On the Reduction of Grounding to Essence


  • Pablo Carnino




grounding, essence, necessity


In a recent article, Fabrice Correia explores the project of reducing the notion of grounding to that of essence. He then goes on to provide several candidate definitions and test each of them against a number of objections. His final take on the situation is, roughly, that two of the definitions can handle all of the considered objections. The aim of this paper is to re-evaluate Correia's conclusions in the light of two sources of insights: Firstly, I will argue that one of the objections treated by Correia has been somewhat underestimated, and that it still constitutes a threat against definitions of grounding in terms of essence. Secondly, there are at least two further objections that should be considered by the advocate of such definitions. As I will show, one of them can be neutralized; but the other one is more serious and suggests a clear dialectical edge to an operationalist definition.


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How to Cite

Carnino, P. (2015). On the Reduction of Grounding to Essence. Studia Philosophica Estonica, 7(2), 56–71. https://doi.org/10.12697/spe.2014.7.2.04