Studia Philosophica Estonica

Contrarian Conspiracy Theories and Higher-Order Evidence

Simon Barker — Sat, 03 Jun 2023 00:00:00 +0000

Is it always epistemically irrational to believe a conspiracy theory? Not on principle. According to the standard definition in the philosophical literature, conspiracy theories are too wide and heterogenous a class for us to proffer any universal rules re their rationality. This does not mean, however, that we cannot offer any useful generalisations. This paper argues that one useful generalisation concerns the contrariness of some conspiracy theories. Whilst we cannot say that it is always irrational to believe a conspiracy theory, ceteris paribus, it is irrational to believe a contrarian conspiracy theory.

A conspiracy theory is contrarian when recognised credible epistemic authorities reject that theory. When a conspiracy theory is contrarian the conspiracy theorist will, by default, possess negative higher-order evidence for the theory in question – that is, evidence that they may have made a mistake in the deliberations that led them to believe the relevant theory. In general, on acquiring negative higher-order evidence one acquires an undercutting defeater for whatever justification one otherwise has for the relevant beliefs. Therefore, absent a defeater-defeater, one will no longer be justified in holding the relevant beliefs. Applied to conspiracy theories, then, the consequences are simple enough. If a theory is contrarian, one will, by default, possess an undercutting defeater for whatever evidence on the basis of which one may have come to believe that theory. Absent a defeater-defeater for the relevant higher-order evidence, then, it is not rational for one to believe a conspiracy theory when that theory is contrarian.

Alexander of Aphrodisias' Lazy Arguments against Stoic Determinism

Ronja Hildebrandt — Sat, 31 Dec 2022 00:00:00 +0000

Scholars generally agree that Alexander of Aphrodisias' objections to Stoic determinism in De fato are unconvincing. I show that there is one argument, however, that is more successful than Alexander's other arguments. This argument is an innovative version of the so-called "Lazy Argument". Traditional versions of the Lazy Argument claim that actions and deliberations would not matter in a deterministic world and that for this reason Stoic determinism cannot be true. By contrast, Alexander's new version asserts that it is too risky to believe in Stoic determinism because it can give average rational agents good reasons to be lazy. Since we cannot know whether Stoic determinism is true, it is safer not to believe it.

A Synthetic, Frankenstein Philosopher Using Analytic Tools to Test Possibilities: An Interview with Daniel D. Hutto

Bruno Mölder — Thu, 01 Dec 2022 00:00:00 +0000

Daniel D. Hutto is the Senior Professor of Philosophical Psychology and the Head of School of Liberal Arts at the University of Wollongong. His main research area is philosophy of mind and cognitive science. He is well known for his narrative practice hypothesis about the development of folk psychology and the endorsement and development of the radically enactive approach to cognition. In his recent work, along with Glenda Satne, he has developed a version of naturalism called "relaxed naturalism". Hutto is the author of The Presence of Mind (John Benjamins, 1999), Beyond Physicalism (John Benjamins, 2000), Wittgenstein and the End of Philosophy (Palgrave Macmillan, 2003; second edition 2006), Folk Psychological Narratives (MIT Press, 2008), and with Erik Myin, Radicalizing Enactivism: Basic Minds without Content, (MIT Press, 2013) and Evolving Enactivism: Basic Minds meet Content (MIT Press, 2017). He gave the Gottlob Frege Lectures in Theoretical Philosophy at the University of Tartu on September 13-16, 2022, under the title "Why I am not an enactivist?" The interview took place in Tartu on September 16, 2022.