

The duality of understanding and the understanding of duality in semiotics

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Abstract. In the view of the author, the main problem of semiotics is the understanding and advancing of understanding. To contribute to the solution of this problem, a distinction is suggested between two types of understanding: enlogy and empathy. The subject of enlogy reduces what he understands to himself as a code: he hears only what he is himself. The subject of empathy reduces what she understands to herself as a text: she sees only what she is striving to become. Enlogy is possible due to the identity of the communicants as a present unified code. Empathy is possible due to the identity of the communicants as a future common text. Mastering the code is a by-product of empathy; the texts rests on the enlogy that already is possible. Enlogy and empathy do not perceive each other as understanding. Therefore their mutual understanding remains the hardest problem of understanding. To fulfil its task, semiotics has to address this problem.

In this paper, I am concerned with semiotics as a study of the possibility of understanding and a striving for understanding.

The word ‘understanding’ has, of course, been construed in many different ways. A relevant distinction will emerge here.

A scene from family life

In order to introduce the problem let me cite a scene from family life.

“You don’t understand me.”

“I do!”

“Your saying so shows you don’t.”

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Are we to take this seriously? Can understanding be an obstacle to understanding? It seems that it can — and so understanding reveals its self-contradictoriness. Let us have a closer look.

If I am able to parse your sentences and to identify your words, then I understand what you are saying, and so I understand you. I understand you as using a grammatical sentence of a language I understand. Whenever you say something I understand, you are picking out one of the sentences the language allows to form and to understand. I understand you precisely because I share your language. I understand you before you ever say anything — because I understand whatever you could say — provided you follow the rules of a language common to us. By understanding whatever you say I understand you — as you *are* what you could say; *you are the language*, you always were. I understand you as long as I am the same language.

However, is what I am understanding really *you*? You would say: of course not. You are not your language. A language could never have enough room for you. Your language is just a means for you. You *are* what you are telling me. However, what you are saying is never *you*. I have to understand you from your messages though you never are present in them. I have to understand you though you are *unsayable*. In order to do so I have to find you in myself, or rather, I have to become you. This is possible since we are just becoming what we *are*. So, understanding involves being aware that understanding is still not there. I can understand you due to my producing and operating on a common ground which is conceived as both you and me.

Meaning as sense and significance

Let me explain this in other words. We distinguish between different ways of having meaning for us, namely, making sense and having significance.

What makes sense for me is what can be embraced by my codes or stereotypes that are ready already. What makes sense is what doesn't force or expect me to change myself.

By contrast, what has significance for me is what shows me something outside of me and is telling me something.

In communication, people usually have expectations concerning both sense and significance. A message is expected to be clear and

understandable: it is supposed to make sense. On the other hand, it is not expected to be trivial, it should be telling, it should be understandable why it was sent us: it is supposed to have significance. These two expectations have different, even opposite directions. In order to be meaningful for us, a message shouldn't be new, or else it wouldn't make sense and so it wouldn't be understandable; and in order to be significant for us, it should be new, or else it wouldn't have significance and so it wouldn't be understandable.

Here we can see that understanding can be construed in two ways: understanding consists either in detecting sense or in detecting significance.

Lotman on the paradox of communication

Juri Lotman in his work addresses issues similar to what has been noted in the previous section. Throughout his lectures, Lotman has cited the following paradox:

If two individuals are absolutely different from each other, if they do not have anything in common, then meaningful communication between them is impossible. But if two individuals are absolutely identical, then, also, communication is impossible — actually, it is possible, but they just do not have anything to tell each other. (Kull 2005: 176)

In the terms of the previous section, the missing 'meaning' is construed either as 'sense' (common codes) or as 'significance' (having something to tell each other).

If we imagine a sender and a receiver with the same codes and entirely lacking memory then the understanding between them will be ideal but the value of the information transferred will be minimal, and the information itself will be strictly limited. [...] It can be said that the sender and the receiver which are ideally similar will understand each other ideally but they won't have anything to talk about [...].

In normal human communication, and what is more, in the normal functioning of the language, an original lack of identity between the speaker and the hearer is assumed.

Under these conditions, the situation of an intersection between the linguistic spaces of the speaker and the hearer becomes normal [...].

In the situation of the lack of intersection, communication is assumed to be impossible, the complete intersection (identity of [the linguistic spaces —

A. L.] *A* and *B*) deprives the communication of content. So, a certain intersection of the spaces and, at the same time, an intersection of two mutually fighting tendencies: the striving to facilitate the understanding, which will continually try to enlarge the domain of intersection, and the striving to increase the value of the message, which is connected with the tendency maximally to increase the difference between *A* and *B*. [...]

The space of intersection between *A* and *B* becomes the natural base for communication. And the non-intersecting parts of the spaces seem to be excluded from the dialogue. However, here we meet one more contradiction: the exchange of information within the intersecting part of the sense space suffers from the same vice of triviality. The value of the dialogue turns out to be connected not with the intersecting space but with the information transfer between the non-intersecting parts. This renders us faced with an unsolvable contradiction: we are interested in communication with namely the sphere that makes communication more difficult, and, in the limit — renders it impossible.² (Lotman 1992: 15–16, translation mine — *A. L.*)

² “Если мы представим себе передающего и принимающего с одинаковыми кодами и полностью лишенными памяти, то понимание между ними будет идеальным, но ценность передаваемой информации минимальной, а сама информация — строго ограниченной. [...] Можно сказать, что идеально одинаковые передающий и принимающий хорошо будут понимать друг друга, но им не о чем будет говорить. [...]

В нормальном человеческом общении и, более того, в нормальном функционировании языка заложено предположение об исходной неидентичности говорящего и слушающего.

В этих условиях нормальной становится ситуация пересечения языкового пространства говорящего и слушающего [...].

В ситуации непересечения общение предполагается невозможным, полное пересечение (идентичность *A* и *B*) делает общение бессодержательным. Таким образом, допускается определенное пересечение этих пространств и одновременно пересечение двух противоборствующих тенденций: стремление к облегчению понимания, которое будет постоянно пытаться расширить область пересечения, и стремление к увеличению ценности сообщения, что связано с тенденцией максимально увеличить различие между *A* и *B*. [...]

Пространство пересечения *A* и *B* становится естественной базой для общения. Между тем как непересекающиеся части этих пространств, казалось бы, из диалога исключены. Однако мы здесь оказываемся еще перед одним противоречием: обмен информацией в пределах пересекающейся части смыслового пространства страдает все тем же пороком тривильности. Ценность диалога оказывается связанной не с той пересекающейся частью, а с передачей информации между непересекающимися частями. Это ставит нас лицом к лицу с неразрешимым противоречием: мы заинтересованы в общении именно с той сферой, которая затрудняет общение, а в пределе — делает его невозможным.”

What did Peirce not understand

Charles Sanders Peirce did not understand the laws of nature. In his paper "The Architecture of Theories" he wrote:

To suppose universal laws of nature capable of being apprehended by the mind and yet having no reason for their special forms, but standing inexplicable and irrational, is hardly a justifiable position. Uniformities are precisely the sort of facts that need to be accounted for. That a pitched coin should sometimes turn up heads and sometimes tails calls for no particular explanation; but if it shows heads every time, we wish to know how this result has been brought about. Law is *par excellence* the thing that wants a reason.

Now the only possible way of accounting for the laws of nature and for uniformity in general is to suppose them results of evolution. (Peirce 1992: 288)

I take '*inexcliplable*' to mean 'ununderstandable' in a sense, since a thing is made understandable by explanation. So, in a sense, Peirce does not understand laws of nature. Nor the exact formulation of a law neither subsuming it under a more general law renders it understandable. For Peirce, understanding seems to involve affinity with the understander, a common history and participation in a common process. The process in question is habit taking. A natural law is to be conceived to be a habit of nature, and understanding it is taking a habit as well:

The one intelligible theory of the universe is that of objective idealism, that matter is effete mind, inveterate habits becoming physical laws. (Peirce 1992: 293)

Empathy and enlogy

As the short names of the different conceptions of understanding I want to distinguish between, I propose '*empathy*' and '*enlogy*'.

'Empathy' is a common word, meaning 'putting oneself into another's shoes'³. It origins from the Greek words *en* 'in, inside' and

³ The word has been coined after the Greek word *empathia* 'physical affection; passion; partiality' (Liddell, Scott 1940: sub *empathia*) but it has a new meaning following the German word *Einführung* (literally: 'feeling into') intro-

pathos (multiple meanings, among them ‘what happens to or in someone or someone’ and ‘what one feels like’).⁴ So, empathy can be conceived as: what is happening (as if) to me or inside of me.

I propose to broaden this concept, having in view the examples above — understanding that requires not understanding, and the understanding Peirce sought after. The empathic understander models on herself what is to be understood. She understands anything only by understanding herself. She understands herself as evolving from a long history, and anything else is understandable as far as it has common roots with herself. Understanding is part of that history, or better, all of her history is understanding. Her history can’t take end. While she is understanding, she doesn’t understand.

In contrast, I use the word ‘*enlogy*’⁵ by analogy to ‘*empathy*’, evoking the Greek word ‘*logos*’ that has notoriously numerous meanings, including ‘*law*’, ‘*rule*’ and ‘*reason*’ (Liddell, Scott 1940: sub *logos*, 2006/06/04). Reminding our examples, *enlogy* is meant to be understanding by rules of language and the kind of understanding Peirce denied. By understanding the laws of nature one understands nature. This is all one needs. *Enlogic* understanding has no history, and every *enlogy* is complete, non-processual.

Meaning transmission and meaning generation

Texts are products of two kinds of semiotic processes: meaning transmission and meaning generation.

In the general system of culture, the texts fulfil at least two main functions: adequate transmission of meanings and generation of new meanings.⁶ (Lotman 1992 [1981]: 150)

duced by Rudolf Lotze in 1858 (Harper, Douglas 2001. *Online Etymology Dictionary*, sub *empathy*, <http://www.etymonline.com>, 2006/06/02).

⁴ The meanings include: ‘that which happens to a person or thing’, ‘good or bad experience’, ‘calamity, misfortune’, ‘emotion, passion’, ‘state, condition’, ‘happenings or changes in things’, ‘properties, qualities of things’ partiality’ (Liddell, Scott 1940: sub *pathos*).

⁵ The word *enlogy* (in Russian: энлогия) in a different though close meaning was introduced by Dvorkin 1983 and later widely used by Chebanov (e.g., Chebanov 1995).

⁶ “В общей системе культуры тексты выполняют по крайней мере две основные функции: адекватную передачу значений и порождение новых смыслов.”

In order to understand a text enlogically, we are to recognize it as a variant of a paradigm, a textual instance of a sign system (code or language). A sign system provides the possible meaningful ('senseful') syntagmata in the framework of that system. The paradigm also can be a text-code ('an intermediate link between language and texts',⁷ Lotman 1992 [1981]: 150).

[The function of adequate transmission of meanings] is best fulfilled in the case of the fullest coincidence of the codes of the speaker and the hearer and, consequently, in the case of the maximum unambiguity of the text.⁸ (Lotman 1992 [1981]: 150)

The core of enlogic understanding is reducing texts to variants of paradigms. A sign system is a paradigm providing the possible texts in that sign system. A text-code can be conceived as a single sign occurring in different variants.

Enlogy isn't limited to subsuming under a single, known code. The enlogic striving of understanding is at work even when a text is encoded by several codes which still might only be sought after. Lotman seems to identify the key of the ability of texts to generate new senses in the plurality of codes:

Culture is, in principle, polyglottic, and texts always are realized in the space of at least two semiotic systems. [...] being encoded by many codes is a law for an overwhelming number of texts of culture [...].⁹ (Lotman 1992: 143)

[...] the text itself, being semiotically heterogeneous, enters the game with the codes decoding it and influences it in a deforming way. In result, in the process of the advance of the text from the addresser to the addressee, a shift of sense and its increase takes places. Therefore, this function [of the text] can be called *creative*. [...] the text is heterogenous and heterostructural, it is a manifestation of several languages at the same time. The complex relationships of dialogue and play between the text's manifold substructures constituting its

⁷ "[...] между языком и текстами промежуточного звена [...]."

⁸ "[...] выполняется наилучшим образом при наиболее полном совпадении кодов говорящего и слушающего и, следовательно, при максимальной однозначности текста."

⁹ "Культура в принципе полиглотична, и тексты ее всегда реализуются в пространстве как минимум двух семиотических систем. [...] зашифрованность многими кодами есть закон для подавляющего числа текстов культуры [...]."

inward polyglottism, are mechanisms to generate senses.¹⁰ (Lotman 1992: 145)

The text [...] doesn't stand before us as a manifestation of some one language: to constitute it, at least two languages are needed. [...] the text in its second function is not a passive receptacle, a bearer of content that has been put into it from outside, but a generator.¹¹ (Lotman 1992 [1981]: 151–152)

The two functions of texts roughly correspond to enlogy and empathy as two functions or two strategies or two ideals of understanding.

Enlogy is finding you in myself, whereas empathy is my becoming you. In enlogy, you are the code of your text(s) in me; in empathy, you are the ideal end of the evolution of your text while my understanding. Enlogy is every time complete since understanding a code is understanding a whole; empathy is never at end because you always stay beyond your text.

Lotman suggests that meanings (senses) constitute no fixed stock. They can be generated, that is, newly created. In terms of enlogy, this would mean that I am not just finding myself as you but I am becoming a new self. That would be a contradiction. So, Lotman points to the limits to enlogy. The process he describes has an empathic character. However, he does not leave the point of view of enlogy and continues to use the concept of code. So, empathy shows itself in another perspective.

¹⁰ “[...] сам текст, будучи семиотически неоднородным, вступает в игру с дешифрующими его кодами и оказывает на них деформирующее воздействие. В результате в процессе продвижения текста от адресанта к адресату происходит сдвиг смысла и его приращение. Поэтому данную функцию можно назвать *творческой*. [...] текст гетерогенен и гетероструктурен, он есть манифестация одновременно нескольких языков. Сложные диалогические и игровые соотношения между разнообразными подструктурами текста, образующими его внутренний полиглоти́зм, являются механизмами смыслообразования.”

¹¹ “Текст [...] предстает перед нами не как манифестация какого-либо одного языка — для его образования требуются как минимум два языка. [...] текст во второй своей функции является не пассивным вместилищем, носителем извне вложенного в него содержания, а генератором.”

Complexity

It seems to be natural to conceive the complexity of a text as the difficulty of its understanding. So, we should distinguish between enlogic and empathic complexity.

In enlogy, the more complex is the text the more simple must be the code, and vice versa. It is obvious to distinguish between two levels of text complexity and code simplicity. First, it might be that every text type is encoded apart so that the text is not analyzable by means of the code but simply is to be recognized as a certain type text. Then the texts are simple (unanalyzable!) but the code is complex as it must enlist all possible text types. Second, it might be that the code provides a grammar allowing to parse a huge, maybe endless amount of different text types. Then the code is simpler as it charges memory at a lesser amount and the texts are more complex since they have analyzable structure.

Now I propose to interpolate this scale of complexity in both directions. First, let us see how texts could be even simpler. Take a sentence in a foreign language. If you know the language you can parse the sentence and understand it. If you only start learning the language it might be that you understand the sentence as a whole though you cannot parse it. At that level of understanding you should know all sentences by heart to understand them. Can it be anything still more primitive? Certainly! Imagine that you understand no sentence itself but can repeat any sentence in order to ask what it means. And finally, maybe you are even not able to repeat sentences, and so you should point to each token sentence in order to learn its meaning. In those cases, respectively, you can identify type sentences only in a chain of repeating, or you can identify only tokens. So, in order to know the language at those levels, memory should have room for all chains of repeating or even for every token sentence! Normally, those levels are perceived as pre-code levels.

Code is what enables us to recognize the sense of a text. The simpler is the code the more difficult task is the recognition since the code is the less similar to the text. We have to recognize a token text, then a chain of token texts, then a type text and then the linguistic form of the text. In each case, the new level of code is impossible in terms of the previous level. The unity is constituted according to a new princi-

ple. For example, the grammar of a language cannot be mastered simply by memorizing the senses of words, sentences or texts.

Further we move as if to the post-code level. Suppose we have to understand poetry that creatively uses language. It contains words and patterns not provided by language codes, and it allows different variants of decoding even where the codes are still at work. How then is understanding possible? Is the concept of code still somehow extrapolatable here? Understanding poetry *is* possible, and this is due to the level of language mastering exceeding the following of grammatical models. And here, the language mastering is mastering the language itself rather than mastering its grammar, or in the other words, the codes in the usual sense. The language itself is a code (a post-code). We can't describe this code and we don't understand it in terms of (usual) codes exactly because it is a code of a higher level and the way of understanding depends on the level of code.

Enlogy can be conceived as clarity about the sense of the text. The requirements for clarity depend on the level of enlogic understanding. Enlogy is accomplished by subsuming the text under a code. However, enlogy can also be conceived as a permanent ability to understand the senses of a variety of texts.

By contrast, empathy involves generating new texts in order indefinitely to approximate understanding the significance of the text. Each text produced by the process of understanding is an intermediate step of understanding and non-understanding. This process is what Peirce called *semiosis*.¹² Interpretants are newly produced texts as expressions of understanding, and at the same time, in their quality of representamina (or 'signs') in new semioses, they are sources of non-understanding.

Each text in the chain of interpretation is understandable in the framework of *some* enlogy. On the other hand, for empathy this understanding of sense is trivial, as significance manifests itself only in the choice of the variant envisaged by a certain code. For enlogy, this choice is irrelevant. The choice is a by-product of instantiating a code.

¹² Peirce uses the word *semiosis* in a manuscript titled as "Pragmatism": "[...] by 'semiosis' I mean [...] an action, or influence, which is, or involves, a cooperation of *three* subjects, such as a sign, its object, and its interpretant, this tri-relative influence not being in any ways resolvable into actions between pairs" (Peirce 1998: 411).

The code, in its turn, is a by-product of the chain of interpretation.¹³ Complexity in terms of empathy increases along with decrease of complexity in terms of enlogy. On each level of code complexity, the process of interpretation is working towards the next level. As the next level is not present, it is compensated by code changes. As there is no envisaged text variant, significance is expressed by combining codes. Lotman describes this process as dialogue and sense-generating creativity of texts (see above).

Understanding: discrepancy of expectations

Lotman's presentation of the communication in "the situation of an intersection between the linguistic spaces of the speaker and the hearer" (cited above) refers to a scale where significance is increased on account of the diversification of the stock of codes (which eventually is to yield a new level of code).

Is it here the case that "lack of intersection" means the absolute difference of the communicants, and the "complete intersection" means their absolute identity? Both identity and difference can be meant in substantially different ways. Lotman thematises "linguistic spaces" as the criterion of identity and difference (intersection). That amounts to code mastering as the criterion of similarity of communicants. Communicants similar in that way produce texts (messages) making sense to each other exactly due to this similarity. Further, we can't literally say that communicants similar in this aspect have nothing to tell each other. Obviously, significance need not and typically doesn't lie in codes. It turns out that the character of the troubles at the two ends of the scale lies in two different dimensions: communicants identical in terms of significant content cannot communicate in a significant way, and communicants entirely different in terms of codes cannot communicate in a way making sense. The expectations in the two cases are totally different! And if we look for the conditions of the possibility of communication then we don't look just for a middle ground between two extremes but we combine two types of expectations.

¹³ Peirce describes this process as habit-taking, habits being final interpretants (e.g., Peirce 1998: 412–418).

We are used to think that codes are *mere* means of conveying and receiving messages. However, the two types of expectations are not only different but incommensurable and even antagonistic. The expectations are either enlogic or empathic. Understanding sense and understanding significance are different interests. The texts make sense when the communicants have a common “linguistic space“. And the texts have significance when the content to communicate is different between the communicants.

Different expectations in terms of understanding lead to different communicative behaviour as in our family scene above. There is a sort of lack of understanding that has its source precisely in the difference of expectations in two types of communicative agents. Of course, usually both attitudes are combined in one and the same agent. Nevertheless, modelling communication in terms of types of agents might be a useful method of analysis. It seems that the existing semiotic theories pay little or no attention to the distinction in question.

Meno’s paradox

In the context of the semiotic paradoxes, Kull (2005) mentions Meno’s paradox:

It has been formulated in the Platonic dialogue *Meno*, and it states that one cannot search for what one does not know and does not need to search for what one already knows. If so, then learning turns out to be impossible. Learning as acquiring knowledge of something else is essentially a sign process, and in this sense it requires an embeddedness into the sphere of signs. (Kull 2005: 176)

However, Plato’s (or Socrates’) solution to that problem raised by Meno seems to be different. The problem is raised by Meno as follows:

Meno: How will you look for it, Socrates, when you do not know at all what it is? How will you aim to search for something you do not know at all? If you should meet with it, how will you know that this is the thing you did not know?

Socrates: I know what you want to say, Meno. Do you realize what a debater’s argument you are bringing up, that a man cannot search either for what he knows or for what he does not know? He cannot search for what he knows —

since he knows it, there is no need to search — nor for what he does not know, for he does not know what to look for. (80d–e; Plato 1997: 880, translated by B. M. A. Grube)

Plato's (Socrates') solution is that learning is recollection:

Socrates: Then if the truth about reality is always in our soul, the soul would be immortal so that you should always confidently try to seek out and recollect what you do not know at present — that is, what you do not recollect?

Meno: Somehow, Socrates, I think that what you say is right. (86b; Plato 1997: 886)

Of course, what Plato (Socrates) says should not be taken literally. But what is the lesson? We should find an analogy with the situation of incommunicability as cited above.

The specific thing Meno and Socrates were searching for was the definition of virtue. If we conceive learning as communication with reality then the definition of virtue both conveys us a certain code for understanding (the sense of) our experience and mediates (significant) knowledge about reality. When we know the definition we have nothing to search for as empathy has come to an end. When we don't know the definition we lack the crucial code to learn it.

My interpretation of Plato's (Socrates') purport is as follows. We can't acquire new codes immediately by means of our old codes. The new codes are generated as by-products of empathy. This is what Plato (Socrates) means by 'recollection'. There are two sources of the possibility of understanding. First, the communicants share 'linguistic spaces' (in Plato's example, we know something we still have to recollect). Second, they share a common striving (amounting to a striving to learn) that makes understanding possible even when there is no language mastering.

Understanding: a challenge for semiotics

We started from an example from everyday life where it became manifest that lack of understanding can be due to different models of understanding at work. So we need one more concept of understanding besides enlogy and empathy: understanding between enlogy and empathy.

Mastering this concept requires overcoming one-sided orientation towards either enlogy or empathy in semiotics. To avoid reduction, the interdependence between enlogy and empathy (as sketched above) should be addressed. Further, an adequate approach to the real problem of understanding needs a positive conception of understanding between enlogy and empathy.

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¹⁴ Available at <http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/cgi-bin/resolveform>.

¹⁵ Available at <http://yanko.lib.ru/books/cultur/lotman-selection.htm>.

¹⁶ Available at <http://yanko.lib.ru/books/cultur/lotman-selection.htm>.

¹⁷ Available at http://yanko.lib.ru/books/cultur/lotman_semiosphera.htm.

Дуальность понимания и понимание дуальности в семиотике

В качестве основной проблемы семиотики автор видит понимание понимания и содействие пониманию. К решению этой проблемы в статье предлагается различить две формы понимания — энлогию и эмпатию. Субъект энлогии сводит понимаемое к самому себе как коду: он слышит в понимаемом только то, чем он сам является. Субъект эмпатии сводит понимаемое к самому себе как тексту: он видит в понимаемом только то, чем он сам стремится стать. Энлогия возможна благодаря тождественности коммуникантов в качестве наличного единого кода. Эмпатия возможна благодаря тождественности коммуникантов в качестве будущего общего текста. Владение кодом является побочным продуктом эмпатии; текст опирается на ту энлогию, которая уже возможна. Энлогия и эмпатия не воспринимают друг друга как понимание. Поэтому самой трудной проблемой понимания останется их взаимопонимание. Чтобы выполнить свою задачу, семиотика должна заняться этой проблемой.

Mõistmise duaalsus ja duaalsuse mõistmine semiootikas

Autor näeb semiootika põhiprobleemina mõistmise mõistmist ja mõistmise edendamist. Et selle probleemi lahendamisele kaasa aidata, pakutakse artiklis välja eristus kahe mõistmise vormi (arusaamine ehk enloogiline mõistmine ja mõistmine kitsamas mõttes ehk empaatiline mõistmine) vahel. Arusaaja taandab arusaadava iseendale kui koodile, kuulates arusaadavas ainult seda, mis ta ise on. Mõistja taandab mõistetava iseendale kui tekstile, nähes mõistetavas ainult seda, milleks ta ise püüab saada. Enloogia on võimalik tänu kommunikantide samasusele olemasoleva ühtse koodina. Empaatia on võimalik tänu kommunikantide samasusele tulevase ühise tekstina. Koodi valdamine on empaatia kõrvalsaadus; tekst tugineb enloogiale, mis on juba võimalik. Enloogiline ja empaatiline mõistja ei mõista teineteisele omast mõistmist mõistmisena. Seetõttu jääb raskeimaks mõistmisprobleemiks nende omavaheline mõistmine. Et oma ülesannet täita, peab semiootika selle probleemiga tegelema.