On stasiosemiotics and semiostasis: Deleuze, Guattari, and the potential of group phantasms for radical politics

Simon Levesque[1]

Abstract. Stasiosemiotics is made of two concepts: 'stasis' and 'semiotics'. Stasis is a concept that refers to both the division of society and a suspension of time. As a branch of general semiotics, its specific focus, or object, is semiosis stasis, or semiostasis, which is technically impossible: by definition, semiosis is evergoing, continuous and infinite. Though paradoxical, semiostasis can nevertheless inspire a method to study sign systems and objects of which the meaning form is profoundly intricate and temporally stratified. Among such inextricably complex objects shaping constellations of signs are phantasms and political fictions, or 'group phantasms' in Guattari's terminology. Although on different levels, they both act as meaning condensers partaking in social subjectivation and alienation. Leaning on Deleuze and Guattari's semiotics of phantasm, political philosophy and anthropology, and poetics, 'stasis' can be understood both in the political sense (civil strife, division of the political body) and in the aesthetical sense (standstill – as in ecstasy, *ek-stasis*: being out of oneself, out of ego, in suspended time). Stasiosemiotics aims to virtually suspend the motion of semiosis (or what Guattari calls 'semiotic fluxes') for the profit of an inquiry on the intricacies of signs formation and operation. The conclusion suggests ethical consequences regarding the consciousness of habit and implications for radical politics.

Keywords: semiosis; stasis; group phantasm; radical politics; Deleuze and Guattari

In this article, I introduce *stasiosemiotics* as an innovative theoretical framework for analysing complex sign systems within social and political contexts. At the intersection of semiotics, political philosophy and critical theory, stasiosemiotics offers a powerful lens through which to examine the intricate relationship between signs, power, and societal tensions. The concept's foundation lies in the paradoxical notion of *semiostasis*, or the virtual suspension of semiosis for analytical purposes. While semiosis is inherently continuous and infinite, temporarily "freezing" this process allows for a deeper examination of temporally stratified and politically

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[1] Université du Québec à Montréal, Canada; e-mail: levesque.simon@uqam.ca.

charged sign systems. This approach is particularly valuable for studying what Félix Guattari terms 'group phantasms', i.e. collective semiotic formations of varying intensities that condense meaning and participate in both social subjectivation and alienation.

Drawing from contemporary interpretations of ancient Greek political thought, the concept of stasis (*στάσις*) is thoroughly discussed. 'Stasis' carries a dual significance: it refers both to civil strife or internal division within a political body and to a temporal suspension or standstill. This semantic richness allows stasiosemiotics to operate as a transdisciplinary approach that traverses conventional academic boundaries, connecting political theory, anthropology, psychoanalysis, poetics and semiotics in a novel theoretical assemblage. The methodology centres on analysing the semiotic production of political fictions and their counter-narratives. By examining how 'collective equipment' (in Guattari's terminology) facilitates the implementation of power through sign systems, stasiosemiotics reveals how States deploy semiotic strategies to maintain cohesion while obscuring internal divisions. This investigation extends to the group phantasm as a site where political desires are semiotically crystallized and where revolutionary potential may emerge.

The novel contribution of this article and the concepts it introduces lies in their ability to help us better understand how power operates through semiotic means, particularly in the tension between unifying political narratives and disruptive counter-narratives. Where existing literature often treats political semiotics as either purely descriptive or ideologically determined, stasiosemiotics offers a more nuanced perspective that acknowledges the role of signs in both subjugation and emancipation.

The article unfolds through several interconnected sections: first examining war within society via Michel Foucault's reversal of Carl von Clausewitz's aphorism; then exploring Guattari's concept of 'collective equipment' as a semiotic means of subjection; continuing with an analysis of stasis as both political division and temporal suspension; investigating political fictions and group phantasms as crystallizations of collective desire; and finally proposing semiostasis as a method for developing critical consciousness of habitual sign interpretation. This progression reveals how stasiosemiotics can function not only as a theoretical framework but as a practical tool for ethical reflection and radical political imagination.

Ultimately, I suggest that stasiosemiotics aims not merely to describe political sign systems but to cultivate a critical awareness of how semiotic processes shape political subjectivity. By virtually "suspending" semiosis to examine its underlying structures, this approach creates theoretical space for ethical reflection and radical political reconsideration. In revealing how habits of interpretation become vehicles for political subjection, stasiosemiotics suggests that the consciousness

of these semiotic processes might itself become a precondition for political liberation.

War and society

Interrogating war within society, rather than just between societies, implies an inquiry into political power structures within a given social group and, correlatively, the identification of existing means of coercion, as well as the apparatus of repression and cohesion taking place within that group. Borrowing from the works of Pierre Clastres, Michel Foucault, Félix Guattari, Ninon Grangé and Nicole Loraux, in this section and throughout the article, I will examine the relationships of meaning that are established between institutions of power, the modern State formation, semiotic alienation and war.

Lévi-Strauss' exchange hypothesis on war states that trade represents potential wars resolved peacefully, and that wars are the result of unfortunate transactions (Lévi-Strauss 1943: 136). However, according to Foucault (1997), power is not entirely determined by economy, and economy is not at the service of power, because power is primarily and irreducibly an agonistic relationship. Whereas Lévi-Strauss sees a continuity between exchange or commerce and the possibility of conflicts and war, Foucault suggests that, because it is coextensive to power (as a means), war is not the continuity of trade, but of politics.

War cannot be based solely on economic reasons, because power, in its manifestation, is prior to it or, at the very least, concomitant, but not subordinate. From these premises, Foucault posits a crucial element for understanding the mechanism of establishment and maintenance of power, an element which, as transversal as it is, perhaps constitutes the very framework of its organization: war. Indeed, if power is an agonistic relationship, the balance of power, then it has to be analysed in terms of combat, confrontation and war. Instead of the Lévi-Straussian hypothesis, we would then have to posit another hypothesis: power is war, it is war continued through other means. This echoes Clausewitz's aphorism according to which war is nothing but the continuation of politics with other means (Clausewitz 1984[1832]: 87). On the contrary, Foucault (1997: 16) believes that politics is the continuation of war with other means.

To the *economy–conflicts–war* sequence proposed by Lévi-Strauss, Foucault opposes the *war–politics–war* continuity. The former is traversed by and functions under the aegis, or logic, of exchange, while the latter is consistent with the paradigm of power as the primary principle of social division. While it is true that political power can stop wars and install peace between societies, this is not done to suspend the effects of war or neutralize the imbalance manifested in the final

battle of war. Political power perpetually re-inscribes the agonistic relationship of war in social institutions, economic inequalities, language, bodies and signs, transforming it into a kind of silent war (see Petrilli, Levesque 2025: 45). Thus, "politics is the sanction and continuation of the imbalance of forces manifested in war"[2] (Foucault 1997: 16).

In support of Foucault's position, here are the terms in which military historian John Keegan (1993: 12) comments on Clausewitz's work:

> Had his mind been furnished with just one extra intellectual dimension – and it was already a very sophisticated mind indeed – [Clausewitz] might have been able to perceive that war embraces much more than politics: that it is always an expression of culture, often a determinant of cultural forms, in some societies the culture itself.

If war finds its place within the very institutions of culture, as the foundation of power relations and as an expression of the political ethos of society, it is because, at the deepest level of its structure, *war gives its form to the State.*

I wish to highlight an intrinsic configuration of the State with regard to war, namely that of the displacement of armed conflicts outside its own territory in favour of a logic and practice of pacification on its own population. This configuration is deployed through a whole series of semiotic processes articulated with the economy (exchanges), institutions (the authority of established codes) and bodies (where these codes are inscribed and replayed), through customs and behaviours (which are expressions of singularized cultural bundles), through the vital expenditure of each person within meaningful environments with fluctuating borders.

It is this particular configuration that leads me to consider State practice in relation to war. What is State practice? Campagno (2012: n.7)[3] suggests that

> it is the practice that splits society, that establishes within it two opposing poles: the first has the legitimate monopoly of physical coercion and the second submits to the first. State practice therefore implies a relationship of domination maintained by the control of force and legality on the side of the dominant social group.[4]

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[2]   "*[...] la politique, c'est la sanction et la reconduction du déséquilibre des forces manifesté dans la guerre.*"

[3]   Campagno, Marcelo. 2012. Pierre Clastres et le problème de l'émergence de l'État. *Revue du MAUSS permanente*: n.p. http://www.journaldumauss.net/./?Pierre-Clastres-et-le-probleme-de

[4]   "*C'est la pratique qui scinde la société, qui institue en son sein deux pôles opposés : le premier dispose du monopole légitime de la coercition physique et le second se soumet au premier. La*

Because State practice implies such a relationship of dominance, it is based first and foremost on power; power whose main role in such circumstances is to maintain the population it encloses in a situation of subordination. According to Clastres (2002[1976]: 252), "State practice is the exercise of power, for the State is the instituted division and stratification of society and the effective implementation of the power relationship."[5]

However, assimilating this form of power to war implies that war is turned inward, that it is waged from within and that it divides society. Such an invisibilized power relationship is not usually called war, but this is what makes Foucault's reversal of the Clausewitzian aphorism so powerful: *politics is war continued by other means*. It reveals the reverse side of a discourse whose foundation we no longer perceive, i.e. the negative base on which the State is built. This negative base, as the following sections will clarify, is stasis.

Before examining this idea further, we must turn to Deleuze and Guattari, who developed a complex theory of the relationship between war, the State, and political power in *A Thousand Plateaus*, particularly in Plateau 12 ("1227: Treatise on nomadology – the war machine") and Plateau 13 ("7000 B.C.: Apparatus of capture"). Their perspective draws significantly on Clastres's anthropological insights while extending his theory in new directions.

Building on Clastres's analysis in *Society Against the State*, and in the spirit of Foucault, Deleuze and Guattari propose that war and the State exist in tension with each other, not as exclusive categories, but as an agonistic mixture. While Clastres argued that primitive societies had mechanisms to prevent the formation of the State, Deleuze and Guattari develop this into their concept of the 'war machine' as an exteriority to State apparatus. For them, the war machine is not primarily about warfare but represents a nomadic mode of social organization that resists State capture. The war machine operates through 'smooth space' (open, heterogeneous, and deterritorialized), while the State functions through 'striated space' (enclosed, homogeneous, and territorialized). This distinction extends Clastres's observations about how stateless societies actively resist State formation. Unlike Clastres, who saw primitive societies as successfully preventing the emergence of the State, Deleuze and Guattari view the relationship between the war machine and the State as an ongoing tension. Indeed, the State constantly attempts to appropriate the war machine, converting it into a military institution under State control. When captured by the State, the war machine's original function

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pratique étatique implique donc, une relation de domination maintenue par le contrôle de la force et la légalité du côté du groupe social dominant."

5   "*L'État, comme division instituée de la société en un haut et un bas, est la mise en jeu effective de la relation de pouvoir. Détenir le pouvoir, c'est l'exercer [...].*"

of deterritorialization becomes redirected toward maintaining State power and conducting organized warfare against external enemies.

Deleuze and Guattari also extend Clastres, and draw on Foucault, by connecting these political formations to economic systems. They see the State's emergence as linked to the 'apparatus of capture' that establishes property, taxation, and public works, i.e. economic arrangements that support centralized power. This latter aspect is crucial, as the next section will demonstrate.

State and collective equipment

In a manuscript produced as part of the CERFI[6] research programme, written in parallel with *A Thousand Plateaus* but unpublished until 2011 (in French), Guattari focuses on what he calls 'collective equipment' (*les équipements collectifs*). Collective equipment refers to institutional structures, technical systems, and social apparatuses that organize collective life and subjectivity. These include schools, hospitals, prisons, media networks, transport systems, and other social infrastructures that shape both individual and collective experiences. This concept is akin to infrastructure in Marxist theory, Ideological State Apparatuses in Althusser, the Foucauldian *dispositif*, or even the notion of 'commons' in contemporary political philosophy. However, Guattari coined this concept to specify his own view by emphasizing a few key points: collective equipment bridges material infrastructure and subjective experience; it captures how power operates through mundane technical arrangements; it highlights how collective subjectivity is produced through institutional forms; all the while providing a concrete target for micropolitical intervention. Unlike Althusser's Ideological Apparatuses, collective equipment emphasizes material and semiotic production rather than just ideological reproduction. Unlike traditional Marxist infrastructure, it operates on multiple registers simultaneously (technical, subjective, social). And unlike Foucault's more discourse-oriented *dispositif*, collective equipment emphasizes machinic processes and the production of subjectivity. The concept specifically foregrounds the productive dimension of institutions rather than just their constraining or repressive functions.

Guattari sees collective equipment as social condensers. One of the objectives of Guattari's aforementioned text is to address a series of questions concerning the

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6   *Centre d'études, de recherches et de formation institutionnelles* (the Centre for Institutional Study, Research and Development) was a transdisciplinary militant research cooperative, active between 1967 and 1987, formed of psychiatrists, sociologists, urbanists, economists, artists and educators. On the CERFI, see Fourquet 1982; Querrien 2005.

modes of semiotization brought into play by power formations and in particular by collective equipment.

Collective equipment is the semiotic means – ideological and practical – with which the power formations equip themselves in order to establish various connections between use and code (between practices and institutions) allowing the subjection of human groups.

> No human group, however 'primitive' one might consider it, can organise itself, in effect, independently of a series of types of 'collective equipment', the first of which is to be sought in its capacity, particularised at the level of each ethnic group or its modern equivalent, of the marking out and expression, by means of diverse 'sign machines', of its cosmic and social outline, the form of its internal relations, of its 'foreign politics', all things that we have gathered here under the rubric of collective modes of semiotisation. (Guattari 2016[2011]: 11)

Within State societies, and especially in the case of modern capitalist societies, the semiotic modalities of subjectivation are in no way limited to the domination of a central power defending private property or imposing exploitative relationships by force. On the contrary, Guattari (2016[2011]: 11) argues that they unfold across

> a multitude of intermediary operations, machines for initiation and semiotic facilitation that can capture the molecular energy of desire of human individuals and groups. These machines, of every kind and size, converge in the same semiotico-libidinal productive function that we will call the *general collective equipment function*.

Of course, this collective equipment encompasses all the objects belonging to the sphere of industrial production and to that of consumption which results from it. Yet less than the objects, it is the processes in which these objects are inscribed that interest Guattari. Hence the concept of 'machine', which refers to the idea of 'machining' (standardized manufacturing) as a form of affection of the dynamic processes that inform our relationships with objects as well as with people, i.e. that give their form to the objects, signs or values with which we interact.

For Guattari, 'to machine' (*machiner*) is a fundamental process that goes beyond the conventional understanding of machines as mere technical objects. This verbal form emphasizes processes over static entities and describes how heterogeneous components connect, operate, and produce effects across different registers of reality. Unlike traditional structuralist semiotics, machining emphasizes the operative and productive dimension of signs. Unlike phenomenological accounts of subjective experience, machining decentres consciousness in favour of pre-personal processes. And unlike humanist understandings of technology

as tools, machining sees humans and machines as co-constitutive. In this framework, the subject is not given but actively produced through machinic processes. However, machining operates at pre-individual levels, organizing affects and percepts before conscious awareness. Thus, subjective experience is machined through collective assemblages rather than individual psychology. This conceptualization allows Guattari to analyse how both domination and liberation operate through the machining of signs and subjects, making possible his schizoanalytic approach to mapping both constraining and liberating assemblages (on schizoanalysis, see Guattari 2011[1979], 2013[1989]).

The concept of machine allows for a transversality between ideology (abstract machines) and social action (concrete machines). According to Guattari, what makes this passage from one level to another possible – what he calls 'social transversality' – does not depend on universal principles or categories. Networks of concrete machines, manifesting (more or less temporarily) systems of abstract machines of deterritorialization, establish a certain consistency of conditions within a given historical period:

> The abstract machines around which the concrete assemblages and equipment [...] crystallise are not external to social temporality, they traverse, produce and reproduce it. They negotiate the regulation of coefficients of deterritorialisation specific to each semiotic component and to each encoding component. (Guattari 2016: 59)

Guattari has a minute understanding of semiotic interactions that allows him to characterize the relationship between culture and social action as a constant tension between use and code. Applying this understanding to the problem of war, and borrowing from Lotman's (2005) theorization of the semiosphere, we could say that *culture is war for dominance in establishing codes*, which are in constant mixing, in constant renewal (by virtue of the principle of self-description, which realizes the centripetal dynamics of the semiosphere). However, Guattari leads us to focus not on the codes themselves but on the modalities of implementation and the dynamics of institution of these codes. In his view, "all encoding must pass through the central programming machine" (Guattari 2016[2011]: 124), and this machine is the State: "The semiotic enslavement of flows of desire which capitalist societies carry out does not tolerate the autonomy of any intrinsic encoding, and no desiring machine can escape being overcoded by the signifying machine of the State" (Guattari 2016[2011]: 134).

From an anthropological point of view, we must take into account two phenomena which, as universal as they may be, nevertheless unfold differently in State societies and in stateless societies (or societies against the State, see Clastres

2013[1974]). These two phenomena are: (1) the war–politics continuum, and therefore the presence of war at the very foundation of political life; and (2) the need for any human group to elaborate for itself, build and adhere to collective equipment, whatever its social organization. Everything is then played out in the articulation of these two phenomena, i.e. in the modalities of sharing collective equipment or, more precisely, at the level of social mechanisms governing the attribution (or limiting the appropriation) of power for their control. We can thus see how these two phenomena are complementary and culminate in a single phenomenon: political life.

 As Guattari (2016: 36) explains, political life is played out at the level of collective assemblages of desire and alienating/emancipating power equipment. The former (*agencements collectifs de désir*) express the desires of the group which inform the relationships that weave or tear it apart, while the latter (*équipements de pouvoir*) have the role of structuring social life in such a way as to accord it with immanent interests (in fact, with the dominant interests, i.e. those of the dominant) and to make society cohesive. However, in State societies, this structuring does not aim to establish harmony within the population, but strictly to pacify the group. *Division* constitutes the form of its political life.

 In her book *Harmony Ideology* (1990), anthropologist Laura Nader has shown that the logic and modalities of justice differ in State societies and in traditional (stateless) societies. "State law as practiced in [State] court concentrates on punishment rather than compensation," Nader (1990: xx) writes. In traditional societies, however, it is the autonomy and local self-sufficiency of communities that is more valued: "Indigenous law is directed at satisfying the necessities of subsistence, whereas state law must follow the profit motive and the accumulation of capital." (Nader 1990: xxii) The State justice system follows the economic parameters that reinforce it: it is centralizing and individualistic, it is not interested in finding a compromise that satisfies the community. It responds only to its own deterritorialized logic. Between the individual and centralized power, the State widens the gap and ensures that the power of intermediate political centres, or nodes, is limited where organized protest movements could arise.

 The State needs to (pre-emptively) crush any possibility of rebellion that could lead to civil war. In this sense, the State's role is not to make political life meaningful or sensible (even if reason can agree with the primary utility of which it is the sign), but *to crush any warlike inclination turned inward*. As Clastres explains, the State prevents war in the field where it has power. It cannot tolerate civil war. The State exists solely to keep the people over whom it exercises power united (Clastres 2013[1974]). On the other hand, external war, i.e. war waged outside the State territory, is valued because it diverts any interior subversive forces potential

of rebellion to the benefit of a necessary unification of the group in the face of a foreign body. For Ninon Grangé (2015: 89), there is no doubt that "regular war is part of the political apparatus to avoid civil war; by only admitting violence from outside and granting it regular attributes that can be summed up as a greater or lesser respect for the enemy, civil war is excluded from the realm of possibility".[7]

It seems quite obvious, as Guattari (2016[2011]: 134) writes, that "the State machine of semiotic enslavement in fact constitutes the fundamental tool enabling the dominant classes to ensure their power of the agents and means of production". However, Clastres believes that the State assumes a more elementary function which, before responding to an economic imperative, responds to a political necessity. Since war is a universal constant that no human society ignores (attempts to prove the contrary have failed, see Kelly 2000), and because war constitutes the negative base on which society is able to erect itself as a cohesive organization – the following section will clarify this –, its importance cannot be underestimated in any way. Hence Clastres's (1994[1980]: 152) aphorism: "To be mistaken on war is to be mistaken on society".

It therefore seems necessary to underline this fundamental conception, already invoked through the Foucauldian idea of 'silent war', that the absence of war (the absence of the actuality of war as an explicit form of everyday life) necessarily also implies its presence in negative. The logic of pacification (and the means of its application, of which the police are only the most visible[8]) imposed by the State on its own territory is done in the name of a refusal of internal or civil war. This internal form of war which divides the political body was called 'stasis' by the ancient Greeks. Since the State is haunted by the threat of its own destruction (as happened in Athens in 404 BC), it seeks to cancel all traces of inward war in the objectification of its structure. The modern State is haunted by the spectre stasis.

Stasis and political fictions

The ancient Greeks had two terms for war. On the one hand, '*polemos*' ('πόλεμος') is warfare that is waged in the form of campaigns and battles against foreign

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7   "*La guerre régulière fait partie du dispositif politique pour éviter la guerre civile ; en n'admettant que la violence à l'extérieur et en lui accordant des attributs réguliers qui se résument à un plus ou moins grand respect de l'ennemi, on exclut la guerre civile hors du domaine du possible.*"

8   "State power is not just the existence of coercive forces that are exercised at the level of large social groupings; it is equally at work at the level of the microscopic cogs of society" (Guattari 2016: 64).

populations or other cities or States. It corresponds roughly to our current conception of war. *Polemos* can be defined as the means – and this means is normally armed and violent – chosen by a group of people or a State to take advantage of another group or another State, or, more precisely, of the resources (material, human) present in the territory occupied by this other group or State. On the other hand, if we look in Latin literature for the term '*stasis*' ('*στάσις*'), common from Thucydides to Aristotle, we are facing a translation problem. The term has been translated indifferently, from Latin, as 'civil war', 'sedition', 'strife' or 'riots'. In fact, from the Latin era, and with Cicero in particular, the term 'stasis' is forgotten in favour of '*bellum civile*'. As Grangé (2015: 10) explains, '*bellum civile*' is not only an unfaithful translation, it is a substitution of concept, which has engendered the greatest obscurity about internal war.

The Latins, inventors of the *Pax Romana*, made sure to erase the very idea of stasis in order to prevent it from happening. This is a clear case of semiotic obfuscation through conceptual displacement in translation. Indeed,

> [...] *bellum civile* appears to be an effective means of concealing *stasis* – the concept but also the reality that it designates and explains – of preventing the understanding of internal war as *stasis*, in favour of what is already from the outset a political and philosophical instrument for pushing back the spectre of internal war.[9] (Grangé 2015: 10–11)

The principle of stasis is the division of one into two. Thus, it designates the war that the city wages against itself (Grangé 2015: 14). The term carries great ambiguity, but if we are to reduce it to its simplest expression, then at least we attain a preliminary definition. Stasis is '*oikeios polemos*': domestic war (see Agamben 2015). This does not mean that it is war internal to any particular family, but war of the *polis* considered as an *oikos*. It is war internal to the city understood as a domestic regime.

As within families there generally exist fables of unity and practices in order to implement such unity despite conflicts, within societies (and States) there are abstract semiotic machines implementing a unitary ideology and generating political fictions, or group phantasms, which, like any phantasm, act as screens covering something else: "Phantasm is a surface phenomenon" (Deleuze 1990[1989]: 216; see also Levesque, Ouellet Tremblay 2020). Also remember that "the signifier

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9   "*Le* bellum civile *apparaît bien comme le moyen, efficace, d'escamoter la* stasis *– le concept mais aussi la réalité qu'il désigne et explique –, d'empêcher la compréhension de la guerre interne comme* stasis*, au profit de ce qui est déjà d'emblée un instrument politique et philosophique pour repousser le spectre de la guerre intérieure.*"

is a fundamental procedure for the dissimulation of the real functioning of power formations" (Guattari 2016: 7). As Loraux (2006: 30; my emphasis, S. L.) puts it:

> The hypothesis can be formulated as follows: the egalitarian *polis* of consensus (the model dear to anthropologists), whose essential propositions are disseminated throughout Greek discourse, exists because actual cities are divided (because, in large and small cities alike, decision and combat, these two subjects of historians, suddenly interfere with each other). This *polis becomes ideology for the divided city because it denies the very possibility of thinking about real divisions.*

Stasis is not merely a principle of confronting oppositions on the same plane; it is the political dynamic of subversion of the political itself (Grangé 2015: 82). It deals not in opposing an established power or a defined system of values; stasis is the potentiality, virtually (negatively) contained in any political unit, to destroy this unit. Stasis does not enshrine the right to differing political opinions, it represents the possibility of the overthrow of the State which guarantees this right. It is why the purpose of established power is to make people forget the very existence of stasis as a possibility: "*politikos* is the name of one who knows how to agree to oblivion" (Loraux 2006: 43).

   In addition to its political meaning, 'stasis' has yet another meaning (which Aristotle made quite clear in his *Politics*). This second meaning remained more or less the same in the domain of poetics throughout the centuries as conveyed by the figure of speech of 'stasis', which marks the suspension before or after a change.

> The literal equivalent (its *de facto* translation) of the internal, violent and systematic political crisis is stasis in literature. The meaning unites the two moments of *stasis*: suspension, change itself, state and mobility. It is not insignificant that Nicole Loraux uses the expression "suspension of political time" to describe Greek *stasis*. The contribution of the literary meaning is comparable to that of a conceptual posterity of the word, it enriches its understanding. [...] It is obvious that the term is mostly used in a strictly political sense. However, it can designate movements of force that have nothing to do with the city.[10] (Grangé 2015: 56–57)

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[10]   "*L'équivalent littéral (sa traduction de fait) de la crise politique interne, violente et systématique, est la stase en littérature. La signification réunit les deux moments de la* stasis : *la suspension, le changement lui-même, l'état et la mobilité. Il n'est pas indifférent que Nicole Loraux use de l'expression « suspension du temps politique » pour décrire la* stasis *grecque. L'apport de la signification littéraire est comparable à celui d'une postérité conceptuelle du mot, il en enrichit la compréhension. [...] Il est évident que majoritairement le terme est employé dans une acception strictement politique. Cependant, il peut désigner des mouvements de force qui n'ont rien à voir avec la cité.*"

This is the direction I want to take the concept in: toward a greater abstraction, toward an exploration of its possibilities of application to various movements or forces, and first and foremost to *the action of signs within social life*. Just like Saussure did with semiology, which he envisioned as a new science, in her book, Grangé (2015: 255) muses on the validity of an eventual stasiology, defined as the "reasoned study of *stasis* as a particularly operational and enlightening concept for understanding war".[11] The object of stasiology is known: it is war, its nature. But how should one go about studying it? Grangé (2015: 264) envisages an analysis of "political fictions", i.e. of "fictional devices of apprehensions of war" which "mask the doubling already at work in the city, before *stasis* as a phenomenon breaks out".[12] In order to do so, it will have to

> take transversal paths that are not limited to philosophy or political science, but pass through anthropology, sociology, strategy, law... The essential content of politics considered under its violent birth and nature deals with fictions, inventions, a collective imagination that naturally preside over politics and ensure the maintenance of the city.[13] (Grangé 2015: 263)

If stasiology is to be developed, I think that a theoretical adjunction would be beneficial. Since stasiology deals with collective fictions, social and political imaginary, or symbolic inventions of various kinds assembled under the category of 'political fictions' and operating through social institutions and infra-symbolic semiotic fluxes, or a-signifying chains of signs,[14] then it calls for semiotics to look into it. A special branch of semiotics, which I call 'stasiosemiotics' (stasis semiotics), should investigate political fictions and their semiotic means of implementation. Political fictions are semiotic formations bonding together ideology and practice, code and use, conforming conducts and ethos: they are vectors of socialization and subjectivation (on the production of subjectivity, see Guattari 1995[1992]:

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[11] "*[...] une étude raisonnée de la* stasis *comme concept particulièrement opératoire et éclairant pour comprendre la guerre.*"

[12] "*dispositifs fictionnels des appréhensions de la guerre [qui] masquent le dédoublement déjà à l'œuvre dans la cité, avant que n'éclate la* stasis *comme phénomène.*"

[13] "*[...] elle emprunte des chemins transversaux qui ne se limitent pas à la philosophie ou à la science politique, mais passent par l'anthropologie, la sociologie, la stratégie, le droit... Le contenu essentiel du politique considéré sous sa naissance et sa nature violentes a affaire à des fictions, à des inventions, à une imagination collective qui président au politique et assurent le maintien de la cité.*"

[14] "A-signifying or post-signifying components, putting into play batteries of deterritorialised signs like those that one is dealing with in money, the 'writing' of the stock exchange, musical writing, systems of scientific, computational formalism, etc." (Guattari 2016: 39).

1–32). Stasiosemiotics studies the modes of semiotization of political fictions, and in doing so it produces a critical knowledge of the group phantasms machined by the political unconscious holding society together and producing subjectivity.

As Guattari (1995[1992]: 4) writes, collective equipment "operate[s] at the heart of human subjectivity not only within its memory and intelligence, but within its sensibility, affects and unconscious fantasms". Stasiosemiotics recognizes in signs a means of circulation and implementation of power. It uses stasis as a key figure to make salient the reality of power and its exercise. In doing so, stasiosemiotics aims to reveal the fundamental, if negative, presence of war within society. In the following section, I turn to phantasm in particular. I want to show how its structure is analogous and complementary to that of stasis, which is precisely why it is an object suited to stasiosemiotics and its method: semiostasis.

Group phantasms and subjectivity

In order fully to understand stasis as both political division and temporal suspension – this latter sense will become much clearer in the last section –, we must engage with the concept of phantasm, a notion that shares stasis's paradoxical structure and helps explain its political efficacy. The study of phantasm is crucial to stasiosemiotics precisely because phantasms function as peculiar semiotic objects that, like stasis itself, operate through temporal suspension and the generation of potential division. Where stasis represents the negative foundation of the political, phantasm reveals the semiotic mechanisms through which this negativity operates in collective consciousness.

Phantasms occupy a unique position in semiotic theory: they are not straightforward signs but complex constellations of meaning that resist interpretation while simultaneously demanding it. Their structure parallels stasis in several critical ways: both suspend normal temporal progression, both contain within themselves the possibility of transformation, and both dissolve the boundaries of established subjectivity. Just as stasis represents the suspended moment before political division erupts into open conflict, phantasm represents the suspended moment where meaning condenses without resolving into definitive signification.

In this section, I explore how phantasms, and particularly group phantasms, serve as vehicles for both subjugation and potential liberation within political contexts. The State itself can be understood as a phantasmatic construction that captures collective desires and redirects them toward maintaining established power structures. Yet simultaneously, within this same phantasmatic structure lies the possibility of its own undoing: the spectre of stasis that the State continuously

works to exorcise. By examining the peculiar semiotic structure of phantasm, we can better understand how political fictions maintain cohesion and how counter-fictions might generate the conditions for revolutionary transformation.

The following analysis demonstrates why phantasm is not merely an abstract psychoanalytic concept but a concrete semiotic reality with profound implications for understanding how stasis operates as both political possibility and temporal suspension. Through phantasm, we can trace the complex ways in which collective desire becomes captured and potentially liberated in the ongoing tension between State power and the forces that resist it.

Phantasm is complicated because of its singular structure. In many ways, phantasm seems an utterly unintelligible sign (Klossowski 1997[1969]; Smith 2005). In *Logic of Sense*, Deleuze (1990[1969]: 211) writes: "Neither active nor passive, neither internal nor external, neither imaginary nor real – phantasms have indeed the impassibility and ideality of the event", adding: "The event is sense itself, insofar as it is disengaged or distinguished from the states of affairs which produce it and in which it is actualized." If the meaning of phantasm lies in its character as an event, then it is a matter of leafing through this event to discover its full depth. Open to interpretation, the event carries "a multiplicity of breaches of the singular" (Farge 1997: 20) that must be accounted for.[15] Yet such a method is not readily obvious, since in phantasm, all the events communicate into one. Phantasm "is inseparable from a displacement, an unfolding, and a development within which it carries along its own origin" (Deleuze 1990[1969]: 217).

We need to avoid the trap of a quest for meaning that would present itself as an explanation or cause. The inquiry will rather take the form of exploration and will follow the signifying chains that the event knots together. According to Deleuze (1990[1969]: 213), "what appears in the phantasm is the movement by which the ego opens itself to the surface and liberates the a-cosmic, impersonal, and pre-individual singularities which it had imprisoned. It literally releases them like spores and bursts as it gets unburdened." It is therefore less the event of the phantasm itself that needs to be leafed through than the singular inscription of the subject in this event. In phantasm, the 'I' loses its prerogative – the one it has in regular enunciation (see Benveniste 1971[1966]: 223–230). Ego is not the organizer of the phantasmatic proposition.

In the enunciation of the phantasm, the subject remains vague and never provides his/her exact coordinates in relation to it: it is characterized by an extreme

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15   "*La structure de l'événement est déjà en soi une mise en relation ; elle n'est pas donnée, et sa façon d'être vue, parlée, communiquée, différée, projetée, imaginée, fait partie de son essence en disséminant autour d'elle une infinité de sens*" (Farge 1997: 19).

mobility. According to Jean Laplanche and Jean-Bertrand Pontalis (1967: 293), in the enunciation of the phantasm, the subject can be represented as participating in the scene without having an assigned place in it; s/he is present in the very thickness of the event and merges with it. Thus, the phantasm is not the object of desire, it is a scene – an assemblage of durations and intensities without a definite cartography.

Phantasmatic scenes are suspended durations that never cease to unfold in a complex system of reflections – Deleuze (1990[1969]: 286) speaks of "frozen cascades" – and signal their temporal thickness; they never cease to indicate that their meaning is to be sought in this very thickness. And this thickness corresponds to the time of *reflection*, made of dilemmas and paradoxes, of refractions and counterfeits. This suspended duration, this thickness that takes shape in reflection, is that of the phantasm itself, which dissolves the subject in the event. What remains of the subject is the intensity by which s/he experiments the event – its singular impulse, its *unique sign*. Indeed, by suspending memory, the phantasmatic sign "always finds itself the same in the place of what memory would develop. [...] There would therefore be no development in the sign, since it is in itself an instant of suspended memory" (Klossowski 2018: 37).[16]

As Deleuze (1990[1969]: 297) puts it, the order of phantasm is a "fascinating world where the identity of the self is lost, not to the benefit of the identity of the One or the unity of the Whole, but to the advantage of an intense multiplicity and a power of metamorphosis, where relations of force play within one another". This disappearance of the subject appears more clearly in the group phantasm than anywhere else. Moreover, it is perhaps also there that the archaic power of metamorphosis bears the greatest consequences.

As a matter of fact, in *Anti-Oedipus*, Deleuze and Guattari (1983[1972]: 30) suggest that phantasm is never individual, but always collective or, rather, political: "Group fantasy[17] is plugged into and machined on the socius." The difference between the individual phantasm and the group phantasm is that the former is connected to the imaginary, whereas the latter is connected to the symbolical. However, even though every individual is inhabited by "a world of fantasms occupying [his/her] daydreams" (Guattari 1995[1992]: 16), "the development of distinctions between group and individual fantasy shows sufficiently well, at last, that there is no individual fantasy. Instead, there are two types of groups,

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[16] "*[...] se retrouve toujours le même à la place de ce que le souvenir développerait. [...] Il n'y aurait donc pas de développement dans le signe, puisqu'il est à lui seul un instant de la mémoire suspendue.*"

[17] The American translators of *Anti-Oedipus* chose to translate the French word '*fantasme*', which can also be spelled '*phantasme*', by the English word 'fantasy'.

subject-groups and *subjugated groups*" (Deleuze, Guattari 1983[1972]: 64; my emphasis, S. L.). And this is where phantasm becomes overtly political.

Group phantasms are ambivalent. As Christopher Santiago (2023: 197) points out: "There is something anarchic or ungovernable about the phantasm. It underpins all systems yet is the wild card in any system." Of course, both subject-groups and subjugated groups experiment phantasms; it is the assemblage of the group and the phantasm that will determine the outcome – subjectivation or subjugation. Phantasms bear an "underlying revolutionary group potential" (Deleuze, Guattari 1983[1972]: 64), but they can also be distressing and paralyzing. I believe that the State is such a group phantasm with ambivalent possible outcomes.

The State is a totalizing force of coercion which uses every possible mode of semiotization to subject its population. The State is the object of much semiotico-libidinal investments on the part of individuals and groups, since it is the symbol of repression *par excellence*. However, remember that within the State itself lies the very possibility of its division and destruction, i.e. stasis – the spectre that haunts the State. Its negative nature is hidden behind the State taken as a positivity. Stasis, as much as the State, can be the object of semiotico-libidinal investments. As Deleuze and Guattari (1983[1972]: 62–63) explain:

> The revolutionary pole of group fantasy becomes visible, on the contrary, in the power to experience institutions themselves as mortal, to destroy them or change them according to the articulations of desire and the social field, by making the death instinct into a veritable institutional creativity. For that is precisely the criterion – at least the formal criterion – that distinguishes the revolutionary institution from the enormous inertia which the law communicates to institutions in an established order.

Subjugated groups can become subject-groups and *vice versa*.[18] Desire fluxes are determining the direction of conversions: "in group fantasy the libido may invest all of an existing social field, including the latter's most repressive forms; or on the contrary, it may launch a counterinvestment whereby revolutionary desire is plugged into the existing social field as a source of energy" (Deleuze, Guattari 1983: 30). On the one hand, political fictions of the State are the metanarratives capturing desire fluxes of subjugated groups and semiotizing them toward repression and outward war (*polemos*). On the other hand, group phantasms of subject-groups can generate political counter-fictions acting as metanarratives capturing desire fluxes and semiotizing them toward revolution and inward war (*stasis*).

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[18]   "Subject-groups are continually deriving from subjugated groups through a rupture of the latter"; "Subjugated groups are continually deriving from revolutionary subject-groups" (Deleuze, Guattari 1983[1972]: 349, 375).

What are political counter-fictions? According to Grangé (2015: 262), an element of stasis is always present in war in general, because it is an archaic principle, a movement, *a force of unbinding*: "[...] stasis is an archaic (ancient and underlying) movement of the political that war reproduces".[19] Political counter-fictions are phantasmatic devices, meaning condensers to capture desire fluxes and increase their intensity under the aegis of a unique sign of irreverence – stasis – toward power posing as a totality.

If political fictions are masking the underlying divide of the city, political counter-fictions must reveal this same divide. Political fictions exert a coercive (and cohesive) effect on society, while political counter-fictions are narratives of its possible and imminent dislocation. Political counter-fictions are *counter-signifying semiotic* productions in the sense in which Deleuze and Guattari (1987[1980]: 135) define this regime of signs: "[...] here, overcoding is assured by the Number as form of expression or enunciation, and by the War Machine upon which it depends; deterritorialization follows a line of active destruction or abolition."[20] Counter-signifying semiotic production differs from (symbolic) signifying production, in which "overcoding is fully effectuated by the signifier, and by the State apparatus that emits it; there is uniformity of enunciation, unification of the substance of expression, and control over statements in a regime of circularity" (Deleuze, Guattari 1987[1980]: 135). The former is divisive and diverting while the latter is totalizing and coercive.

Semiosis stasis and consciousness of habits

So far, the practical sense of stasis remains unclear. Without applying it to a specific object, this article nevertheless proposes a method. And even if stasiosemiotics is closer to critical theory than to pragmatics, I remain convinced that it can have consequences for ethics and radical politics.

In poetics, stasis refers to a suspension of time. It is a device to convey the feeling of being "on the brink", or "on the edge" of an outbreak or a break-

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[19]   "*[...] la* stasis *est un mouvement archaïque (ancien et sous-jacent) du politique que la guerre reproduit.*"

[20]   About 'the Number': some numerical signs are seen by Deleuze and Guattari (1987[1980]: 118) as signs of division: "[...] a numerical sign that is not produced by something outside the system of marking it institutes, which marks a mobile and plural distribution, which itself determines functions and relations, which arrives at arrangements rather than totals, distributions rather than collections, which operates more by breaks, transitions, migration, and accumulation than by combining units – a sign of this kind would appear to belong to the semiotic of a nomad war machine directed against the State apparatus."

through – the outcome is yet unknown. It aims at creating an experience of tension and apprehension by elongating time, or even virtually suspending it entirely. It is time at a standstill – as in ecstasy, *ek-stasis*: being out of oneself, out of ego, in suspended time. Repetition, deepening of description, multiplication of points of view on the same event are all ways of producing poetic stasis. Remember that, conceptually, stasis is the possibility of a division contained within the very thing that serves and produces unity. It haunts *what is* by menacing it with *what could be* if the authority of what is established were to be subverted. It is a pending change looming around, leaving us awaiting its happening. Stasis is both an indefinite duration and a non-moment; it has the consistency of the event without being one. In this, it is similar to the phantasm described by Deleuze as a repetition of differences or variations of the same.

While political fictions act as group phantasms facilitating subjugation, can political counter-fictions bring about critical reflection on this same processes? In other words, are political counter-fictions means of emancipation, or are they just another semiotico-libidinal investment of the same influxes? If we are to equate political counter-fictions to a group phantasm, then it is dubious, because, as we know, "the phantasmal world is the world which has never been fully conquered over. It is the world of the past, never of the future" (Deleuze, Guattari 1983: 28). The point seems unassailable: phantasm is an entrapment and fodder for the anxious mind, it merely circulates intensities. It is nevertheless a restless machine of semiotization. Phantasm is nourished by the past. Politics is oriented toward the future. But are they irreconcilable? I suggest they are not.

Stasis might have a role to play in ethics, and through ethics, in politics. Just like political fictions can lead to ideological subjection, phantasms can lead to psychic enslavement. As Christoph Menke (2019: 113) writes, "servitude is a habit that endures and which one reproduces oneself, even after having left the masters behind. After all, a habit is a state of self-imposed servitude." But is a habit qualified as a servitude congruent with ethics? Ethics is usually defined, in its most pragmatical sense, as the practice of instituting good habits (for oneself). This is consistent with Charles S. Peirce's conception of ethics as a theory of "self-controlled, or deliberate, conduct" (CP 1.191). However, Menke (2019: 114) raises an important counterpoint:

> The logic of habit is that of identical reproduction of a universal. [...] Habit is a rule which is not applied: for to apply a rule means to realize a universal in a particular situation and hence always in a different and new way. Habit is an application of rules without an awareness of the situation; habit is without a situation.

This argument, which is quite similar to Wittgenstein's observations on what it means to follow a rule (see Wittgenstein 1953: §138–242), highlights the unconsciousness of habit. However, Peirce knew this well, as is particularly evident in this crucial passage: "[...] consciousness subsides as habit becomes established, and is excited again at the breaking up of habit" (CP 6.613). This means that a habit is the result of a choice (or an expressed preference) made at some point in the past, and followed thereafter.

Still, just as the State contains its negativity in stasis, a Rule contains the possibility of its suspension in the very way in which it is acquired: by means of practising an activity whose rules we do not yet fully understand or for which we are not yet competent. Grammar appropriation is a step in the experience of rule externality. The disposition to learn, to take up socially instituted habits and reproduce them for oneself, is a vector of socialization. Yet it is also by virtue of the primal potentiality and ambivalence of the individual that socialization is not a fatality: "[...] the natural state of the individual is not the 'disposition' for culture, but the force of indeterminacy, the individual can never fully appropriate the socially pre-given forms of behaviour" (Menke 2019: 118). There is always room for change, but change is a force of destruction (of habit) that appears fearsome to many.[21]

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[21]   In *Difference and Repetition*, Deleuze offers a conceptualization of habit that, in many ways, draws and expands on the pragmatic view. Rather than seeing habit as the repetition of a rule or the root of a mindless routine, Deleuze sees it as a core process of synthesis crucial to the formation of both subjectivity and temporality. For Deleuze, habit is the "first synthesis of time" (Deleuze 2014[1968]: 103), i.e. a passive synthesis that constitutes the living present by assembling dispersed sign occurrences into a cohesive experience. This synthesis does not happen consciously; it occurs at a sub-representational level where the subject (or any organism) draws elements together to create expectation and continuity. Habit is therefore not something we have but something that we are. It is a contraction that constitutes one's present experience of being, and a node containing a number of potentialities for one's future self. The paradox of habit lies in its simultaneous conservatism and creativity. While habits establish patterns that resist change, they also create the conditions for difference to emerge. As Deleuze (2014[1968]: 97) writes: "Habit draws something new from repetition – namely, difference." The realization of one's own potentialities outside of repetition is the result of what Deleuze (2014[1968]: 148–153) calls 'counter-actualization' (*contre-effectuation*). Ethically, this is what can make someone "worthy of the event" according to Deleuze (see Boundas 2006: 14–19). However, it should be noted that counter-actualization, in Deleuze's philosophy, describes a practice of extracting virtual potentialities from *actual* events, while stasiosemiotics, and semiostasis as a method, can take on such complex objects as phantasms, understood as non-occurring events made of myriads of a-signifying signs cascading on a virtually atemporal plane. Still, counter-actualization in Deleuze's sense and political counter-fictions discussed here share a family resemblance.

As any psychoanalyst will tell you, a phantasm can be such a meaning conden-ser that all fluxes, varying in intensities, will flutter around it seemingly without a chance of escape. Perpetual rehashing ensues. For a line of flight to happen, there needs to be a change of habit, i.e. the objectivation of a rule – *consciousness*. Can stasiosemiotics help raise consciousness? I believe it can. Rehashing oftentimes takes the form of phantasm, for it is unknowingly captive of it. But how to inquire into a phantasm and its ineffable constellation of signs? Only by acknowledging its multiplicity, repetition and indefinite lingering will we be able to draw a line of flight traversing and leading outside the semiotic cycle of what is in reality a unique sign pulsing unendingly. The form signals the matter. Phantasm is a never-occurring event of an indefinite duration.

Stasiosemiotics is cut out for the inquiry of such an object. Indeed, its specific focus, or object, is semiosis stasis (or *semiostasis*), which is technically impossible: by definition, semiosis is evergoing, continuous and infinite. Though paradoxi-cal, semiosis stasis can nevertheless inspire a method to study sign bundles and objects of which the meaning form is profoundly intricate and temporally strati-fied. A stop on semiosis will necessarily point in all directions of the continuum from which the unique sign draws and where it disgorges. Semiosis stasis is the analytical suspension of the regular intergeneration of signs to the benefit of an examination of their modalities of interweaving and effectuation.

Semiostasis will soon reveal how "multiplicities are defined by the outside: by the abstract line" (Deleuze, Guattari 1987[1980]: 9). Grammars are to be revealed; a sign needs to elect its interpretant in order to self-reflect on its own functio-ning. "The plane of consistency (grid) is the outside of all multiplicities. The line of flight marks: the reality of a finite number of dimensions that the multiplicity effectively fills" and "the impossibility of a supplementary dimension" (Deleuze, Guattari 1987[1980]: 9). There can only be displacements, as the phantasm shows: grammars and interpretants are not on different planes, although like a mirror they reflect multiplicities as one – the light is the same. An essential divide marks the unconscious subject (Guattari 2015[1972]: 320; Lacan 1977: 288). Once you realize that the mirror is actually broken, you can choose a new habit for yourself.

The machinic unconscious is nothing but the social and political conformation of the subject through the production of desire by various means of semiotization, in particulara-signifying semiotics, from which unconscious habituation results. Menke is right to assert that "the theory of habit is social theory". But his takeaway from here is even more enlightening: "If the liberation from servitude is the central problem of any radical politics and if it is true that the liberation from servitude is, or requires, breaking habitual chains, then the political act (of liberation) and social existence (as habit) are entwined with one another" (Menke 2019: 114).

Semiostasis is designed as a means to resist the semiotic enslavement of subjectivity, or ego. Stasiosemiotics is the study of the underlying divide of society and of the subject, signalling its potential every time consciousness arises, i.e. when a rule previously obfuscated is objectified. Phantasm might well be necessary, for "there is no subjectivity strictly speaking without desire" (Kerslake 2008: 46), and "there is no thought without a phantasm" (Santiago 2023: 184). However, "group phantasizing has no 'safety rail' to compare with those that protect the libidinal instinctual system, and has to depend on temporary and unstable homeostatic equilibria" (Guattari 2015[1972]: 227). The revolutionary potential of group phantasm is inherently ambivalent and largely uncontrollable. Just like phantasms, rules might well be necessary, but rulers are all war profiteers.

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Sur la stasiosémiotique et la sémiostase : Deleuze, Guattari et le potentiel des fantasmes de groupe pour la politique radicale

La stasiosémiotique est formée de deux concepts : la stasis et la sémiotique. La stasis (ou stase) est un concept qui réfère à la fois à la division de la société et à la suspension du temps. En tant que branche de la sémiotique générale, l'objet spécifique de la stasiosémiotique est la stase de la sémiose, ou sémiostase, laquelle est techniquement impossible : par définition, la sémiose ne s'arrête jamais, elle est continue et infinie. Bien que paradoxale, la sémiostase peut néanmoins inspirer une méthode pour l'étude des systèmes de signes et des objets dont la forme du sens est profondément intriquée et temporellement stratifiée. Parmi de tels objets inextricablement complexes formant des constellations de signes, on trouve les fantasmes et les fictions politiques, ou « fantasmes de groupe » selon la terminologie de Guattari. Sur différents plans, ils agissent tous deux en tant que condensateurs de sens participant de la subjectivation et de l'aliénation sociale. À partir de la sémiotique du fantasme de Deleuze et Guattari, de la philosophie et l'anthropologie politiques ainsi que de la poétique, la stasis/stase peut être comprise à la fois au sens politique (guerre civile, division du corps social) et au sens esthétique (la stase comme figure de style – comme dans l'extase : *ek-stasis*, être hors de soi, hors d'ego, dans un temps suspendu). Précisément, la stasiosémiotique vise à suspendre virtuellement le mouvement de la sémiose (ou ce que Guattari appelle les « flux sémiotiques ») au profit d'une enquête sur les subtilités de la formation et du fonctionnement des signes. La conclusion suggère des conséquences éthiques quant à la conscience de l'habitude et des implications pour la politique radicale.

Stasiosemiootikast ja semiostaasist: Deleuze, Guattari ja rühmafantaasiate potentsiaal radikaalse poliitika jaoks

Stasiosemiootika koosneb kahest mõistest: '*stasis*' ja 'semiootika'. *Stasis* viitab nii lõhele ühiskonnas kui ka aja seiskamisele. Üldsemiootika haruna oleks selle eesmärk või objekt semioosi *stasis* ehk semiostaas, mis on tehniliselt võttes võimatu, sest semioos on määratluse järgi igikestev, pidev ja lõpmatu. Ehkki semiostaas on paradoksaalne, innustab see ikkagi looma meetodit uurimaks märgisüsteeme ja objekte, mille tähendusvorm on äärmiselt keerukas ning ajaliselt kihistunud. Sääraste taandamatult komplekssete objektide sekka, mis kujundavad märgikoosluси, kuuluvad fantasmid ja poliitilised fiktsioonid ehk Guattari mõistestikus 'rühmafantaasiad'. Kuigi need toimivad eri tasanditel, käituvad mõlemad tähenduse tihendajatena, mis osalevad ühiskondlikus subjektivatsioonis ja võõrandumise protsessis. Deleuze'i ja Guattari fantasmisemiootika, poliitilise filosoofia ja antropoloogia ning poeetika järgi saab *stasis*'t mõista nii poliitiliselt (kodusõda, lõhe poliitilises kehas) kui ka esteetiliselt (paigalseis, ekstaas, *ek-stasis*: enesest väljas, minast väljas, seiskunud ajas olemine). Stasiosemiootika püüab semioosi liikumist ehk Guattari sõnutsi 'semiootilisi voolusid' virtuaalselt seisata, et uurida märgiformatsioonide ja -toime peensusi. Kokkuvõtteks esitan mõned stasiosemiootika eetilised tagajärjed harjumuse teadvustamise osas ning implikatsioonid radikaalse poliitika jaoks.