of his short text ‘The Shoe Shiner of Split’ to demonstrate how this type of writing is phenomenological, which is then deepened by means of his poetological statements.

Phenomenology explores how people experience things. Edmund Husserl, the founder of phenomenology, argued against empirical views, building on Immanuel Kant’s transcendental philosophy and asserting that the human world is always shaped by our means of perception. He introduced the concept of epoché, which involves suspending judgment to analyse experiences. Husserl’s focus on the perception of phenomena aimed to avoid prejudices in the cognitive process and establish phenomenology as a rigorous science. The world is thus always the result of the perceiver’s historical, cultural and social situatedness. To understand the world better, we must thus better understand the processes of perception.

Language plays a crucial role in phenomenology and the processes of perception. Wilhelm von Humboldt described languages as worldviews, which shape our cognition and understanding of the world. Language is essential for making sensory experiences intelligible. Literature, as the art of language, serves as a laboratory for these processes, transforming our perceptions through poetic thinking, that is, the constitution of a subject in creative and dialogical speech, transforming its ways of feeling and thinking in short, its ways of perceiving the world.

Handke’s short text ‘The Shoe Shiner of Split’ describes an encounter between a traveller and a shoe shiner in Split, set against a backdrop rich in religious and philosophical undertones. The traveller, after contemplating religious figures at the cathedral, witnesses the shoe shiner meticulously polishing his own shoes with extraordinary care and precision. Moved by the shoe shiner’s dedication, the traveller decides to have his own shoes shined. The shoe shiner’s actions are depicted with reverence, emphasising the spiritual and ceremonial nature of his work. His care transforms the traveller’s shoes into shining artifacts, providing a sense of enlightenment and healing. This act is portrayed as a form of anointment, resonating with religious themes and the traveller’s search for meaning. Handke’s use of language underlines the transformative power of attention to the phenomena. This experience underscores Handke’s broader literary theme of finding deep significance and beauty in ordinary moments, bridging the gap between the human being and the world, aligning with phenomenological principles of perception.

After an analysis of Handke’s phenomenological writing in this short text, the article further explores in Handke’s poetological writings how his poetic thinking relates to phenomenology. Handke’s view of ‘life without poetry’ is characterised by a lack of feeling and detachment from the world, functioning mechanically within it. Conversely, poetry brings a sense of connection and self-awareness. For Handke, writing is a realisation of this connection, identifying art with intense and aware perception, making it a gateway to the world and feelings.

Handke’s approach aligns with Martin Buber’s ‘realising thinking’ in dialogical thinking, differentiating veritable reality from conventional reality. This veritable reality is the domain of art. Paul Cézanne’s art influences Handke, teaching the importance of perspective shifts to awaken the inner richness. Handke values the ‘presence’ in art, where moments become constitutive of life. He uses terms such as ‘now-time’ from Walter Benjamin to highlight art’s role in making the present meaningful and transformative.

Handke’s poetics, however, differs from Buber’s dialogical thinking, which emphasises the subject–subject relationship. Handke remains in a subject–object framework, focusing on individual perception and on the connection of an ‘I’ with the world, rather than an encounter of two subjects. Despite this difference, his work parallels the pursuit of connection and world-feeling found in poetic thinking.

Literature, in Handke’s view, in granting the phenomena attention, makes the things reveal themselves, thus showing their appreciation (‘das Sich-Erkenntlich-Zeigen der Dinge’). This perspective aligns with phenomenology but also transcends it by actively creating a human world through poetic transformation. Handke’s poetics epitomises phenomenology’s focus on perception. Handke’s literature is phenomenological because it recognises that phenomena gain their meaning through the human meaning-making perception process. However, poetic thinking extends beyond phenomenology by being inherently creative. It does not merely analyse phenomena but actively participates in their creation. Through poetic thinking, a human world emerges, continuously formed and reformed by our engagement with it.

Kirjeldamisest lavastamiseni. Loovuurimuslik vaade / From Describing to Staging: A Practice-as-Research Look

Karl Saks — 2024-12-13

Teesid: Käesolev artikkel tutvustab TÜ Viljandi kultuuriakadeemias etenduskunstide õppekava lavastaja eriala üliõpilastega läbiviidud loovuurimuslikku projekti, mille eesmärk oli luua ja katsetada erisuguseid kujutlusvõimet käivitavaid ülesandeid. Lähtuti hüpoteesist, et ekfraasi ning hõreda ja tiheda kirjelduse kasutamine tekitab üliõpilastel uusi kompositsioonilisi ideid ja võimaldab neil jõuda oma loomingus uute töövõteteni. Uurimus kinnitas, et teistest uurimuslikest praktikatest pärit meetodite rakendamine etenduskunstide kontekstis on viljakas ning üliõpilased kasutasid kirjeldamist nii lavastusprotsessi ettevalmistamisel kui ka lavastuses endas. Projekti lõppedes võib väita, et õppeprotsessi käigus selgines mudel, mis on potentsiaalselt universaalne, korratav ja kasutatav.

The article presents an overview of a practice-as-research project carried out with the directing students of the University of Tartu’s Viljandi Culture Academy. The aim of the project was to apply and analyse creative practices that are based on ekphrastic and thin and thick description to find out whether and how these kinds of practices activate the imagination of the students in creating their own personal performances.

Viljandi Culture Academy is currently restructuring its study curriculum for directing students. The focus point will be on the students’ own author-positions and de-hierarchisation of theatrical signs, meaning that the postdramatic theatre approach is more included in the study programme.

The research project was carried out with the second-year directing students. The undergraduates participated in the following activities: 1) describing different environments; 2) practising thin description, thick description and ekphrasis; 3) activating imagination through descriptive practices; 4) getting acquainted with different works by various video artists; 5) montage. All these exercises were meant to support the creation process of an individual performance, the outcome of the course.

Semi-structured interviews were carried out with five directing students at the end of the course. One aim of the interviews was enabling the students to reflect how and whether they had used description-based exercises in preparing their individual performances. The interviews were coded and analysed using qualitative content analysis.

The results enable us to conclude that thin and thick description and ekphrasis activated students’ imagination on different levels. The exercises were used for activating imagination as well as supporting the composition process of directing, while two students out of five also used these techniques in their own performances, not only during the rehearsal process. In addition, using descriptive practices directed the students’ attention to different elements in the environment and thus raised the understanding of the concept of de-hierarchization of theatrical signs.

Describing more dynamic and unfamiliar environments quickens the activation of creativity. However, describing as an exercise should be used repeatedly, and theoretical concepts (thin and thick description and ekphrasis) should be explained more thoroughly to students. Even though using descriptive practices for preparing the individual performances was optional, all of the students used them.

Both the learning process and then the research proved that description is useful in activating imagination as well supporting the understanding of composing practices. Description as a creative practice should be used repeatedly in order to turn it into a habit. It raises one’s awareness of the surrounding environments and enables the student to notice how he or she uses his or her different senses. Being able to describe—therefore express verbally both auditory and visual elements present in the environment—is a very relevant skill for directors.

The research shows that using ekphrasis and thin and thick description—methods used in other fields—is a fruitful practice and the description based exercises are later useful in their professional career as directors.

We argue that we developed a model that is potentially universal, repeatable and useful and the authors recommend using it in teaching some other art studies. It is also recommended to use the model again in a similar learning process.

Rahvapsühholoogia ajalised piirid / Temporal Limits of Folk Psychology

Bruno Mölder — 2024-12-13

Teesid: Kas meie igapäevane raamistik vaimunähtuste tähistamiseks ehk rahvapsühholoogia rakendub ajaliste piiranguteta? Või ei rakendu rahvapsühholoogia mikroskaalal (millisekunditest kuni sadade millisekunditeni). Käesolev artikkel vaeb seda küsimust ja uurib, et mis järeldub sellest vaimsete nähtuste olemuse kohta, kui rahvapsühholoogia mikroskaalal ei rakendu. Vaatluse alla tuleb eeldus, mille kohaselt vaimseid seisundeid individueeritakse rahvapsühholoogia kaudu. Toon välja mitmesuguseid võimalusi käsitada rahvapsühholoogia, mikroskaala ja mentaalse omavahelist seost.

It has been claimed that familiar psychological categories do not apply at a very short time scale. The conceptual framework that collects our everyday psychological notions is called ‘folk psychology’. This paper explores the following question: is there a limited time scale in which folk psychology is applicable, and if that is the case, then what does this tell us about the nature of mental phenomena? In particular, the question concerns the applicability of folk psychology at the microscale (ranging from milliseconds up to hundreds of milliseconds). I outline several options concerning the relationship between folk psychology, the microscale and the mental.

Why does this matter? First, this is important since if folk psychology applies only within certain temporal limits, this is an obstacle to developing models of micro-scale time consciousness in folk-psychological terms. Second, ‘folk psychology’ can be understood as just another name for a set of mental terms. This is not an innocent assumption. If this assumption holds, then the folk conception tacitly settles which properties are mental. We can call this assumption the ‘Principle of Folk Individuation’ (FIP): mental states are individuated only through folk psychology.

If folk psychology is limited to a macroscale, and the FIP holds, then processes happening outside this scale at the millisecond range are not mental. This presumes that the mental is recognition-dependent: a property is mental only if it has a specification in mental (folk) terms; if it lacks it, there is no reason to classify it as mental. On the other hand, if folk psychology is limited to the macroscale, but there are good reasons to think that the mind is not, then this tells against the Folk Individuation Principle.

Some reasons for considering certain events at the microscale as mental, albeit not part of folk psychology, could be found in research in psychology, where scientists have ascertained certain modality-dependent thresholds for distinguishing stimuli. The lowest threshold is for auditory stimuli (only a two-ms interval between stimuli suffices to detect them as separate). The ordering of stimuli requires intervals between stimuli of at least 20 ms. Are these discriminations mental? Prima facie, they must be, for these are conscious events. Therefore, they provide a counterexample to the FIP. This would lead to the position that the microscale processes are mental.

At this point, someone who would like to keep the FIP might argue that considerations based on temporal thresholds do not show that the microscale events are mental but not folk-psychological. First, one could hold that these short-lived conscious experiences are neural states and that the brain has better temporal resolution than the mind/folk psychology. However, this reply might cause difficulties in giving a full picture of how neural consciousness relates to mental events. If microscale conscious events are merely neural, one is faced with the task of explaining at what point a conscious event becomes properly mental. The second option is to point out that ‘conscious experience’ is a folk-psychological term, too. Hence, considerations from temporal thresholds do not tell against the FIP. However, one may ask if the term ‘experience’ applies without problems to these discriminatory states. For instance, how can we tell that these states are perceptual experiences, not recent memories?

There is another option. There is no need to construe folk psychology narrowly as a theory of beliefs, desires, memories and thoughts. In principle, folk psychology can be extended and developed: it could also include reference to events that take place at the microscale. We would need a new vocabulary to characterise those states, but this new vocabulary could still be part of an extended folk psychology—folk psychology 2.0. In this way, we could keep the FIP by updating it to state that mental states are individuated only through folk psychology 2.0 (which includes folk psychology and more). Then, one could say that although folk psychology, as traditionally conceived, applies only at the macroscale, folk psychology 2.0 also spans the microscale.

Käsitsi süvavõltsitud maailm. Postfenomenoloogiline uurimus inimese ja pilditehnika suhte muutustest süvavõltsingute kontekstis / The Handmade Deepfake World: A Postphenomenological Study of the Changing Human–Imaging Technology Relation...

Kevin Rändi — 2024-12-13

Teesid: Artikkel pöörab postfenomenoloogilise pilgu süvavõltsingutele. Postfenomenoloogia on subjektiivsest kogemusest lähtuv mõtteviis, mis uurib, kuidas tehnika kui materiaalsed esemed ja nende kasutusviisid mõjutavad tähendusloomet. Artiklis keskendume süvavõltsingutega kaasnevale inimese ja maailma suhtele, mille keskmes on pilditehnika ja salvestised. Oma käsitluses toome välja, et süvavõltsingute kogemusega kaasneb arusaam digitaalsete salvestiste episteemilistest normidest, mis sarnanevad käsitsi tehtud piltide omadega.

Artificial intelligence (AI) exerts a transformative pressure on our ongoing engagement with other technologies and on our meaning-making practices as they relate to ourselves as well as the world. Intriguing predictions and narratives about possible future outcomes, however, are not limited to AI as a ubiquitous technology that needs careful ethical consideration. Some relevant issues concern our present-day imaging technologies. Photos, videos, and other recordings have traditionally contributed to the creation of a shared understanding regarding the facts. Machine learning algorithms enable the creation of different forms of synthetic media, including deepfakes, which greatly simplify the manipulation of recordings. Deepfakes are notorious because they enable the generation of believable recordings of events that never took place by, for example, seamlessly replacing human faces and voices. After they emerged sometime around 2017, deepfakes have been used for generating involuntary pornographic material and spreading political disinformation. Such uses may be reason enough for taking legislative actions toward combating deepfakes.

Moral issues notwithstanding, an underlying intellectual concern has to do with the future of trust in recordings as a means of establishing the facts. The ubiquity of AI tools that facilitate the manipulation of recordings in ways that make them indistinguishable from real ones could further exacerbate the problem of disinformation. As such, deepfakes are a serious threat that cause epistemic harm and could possibly bring about a form of dystopia called the ‘infocalypse’ (Schick 2020). This possibly leads to a loss of control over information on a large scale.

We consider deepfakes from a phenomenological point of view that puts special emphasis on the role of technologies (or artefacts) as mediators of how the world gains its meaning (Verbeek 2005), known as postphenomenology. Don Ihde (1934–2024), the originator of postphenomenological thought, emphasised the practice-oriented, both culturally and technologically textured lifeworlds in which humans make sense of their surrounding world, and often use artefacts in diverse ways. Thus, postphenomenological research avoids totalising accounts of the future—like the infocalypse—and instead focuses on the complexities found in the practices and varieties of human–technology relations. Regarding deepfakes, this means taking a socio-technically embedded view of embodied human beings and their engagement with imaging technologies in which machine learning plays an active role in shaping our experience of the images.

From a postphenomenological perspective, the relation between humans and technology that characterises our use of imaging technologies is a hermeneutic one. The world mediated through technological imaging could be more ‘transparent’ for experts than non-experts and relies on strategies for interpreting the image (Rosenberger 2008). On the screens of our everyday life, even though many users are familiar with the technical or platform-related context of recordings, it could nevertheless be argued that deepfakes further dissolve our ability to interpret and change strategies to distinguish a truthful representation from a deceptive one.

However, a purely postphenomenological account would provide an incomplete understanding of deepfakes and the possibilities of meaning-making through imaging technologies. With the increasing involvement of AI and algorithms in imaging technologies, postphenomenology has recognised the need for expanding hermeneutic human-technology relations (Wiltse 2014; Wellner 2020). Furthermore, AI poses problems for artefact-centred approaches in postphenomenology (Coeckelbergh 2022). In light of this, we argue for a socio-technical systems approach to human-technology relations combined with postphenomenology in the context of AI. From this combined theoretical perspective, , we argue for a hermeneutical programme that accounts for how humans can change the perspectives from which they view recordings and how this influences their interpretations of said recordings . This is also significant for ethical purport in design against deepfakes.

Contrary to other philosophical explanations, we argue that deepfakes are epistemically harmful because they undermine trust in recording technologies. This changes our hermeneutic relationship with recordings. We analyse this change by comparing how traditional and digital photography mediates our relationship with the world. Relying on Hopkins (2012), we then suggest that deepfake technology, viewed as an AI system (a subtype of socio-technical systems), changes our hermeneutic relationship to recordings so that it begins to resemble our relationship to handmade images. After analysing the latter, we conclude that the reliability of recordings, in the age of deepfakes, depends on their provenance and the reputation of their source, as is the case with handmade images. In other words, deepfakes change the epistemic norms associated with and our hermeneutic relationship to recordings so that they resemble those we have toward handmade images.

Passiivne süntees kultuurifenomenoloogias / Passive Synthesis in Cultural Phenomenology

Regina-Nino Mion — 2024-12-13

Teesid: Oma artiklis soovin arutleda kultuurifenomenoloogia kui meetodi üle. Sel teemal on Tõnu Viik avaldanud mitmeid nii inglis- kui ka eestikeelseid artikleid. Ma leian, et Viigi arendatud kultuurifenomenoloogia on liialt Husserli staatilise fenomenoloogia raamistikus – otsides invariantseid, eideetilisi struktuure (noeem–noees). Oma hilisemas filosoofias arendab Husserl aga geneetilist fenomenoloogiat. Kui uurida tähendusloome protsesse, siis peaks kindlasti vaatama Husserli geneetilist fenomenoloogiat ja tema aktiivse ja passiivse sünteesi ideed. Ma soovin näidata, et just kogemuse passiivne tasand aitab seletada mõningate kultuuriobjektide kogemist, samuti kultuurikriiside tekkeid ja nendest väljatulekuid.

The aim of the article is to contribute to the study of the methodology of cultural phenomenology based on Edmund Husserl’s philosophy. More specifically, it aims to develop further, but also criticise, Tõnu Viik’s understanding of the meaning-formation in Husserl’s phenomenology. I find that the cultural phenomenology developed by Viik is too constrained in the framework of Husserl’s static phenomenology, describing the invariant, eidetic structure of consciousness. Husserl later developed genetic phenomenology that, in my view, is better suited to examine the processes of meaning-formation. This is why the concepts of passive and active synthesis in genetic phenomenology become important.

According to Husserl’s distinction between passive and active synthesis (or genesis) presented in the Cartesian Meditations, passive synthesis is the lowest level of our experience. However, active synthesis, as a higher form, necessarily presupposes the passive synthesis in which the objects are already given. In active genesis, the Ego functions through specific Ego-acts that are productively constitutive. On the basis of already given objects (in passive synthesis), active synthesis can constitute new objects originally. As Anthony Steinbock emphasises, it is important to see that already passive synthesis functions to form intelligible, meaningful wholes out of diverse manifolds. Thus, passive synthesis is an important part of meaning-formation.

In Experience and Judgment, Husserl divides passive synthesis into primary or original passivity (ursprüngliche Passivität) and secondary passivity (sekundäre Passivität). The former is a mere act of receiving the sense originally preconstituted in passivity and involves the structures of association and affection. Secondary passivity involves, for instance, habituality and traditions or sedimentations. In my article, I would like to show that the concept of primary passivity can be used to explain our strong emotional responses to certain cultural objects and that the concept of secondary passivity can be useful in understanding the emergence of cultural crises and the ways to overcome them.

Simon Høffding and Tone Roald argue in their article ‘Passivity in Aesthetic Experience’ (2019) that Husserl’s concepts of passive synthesis and passivity are helpful in explaining intense aesthetic experience, that is, the experience of being moved or carried away, or the putative experiences of subject–object fusion. Harri Mäcklin follows Høffding and Roald’s approach in his article “Ingarden, Dufrenne, and the Passivity of Aesthetic Experience” (2021) and summarises ‘passive synthesis’ in the following way: it is a peculiar experience of which I have a sense of ownership (a sense of being the one who experiences the results of those acts), but no sense of agency (a sense of being the instigator of those acts). In my article, I take this description of passive synthesis to correspond to Husserl’s primary passivity and suggest that it is not limited to aesthetic experience. Some ordinary everyday life objects that we own, such as a cup of coffee, can evoke strong affective responses in us, so much so that we might even be reluctant to let someone else touch them. These experiences could be explained by the concept of primary passivity.

Many of Husserl’s texts suggest that cultural crises are instigated by the upsurge of passive tendencies (containment, impotence and servitude). To overcome crises, we need renewal (Erneuerung) which can only be achieved through activity. As Husserl argues in the so-called Kaizo-articles, passive tendencies obstruct reflection and self-evaluation, that is, truly authentic human life. Authenticity consists in the sovereignty of the rational, active self over the passive self. However, as many Husserl scholars have shown, passivity can also play an important role in overcoming cultural crises. Victor Biceaga shows that there is no clear-cut divide between passivity and activity in Husserl’s philosophy. Moreover, passive sedimentations (secondary passivity) are necessary for the conservation of actively thought. Thus, passivity not only causes cultural crises, but also contributes to the accomplishment of the renewals.

This article highlights the importance of distinguishing between passive and active synthesis to emphasise that passivity plays an important role in meaning-formation. A further step would be to examine whether primary and secondary passivity are culture-defined, culturally dependent. For example, is the strongly emotional experience of works of art specific to certain cultures? Or, do cultural crises manifest differently in cultures that do not consider rationality (Rationalität) and free will to be the ‘highest’ form of life?