Studia Philosophica Estonica

Deliberative Imagination

2026-08-17T08:13:22+00:00

Philosophical accounts of imagination tend to focus on science, art, and games—not on decision-making. Accounts of decision-making tend to focus on desires, beliefs, and reasoning—not on imagination. Contrary to these traditions, I argue that imagination plays at least three important roles in decision-making. In what I call Diagnostic Imagination, agents aim to get clear about situations in which they act. In Imaginative Anticipation, agents mentally rehearse scenarios they take to lie ahead. In Imagination Tests, agents imagine choice scenarios with a view to assessing whether they would like them. I call these kinds of imagination “deliberative,” to signal that, while they are all concerned with decisions, they are not all about the moment of choice.

Sub Specie Boni, Sub Ratione Boni: Imagination and Estimation in Aquinas's Guise of the Good

2026-08-17T08:28:15+00:00

According to the thesis sometimes known as “the guise of the good”, we can only want or desire something (or intentionally do something) if it appears good to us in some respect. Typically, when introducing this thesis, one finds contemporary authors using the Latin phrase sub specie boni. In medieval Latin formulations, however, the standard formula is that whatever we will, we will sub ratione boni, or that we can only will something sub ratione boni, i.e. under the ratio (aspect) of good/goodness. Much more rarely does one find the expression sub specie boni, i.e. under the appearance or semblance of good/goodness. This seems especially true in Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274). First, I present textual evidence for this terminological difference in Aquinas, and show that sub specie boni occurs almost exclusively in contexts where the agent wants something on the basis of, mistakenly, taking something bad to be good. But why reserve sub specie boni for these cases? In the second part of the article, I compare the role played by the cognitive powers of imagination and estimation in the evaluations which are proposed to the will, concluding that not imagination, but estimation is, at least in part, the key to Aquinas’s view of the will. I also highlight differences between the evaluations of estimation and those of conscience. Once we bring out these contrasts, sub specie boni turns out to be an expression with its own significance, and not just a rhetorical variant of sub ratione boni.

The Role of Value in Creative Imagining

2026-08-17T08:31:23+00:00

In discussions of imagination’s role in creativity, scholars have drawn two relevant distinctions. First, imagination has traditionally been described as free or unconstrained in creative contexts, while it is considered as largely constrained in epistemic contexts. Second, we can distinguish passive from active creativity: in passive creativity, an idea emerges spontaneously and is displayed in the imagination; in active creativity, imagination is employed deliberately to generate new ideas. This paper argues that there are two different modes of active creativity. The first involves generating ideas in an unguided way; the second involves value-guided imagination – a process in which imagining is shaped by attention to what we value. Adding this further distinction helps clarify the role value can take in creative processes and sheds light on the distinction between creative and epistemic uses of imagination.

Layered Imaginative Acquaintance: A Roadmap

2026-08-17T08:09:11+00:00

This paper explores the role of imagination in aesthetic appreciation, distinguishing between its function as a medium of basic acquaintance and as a surrogate. While imagination has long been acknowledged as essential for experiencing aesthetic qualities, its status in the debate surrounding the Acquaintance Principle remains controversial. The aim of this paper is to clarify the distinction between basic and surrogative acquaintance through imagination. It argues that the most promising way to make sense of the distinction is to appeal to the artwork-specific standards, such that it is a matter of artistic context as to whether imagination counts as a medium of basic acquaintance or surrogative acquaintance, or whether it is not suitable as a medium of acquaintance at all. The resulting view accommodates the variety of ways in which imagination figures in warranting aesthetic judgment and draws together the two strands of literature in which the aesthetic role of imagination has been discussed, in the context of first-hand experience and in the context of surrogates. This provides a unified account of how imagination figures in aesthetic appreciation, both in its basic and in its surrogative capacity.

Aesthetics of Imagery. The Quixotic Dilemma

2026-08-17T08:43:56+00:00

I examine whether imagery has aesthetic value. In trying to answer this question, we face the Quixotic Dilemma, which claims that both possible answers are false. I suggest that this question may therefore be undecidable. A solution may involve rejecting the idea that sensory imagination must be defined in experiential terms. Instead, adopting a content-based theory of mental imagery might clarify the similarities and differences between perception and imagery, ultimately resolving the Quixotic Dilemma.

Ulme-argument ja uus teadmine

2026-08-17T09:16:54+00:00

Kas üks bambus võiks tõepoolest mõelda ja kõneleda? Kas taimedega saaks ja tuleks võrdsetel alustel koostööd teha? Sue Burke’i ulmeromaanis “Semiosis” (2018) tehakse see usutavaks. Romaani alusel tekkivas ulme-kujutluses kerkib esile teadmine, et taimmõtlemine ja -kõnelemine ei pruugi olla midagi müstilist. Selle teadmise kergitab esile ulme-argumendi mehhanism. Ulme-argument on ulmeteostele omane uute teadmiste hankimise viis. Esimeses osas selgitame ulme-argumendi toimimist ja teises uute teadmiste sündi “Semiosises”.

Could a bamboo plant really think and speak? Could we, and should we, cooperate with plants on equal terms? Sue Burke’s science fiction novel "Semiosis" (2018) makes this seem plausible. The science-fictional imagination that emerges from the novel gives rise to the insight that plant thinking and communication need not be anything mystical. This insight is brought to the fore by the mechanism of the science fiction argument. A science fiction argument is a way of acquiring new knowledge that is characteristic to science fiction. In the first part, we explain how the science fiction argument works; in the second, we examine how new knowledge emerges in "Semiosis“.

Editorial. Value Cognition in Imagination

2026-08-17T09:20:23+00:00