Normativity and Deflationary Theories of Truth

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It has been argued that deflationary theories of truth stumble over the normativity of truth. This paper maintains that the normativity objection does not pose problems to at least one version of deflationism, minimalism. The rest of the paper discusses truth-related norms, showing that either they do not hold or they are not troublesome for deflationism.

Keywords: normativity, truth, minimalism

1. Introduction

There is a common but seldom questioned assumption in the literature on normativity that truth is a norm. For the most part, it is claimed that truth is a norm for belief and assertion. Its being a norm, it is argued further, constitutes a problem for deflationary accounts of truth that do not treat truth as a substantial property.[1] These points are separate, the second rests on the former claim that truth is indeed a norm for belief and assertion. For only if truth is a norm can one argue that due to the normativity of truth, deflationary accounts of truth are in trouble. This paper discusses both issues—truth as a norm and the normativity objection to deflationism. In the first part of the paper, it will be argued that normativity poses no problems for deflationism and the second part calls for the dissolution of the whole issue by arguing that the alleged normativity has nothing to do with truth. The second part yields independent support to the first part. It is pointed out in the second part that even if there are truth-related normative

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[1] Cf. (Dummett 1959) for an early statement of such a line of argument.

statements, deflationists need not worry about them as they do not have to be explained by an account of truth. Furthermore, there are reasons to doubt that such truth-related statements make up norms for assertion and belief.

2.   Deflationism about truth and the normativity objection

Before one can spell out the normativity objection to deflationism, a brief introduction to deflationism about truth is needed. There are various deflationary accounts of truth in the philosophical literature. The most well-known accounts are the redundancy theory (Strawson 1950), Tarski's theory of truth (Tarski 1944), the sentence-variable analysis (Ramsey 1927, Künne 2003), the disquotational theory (Quine 1992, Field 1994), prosentential theory (Grover et al. 1975, Brandom 1994) and the minimalist theory (Horwich 1998b).[2] There are at least two things common to accounts described as deflationary. First, they claim that 'is true' does not stand for a substantial property, that is, a property that has an underlying nature which can be given a reductive analysis in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. Having no underlying nature, truth cannot be used to explain some other subject-matter. Second, they attempt to elucidate the concept of truth in terms of a certain formal role in sentences, in propositions or in utterances.

Although there are several important differences between deflationary accounts, I ignore the differences here and concentrate on Paul Horwich's (1998b) minimalist theory of truth. I do this partly for the ease of exposition and partly for the reason that the problem of normativity has been mainly discussed in relation to Horwich's work. But it is generally conceded that normativity poses a broadly similar problem for all deflationary accounts of truth (cf. McGrath 2003, 48), so this simplification should not have great significance.

In Horwich's account, propositions are primary bearers of truth. His minimalist theory of truth can be presented by the equivalence schema

(E) $<p>$ is true if and only if p

where $<p>$ abbreviates 'the proposition that p'. The brackets, '$<$', '$>$', when applied to p, thus produce a singular term that refers to the proposition expressed by p. The minimalist theory consists of all the propositions that are expressed by the (non-paradoxical) instances of the schema (E), e.g., 'The proposition that *Snow is white is true* if and only if snow is white'.

The account is deflationary, for it claims that the instances of the equivalence schema capture everything that can be said about truth. No further

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[2] For a closer overview of all these deflationary theories, see (Horwich 2005b).

substantial account is required. (E) is neither an analysis nor a explicit definition of truth, but it helps to explain certain facts about truth, that is, the role of the truth predicate as a device of semantic ascent and its role in facilitating certain generalisations.[3] Horwich provides an explanation of what it is to have the *concept* of truth by means of (E)—it is to be inclined to accept the instances of the very schema, that is, instances of '<*p*> is true if and only if *p*'. He also claims that this fixes the *meaning* of 'true'. But what is crucial is that such an account about the possession of the concept and its meaning does not yet inflate the conception of truth.

Given this outline of minimalism as an example of a deflationary theory of truth, we can begin to discuss the normativity objection. A few preliminary remarks on normativity are needed at this stage. The requisite refinements are provided later. Normativity is usually unpacked in terms of 'oughts' (e.g., Hattiangadi 2006, Whiting 2007). Normative 'ought'-statements are action-guiding, in other words, they prescribe an action. Similarly, we can say that a property is normative if its obtaining constitutes a prescription for an action. Given this understanding, to claim that truth is normative is to claim that the statement's being true generates certain prescriptions for acquiring or modifying beliefs and making assertions. Derivatively, we can specify the property of being a norm as the property of being something that makes up the prescription.

What is the normativity objection to deflationary theories of truth? It is difficult to spell out precisely, but the intuition should be clear enough. The basic idea is that deflationary theories are incomplete, since they do not capture the normativity of truth. As truth is an insubstantial notion and plays a purely formal role in deflationary accounts, these accounts cannot capture the substantial aspect of the concept of truth, which is that we treat truth as a norm for such areas of discourse as believing and asserting.

As already noted, the objection from normativity to deflationary theories originates in (Dummett 1959).[4] Drawing on an analogy between the concept of truth and the winning of a game, he argues that one could specify every rule of a game (e.g. chess) and the conditions for winning, but something would still remain unsaid. This is the fact that the game is played with the *aim* of winning. Arguably, it is similarly a part of the concept of truth that we ought to aim to tell the truth or ought to believe only what is true, and

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[3] The claim that the schema (E) explains facts about truth is consistent with deflationism. A deflationist can say that truth is an insubstantial property that cannot be analysed, and that facts about the property can be explained by some simple principle (McGrath 2003, 50). What is crucial is that there are no facts about the insubstantial property that do not fall out from the schema (E).

[4] Here I rely on the construal of the objection by Hattiangadi (2006, 233).

this element of the concept of truth is not captured by deflationary theories.

A refined objection to deflationary theories from the normativity of truth has been presented by Crispin Wright (1992, 1999). He points out the following inconsistency in deflationary theories. On the one hand, they claim that 'is true' does not stand for a substantial property, but, on the other hand, they claim that the role of a truth-predicate is to endorse a proposition as complying with a certain norm. This itself is not yet enough to generate incoherence. After all, a deflationist could reply that no truth norms would be left out, for the only norms at issue would be the unproblematic norms of epistemic justification (Wright 1999, 212). Even if the truth-predicate is sometimes used to mark the fact that the proposition complies with some norm, then this would just amount to using the truth-predicate to emphasise that the proposition is epistemically warranted. However, Wright argues further that the deflationist is forced to claim that these norms are distinct from the norms of epistemic justification, for truth commutes with negation, while norms of epistemic justification do not. To make it clear that the norm of truth differs from the norm of epistemic warrant, (Wright 1999, 212–213) presents the following argument:

From the schema

It is true that p iff p

we can get by negating both sides of the biconditional

It is not true that p iff $\sim p$.

By substituting '$\sim p$' for 'p' in the schema, we get

It is true that $\sim p$ iff $\sim p$.

As biconditionals are transitive, we get from the last two principles

It is not true that p iff it is true that $\sim p$.

However, this cannot be done for norms of epistemic justification. An inference of

It is the case that $\sim p$ is warranted

from

It is not the case that p is warranted

cannot be sound.

Wright claims that this is most obvious in cases where we have neither justification for nor against p. His conclusion is thus that a proposition's compliance with a norm of truth differs from its compliance with the

norms of epistemic justification. But this has important consequences for deflationism—if there is a special norm of truth and if the role of the truth-predicate is to endorse compliance with this norm, then truth is a substantial property. Hence, truth cannot be an insubstantial property as deflationism claims.

However, there are several reasons to remain unpersuaded by this argument. First, as Miller (2001) has pointed out, there is an easy way to neutralise Wright's argument. Namely, Wright (1999, 212) himself subscribes to the distinction between *a word expressing no property* and *a word expressing no property but being used to commend items for their possession of a certain property*. This can be viewed as a version of the idea that something non-normative can have normative implications (Horwich 1998a, 188). A deflationist could employ this distinction and claim that the predicate 'is true' commends propositions as complying with some norm, whereas it does not yet follow that 'is true' expresses this norm. One can then still claim that 'is true' expresses no substantial property.

The second problem with the argument has to do with how Wright has set up the position he is arguing against: it is not part of every deflationary theory that the function of a truth-predicate is to endorse or to commend a proposition (Horwich 1996, 879). As outlined above, Horwich's minimalism holds instead that the function of a truth-predicate is to provide semantic ascent and facilitate generalisations.

Horwich himself has argued in reply to Wright that a deflationary account could fully capture the norm of truth in the sense that it can explain how we use the truth-predicate to formulate the norm. Let us view briefly how this works in (Horwich 1996, 880):

Assume the generalisation:

If one believes that p, one has reason to say $\ulcorner p \urcorner$

Given the deflationary account, this can be rewritten as

If one believes of $<p>$ that it is true, then one has reason to say $\ulcorner p \urcorner$

Instances of this schema can be summarised as:

$(\forall x)$(If one believes of x that it is true, then one has reason to say x)

Informally, this can be formulated as a norm of assertion: one has reason to assert any sentence one believes to be true.

Horwich's point is that the truth-predicate is used here only as a generalisation device. Thus the very claim that truth is a norm of assertion is a result of generalisations that are made possible by the deflationary truth-predicate. Of course, this does not solve the further question of whether there really is

such a norm. The point is just that *given* the premise about the connection between belief, reason and assertion, the minimalist account of truth can be used to derive the normative statement that includes the truth-predicate.

In a recent book, Horwich (2005a) tackles the normativity issue again and attempts to reduce norms of truth to norms of meaning, while arguing that the latter are not problematic to his account. The norms of meaning, according to Horwich, are prudential norms that benefit those who follow them. Such norms are not constitutive to meaning and they do not challenge deflationism. Horwich's idea is thus that the norm of truth for belief:

> "It is desirable (i.e. our aim ought to be) to believe only what is true"
> (Horwich 2005a, 108)

is just a generalisation of particular belief norms

> "It is desirable to believe that dogs bark, only if dogs bark
> It is desirable to believe that killing is wrong, only if killing is wrong
> …and so on." (Horwich 2005a, 111)

The latter can be shown to be equivalent to the norm of meaning:

> "If a sentence means *that dogs bark*, then it is desirable for us to accept it only if dogs bark; and if a sentence means *that killing is wrong*, then our aim ought to be that we accept it only if killing is wrong, …, and so on." (Horwich 2005a, 108)

It is not necessary to dwell on details of this derivation, for the main idea should be evident enough: there are several ways for deflationism (in the form of the minimalist theory) to counter one of the main arguments from the normativity of truth. However, it is still not entirely clear whether normativity is harmless to deflationism and what the relationship between norms and truth is. In the remaining part of this paper, I discuss various candidates for norms that might be relevant to truth. The discussion leads to the dissolution of the whole issue—it is not only the case that if there were such norms, they could be accommodated by deflationism, but there are no norms that would be an immediate concern for a theory of truth.

3.   Norms of truth, assertion and belief

It is somewhat striking that in the discussions of the normativity of truth, there is no agreement over the norms that would be relevant to the question of whether truth is normative. Hence it is important to find out which norms are at issue at all. What follows is a list of norms, all of which have been discussed in relation to truth:

> (1) "For any p, believe that p only if, for all you know, p (is true)." (Engel 2002, 129)

(2) "[I]f *p* is true, one should assert that *p*." (Price 1998, 246)

(3) "One is incorrect to assert that *p* if, in fact, it is not the case that *p*." (Price 1998, 248)

(4) "Any reason to believe that *p* is true is a reason to believe (and hence allow the assertion) that *p*." (attributed to Wright (1992) by Price 1998, 243)

(5) "You have reason to assert any sentence you believe to be true." (Horwich 1996, 880)

(6) "It is desirable (i.e. our aim ought to be) to believe only what is true." (Horwich 2005a, 108)

Two things should immediately obvious if one glances at this list. First, these norms are different and it would require a substantial argument to establish that they all reduce to a single norm. Second, it is far from clear, whether some of these norms hold at all. For example, it is not the case that if a sentence is true (or if one believes it to be true), then one should assert it.

Bracketing out for a moment the question of whether they are indeed norms of our community or not, let us investigate their relation to truth and deflationism. It is instructive to note that several of these norms can be formulated with no explicit reference to truth without suffering any substantial loss:

(1a) For any *p*, believe that *p* only if, for all you know, *p*.

(2a) If *p*, one should assert that *p*.

(3a) One is incorrect to assert that *p* if, in fact, $\sim p$.[5]

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[5] Huw Price (1998) has argued that

(3) "One is incorrect to assert that *p* if, in fact, it is not the case that *p*"

is problematic for deflationism. However, given that the norm can be rephrased as (3a), containing no truth-predicate, it is not a norm of truth in the first place. It might, instead, be an expression of a standard of correctness for assertion. But if the truth-predicate is included in the claim, it can be derived by the equivalence schema (McGrath 2003, 52):

(a) <*p*> is true iff *p*   (E)

(b) One is incorrect to assert that *p* if $\sim p$ Norm of assertion

∴ (c) One is incorrect to assert that *p* if <*p*> is not true   a,b

This indicates that these norms do not concern truth in the first place (cf. Dodd 2002, 285). Of course, we could re-introduce the truth-predicate to these formulations, but this would be enabled by the equivalence schema and thus this fact cannot be used to argue against deflationism.

The remaining norms—(4), (5) and (6)—pose no problems for deflationism. Norms mentioned by Horwich, (5) and (6), have been shown by him to be derivable using the equivalence schema. The norm (4) attributed to Wright, "Any reason to believe that p is true is a reason to believe (and hence allow the assertion) that p", relies, in fact, on the deflationary equivalence between *the proposition that p is true* and *the proposition that p*, for it is this equivalence that allows one to move from the reason to believe that p is true to the reason to believe that p.[6] Note that this move could not be licensed merely by the putative equivalence of 'believing that p' and 'believing that p is true', as one might think, for there is no such equivalence. As believing creates an intensional context, believing that p is not the same thing as believing that p is true. This norm also contains an additional claim, namely that having a reason to believe that p allows one to assert that p. It is not immediately obvious what allowing an assertion amounts to. It is not the same as having a reason for an assertion. For having a reason to believe that p is definitely not a sufficient reason for asserting that p. Having a reason to believe that *snow is white* does not give one a reason for the corresponding assertion. A more plausible suggestion is that allowing an assertion is just being in a position to assert something. Thus, if one believes that p, one is in the position to assert that p. This is to say that one *can* assert that p, but it does not imply that one *ought* to assert that p. As such, this claim does not thus constitute a normative statement about the assertion or about the relation between assertion, belief and truth.

If truth is a generalisation device, it is neutral with respect to the content of the statement it generalises. It can thus be used to formulate statements that express norms, but this should not be taken to imply that the truth itself has a motivating force. The mere fact that a proposition (or a statement) is true does not prescribe a course of action to us. Such prescriptions (if there indeed are any) originate from other features of human interaction (cf. Heal 1988).[7] But—and this is important for our present topic—if other features

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[6] Cf. (Price 1998, 244) for an interesting parallel that argues for a similar point.

[7] This point is also supported by the observation that only in case of such mental states as belief and assertion can one seriously consider the possibility that truth is their standard of correctness. For other mental states like supposition, thought or imagination, which could also have true contents, truth is not a good candidate for the standard of correctness (cf. Shah 2003, 470). If one links correctness conditions with normativity (as it commonly but wrongly assumed), it follows that merely entertaining a true proposition does not engender normativity. If belief and assertion are normative, then the normativity should originate

related to truth have normative implications, it does not follow that they have to be explained by a theory of truth (McGrath 2003, 57–58). We could compare this situation with several other notions that may be said to presuppose truth, e.g., factive notions like knowledge and veridical perception. It would be quite uncontroversial to claim that it is not an explanatory task for a theory of truth to explain the factivity of knowledge and perception (cf. McGrath 2003, 57).

Thus far, it has been argued that truth-related normative claims either do not hold or do not pose difficulties for deflationism and that since truth-related norms belong properly to other features of the discourse, it is not a task for a theory of truth to explain the nature and origin of such norms. This raises the obvious question concerning the normativity of those other features, namely, beliefs and assertions.

Let us discuss assertion first. I mentioned already that 'If p is true, then one ought to assert that p' cannot be a norm for assertion, for there is no requirement that p should be asserted merely because p is true. If the truth of a proposition is not enough, then perhaps a similar requirement could still be upheld by adding an additional clause that introduces some further condition X that makes the assertion of p appropriate or acceptable in the given context. In that case, we would get the following norm:

(7) If p is true, and if asserting that p is X, then one ought to assert that p.

However, the problem with this suggestion is that it makes the norm hypothetical and hypothetical norms are not genuinely normative. There is a familiar distinction in the literature on normativity between hypothetical and categorical 'ought'-statements (see (Hattiangadi 2006, 228) for the distinction and for an analogous point). A categorical 'ought'-statement prescribes a course of action that is to be followed irrespective of the agent's contingent desires. A hypothetical 'ought'-statement describes a course of action as a means to a certain end. Hypothetical statements are not prescriptive, but rather descriptive. They *describe* a course of action. For example: 'If you want to finish the talk on time, you ought to start wrapping up'. This describes a way of finishing the talk on time. The mere wish to end the talk on time does not create a normative fact that I ought to draw the conclusion. Similarly, although (7) contains an 'ought', it describes achieving the condition X with asserting that p, and thus it is a descriptive statement rather than

from elsewhere rather than from the truth of the believed or asserted proposition. Actually, the same point shows also that having correctness conditions does not make the state normative, for there can be non-normative states with contents that have correctness conditions (e.g., thoughts and imaginations).

a normative one.[8]

However, perhaps there is yet another way that truth can be the norm for assertion. This sense is expressed by Pascal Engel: "An assertion is correct if and only if it is true" (Rorty and Engel 2007, 14).[9] I have two objections to this proposal. First, if there is such a condition on correctness, then it says something about assertion, rather than truth. This statement should not be read as saying that the truth of a proposition consists in the correct assertion of the proposition. But only in the latter case would it tell us something about truth. Second, it does not follow from this statement that asserting something is a normative matter. It is indeed the case that a close link between having correctness conditions and being normative has been commonly assumed, especially in connection with the normativity of meaning (e.g., Boghossian 1989, 513). However, as has been recently argued by several authors (Glüer 1999, Wikforss 2001, Hattiangadi 2006), having standards of correctness does not imply normativity.[10] This can also be applied to the case of assertion. To say that an assertion is correct is a descriptive claim, which says that an assertion corresponds to a certain standard. This standard distinguishes correct assertions from incorrect ones, but it itself does not yield prescriptions. Fox example, consider the sentence that has the same form as the putative norm of assertion 'A woman is tall if and only if she is at least 1m 80cm in height'. There is nothing normative about tall women, there is only a standard for them to meet.

If assertion is not normative, what about belief? It is possible to advance similar arguments as those above for the claim that having standards of correctness does not make beliefs normative. However, there is a further possibility of arguing for the normativity of belief that perhaps is not open in the

[8] It may be objected that describing a norm does not make it non-normative, so merely finding an appropriate description does not throw the norm out of existence. I agree with this claim, but note that this presumes that we are dealing with a norm in the first place. But it is something that needs to be established separately. At present stage, my claim is that not every statement containing an 'ought' is a normative statement.

[9] Pascal Engel claims that a similar norm also applies to belief: "a belief is correct if and only if it is true" (Rorty and Engel 2007, 14). This is vulnerable to objections similar to those directed at the case of assertion. See also a recent paper by Bykvist and Hattiangadi (2007) for further arguments against the view that the possession of correctness conditions makes beliefs constitutively normative.

[10] Compare what Hattiangadi (2006, 224) says about the relation between the correct use of the term and prescriptivity: "To say that some use of a term is 'correct' is thus to say that it accords with an application rule that specifies the conditions under which it refers—it is to say that the term *refers to* or is *true of* the thing to which it has been applied. If we keep this firmly in view, it no longer makes sense to treat 'correct' prima facie as a prescriptive term."

case of assertion.[11] Basically, it is to claim that there are certain norms that make the belief the very state it is. It is to say that norms must be constitutive of the nature of belief. But what is it for something to be constitutive?

Boghossian (2003, 37) unpacks the notion of constitutivity thus: "B is constitutive of A means: grasping the *concept* of an A-fact requires grasp of the concept of a B-fact." In application to belief, one way to spell out the constitutive normativity of belief is to say that the grasping of norms like 'Our aim ought to be to believe only what is true' is required in order to grasp the concept of belief.[12] In this way, the aim of truth would be built into the very concept of belief. Then the question would be whether it is indeed the case that one needs to grasp the norm 'Aim to believe only what is true' in order to have the concept of belief.

This is definitely something that can be contested. It is a matter of finding out the correct account of the possession of the concept of belief. One might propose an alternative account along the following lines. Assume the semantics for the concept of belief according to which beliefs are information-carrying internal states of cognitive systems.[13] In this case, one could perhaps argue that grasping the notion of belief would require grasping only the idea that there are certain information-carrying internal states. I am not defending this approach; it is presented here as an alternative account of what is required for having the concept of belief, which does not presume any grasp of norms. Anyone who wants to claim that belief is constitutively normative has to show that there are conclusive reasons for preferring the account of the possession of the concept of belief that involves the grasping of norms to accounts that involve no such grasping.

However, I do not think that this is the best way of setting up the issue. Formulating the problem in terms of possessing the concept of an entity rather than in terms of the nature of an entity might blur the distinction between the concept of belief and the nature of belief. After all, one may have reasons to reject the whole intellectualist account of concept-possession according to which the grasping of certain concepts is a precondition of the possession of a concept, yet nothing about the normativity of belief would follow from this. Thus the critique (or defence) of an account of concept-possession does not go to the heart of the matter.

[11] It may seem that an act could still be an assertion even if it is not the case that one ought to assert what is true, whereas the comparable situation is not applicable for beliefs. However, if my argument is correct, beliefs and assertions do not really differ in this respect.

[12] Cf. Boghossian's (2003, 40) proposal: "it's a condition on understanding what it is for S to believe that p that one understand that S ought to believe that p only if p." However, he claims that this makes the attribution of belief normative.

[13] As perhaps hinted in (Lycan 1988, 31–32).

It is better to frame the issue in terms of the nature of belief. The idea should be something along the following lines: a state cannot be a belief state unless it is (in a certain way) governed by norms such as 'Aim to believe only what is true'. This still remains fairly vague until it is specified what exactly is involved in being governed by norms. One option would be the proposal critically discussed by Bykvist and Hattiangadi (2007, 278): "it is necessary for a given mental state to be the belief that p that you ought to be in that mental state if and only if the proposition that p is true."

This invites the objection that a mental state can still be a belief even if it is not the case that one ought to be in that state if and only if the proposition that makes up its content is true. It is not just the simple and irrelevant point that we often have false beliefs. The idea that I am pressing here is rather that it is not constitutive of the nature of belief that we ought to have true beliefs. A close analysis and the full rejection of this version of the belief normativity view would require yet another paper (for a strong and compelling criticism of the view, see Bykvist and Hattiangadi 2007). In what follows, I try to explain why one might be inclined to hold such a view. I expect that this aetiological consideration would support the case against such a position.

Perhaps people are inclined to assume that the aforementioned norm holds for belief, since they do not distinguish this norm from the norm that has sometimes applied to the *ascription* of belief. However, belief ascription need not be governed by the truth of the belief content either. It is indeed common to ascribe true beliefs, but this cannot be a necessary requirement. An account of belief ascription that aims to capture the various irrational and error-prone aspects of human behaviour should instead subscribe to the norm that one ought to have beliefs that reflect one's cognitive situation. As one's cognitive situation is limited, then ascribing only true beliefs would backfire.

In short, my claim is that the norm that we ought to have true beliefs does not govern the nature of belief. The endorsement of this norm can derive from the mistaken idea that the ascription of belief is constrained by the truth. My alternative suggestion is that the belief ascription should rather aim to take the subject's whole cognitive setting into account and this may sometimes involve ascribing false beliefs.

Does this not entail that *some* norms, albeit not truth-related ones, are still constitutive of beliefs? I do not think that it does. First of all, those norms would concern the ascription of belief rather than the nature of belief. Even if one purports to analyse belief in terms of the ascription of belief, that is, if one subscribes to interpretivism, no such conclusion has to follow. Interpretivism can more plausibly be supported for the *possession* of beliefs

than for the nature of beliefs.[14] Thus even if the possession of belief would turn out to be normative, it would not follow that the nature of beliefs would be normative. In such a case, the norms under discussion would assume the role of folk principles that guide belief ascription and regulate the practice of assertion. But they can be defeated by various other considerations, therefore they would not be norms in the categorical sense. Moreover, by making prescriptions to the ascriber in the first instance, they would constitute the possession of mental states only indirectly.

If this is on the right track, then we can conclude that not only that truth is not normative, but also that assertion and belief are not normative (at least not due to their connections with truth). Given this, there does not seem to be any reason why a deflationist about truth should have the slightest concern about the normativity issue.

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[14] I have taken this course in (Mölder 2007), where I develop interpretivism as an account of what it is to have mental states.

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