TY - JOUR AU - Leerhoff, Holger PY - 2008/08/14 Y2 - 2024/03/28 TI - Bradley's Regress, Russell's States of Affairs, and Some General Remarks on the Problem JF - Studia Philosophica Estonica JA - SPE VL - 1 IS - 2 SE - Articles DO - 10.12697/spe.2008.1.2.07 UR - https://ojs.utlib.ee/index.php/spe/article/view/spe.2008.1.2.07 SP - 249-264 AB - <p>In this paper, I will give a presentation of Bradley's two main arguments against the reality of relations. Whereas one of his arguments is highly specific to Bradley's metaphysical background, his famous regress argument seems to pose a serious threat not only for ontological pluralism, but especially for states of affairs as an ontological category. Amongst the proponents of states-of-affairs ontologies two groups can be distinguished: One group holds states of affairs to be complexes consisting of their particular and universal constituents alone, the other holds that there has to be a "unifying relation" of some sort to establish the unity of a given state of affairs. Bradley's regress is often conceived to be a compelling argument against the first and for the latter. I will argue that the latter approaches have no real advantage over the simpler theories—neither in the light of Bradley's regress nor in other respects.</p> ER -