

Body ground red – integrating Peirce, Kristeva and Greimas

Herman Tamminen¹

Abstract. Ground (Charles Peirce's concept) – regardless whether it be taken as motivation or abstractness – affords the proposition that some abstract categories of meaning have acquired their qualities via bodily experience. In order to show this to be the case, the concept of ground will be drawn together with the division (according to Julia Kristeva) between the symbolic and the semiotic, the semiotic *chora* will be shown to function as an axiologizing thymic category as regard reception of perception (following Algirdas Greimas), and finally it will be proposed that it is this foundation that enables the coherence and inevitability of culture as a whole, being responsible for its stereoscopic quality as well. This procedure will further the haply sacrilegious march towards the emergence of *modal semiotics*, which allows us to dispense of signs in order to gain an anachronistically novel understanding of our own being.

Keywords: ground; semiotic; *chora*; symbolic; thymic category; colour; modal semiotics

*Der Gelehrte giebt seine ganze Kraft im Ja und Neinsagen, in der Kritik
von bereits Gedachtem ab – er selber denkt nicht mehr...*
(Nietzsche 1888)

Introduction

The aim of this paper is to suggest an unorthodox integration of three seemingly disparate corners of semiotic theory. Albeit uncustomary, this paper will conjoin and compare concepts from three major theorists – namely 'ground' as defined by Peirce; the 'semiotic' (*chora*) and the 'symbolic' as defined by Kristeva; and the 'thymic' category along with the 'cognitive' and 'pragmatic' dimensions as defined by Greimas – to bring to the fore their similarities and mutual adaptability and by that, complement each respectively in order to make way for a more general

¹ Department of Semiotics, University of Tartu. E-mail: herman_tamminen@hotmail.com.

synthetic framework for future applications towards modal semiotics in which ‘sign’ will become dispensable.

In very general terms, modal semiotics can be described as semiotics that describes the role of modal values² in the tensional (re-)organization of action, thought, and emotion in their respective dimensions; the meeting point of which each human being is. Pertaining to modes and levels of existence, i.e. states presupposing instances of doing which produce them, the tensional trajectory reaches from virtualization to actualization to potentialization to realization. The trajectory is orientated by modal values which in their turn may be divided into two broad classes – that of doing and that of being – either of which may modalize the other and/or itself in accordance with said values. Albeit signs are imperative for any exchange, concentrating rather on their modalities³ than themselves allows for a more wholesome view on thinking, behaviour, and the collective semantic universe, i.e. culture as postulated structural-functionally analogous to the human intellect.

Proceeding from our approach to modal semiotics, this paper will consistently involve not signs, but merely sign-functions at best. However, since it is quite difficult to speak of sign theory without touching upon signs, they are bound to be mentioned. The paper directs the reader’s attention towards ground that was vaguely described by Peirce. By considering and comparing two approaches to ground as provided by Peirce, and with the help of Kristeva and Greimas, it will be proposed that some potential possibilities of abstract meanings as pertain to ground are phylogenetically conditioned by and within the body.

1. Digging ground

In general, ground is either a pure abstraction and/or an agreement between two things (EP1: 1–10). More precisely, the term ‘ground’ was sketched out as “a pure abstraction, reference to which constitutes a quality or general attribute” (EP1: 4) which enables the relationship between expression and content “as an agreement

² “[...] studies have constantly shown the exceptional role that the modal values of *wanting*, *having-to*, *being-able*, and *knowing* – which can modalize being as well as doing – play in the semiotic organization of discourses” (Greimas, Courtés 1982: 194).

³ “[A] modality is a predicate governing and modifying another predicate (or an utterance which has as object-actant another predicate). In this perspective, any case of doing – whether it be a case of an instrumental doing (causing to-be), or a manipulative doing (causing to-do), of a doing which constructs, transforms, and destroys things, or of a factitive doing which manipulates beings – appears as the predicate-function of a modal utterance governing another utterance” (Greimas, Courtés 1982: 93).

in some respect” (EP1: 4). This quality may be determined in such a fashion as to have “its being prescinded from reference to a correlate” (EP1: 7) thus bringing about “two kinds of relation” (EP1: 7):

- 1st That of relates whose reference to a ground is a prescindible or internal quality.
 2nd That of relates whose reference to a ground is an unprescindible or relative quality.

(EP1: 7)

Accordingly, there are two ways in which Peirce approached the concept of ground: on the one hand, he associated “ground strictly with the features and properties of the representamen prior to any relation”, whereas, on the other hand, he “clearly associates ground with the relation between these features and properties” (Bennett 2016: 215). In the first case, it is the abstraction of, for example, ‘red’, thus excluding “the possibility of ground having anything to do with the connection between explanans and explanandum because in firstness there is as yet still no relation proper” (Bennett 2016: 216).

In the second case, instead of seeing ground as an idea or abstraction, the emphasis is more on the relation to the object in the sense that “the ground provides the motivation for the association of the features of the representamen with its object, however not yet in association with any particular object” (Bennett 2016: 216). In this sense, grounded signs sort of pre-exist in a more constricted or (pre-)defined manner than groundless signs. Either way, “[g]round is the self abstracted from the concreteness which implies the possibility of an other” (EP1: 6). In other words, in order for there to be some thing, there must be some other thing upon which it is based, or from which it differs and whence it is abstracted by (or in) the self; ground is that which enables sign-function, at least as concerns grounded signs.

Since this article strives to pave the way for modal semiotics instead of analysing the finer nuances of (types, classes, etc.) signs, then duly here “there are not signs, but only *sign-functions*” (Eco 1979: 49). As such, the notion ‘sign’ – when referred to – is understood as denoting “the unit consisting of content-form and expression-form and established by the solidarity [...] called the sign-function” (Hjelmslev 1961: 58). In general, sign-function refers to the solidarity between the functives’ expression and content, and the fact of their mutual presupposition, the outcome(s) of which is sign. Thus sign-function may be equated with the concept of semiosis, and, by extension, the signifying process. The symbol :: is adopted from Greimas and Courtés (1982: 158), and used to denote ‘equal to’, ‘same as’, or homologous.

It may be stated that a relationship of reciprocal presupposition between expression and content exists or, more precisely, has the potentiality to exist before it becomes known. Though the “possibility of possibility precedes Firstness; it precedes the possibility of the signs becoming” (merrell 2010: 43), the ground of any sign (provided it has ground) is based on a relation of similarity or agreement between two things by way of abstraction or, “more precisely it is the first kind of these relationships, termed firstness [...] as it applies to the relation in question” (Sonesson 1998: 294–295).

We might wish to recall that firstness “is the Idea of that which is such as it is regardless of anything else. That is to say, it is a Quality of Feeling” (EP2: 160). Accordingly, it is a quality which refers to the ground of the sign by way of firstness. The relation of similarity or agreement is external to the sign itself since a sign in itself *is* a relation, a sign only in the way it is used and thus requires an interpreter in order to indicate either by means of similarity/resemblance, convention, or contiguity or it remains a non-sign or mere possibility. It is this pre-existing potential that affords generation of new concepts, ideas, worlds and so on. Naturally, these sort of relations become known only upon semiosis which raises the question whether the interpreter’s relation to content and expression is also pre-existent from the point of view of ground regardless of there being – presumably – no actant to propose this save for culture as a collective intellect.

In a rather quirky and semi-esoteric reading from the subject’s point of view, the ground as the self abstracted from the concreteness implying the possibility of an other would then correspond to the birth of subjective cognition. Or, in a more down-to-earth fashion, it may be likened with the Lacanian mirror-stage when a child comprehends its otherness and slowly begins to become absorbed into the world as a speaking subject. Or, as Peirce himself put it, “The *ground* being that partaking of which is requisite to any communication with the Symbol, corresponds in its function to the Holy Spirit” (W1: 503). Provided this is taken seriously, the concept of ground could be nudged closer to the centre of attention in Peircean semeiotic theory.

For the integrative purposes of this article, especially as concerns the use of ground, it is worthwhile taking into account that “the ‘subjects’ of Peirce’s ‘semiosis’ are not human subjects but rather three abstract semiotic entities, the dialectic between which is not affected by concrete communicative behavior” (Eco 1979: 15).

Albeit Peirce decided to lose ‘ground’ quite early on⁴, it deserves closer inspection just for that reason. Supposedly the final in-theory mention of ground regards

⁴ “Now, with the one exception we have noted, Peirce seems to have dropped the term ‘ground’ after 1867, and even in the exception of 1897, the ground is not described as a quality common to possible objects of a sign” (Short 1986: 107).

a sign standing for something – “it stands for that object, not in all respects, but in reference to a sort of idea, which I have sometimes called the ground of the representamen” (CP 2.228). For Peirce, signs are triadic, but as the above quote shows, it would seem as if the term ground would somehow be a fourth element in the relation. Nevertheless, the “ground is not a fourth element, however, but is reducible to one of the other three components. In general, the ground is that by virtue of which the sign refers” (Meyers 1996: 24).

Reading ‘by virtue of’ between the lines as ‘because or as a result of’ refers to ground as to sign-function itself and raises questions pertaining to reason or causality – the sign refers *because* or the sign refers *as a result of* – and in this light, ground would be that which affords the becoming of a sign at all and by that demands taking chronology into account. It may be postulated that during the human phylogenesis ‘simpler’ or ‘indicative’ signs pre-date the abstract, or language as such and its secondary outcomes. This in its turn begs the question how exactly did we as a species transfer from simple indicative/indecixal object-language to purely abstract language that transcends its users from the immediate reality and enables us to speak of things not present or physically existent at all.

The reducibility of ground to one of the three components does not make it obsolete or useless. Quite the contrary – the sign refers because of the existence of ground provided it be a grounded sign. Qualia *are* regardless whether we are aware of them; as far as colour is concerned, the spectrum of light is wider than our eyes discern and in the light of human phylogenesis, all signs would have risen from ground(s). Be that as it may, “the presence or absence of ground is the very substance of the meaningfulness of the sign, which is defined by its unpredictability, multi-valence, and context-specific variation of interpretation” (Bennett 2016: 231).

Grounded or not, on what comes to usage of signs in general, “uses that are fixed in time and space – are of mixed character: they are natural-conventional but, at the same time, indicative, indexical, signalling, iconic and symbolic also” (Pelc 1986: 14). On the same note, the natural-conventional nature of sign-use may be proposed to change in time with regard to logical systems⁵ of knowledge

⁵ “We may say of semiotic systems that they are the object of knowing sought after by general semiotics (or semiology). An object such as this is not definable in and of itself but only in terms of the methods and procedures which permits its analysis and/or construction. Any attempt, therefore, to define semiotic systems and/or processes (whether as human faculty, as social function, or as means of communication, etc.) reflects a theoretical attitude which disposes the set of “semiotic facts” in its own way. [...] Furthermore, every semiotic system is articulated. As a projection of the discontinuous upon the continuous, it is made up of differences and oppositions” (Greimas, Courtés 1982: 285).

prevalent in a given time and place (or, signs are system-specific). Were this not the case, there would be no change in the world.

And so ground offers intrigue since “reference to a ground cannot be prescinded from being, but being can be prescinded from it” (EP1: 4). Again, ground is something that *is* quite irrespective whether or not we as sign-users take note of it. This also provides the obverse as regards signs’ referring i.e. in the case of being there may as well be signs that lack ground. Such signs are symbols proper or signs that function on a semiotic level which carries no biological interpreters (cf. Bennett 2016).

The outdistancing of sign from its ground does not automatically entail the disappearance of sign-function i.e. semiosis. However, it is of course possible that the groundless sign dies or shapeshifts (evolves) in such a fashion as to have little or no semiotic aspects. A stagnant or dead sign does not by default entail the disappearance of its meaning, which may have just become to be referred to via a different chain of semioses. Chronologically speaking, it may be said that there are meaning(s) that used to be referable to by this or that sign or chain of semioses but for reasons here unspecified, they may refer to something completely different or to nothing at all. Etymologically speaking, an example is any word that used to refer to ‘A’ but now refers to ‘X’ or has fallen out of use, or any thing that is nothing, i.e. is non-semiotic and/or below the semiotic threshold.

The ground to an extent defines the sign; it is unlikely for a sign to be in contradiction with itself. Though it pays to note that the term ‘ground’ (as abstraction) already contains also its opposite (as well as their respective negations) and remains ambivalent until the manifestation of the sign i.e. becoming of meaning by semiosis (:: sign-function :: signifying process). This becomes evident via the projection of ground as a given semantic category or term, say, ‘red’ onto the semiotic square thus yielding the logical articulation and elementary structure of signification of ‘red’ as ground. Seeing that in opponent colour theory – according to which the human eye discerns between signals in an antagonistic fashion – the colors ‘red’ and ‘green’ are opposed in a like manner as ‘yellow’ and ‘blue’ or ‘black’ and ‘white’ (the latter two being achromatic colours); then based on the relation between these “two terms [which] rests only on a distinction of opposition which characterizes the paradigmatic axis” (Greimas, Courtés 1982: 308) it may be stated that a given sign might have ‘red’ as ground and ‘green’ as representamen. One might then complement the basic quantum question by asking what colour is/were the eyes of Schrödinger’s cat in the box?

In short, “ground explains the relation that exists between the two items forming the sign, but it does not itself guarantee that a sign is present” (Sonesson 2019: 270) Thus, from the point of view of signs and their users, ground is sub-symbolic

(pre-sign-ness) and cannot be positively identified albeit it serves as the ground for signs save for groundless signs i.e. symbols proper. In comparison with icons and indices, which have common characteristics with whatever they refer to and by that are more likely to be grounded, symbols “typically lack properties shared with their referents and by virtue of this lack of grounding are able to be combined and manipulated in ways that makes possible nearly unrestricted referential relationships” (Deacon, Rączaszek-Leonardi 2018: 233). Signs that lack ground are then symbols which may be functional or not to varying degrees; however, they are more prone to becoming stagnant or solidified by losing their plurality of interpretation and it may be presumed that this is not necessarily a good thing if we take signs (symbols) to be living things “in a very strict sense that is no mere figure of speech. The body of the symbol changes slowly, but its meaning inevitably grows, incorporates new elements and throws off old ones” (CP 2.222). A symbol proper may have lost its plurality of interpretation, but this does not mean that it would have altogether lost its meaning.

2. A Kristevan undertaking

In order to introduce and collocate the concepts of ‘the semiotic’ and ‘the symbolic’ with the double-notion of ground, the following chapter is divided under two major themes. First, a roundabout definition of the ‘*chora*’ along the lines of Kristeva will be presented as the ‘where’ sign-function ‘takes place’ for/ in the human. In essence, the *chora* is a functional aspect of the body come to be, where it is and how it is constructed both in the physical as well as psychical sense, generating and being generated in and as a semantic micro-universe that is co-extensive with the given individual. Finally, the plurality of subjects guarantees the plurality of worldviews and the stereoscopic nature of culture(s), and by extension the plurality of cultural universes.

Secondly, a thorough overview of the semiotic and the symbolic will be given. In general terms, the semiotic is “a *distinctiveness* admitting of an uncertain and indeterminate articulation because it does not yet refer or no longer refers to a signified object for a thetic consciousness” (Kristeva 1980: 133). In its turn, the symbolic “as opposed to the semiotic, is this inevitable attribute of meaning, sign, and the signified object for the consciousness” (Kristeva 1980: 134). Consequently, the use of the terms ‘semiotic’ and ‘symbolic’ is adopted in accordance with Kristeva’s (1980) definition, and to avoid terminological confusion, the terms are henceforth referred to as ‘semiotiK’ and ‘symboliK’ respectively (with ‘K’ deriving from Kristeva).

2.1. The signifying process

Before specifying these concepts, the notion of the signifying process deserves an overview in order to emphasize the mutual adaptability of our three main theorist's corners of thought. According to Kristeva (1996a: 28), “within this process one might see the release and subsequent articulation of the drives as constrained by the social code yet not reducible to the language system”. The signifying process is here favoured due to its “potential for exploring the experience of heterogeneity” (Ponzio 2010: 250) by which it offers a wider yet more precise view to the subject at hand since it simultaneously pertains to the body, language, and societal regulations (i.e. culture) as well as their interaction. The heterogeneity of the signifying process is based on the theoretical division between the semiotic and the symbolic (specified below), both of which are always present in all signifying (:: semiotic) systems. These systems are dominated by one or the other tendency; however, in each signifying process the subject (or system) is always marked by an indebtedness to both aspects. Hence it is only in theory that such processes and relations may be situated “diachronically within the process of the constitution of the subject precisely because *they function synchronically within the signifying process of the subject himself*” (Kristeva 1996b: 96). More generally speaking, the signifying process may be taken to mean “the ways in which bodily drives and energy are expressed [...] and how our signifying practices shape our subjectivity and experience” (McAfee 2000: 14). Speaking of heterogeneity, seeing that there is a distinction between semiology and semiotics, here the distinction is adopted as presented by Greimas and Courtés (1982).

Semiology as such designates “the theory of language and its applications to different signifying sets” (Greimas, Courtés 1982: 282) and differs from semiotics in that for the former it is “natural languages [which] serve as instruments of paraphrase in the description of semiotic objects” (Greimas, Courtés 1982: 284), whereas the main objective of semiotics “is the construction of an appropriate metalanguage” (Greimas, Courtés 1982: 284). However, it is not the objective of this paper to engage in a discussion of the difference between semiology and semiotics. It may also be noted that since semiotics is but a metalanguage having little to do with reality, it tends to homogenize its objects into terms, concepts, etc., and discourses suitable for its own needs and by doing that cannot practise what it preaches, as it were. Although the “boundary between what is linguistic and metalinguistic is nearly impossible to draw” (Greimas, Courtés 1982: 286), semiotics, due to its position as a metalanguage (i.e. system-specific), is caught in a paradoxical situation only discussing the world(s) and how things happen. Moreover, the term semiotics itself is divisible unto three, “depending on whether

it designates (A) any manifested entity under study; (B) an object of knowledge, as it appears during and after its description; and (C) the set of ways that make knowledge about this object possible” (Greimas, Courtés 1982: 287). Rephrasing the same, (A) corresponds to object-semiotics; (B) strives towards a typology of semiotic systems; and (C) fulfills the function of a metalanguage. Luckily, such divides also fuel language as a generative structure.

From such a point of view, regardless whether one speaks in terms of this or that sign system, of semiotics or semiology or referring to the human subject, meaning is seen as an ongoing signifying process. Or, the totality of socially constrained articulations of drives as based on subjects’ bodily responses and/ as emotions along with their regulated, behavioural manifestations that are the ongoing result – lived meaning – of the signifying process. And as is quite plain, the ongoing result of the signifying process :: semiosis :: sign-function.

2.2. *Chora*

It is reiterated that the terms ‘semiotic’ and ‘symbolic’ are adopted in accordance with Kristeva’s usage and are here referred to as ‘semiotiK’ and ‘symboliK’ only in order to help the reader avoid confusing the semiotiK with ‘semiotic’ (system, field of study) or the symboliK with ‘symbolic’ (definition of choice).

The distinction between the semiotiK and the symboliK is based on the very beginning of a subject and the relations s/he holds with the world and itself. These relations may be presented as topological spaces that facilitate the world in which things are connected via and in the zones of the fragmented body. By this, in general terms it may be said that in each individual subject an ‘existential map’ of sorts is established that is not only generative, but also mentally homeomorphic in relation to the surrounding world at large. The semiotiK as part of the signifying process has its origins in the *chora*, a non-expressive, pre-verbal functional state.

As defined by Kristeva, the *chora* is a pre-verbal state that in itself is not expressive but merely functional: “The *chora* is not yet a position that represents something for someone (i.e. it is not a sign); nor is it a *position* that represents someone for another position [...] it is, however, generated in order to attain to this signifying position” (Kristeva 1996b: 94). Albeit pre-verbal, the *chora* does not disappear upon acquisition of language, but continues to exert and regulate the body’s energies and pulsions, thus intruding the semiotiK to the articulation(s) of the symboliK and by that guaranteeing the heterogeneity of the signifying process.

The *chora* is seen as the subject’s physical body as such, its thought- and behavioural patterns (its type of thinking) which constitute what is called ‘personality’

or ‘(self-) identity’ along with its positioning in the world as regards family- and other human relations as well as its relations towards the natural world and placement therein. “The *chora* is a modality in which the [...] sign is not yet articulated as the absence of an object and as the distinction between real and symbolic” (Kristeva 1996b: 94). In short, the *chora* rests on the physical side of one’s disposition and, by extension, relates to the unconscious – not as *the* unconscious (or sub-conscious), but rather as a state-of-the-organism that defines, regulates and effects the (subjective) outcomes of signifying processes. So we have arrived at a suitable definition of the *chora* in a physical, corporeal sense consisting of sensory motor emotions and affects of the unconscious, both of which can be described in terms of the iconic and the indexical or firstness and secondness, respectively⁶.

2.3. The semiotiK and the symboliK

In addition to its physical specificity, the *chora* is moulded by the social organization surrounding it, which is “always already symbolic [and] imprints its constraint in a mediated form which organizes the *chora* not according to a *law* [...] but through an *ordering*” (Kristeva 1996b: 94). This ordering leaves the subject in a continuous state of doing that re-organizes the subject to a greater or lesser extent. The *chora* is ‘where’ the signifying process happens, the outcomes of which may or may not be dispersed to the world at large – as actions or expressions in a variety of modalities constituting a reciprocal relation with itself and the world. Solipsistic as it may seem, were ‘I’ not to exist, neither would the world – at least not from that specific perspective.

The semiotiK is based on an individual *chora*’s relations in, and towards, the world; it is responsible for the ordering of the symboliK for/in the given individual (and on the basis of structural-functional analogy, in any other given intellectual object, text, or culture; cf. Lotman 1979; Lotman 1991). However in the human subject, the semiotiK is a kinetic, functional stage that precedes the establishment of the sign. Being based on the body as such, it simultaneously enables and excludes, and by that – ontogenetically speaking – precedes language. The semiotiK is a psychosomatic modality of the signifying process and not cognitive in the sense of being assumed by a knowing, already constituted subject.

In other words, the semiotiK corresponds to the aspects we seldom pay notice to – what is physically happening in our bodies in total, or to those parts of memory not essentially engaged in the signifying process. In terms of sign, syntax, denotation and signification as regard the symboliK, the semiotiK is and

⁶ The author would like to thank Tyler Bennett for this thought.

remains chronologically anterior to them, but it crosses them synchronically. The semiotiK is ‘in place’ before sign function or semiosis (:: the signifying process) in a temporally similar manner as culture and language pre-date each individual.

In general terms, the symboliK may be referred to as the material which determines what can be expressed within a given sign system. In the case of say, natural language, it corresponds to all potential meanings that can, could be or have been articulated in it. However, the symboliK designates not only language in its normative use but by extension also other systems based upon language, i.e. secondary modelling systems in the Lotmanian sense, which yield their valence from the symboliK at large⁷. Although the symboliK is opposed to the semiotiK, it is the inevitable attribute of meaning, sign, and the signified object for consciousness. Though opposed, the symboliK and the semiotiK are always intertwined in each and every heterogeneous signifying process – the signifying process consists of both the symboliK and the semiotiK with varying intensities.

Although from this perspective all signs comprising the semantic universe would fall under the symboliK, by extending the division of groundless and grounded signs along with ground’s dyadic definition (abstraction and/or motivation) onto the symboliK, those “signs which lend themselves to reproduction independent of biological interpreters lack ground” and pertain more to the symboliK ‘out-there’ and are closer to ground as abstraction. Similarly, “grounded signs [that] produce different interpretants across different contexts and for different users” (Bennett 2016: 232) are more determined by the intrusion of the semiotiK, and by that ground as motivation. In essence, groundless signs or symbols proper belong more to the symboliK, whereas signs that have retained their ground belong more to the order of the semiotiK. As a sidenote, this divide could be seen to apply also to the relative positions of individual intellect (governed by grounded signs due to physical, acknowledged existence, i.e. the semiotiK) and collective intellect, that is, culture (governed by groundless signs due to the presumed lack of acknowledged existence).

Perceptions processed (in want of a better term) within the *chora* that originate from the external symboliK – semiotiKally pre-conditioned stimuli from the external world – become coalesced with the symboliK knowledge of one’s internal world – the semantic micro-universe – only to become co-ordered in accordance

⁷ These in their turn define and are defined by, for example, the grammatical structure and lexicon of a language, geographical location of a culture, fragmentation of universal space, and their chronologic as well as spatio-temporal relations in and towards ‘reality’ giving basis for specifications of universal beliefs, for example in myths and other like cultural texts bringing about cultural models (cf. Lotman 1975). The quest for *chora* in culture laying the basis for the semiotiK for culture requires separate analysis.

with the subjective semiotiK having its origins in the *chora*. The outcome(s) of this heterogeneous action correspond to the subjective interpretant(s) in the continuous signifying process irrespective of whether they are conscious or not. The signifying process is regulated by the semiotiK and fuelled by the symboliK(s); from the point of view of the *chora*, it may thus be said to be internal and by that functionally wholly subjective.

From the subject's (interpreter's) point-of-view, depending on the presence or absence of ground, an overtly coarse and simplified comparison can be made between groundless signs as having predominantly a symboliK existence, whereas signs that are grounded may be said to be more determined by the semiotiK in their existence. In addition, on the level of culture, the symboliK in its totality would perhaps functionally correspond to ground as abstraction, whereas the semiotiK would correspond to ground as motivation.

3. Homologation à la Greimas

Allowing the divide between groundless signs (symbols proper) as belonging more to the symboliK and grounded signs regulated more by the semiotiK, the symboliK may further be seen to comprise two aspects: exteroceptive properties and interoceptive data. Here the reader is commended to note that since in this section the symboliK will be split in twain, in order to aid discern this divide it will be marked in ^{superscript}.

Both the exteroceptive modality and the interoceptive modality serve as classifying terms and offer a basis for the “set of semic categories which articulate the semantic universe taken to be co-extensive with either a given culture or individual” (Greimas, Courtés 1982: 158). In a different reading, the sum total of individual subjects in their totality as outcomes of signifying processes yielding from both aspects of the (groundless/ground as abstraction) symboliK, and conditioned by the (grounded/ground as motivation) semiotiK ordering of the *chora*.

All information falls under either of the two aspects of the symboliK⁸ “according to whether or not they have corresponding elements within the semiotic system of the natural world” (Greimas, Courtés 1982: 158). In other words, exteroceptive properties originate from the exterior, natural world by way of (physical) stimuli and correspond mentally to phenomena therein, whereas interoceptive data by definition has “no correspondence in that world” (Greimas, Courtés 1982: 114). As such, interoceptive data (as part of the symboliK) also accounts for

⁸ The symboliK is seen to comprise two aspects: exteroceptive and interoceptive, marked symboliK^E and symboliK^I respectively.

non-physical and unreal phenomena within the mind's eye. However, so as to make possible a reality shared with con-specifics, a bulk of interoceptive data is presupposed by the perception of exteroceptive properties which enables action within, and in part constitutes, the meaningful, shared world around us.

Exteroceptive properties were defined as coming from the outside world, and possess content that – by their very mode of being – corresponds to something on the expression level of the natural world. Everything outside the subject *is* something and more importantly, something *else* than the subject itself. That is, exteroceptive properties are figurative insofar as the expression of their content belongs to the natural world as concrete, whereas interoceptive data are abstract since they “have no correspondence in that world and [...] are presupposed, on the contrary, by the perception of the former” (Greimas, Courtés 1982: 114). In short, (interoceptive) symboliK^I is non-figurative in the sense that *as such* its content does not correspond to something on the expression level of the natural world. In the case of (exteroceptive) symboliK^E – being figurative – that content corresponds to something on the expression level of the natural world. Imagination is not corporeal nor is the physical world merely imaginary.

Naturally, if something perceived seems incomprehensible (whether physically or mentally), the anthroposemiotic requires it be made to make sense. By way of gradual determination from total indeterminacy, “a vagueness not determined to be vague, by its nature begins at once to determine itself” (EP2: 324). With or without fatalist determinism or teleological dynamics, it is taken for granted that, in the framework of this paper, the individual human subject exists only *as a* body, encompassing the whole spectrum of its mental and other produce. For the anthroposemiotic as a mental-physical being, the *chora* is ‘where’ this vagueness becomes determined by way of the signifying process, thus constituting (later in life, upon the becoming of the speaking subject, complementing) the subjective semantic micro-universe as outcomes of interpretata.

For the time being, the functional basis for this may be reduced to bare essentials on a ‘positive -(+/-)- negative’ scale by way of proprioceptivity *viz.* the thymic category. Accordingly, a few words as regards the homology⁹ of the elements at play in valorization of values, i.e. axiologization, are in order if only to show the

⁹ “Homologation is an operation of semantic analysis, applicable to all semiotic domains, which is a part of the general procedure of structuration. It is to be considered as a rigorous formulation of reasoning by analogy. [...] As a constraint imposed on analogical reasoning, the importance of which for research must not be underestimated, homologation is a general procedure which goes beyond the limits of semantics [...] it is used to establish the rules of conversion between levels, to determine correlations in comparative methodology, to formulate semiotic constraints (syntactic or semantic), etc.” (Greimas, Courtés 1982: 144).

depth and width of dispersement of terminology suitable to be synthesized even within one theory, as well as to underscore the integrability of the three main thinkers whose thoughts are used in this paper.

3.1. *Chora* :: thymic category

Thus, as regards the body, it makes sense to begin with the concept of the *thymic category* which “is used to articulate the semanticism that humans have of their own bodies” (Greimas, Courtés 1982: 346). The heterogeneity of the symboliK, consisting of exteroceptive properties present in concord with appropriate presuppositions as interoceptive data is axiologized in accordance with proprioceptivity or more precisely, the thymic category.

It is only to avoid solely psychophysiological connotations that the thymic category is favoured instead of the concept of proprioceptivity. However, the meaningful elements resulting from experiencing one’s body most certainly play a role in its way of being, and by way of agency effect the cultural space. By extension, every body’s actions in the world also effect the symboliK, if even infinitesimally. Being hierarchically inferior to the category of exteroceptive/interoceptive, the thymic category orientates and, to an extent, defines the classification of perceived properties (symboliK^E) and data (symboliK^I) or, regulates the (re-)organizing of the semantic micro-universe. The thymic category “plays a fundamental role in the transformation of semantic micro-universes into axiologies” (Greimas, Courtés 1982: 346). It is the ‘what’ and ‘where’ that in a way deems a thing positive or negative in accordance with its being in the world, and by that reorganizes itself. In a more precise reading, the thymic category in its function corresponds to that of the semiotiK *chora*.

In its turn, the thymic category divides expressions/stimuli of the two-fold symboliK into articulations of *euphoria/dysphoria* (*aphoria* being the neutral term) on the semiotic square as an elementary structure of signification, and “provokes the positive and/or negative valorization of each of the terms of the elementary structure of meaning” (Greimas, Courtés 1982: 346). This process then orientates the generative trajectory from vagueness of the sign-to-be or serves a similar basis for/in the human as ground (as motivation) does to sign. If ground is the ‘by virtue of’ which a sign can become, then clearly the *chora* (as thymic category) is the ‘by virtue of’ which we are able to become aware of these signs at all.

The transformation of semantic micro-universes into axiologies consists of exteroceptive properties (symboliK^E), interoceptive data (symboliK^I), and proprioceptive elements in part as, and in accordance with the valorizations

of each term of the elementary structure of meaning on the semiotic square as applied in the thymic category that in its function corresponds to the (semiotic) *chora* facilitating it. For the sake of and because of the dynamic nature of human activity, the effect or “input volume” of the modalities varies in intensity in each signifying process.

4. Body ground ‘red’

Axiologies pertain to the notion of value and, as is obvious, gain said value along the +/- spectrum of the thymic category. More precisely, in semiotics axiology has to do with the “paradigmatic existence of values” (Greimas, Courtés 1982: 21) and presupposes that the semantic category in question is representable on the semiotic square.

The remainder of this paper is dedicated in formulating an alternative constant to Peirce’s question “how could such an idea as that of *red* arise?” (EP 2: 324). Inevitably intuitively, it must have to do with the age-old experiences with said colour – whether of exteroceptive, interoceptive, or proprioceptive origin – during our phylogenesis. According to Peirce, an idea “denotes anything whose Being consists in its mere capacity for getting fully represented, regardless of any person’s faculty or impotence to represent it” (EP 2: 434). By this, it may be abduced that ‘red’ as an idea stems from limited human capacity to perceive a definite spectrum of visible light, regardless that we as subjects are not capable to reflect it outside the mind’s eye (compare with *exteroceptive/interoceptive*).

‘Red’ as an idea originates from all and everything that reflects visible light on the wavelength of approximately 625–740 nm (i.e. the symboliK in total as exteroceptive properties/symboliK^E and interoceptive data/symboliK^I). All languages have terms for ‘black’ and ‘white’¹⁰, and “if a language contains three terms, then it contains a term for red” (Berlin, Kay 1969: 2). In addition, the vocabularies of different languages allow for “different *numbers* of basic color categories” (Berlin, Kay 1969: 2) which are drawn from eleven basic colours¹¹. But since this paper is not about the evolution of language and their usage, a run-through of a few basic physiological traits as regard ‘red’ will be offered instead.

Physically speaking, in addition to black and white (or light/dark), for the human eye ‘red’ is the most prominent colour. It “stands out in relation to all other

¹⁰ Black and white are achromatic colours, i.e. not colours *per se*, but rather the two extremes of visible light for the human eye.

¹¹ “The eleven basic color categories are *white, black, red, green, yellow, blue, brown, purple, pink, orange, and grey*” (Berlin, Kay 1969: 2).

hues by virtue of a reciprocal heightening effect between saturation and brightness” (Sahlins 1976: 4). In this sense, ‘red’ is a primary, or first colour, catching the eye more likely than, say, blue or yellow at the same level of saturation. This is based on the argument that at “normal light levels [...] red will appear brighter or more luminous than other colors at the same level of saturation – an effect (the Helmholtz-Kohlrausch effect) that holds at all but the highest saturations, where blue and purple surpass red in brightness” (Sahlins 1976: 4). Be that as it may, irrespective of levels of saturation which vary from situation to situation, ‘red’ has “perceptual significance by the fact that red appears to achieve a relatively high saturation over a greater variety of wavelength combinations than other colors” (Sahlins 1976: 4). This optical fact may be presumed to be one main reason for ‘red’ to be the first colour term provided a language has three (or more) terms for colour(s). In addition, “reds are perceived as purer or more saturated than other hues of the same brightness” (Sahlins 1976: 5). Not only does ‘red’ stand out and catch the eye, it literally “stands closer: a direct spatial effect known as ‘chromatic aberration’ [...] brings red surfaces subjectively nearer to the observer than objects of other hues at an equal distance” (Sahlins 1976: 5). Hence it may be proposed that ‘red’ as an idea fully represented would have arisen from our visual capacity to perceive colours at all, alongside the optical peculiarity of ‘red’ itself. ‘Red’ has the capacity to be fully represented *to us* by way of its innate being, regardless of our faculties to represent it or inability to do so. It can be argued that ‘red’ serving as ground for signs (either as abstraction or motivation) originates from ‘red’ as such i.e. light by way of an idea. In this sense, primary ‘red’ as an idea is a third.

From the body’s, i.e. *chora*’s, perspective a speculation on ‘red’ as ground calls to mind *possible* or *potential* signs having to do with blood and, by that, emotion. In essence, the notion of ‘red’ as ground or types of ground and what has followed (for instance the various symbolic uses of ‘red’) will be proposed to be bodily conditioned to an extent. On what comes to ‘red’ as ground, it may be speculated that besides ‘red’ being the most salient and closest of colour experiences, early on an unacknowledged connection established itself between ‘red’ and emotion or passion.

Like most other vertebrates, humans bleed red and seldom draw blood without a cause or motivation, regardless whether these be just, sane, or right. Besides natural cycles, blood is often spilt either due to trophic or emotive motivations – for hunger or passion. To put it in other terms, a sudden surge (or drop) in the subject’s circulatory system, if taken as an emotional response to stimuli from/in the external world, brings about changes in bodily experience and is (should be) accompanied by socially defined regulations of emotion and respective behaviour.

Emotions are often, if not always, felt as bodily sensations, giving rise to somatosensory feedback, which in its turn may trigger conscious experiences that require (behavioural) adjustment. “Numerous studies have established that emotion systems prepare us to meet challenges encountered in the environment by adjusting the activation of the cardiovascular, skeletomuscular, neuroendocrine, and autonomic nervous system” (Nummenmaa *et al.* 2014: 646). By effecting the physiological state, and *vice versa*, emotions also coordinate our behaviour as well as language use. Or, the regulative coordinates of the semiotic *chora* are re-adjusted by emotions, thus re-organizing the intrusion of the semiotic into the symbolic, which effects the balance of heterogeneity of the signifying process.

With regard to the emotional link between body, behaviour, and language, it is interesting to note that “different emotional states are associated with topographically distinct and culturally universal bodily sensations” (Nummenmaa *et al.* 2014: 646). In other words, both basic and non-basic emotions¹² are experienced in the same areas of the body irrespective of culture or language. This does not, however, guarantee that the regulated behavioural outcomes would by far be identical cross-culturally; the experiential somatic loci of emotions may be shared among all but appropriate reactions to them differ considerably and are dictated by/in the given culture (or individual) as norms and values. Unfortunately, specifying the reasons for this is well beyond the scope of this article. In general, however, basic emotions are “associated with sensations of elevated activity in the upper chest area [...] corresponding to changes in breathing and heart rate” (Nummenmaa *et al.* 2014: 648).

Take, for example, anger, which is quite a bodily feeling and, as such, by, e.g., blushing and a quickening pulse relates to blood irrespective of whether the subject is aware of this fact. By that – when taken as a grounded sign/ground as motivation – it affords to postulate its manifested meaning (say, suitable behaviour) as being motivated by/having ‘red’ as ground. By extension, the body, i.e. the semiotic *chora* facilitating the thymic category in its function, may be collocated with the concept of ground as such. “Since semiotic existence results from the mutation of the products of perception (what is exteroceptive produces interoceptive phenomena through proprioception), it retains a memory of the body” (Greimas, Fontanille 1993: 94–95). Paralleling ‘semiotic existence’ with the semantic (micro) universe in either entity, a memory of the body from generation to generation (for example behavioural norms regarding anger) can be functionally equated with the de-grounded sign free to proliferate without biological interpreters; the world

¹² The basic emotions are *anger, fear, disgust, happiness, sadness, surprise, neutral*; the non-basic emotions *anxiety, love, depression, contempt, pride, shame, envy* (c.f. Nummenmaa *et al.* 2014).

(of signs, norms, behaviour, etc.) you were born into is of a very ancient origin and to get along, one must act accordingly.

To formulate an axiomatic¹³ hypothesis, it is reiterated that the transformation of semantic (micro) universes into axiologies in accordance with the thymic category consists of exteroceptive properties, interoceptive data, and proprioceptive elements with varying intensities in each signifying process. The last three elements in their turn – axiomatically in theory – are equivalent with the (exteroceptive) symboliK^E, (interoceptive) symboliK^I and the semiotiK *chora* as facilitating the thymic category. Their sum total constitutes the semantic micro-universe and by that, transforms semantic micro-universes into axiologies i.e. values of a given individual (or collective). Phylogenetically speaking, a memory of the body will arise onto (more precisely, formed) culture and what followed, and as such is comparable with the de-grounded sign. From a more general point of view, it will be recalled that groundless signs tend more towards the symboliK, whereas grounded signs tend toward the semiotiK.

5. Stereoscopic dimension

In the framework of this paper, and in the case of ‘red’, properties and data from the twofold symboliK become axiologized in accordance with the thymic category by way of and within a given semiotiK *chora*. Or, a sign’s meaning from abstractness as motivated by ground ‘red’ is in cases based on bodily and/or cultural conditioning.

Besides the *chora* facilitating the function of the thymic category for the becoming of signs in/for the human, it must be noted that in the course of the signifying process (or sign-function, semiosis, etc.) all elements belong simultaneously to three dimensions – the cognitive, the pragmatic, and the thymic dimension: “Variations of “euphoria” and “dysphoria” are part of the three dimensions, but they function more specifically on the thymic dimension as *thymic objects*” (Greimas, Fontanille 1993: 44). In general terms, a thymic object may be seen as anything belonging to or coming from either of the symboliKs (or be of proprioceptive origin) that can be deemed either as positive or negative in accordance with the thymic category. The thymic *dimension* is a separate dimension from those of the cognitive and pragmatic dimensions, and it was postulated in theory because “the modal restrictions and the results of euphoria/dysphoria produced

¹³ “The term axiomatic is applied to a body of non-definable concepts and/or a group of non-demonstrable propositions which, by an arbitrary decision, are said to be interdefined and demonstrated” (Greimas, Courtés 1982: 21).

by the pragmatic and cognitive dimensions cannot in themselves explain passionate meaning effects” (Greimas, Fontanille 1993: 44).

As concerns the body as a locus of experience in the world, once these experiences (knowingly or not) have “been divided into discrete units and categorized, the only thing it retains [...] is retained in terms of a polarization of the thymic mass euphoria/dysphoria” (Greimas, Fontanille 1993: 95). The resultant structures (in want of a better term) that sprout in/from the body from the intermingling of the twofold symboliK ‘red’ as ground by way of the thymic category in/for the semiotiK *chora* may then act or be acted upon by the subject, whether mentally or physically, i.e. as mental activity, or as action in the natural world. The former belongs to the subject’s cognitive dimension whereas the latter finds its way in the pragmatic dimension. The cognitive dimension remains hierarchically superior to the pragmatic dimension and develops “in parallel fashion with the increase in knowing (as a cognitive activity) attributed to the subjects” (Greimas, Courtés 1982: 32). The more you deal with ‘red’, the more you know ‘red’.

In its turn, the pragmatic dimension “corresponds roughly to the descriptions which are made there of signifying somatic behaviors, organized into programs and taken [...] as “events” independently of their possible utilization at the level of knowing” (Greimas, Courtés 1982: 240). Not all ‘red’ is blood nor do you always have to stop when you see a red light – the pragmatic behaviour or action depends on the context and district where the red light is perceived. Odd as it may seem, the pragmatic dimension acts as the internal referent of the cognitive dimension; once again, one has to have previously acquired knowledge (or knowledge applicable in the situation) to do what is right. The individual *chora*’s homeomorphic ‘existential map’ semiotiKally structures and organizes (hopefully) an appropriate response in accordance with the stimuli from the twofold symboliK. The presence or absence of ground to an extent defines the independence of the sign and, by that, its meaning within the given system of knowledge.

On the same note, as regards the pragmatic dimension being the internal referent of the cognitive dimension, “the reciprocal is not true: the cognitive dimension, which can be defined as the taking of charge, by knowing, of pragmatic actions, presupposes them” (Greimas, Courtés 1982: 32). If I cannot see the red light in whichever situation, I would not halt lest there be other culturally conditioned stimuli (sounds, gestures, scents, etc.) to propose the same action. Rephrasing the same, if an individual *chora*’s buildup lacks the ability to receive and make understandable the twofold symboliK’s properties and data, they simply either do not exist or remain unidentified or ignored. Or as far as signs go, grounded or groundless, these remain unidentified as ground, or possibilities of possibility preceding firstness if there be no sign-function. In a sense reversed, the positional

relation of the pragmatic and cognitive dimensions is quite the similar positional relation as that between the exteroceptive/interoceptive – in which interoceptive data are presupposed for the perception of exteroceptive properties.

The pragmatic dimension constitutes and, in a sense, is the immediate physical reality of subjects whence (exteroceptive) symboliK^E information originates in an “equivalent but different” fashion to all subjects only to be entwined with the (interoceptive) symboliK^I in the cognitive dimension in accordance with the subjective semiotiK *chora*. In the latter, semantic micro-universes are axiologized by way of the thymic category, resulting or not, in mental or physical, cognitive or pragmatic action, the meaning effects of which are determined by/in the thymic dimension. From all of us to all of you, such diverse double distortion may be seen as a prerequisite for the stereoscopic nature of culture:

The presence of diverse mental subjects that translate the same reality into the individual languages of each particular consciousness is transformed, after a new translation of all these texts into a language common to all of them, into a variety of texts that represent the same object in different ways and impart to culture as a whole its stereoscopic quality. (Lotman 1977: 96)

By motivational association of abstractness, the ground of the sign defines the becoming of the sign – although culture is stereoscopic, the symboliK in culture is independent from subjective interpretata for just the same reason. By extension, it may be presumed that the ground ‘red’ and its semantic field is and remains fairly constant as the outcome of phylogenetic conditioning.

Conclusion

The first part of the article concentrated on the concept of ‘ground’ as abandoned by Peirce, regardless that he compared its function to that of the Holy Spirit (W1: 503). Ground was shown to divide unto two as pertains to its role in the becoming of signs; ground is either pure abstractness or motivation. Such a double take showed ground to be the ‘what’ by virtue of which a sign refers (provided it be a grounded sign) and as such – chronologically speaking – suggested that ground is (was) that which enables the becoming of signs at all for/in the human species. As time went by, some signs came to lose ground. Such phenomena may have entailed the death of the sign or stagnation of (plurality of) interpretation, which entailed the possible transfer of the sign from the level of biological (human) onto the level of culture as collective intellect, as, for example, in case of norms regulating behaviour, etc.

The second part made use of the notions of the semiotic and the symbolic along with the concept of *chora* in order to frame a 'where' in which all sign-action takes place in/for the human. Each human is a body, irrespective of the amount of philosophical debate over its constituent parts. The concept of the signifying process was homologated with semiosis and sign-function, if only to emphasize the dispersement and, by that, the mutual integrability of terminology from disparate corners of theory. The *chora* was adopted as a type of psycho-physiological construct that is mentally homeomorphic with the relations by which s/he exists in the world. The symbolic was shown to be the material of this or that sign system, whereas the semiotic is what organizes it upon the becoming of meaning. Reduced to bare essentials, it was proposed that groundless signs would veer toward the symbolic (i.e. culture) whereas grounded signs would be more restricted by the semiotic.

Additionally, when speaking *only* of ground as a concept, it was alluded that ground as abstractness is compatible with the symbolic, whereas ground as motivation is compatible with the semiotic. However, to avoid complexification this line of thought was not developed further.

The third part showed the symbolic to consist of two aspects, of *exteroceptive properties* and *interoceptive data*, the latter of which is presupposed by the perception of the former. If you do not know what you perceive, you do not know what you perceive. Something never before encountered or experienced begins at once to determine themselves from vagueness not determined to be vague by way of the thymic category, which plays an essential part in the valorization of perception and, by that, plays a fundamental role in the transformation of semantic (micro) universes into axiologies. This valuing of the twofold symbolic is instigated in the body, i.e. *chora*, on a very basic 'positive (+/-) negative' scale. Hence, in comparison with ground it was more feasible to maintain the divide between groundless :: symbolic, and grounded :: semiotic to avoid potential confusion. This was done because the world we live in consists of both grounded and groundless signs.

The fourth part discussed 'red'. It strived to formulate a satisfactory proposal to Charles S. Peirce's question on the origin of the idea 'red'. It is interesting that in all languages 'red' is primary immediately after black/white, i.e. 'red' is both first and third. As an idea, 'red' has the capacity to be fully represented regardless of our faculties or impotence to represent *it*. 'Red' is 'red' due to human capacity to perceive light, and because of all things 'red'. By this, and by way of the body as such, the close tie between 'blood' and 'emotion' was knit. Irrespective whether we are, or whether our ancestors were, aware of the psycho-somatic action/re-action effects that affect behaviour, the connection *is* there, much like ground as quality or firstness *is* regardless of whether or to what extent it is known. In the case of

anger, this by way of retaining a memory of the body from generation to generation made it possible to suggest that the meaning(s) that followed, as behaviour, has 'red' as its ground. Naturally, behaviour is regulated by (cultural) norms which in their turn change slowly, if at all, in time by proxy of the body and memory of it that is handed down. As signs, they become de-grounded and symbols proper, no more in need of biological interpretants; in other words, they transfer onto the level of culture whence they regulate human lives to greater or lesser extent.

The final part introduced the dimensions essential for human and culture, the latter borne from the former and both being structural-functionally analogous. The thymic dimension facilitates the +/- valorizations of perception (thymic objects) and aids in explaining passional meaning effects: to draw blood or not to draw blood, that is a thymic question. It was necessary to be postulated in theory since the pragmatic and cognitive dimensions – the former being the internal referent of the latter – themselves offer merely descriptions of action and thought and by that leave out something essential in being human.

One reason for the analogous build-up and function between the individual and the collective is based on the stereoscopic character of culture, coming from the presence of diverse mental subjects, whose being in turn is regulated by norms, values and ideas fleshed out during time in a given culture, creating an inertial frame of reference for behavioural temperament, character, and interest of types of thinking, respectively. Thus it may be proposed that in order to further the emergence of modal semiotics, signs perforating the field are not of the essence.

References

- Bennett, Tyler James 2016. On the semiotic concept of ground. In: Rodríguez Higuera, Claudio Julio; Bennett, Tyler James (eds.), *Concepts for Semiotics*. Tartu: University of Tartu Press, 213–233.
- Berlin, Brent; Kay, Paul 1969. *Basic Color Terms*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- CP = Peirce, Charles S. 1931–1958.
- Deacon, Terrence W.; Rączaszek-Leonardi, Joanna 2018. Ungrounding symbols in language development: Implications for modeling emergent symbolic communication in artificial systems. In: *Joint IEEE International Conference on Development and Learning and Epigenetic Robotics*, 232–237. <https://doi.org/10.1109/DEVLRN.2018.8761016>
- Eco, Umberto 1979[1976]. *A Theory of Semiotics*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- EP1 = Peirce, Charles S. 1992.
- EP2 = Peirce, Charles S. 1998.
- Greimas, Algirdas J.; Courtés, Joseph 1982. *Semiotics and Language*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Greimas, Algirdas J.; Fontanille, Jacques 1993 [1991]. *The Semiotics of Passions – From States of Affairs to States of Feeling*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

- Hjelmslev, Louis 1961. *Prolegomena to a Theory of Language*. Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press.
- Kristeva, Julia 1980. *Desire in Language: A Semiotic Approach to Literature and Art*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Kristeva, Julia 1996a. The system and the speaking subject. In: Moi, Toril (ed.), *The Kristeva Reader*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 25–33.
- Kristeva, Julia 1996b. Revolution in poetic language. In: Moi, Toril (ed.), *The Kristeva Reader*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 89–136.
- Lotman, Juri 1975. On the metalanguage of a typological description of culture. *Semiotica* 14(2): 97–123. <https://doi.org/10.1515/semi.1975.14.2.97>
- Lotman, Juri 1977. Primary and secondary communication-modelling systems. In: Lucid, Daniel P. (ed.), *Soviet Semiotics: An Anthology*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 95–98.
- Lotman, Juri 1979. Culture as collective intellect and the problems of artificial intelligence. In: O’Toole, Lawrence Michael; Shukman, Ann (eds.), *Dramatic Structure: Poetic and Cognitive Semantics*. (Russian Poetics in Translation 6.) Oxford: Holdan Books, 84–96.
- Lotman, Juri 1991. Aju – tekst – kultuur – tehisintellekt. In: Lotman, Juri, *Kultuurisemiootika: Tekst – kirjandus – kultuur*. Tallinn: Olion, 394–410.
- McAfee, Noëlle 2000. *Julia Kristeva*. New York: Routledge.
- merrell, floyd 2010. *Entangling Forms Within Semiotic Processes*. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. <https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110245585>
- Meyers, Robert G. 1996. The philosophic significance of Peirce’s theory of signs. In: Colapietro, Vincent M.; Olshewsky, Thomas M. (eds.), *Peirce’s Doctrine of Signs: Theory, Applications, and Connections*. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 3–18. <https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110873450.19>
- Nietzsche, Friedrich 1888. *Ecce Homo: Wie man wird, was man ist*. Leipzig: Insel-Verlag.
- Nummenmaa, Lauri; Glerean, Enrico; Hari, Riitta *et al.* 2014. Bodily maps of emotions. *PNAS* 14:111, 646–651. <https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1321664111>
- Peirce, Charles S. 1931–1958. *Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce*. (Hartshorne, Charles; Weiss, Paul; Burks, Arthur W., eds.) Cambridge: Harvard University Press. [In-text references are to CP, followed by volume and paragraph numbers.]
- Peirce, Charles S. 1982. *Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition, Vol. 1*. (Moore, Edward C.; Fisch, Max H.; Kloesel, Christian J. W. *et al.*, eds.) Bloomington: Indiana University Press. [In-text references are to W1 followed by page number(s).]
- Peirce, Charles S. 1992. *The Essential Peirce. Vol. 1 (1867–1893)*. (Houser, Nathan; Kloesel, Christian, eds.) Bloomington: Indiana University Press. [In-text references are to EP1, followed by page numbers.]
- Peirce, Charles S. 1998. *The Essential Peirce. Vol. 2 (1893–1913)*. (Houser, Nathan; Kloesel, Christian, eds.) Bloomington: Indiana University Press. [In-text references are to EP2, followed by page numbers.]
- Pelc, Jerzy 1986. Iconicity: Iconic signs or iconic uses of signs? In: Bouissac, Paul; Herzfeld, Michale; Posner, Roland (eds.), *Iconicity: Essays on the Nature of Culture: Festschrift for Thomas A. Sebeok on his 65 birthday*. Tübingen: Stauffenberg-Verlag, 7–16.
- Ponzio, Augusto 2010. Kristeva. In: Copley, Paul (ed.), *The Routledge Companion to Semiotics*. London: Routledge, 249–250.

- Sahlins, Marshall 1976. Colors and cultures. *Semiotica* 16(1): 1–22. <https://doi.org/10.1515/semi.1976.16.1.1>
- Short, Thomas J. 1986. What they said in Amsterdam: Peirce's semiotic today. *Semiotica* 60(1): 103–128.
- Sonesson, Göran 1998. Iconicity. In: Bouissac, Paul (ed.), *Encyclopedia of Semiotics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 294–297.
- Sonesson, Göran 2019. Elements of Peircean phenomenology: From categories to signs by way of grounds. *Semiotica* 228: 259–285. <https://doi.org/10.1515/sem-2018-0086>
- W1 = Peirce, Charles S. 1982.

Телесная основа красного – интеграция Пирса, Кристевой и Греймаса

Понятие основы (*ground*) Чарльза Пирса позволяет выдвинуть тезис, что некоторые абстрактные категории значения получили свои свойства путем телесного опыта. Для доказательства понятие основы соотносится с предложенной Юлией Кристевой различием между символическим и семиотическим и показывается, что семиотическая *chora* действует в ходе перцепции в качестве аксиологизирующей тимической категории (понятие Греймаса). Выдвигается гипотеза, что именно такая основа создает предпосылки для когерентности и неизбежности культуры и несет ответственность за ее стереоскопическое качество. Проведенная процедура продвигает движение в сторону возвышения *модальной семиотики*, что в будущем сулит нам возможность отказа от знаков, чтобы достичь анахронистически нового постижения самого себя.

Keha pind punane – Peirce'i, Kristeva ja Greimasi lõiming

Charles Peirce'i mõiste 'pind' – olenemata sellest, kas pidada seda motiveerituseks või abstraktsuseks – võimaldab propositsiooni, et mõned abstraktsed tähenduskategooriad on saanud oma omadused kehalise kogemuse kaudu. Selleks, et näidata, et tegu on sellega, viiakse pinna mõiste kokku Julia Kristeva välja pakutud eristusega sümboolse ja semiootilise vahel; näidatakse, et semiootiline *chora* toimib aksiologiseeriva tüümilise kategooriana, mis puutub taju vastuvõtmisesse (Algirdas Greimase järgi), ning lõpuks pakutakse välja, et just see baas muudab võimalikuks kultuuri kui terviku sidususe ja paratamatuse ning kannab vastutust selle stereoskoopilise kvaliteedi eest. See protseduur edendab juhtumisi pühadusteotavat marssi *modaalsemiootika* esilekerkimise suunas, mis võimaldab meil loobuda märkidest, et jõuda omaenda olemuse anakronistlikult uudsele mõistmisele.