Juri Lotman, Gilles Deleuze and their approaches to cinema: Points of intersection

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Abstract. Engaging with the methods of studying contemporary digital audio-visual art is a dominant topic in contemporary theories of art. Against this background, the article offers a view onto some aspects of Juri Lotman’s and Gilles Deleuze’s studies on the cinema.

As a rule, contemporary studies of digital audiovisual art take place in the context of interdisciplinary studies. One of the methodological principles of such studies consists in adopting a structural and semiotic approach. As of today, this methodological approach to studying audio-visual art is most developed in semiotics of the cinema, which is why in this article visual semiotics in general is viewed through semiotics of the cinema (proceeding from the approach of Juri Lotman). Also, the philosophical understanding of the nature of the cinema offered by Gilles Deleuze has proven fundamental for the study of contemporary audio-visual art.

The two authors were contemporaries, but represented different scholarly paradigms: while Juri Lotman was an adherent of structuralism, Gilles Deleuze was a poststructuralist who criticized the structuralist approach. Yet despite this principal difference, both scholars still arrived at similar conclusions as concerns several questions regarding the understanding of the cinema and its very nature. In the present paper I focus on the features of these authors’ approach to spatial and temporal relations in the cinema, audiovisual relations in film as a heterogeneous form of the work of art, virtuality and mythologism in the viewer’s perception of cinema.

The differences and similarities in academic approaches to cinema, developed by Lotman and Deleuze, indicate a common direction in the development of the cinema and visual arts theory, which seems relevant for the study of contemporary audio-visual arts.

Keywords: Deleuze; Lotman; spatio-temporal blocs (relations); nonlinear narrative construction; movement-image; time-image; visual and sound components of cinematographic image; bipolar asymmetry

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Introduction

At first glance, it might seem that the two approaches to cinema developed by the Soviet-Estonian culturologist Juri Lotman (1922–1993) and by the French philosopher and founder of the philosophy of cinema Gilles Deleuze (1925–1995), respectively, have scarcely anything in common. Therefore, the fact that today there is only one paper treating the subject – Sergej Ogudov’s “Cinematographic sign and narrative in the concepts of Gilles Deleuze and Juri Lotman” (Ogudov 2017) – can easily be explained by the effect of such a first impression. Lotman basically cleaved to the structural-semiotic approach in his study of the cinema, while Deleuze is well known for his heavy criticism of this approach. Deleuze develops his approach in his only study of the cinema that consists of two books titled Cinéma 1 and Cinéma 2 (1983–1985). Criticizing the approach of structural semiotics to the study of cinema, Deleuze (1995a: 65) says that the cinema generates its own signs, which scatter all around at once. However, according to Deleuze, semiotics along with linguistics abolishes the concept of image or sign. It reduces the image to a proposition, and then detects the language operations hidden in the proposition: syntagms, paradigms, denotations. This approach presupposes that movement should be either bracketed or forgotten (Deleuze 1995a: 65). According to Deleuze (2006b: 219), neither linguistics nor semiotics is able to solve the problem of signs. For Deleuze, the theory of cinema is not a language for understanding films, but a meta-language that describes thinking processes created by the cinema and creates these processes at every moment of the existence of a cinema image. Deleuze calls it the plane of immanence (plan d’immanence). For Deleuze, cinema is not a universal or primitive language system [langue], nor a language [langage] (Deleuze 1989: 262). Cinematic signs differ from the signs of other arts: photography, painting, theatre, music, etc. He also states, “The concepts philosophy introduces to deal with cinema must be specific, must relate specifically to cinema” (Deleuze 1995c: 58). Also Lotman points out the distinctive features of cinematographic language and cinematic meaning: “Cinematic meaning is meaning expressed by the resources of cinematic language, and it is impossible outside that language. Cinematic meaning arises due to a unique combination of semiotic elements which are found only in cinematography” (Lotman 1976:42; original emphasis).

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Film language, according to Lotman, is isomorphic to literature and linguistic language. Cinema can be explored using linguistic methods, and film language is a universal model (Lotman 1989: 145–147), which is why Lotman, despite the development of his scholarly approach, remains within the framework of structuralism. Deleuze's film language is not isomorphic to any other language. Cinema, therefore, cannot be explored in a linguistic way. Film language, for Deleuze, comes from movement-images the disclosure of which creates the narrative of the film. There are three types of such images: action-image, perception-image and affection-image. Therefore, film language is not a universal model (Deleuze 1989: 25–30).

Both Lotman and Deleuze indicate the heterogeneity of the cinematographic text-fabric. Deleuze emphasizes that it is the cinema itself that created the partition that divided visual images from sound images (Deleuze 2006b: 214), as the sound-visual relation is the cinematic syntax (Deleuze 2006a: 289). Lotman and Deleuze show a positive attitude to the sound in cinema, although in the history of the cinema it has never been an unequivocal question (Jakobson 1987[1933]: 461–465).

For both Lotman as well as for Deleuze, the cinema is a meta-art that uses the achievements of other arts for its own purposes. The cinema combines these achievements to reach a level which is inaccessible to other arts. According to Lotman, the cinematographic language creates the general (and common) code that includes language-codes of other arts, preserving their peculiarities. The common language, eventually, brings together all these particular codes (Lotman 1998[1977]: 659). For Deleuze, the cinematographic image:

\[\text{[...]} \text{ makes what the other arts are restricted to demanding (or to saying), it brings together what is essential in the other arts; it inherits it, it is as it were the directions for use of the other images, it converts into potential what was only possibility. (Deleuze 1989: 156)}\]

Here, I see that both Lotman and Deleuze share a similar vision of the role of the cinema in human culture. However, for Deleuze such a vision seems to be insufficient. Being a philosopher, Deleuze uses the topic of the cinema to raise the question of what thinking is, thus opposing the cinema to the dominant metaphysical tradition in philosophy (see Ogudov 2017: 68). In his introductory article “The language of time” included in the Russian translation of Deleuze’s Cinema


4 Oleg Aronson (Russ. – Олег Аронсон) is a scholar at the Institute of Philosophy of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow. He is a leading Russian researcher in Gilles Deleuze's philosophy and philosophy of the cinema.
on the cinema as a book on the process of how a conscious subject becomes the subject of perception” (Aronson 2004: 34; my translation, M. K.). Deleuze himself uses the term ‘meta-cinema’ in the sense of ‘cinema in itself or plane of immanence’ once in the book (see Deleuze 1986: 59). All these terms themselves do not refer to the level of meta-description, as the common conventions in semiotics or linguistics would require. Oleg Aronson comprehends this Deleuzian term as ‘after (-cinema)’:

\[ \text{After means that cinema is already there, not only as films made in certain years, but primarily as efficient virtuality. After means here that cinema and our thought are both there in our present, when we are already unable to trace the line between cinema and our thought of cinema, cinema and the thought itself. (Aronson 2004: 35).} \]

Deleuze started examining the cinema in the mid-1970s, yet it should be noted that until the two-volume *Cinéma* appeared, the cinema had not merited a comprehensive analysis in Deleuze. Lotman wrote two separate books on the cinema: the first appeared in 1973, and was translated into English under the title *Semiotics of Cinema* (1976); the second, entitled *Dialog s ekranom* [A Dialogue with the Screen], appeared posthumously in 1994, and has been published only in Russian.

**Cinema between space and time**

Deleuze compares the process of film perception with brain processes and the cinema itself, or a creative process of making a work of art, with the brain (see Deleuze 1989: 125, 204; Deleuze 1995c: 60–61; Deleuze 2006a). Lotman compares the brain with culture as a whole (see Lotman, Tsiv’yian 2014: 295). Deleuze also defines the brain as a *spatio-temporal volume* (Deleuze 1995c: 61); that is, any film (as well as any work of art) appears within the framework of *spatio-temporal relations*. Regarding the spatio-temporal relations in the work of art, Lotman gave preference to space. He believed that space was rather more universal than time and “eternal (the space of Platonic ideas, but not their shadows in the world of matter)” (Lotman 1997: 720; my translation, M. K.). Lotman’s initial standpoint was:

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5 Deleuze (1986: 61) defines ‘the plane of immanence’ as “[…] a set of movement-images; a collection of lines or figures of light; a series of blocs of space-time”.

6 Up to the present the concept of ‘spatio-temporal relations’ has been receiving much critical feedback (Marievskaya 2015: 26–27). Here, I use the term in the sense in which it was understood and used by Juri Lotman.
the mathematical (topological) concept of space: the space, in this sense, is the plurality of objects (points), between which there is a relation of continuity. In this sense it is possible to speak of semantic space, coloured space, moral space, temporal space, and even of the space of physical space. From this viewpoint space is nothing but a universal language of modelling. In everyday language we use temporal predicates in spatial language (foregoing, forthcoming, time goes, time stopped, etc.), but the concept of space can hardly be expressed in temporal language. (Lotman 1997: 720)

Lotman speaks of his general approach to art and makes no distinction between different arts. Cinema, according to Lotman, is an art that simulates (models) reality. It is an art in which space is more important than time.

Time, as a process of becoming, is one of the most important themes in Deleuze’s book on cinema. Deleuze writes, “[...] movement is distinct from the space covered” (Deleuze 1986: 1). Time (according to Bergson, whose steps Deleuze is believed to be following) taken as duration [durée] is the fundamental characteristic of human consciousness, and consequently of the acts of perception. Bergson says that “Questions relating to subject and object, to their distinction and their union, should be put in terms of time rather than of space” (Bergson 1991: 71; original emphasis).

Andrei Tarkovsky (1989: 119) has said that in the cinema “time becomes the very foundation of cinema: as sound is in music, colour in painting, character in drama”, and elsewhere he observes that the main task of the filmmaker is sculpting in time (Tarkovsky 1989: 63), which is why his book on the theory of the cinema bears the title Sculpting in Time (1989). David George Menard has examined Tarkovsky’s film Zerkalo [The Mirror], comparing the views on the cinema expressed by both Deleuze and Tarkovsky, demonstrating their resemblance. Menard associates Deleuze’s ‘time-image’ with Tarkovsky’s ‘time-pressure’, stressing the similarity between them in understanding time as the organizing matter of the cinema. Doing this, Menard, however, does not stress any spatial characteristics of the cinema. He demonstrates that according to both Tarkovsky and Deleuze the cinema involves cooperation of the film-images, determined by the time-image, which “[...] is tied to the concreteness of time and the temporality of matter, reaching out along mysterious paths to regions beyond infinity” (Menard 2003)7.

In Cinema 1. The Movement-Image Deleuze examines classic cinema; in Cinema 2. The Time-Image he analyses modern cinema that began, according to him, after the Second World War. In the first volume, sensory-motor schemata determine the

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movement-image, and thus movement determines time: “[…] it [time, M. K.] is a consequence of action, is dependent on movement and is inferred from space. Hence, no matter how disordered it is, it remains in principle a chronological time” (Deleuze 1989: 128). In the second volume (from which the sensory-motor schemata have already disappeared, there is only ‘optical and sound situation’), time determines movement (this movement is false, since it reflects the relation of times) (Deleuze 1995a: 64–66; Deleuze 1989: XI; Deleuze 2006b: 220). This formula, in which time determines the false movement, is characteristic of the cinema today8: “Cinema thus gives us a false movement – it is the typical example of false movement” (Deleuze 1986: 1). Thus, for Deleuze time is one of the main categories of his philosophical analysis of the cinema, and space is a consequence of either the movement-image or the time-image.

The priority given either to spatial or temporal relations in screen arts reflects the latters’ ontological peculiarity. For example, in contemporary cinema the spatial and temporal relations are dominated by time, while in video games (a form of New Media), priority is given to spatial relations.

Clichés in illusion and in the virtual reality of the cinema

What is happening on screen gives the viewer an illusion of continuous time. Concurrently, the images that the viewers see on the screen remain only an illusion for them (Marievskaya 2015: 53; 306). Speaking of illusions in cinema, Lotman indicates two opposite poles of cinema, regarding them as a necessary condition for the existence of the cinema as an art: “[…] the attempt of cinematography to merge completely with life”, on the one hand, and to manifest its own “[…] cinematographic specifics, the conventionality of its language” (Lotman 1976: 20), on the other hand. Providing an explanation of the first opposite pole in order to merge completely with life, Lotman says that it is the photographic characteristic of the cinematographic image, i.e. an analogy between the depicted object and its cinematographic image. Also Christian Metz and Roland Barthes highlight this characteristic of the cinematographic image (Metz 1974: 62–63; 75–76; Barthes 1977[1961]: 17–20; Barthes 2016[1960]: 129).

Deleuze analyses the question of cinematographic illusion, but not from the standpoint of resemblance or analogy. Yet speaking of the movement-image, Deleuze emphasizes that it is not analogical in the sense of resemblance: it does not resemble the represented object (see Deleuze 1989: 27). The movement-image

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8 Also, Deleuze (1986: X) observes that: “It is not a matter of saying that the modern cinema of the time-image is “more valuable” than the classical cinema of movement-image”.
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is an object caught in movement as continuous function: “The movement-image is the modulation of the object itself. We encounter ‘analogue’ again here, but in a sense which now has nothing to do with resemblance, and which indicates modulation, as in so-called analogue machines” (Deleuze 1989: 27). Using the concept of ‘modulation’, Deleuze explains the cinematographic illusion of reality: “[...] modulation is the operation of the Real, in so far as it constitutes and never stops reconstituting the identity of image and object” (Deleuze 1989: 28). Therefore, Deleuze claims: “There’s no difference at all between images, things, and motion” (Deleuze 1995d: 42; original emphasis).

In the second volume, speaking of the time-image Deleuze opposes virtual images to actual images in the cinema. The relation between them is characterized by the time-image or, to be more precise, the crystal-image which is the essence of the time-image: “[...] the coalescence of an actual image and its virtual image” (Deleuze 1989: 127). Deleuze observes that the virtual is not incompatible with the real, but contributes to the latter (Deleuze 1989: 127). Moreover, the virtual becomes more real than the real itself. Virtuality applied to time in cinema is what makes the image visible and readable, though it does not belong to a particular place within the structure of the work of art, nor have a univocal interpretation. It results in the time-image being freed from the pressure of reality and becoming hyper-real. Deleuze says that “with the cinema, it is the world which becomes its own image, and not an image which becomes world” (Deleuze 1986: 57). Thus, cinema determines our reality, and not vice-versa. Due to the cinema, the virtual is not opposed to the real, but becomes an integral part of the latter. The cinema makes each of us perceive in a different way. This perception becomes our property, that is, a personal experience of virtualization. Such a situation is characteristic of the postmodern cultural paradigm of modern society, in which the ‘virtual’ determines the ‘real’ with the means of simulation.

Postmodern art is notable for its mass character, and cinema is no exception. Speaking of the mass cinema, both authors indicate that cinema may provoke the very basest, brutal feelings of violence, sexuality, etc. (Lotman 1976 [1973]: 12). Deleuze renders the situation as an insufficient development of cinema cerebellum (cinema is the brain) (Deleuze 2006a: 283–284; Deleuze 1995b: 76–77; Deleuze 1995c: 60).

Cliché is a specific feature of postmodern art, and of the cinema in particular. Both Lotman and Deleuze refer to the topic of the cliché in cinema. For Lotman, cliché is a crystallization of the cinematographic form, bearing a mythological worldview, and cliché is one of the foundation stones of the mass cinematic art (see Lotman, Tsiv’yan 1984: 70). Lotman compares the use of the cliché in filmmaking with the technique of defamiliarization [Viktor Shklovskij’s ostranenie]
in cinematographic language (see Lotman, Tsiv’yan 1984: 71). Moreover, using clichés does not hinder the cinema from reaching the heights of high art (see Lotman, Tsiv’yan 1984: 68).

Deleuze says that the use of clichés is a characteristic of a crisis in cinema. The major characteristics of the movement-image are sensory-motor schemata, chronological relations in time, and legal connections in space: “[...] narration always refers to a system of judgement” (Deleuze 1989: 133, original emphasis). In Chapter 12 “The crisis of the action-image” Deleuze presents five characteristics of the crisis of action-image, which is one of the types of movement-image: “[...] movement-images divide into three sorts of images: perception-images, action-images and affection-images” (Deleuze 1986: 66; original emphasis). Among these characteristics are the loosening and vanishing of sensory-motor schema, the collapse of chronology in time and the break of the logical connection in space, i.e. the system of judgement. As a result of all these collapses and breaks, a number of various clichés appear in order to bring together the plurality of actions (or behaviours) and phenomena in the cinematic matter of the film. There

[…] are the current clichés of an epoch or a moment, sound and visual slogans. […] They are these floating images, these anonymous clichés, which circulate in the external world, but which also penetrate each one of us and constitute his internal world, so that everyone possesses only psychic clichés by which he thinks and feels, is thought and is felt, being himself a cliché among the others in the world which surrounds him. Physical, optical and auditory clichés and psychic clichés mutually feed on each other. […] Nothing but clichés, clichés everywhere… (Deleuze 1986: 208–209).

One of the particular features in the reign of clichés in art consists in false actions and behaviours of the characters. The external is underscored in order to emphasize the making-false, for instance, in films of the French New Wave, such as Godard’s Pierrot le fou or Rivette’s L’amour fou, etc. (Deleuze 1986: 213–214). Deleuze says that “[...] falsifying narration, by contrast, frees itself from this system; it shatters the system of judgement” (Deleuze 1989: 133), mentioned above in the discussion of the movement-image. Eventually, Deleuze arrives at the following questions:

[…] if images have become clichés, internally as well as externally, how can an Image be extracted from all these clichés, ‘just an image’, an autonomous mental image? […] What is an image which would not be a cliché? Where does the cliché end and the image begin? (Deleuze 1986: 214)
Deleuze provides an answer to this question in the second volume of his book. The sensory-motor connections disappear in the *time-image*, as the purely optical and sound situation takes the place: there are relations between the virtual and its actual images that characterise time-images. The cliché also participates in the fabrication of the time-image as a *mental image*. Time-image is a situation in which judgment is impossible, narration is broken (deranged), since time as a condition for any movement and difference indicates the crisis of the truth itself. Deleuze says that such a cinema is no longer the cinema of action, but the cinema of the seer (see Deleuze 1989: 2).

For Deleuze, image, thing, and action are *the same*, which is why, referring to Henri Bergson, Deleuze indicates that we do not perceive an image or a thing as a whole. We always perceive less than the thing is itself, we perceive only what we are interested in perceiving. And what we are interested in perceiving is but the cliché:

> A cliché is a sensory-motor image of the thing. […] We therefore normally perceive only clichés. But, if our sensory-motor schemata jam or break, then a different type of image can appear: a pure optical-sound image, the whole image without metaphor, brings out the thing in itself, literally, in its excess of horror or beauty, in its radical or unjustifiable character, because it no longer has to be “justified”, for better or for worse […]. (Deleuze 1989: 20)

Further, Deleuze (1989: 21) says that all the powers serve the cliché because of their interest in hiding something in the image from us. Thus the cliché usually expresses the mythico-ideological component against which Roland Barthes spoke all the time. This is why Barthes, starting with *Mythologies* (Barthes 1991 [1957]: 26), could neither trust nor like cinema, giving preference to photography (Barthes 1981: 3, 55). The other side of the problem arises directly in ourselves: we are accustomed to operate and perceive with clichés (Deleuze 1995d: 42).

Deleuze (1989: 21) indicates that in order to receive the whole image it is necessary to break through the cliché: “[…] the image constantly attempts to break through the cliché, to get out of the cliché”, and then only a purely optical and sound situation remains that reveals to us the whole image. The image has to be freed from sensory-motor links, ceasing to be an action-image, becoming a pure optical, sound image that is the time-image (see Deleuze 1989: 23).

Deleuze emphasizes the use of cliché as expressing *the power of the false*. Therefore, it is impossible to find the truth as long as one uses clichés. Lotman arrives at a similar conclusion. However, as stated above, Lotman interprets the rejection of historical truth in favour of the cliché as the crystallization of the cinematographic form of mass cinema (Lotman, Tsiv’yan 1984: 70), and not as a device of *holding power* as Deleuze and Barthes would believe (Barthes 1991: ...
26). Since in the time-image time determines movement, it is a non-chronological time which produces movements necessarily “abnormal”, essentially “false”. Deleuze says about the crisis of truth that it cannot be explained simply because of the empirical content of time, but rather because of its form or force as such (see Deleuze 1989: 130). Further, Deleuze (1989: 131) concludes that when we speak of the time-image, “[…] narration ceases to be truthful, that is, to claim to be true, and becomes fundamentally falsifying”. That is, description breaks with reality (to a semiotic denotatum or a referent) and narration does not refer to a form of the true anymore (see Deleuze 1989: 135). Narrative expresses a power of the false, that is “[…] chronology of the past and the present is replaced with the image of their simultaneousness and coexistence” (Ogudov 2017: 64).

In the paper “Cinematographic language and the problems of semiotics of the cinema” (“Yazyk kino i problemy kinosemiotiki”), Lotman (1989) speaks about the conventionality of iconic signs. In that paper Lotman examines Tengiz Abuladze’s film Pokayaniye [Repentance] (1984). I would like to revisit the question of using cliché as it arises in Lotman’s analysis with adopting a Deleuzian approach, but beginning with Lotman’s ideas. In the paper Lotman indicates the looseness of iconic sign linkage: the semantic sense (semantic meaning) of the shot (the immediate semantics) does not coincide with the sense (proper meaning) of the shot (the expressed meaning). For example, he refers to an episode with a white grand piano amidst greenery. From the point of view of mere semantics we perceive an idyll, but all of a sudden it becomes apparent that this is a scene of interrogation. Lotman solves the problem using deictic signs which bring together different elements in order to create a single whole, hooking the propositions to reality. Lotman says that in the cinematographic language the function of such hooks is performed with objects that could be remembered by the audience. They enable the proposed text to be hooked up to the reality beyond the text in order to represent the world of the text as true (Lotman 1989: 131–132). I believe that the deictic signs are but clichés which are known to the audience and the authors of the film, and the word ‘true’ must appear inside quotation marks, since there is hardly any equality between the cliché and the truth. When Lotman (1989: 137; my translation, M. K.) says that “[…] none of the shots in Abuladze[’s film] is historical; therefore, the author did not intend any interpretation of any direct coincidences or any other convergences, but nonetheless created an accomplished reconstruction of reality”, in my opinion an alteration is to be made on the reconstruction of reality. Here one can speak of creating a virtual reality that is more real than the real life itself, in which all that happens in Abuladze’s film does not fit in smoothly. As I have already shown, the virtuality of the image makes the image visible and readable, though it does not make the image belong to a particular place within
the structure of the work of art nor have a univocal interpretation. In the present virtual reality, all that is happening in *Pokayanie* does not raise the viewer’s question about the historical veracity of what is happening in the film.

**Virtuality and mythology in the cinema**

‘Cliché’ in Lotman refers to a mythological construction. Moreover, the cinema as such has a penchant for constructions of this kind. Deleuze, speaking of cinema, does not indicate its mythological constructions directly, though one can come across the constructions in his books on cinema. For instance, when Deleuze speaks of relations between the virtual images and the actual images:

> [...] The actual image itself has a virtual image which corresponds to it like a double or a reflection. In Bergsonian terms, the real object is reflected in a mirror-image as in the virtual object which, from its side and simultaneously, envelops or reflects the real: there is ‘coalescence’ between the two. There is a formation of an image with two sides, actual and virtual. (Deleuze 1989: 68)

Spiral and circular development (Lotman 2000: 571) is reminiscent of Bergson’s *circles of perception*, and also the creation of the doubles. All of this characterizes the mythological construction that Lotman is speaking about (Lotman, Mints 1981). Virtual reality contrasts with empirical reality. This contrast is associated with autonomy, that is, the existence of its own space and time, which are not reduced to the space and time of empirical reality and which are established by the principles of the mythological worldview. A gradual transition of events from the past through the present to the future is not characteristic of mythological and virtual time. The moments of the “now” of the present, past and future in virtual reality do not necessarily follow each other. This is an anti-historical time. Virtual time, like mythological time, is anthropomorphic. Virtual reality unfolds due to man. Virtual time, like mythological time, is devoid of duration and sequence of events. Thus, the construction of virtual reality is based on the rules set by mythological thinking, which frees desire through the “logic of the miraculous”, juggling with categories of space and time.

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9 That is why Lotman’s co-author of “SVD: zhanr melodramy i istoriya” [“SVD: melodrama genre and history”] (1984) Juri Tsyvian, speaking of the main thesis of the work which deals with the role of the cliché in cinematic language, says that “the truth is relative and depends on the semiotic channel” (Tsiv’yan 2014: 655).

10 It is related to the *iconic dominant* of the cinematic language that is a non-discrete (continuous) component of the cinematic text.
The non-chronological narrative characteristic of mythology and virtuality was defined by researchers as *nonlinear narrative* (Lotman, Mints 1981: 38–40). Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari first examine the nonlinear construction of narrative in *Rhizome* (1976): the concept of *rhizome* means a nonlinear construction. If structural and hierarchical constructions indicate the vertical and linear connections in knowledge, society, culture, etc., then the *rhizomatic* constructions indicate horizontal/interspecies and flat connections.

Lotman, as well as Deleuze, examined narrative constructions. Lotman includes the concept of *memory*, the structure of which is not subordinated to linearity, and represents a nonlinear development of narration (as does Deleuze’s and Guattari’s *rhizome*). Looking for an example, Lotman instances Tarkovsky’s film *Zerkalo* [The Mirror] (1974). The associative consequence of episodes in the film is as though *taken out* of memory, and then juxtaposed almost accidentally: all this reveals an unexpected sense of each of them. These senses cannot be expressed in a narration of linear construction (Lotman, Tsiv’yan 2014: 160).

I have already stated that the mythological “now” includes the past, present and future. Cinema, as a fine art, uses iconic signs. Speaking of iconic signs, Lotman indicates that these belong only to the present. Therefore all fine arts, including cinema, operate only in the present (tense) (Lotman 1976: 10, 77). Deleuze does not agree with this approach. He says that if it were so, time would be represented in cinema only indirectly, due to a present movement-image and the means of montage. According to Deleuze, there is no present which has not been troubled by the ghosts of a past and a future. This past is not the former presents, and the future is not a present to come (see Deleuze 1989: 37). In another place Deleuze says that the present contains only that which the image “represents”, but not the image itself. The image itself is a complex of temporal relations that can be seen in creative image. These temporal relations cannot be reduced to the present (Deleuze 1989: XI–XII; Deleuze 2006a: 290–291).

I pointed out above that cinema gravitates to mythology. This gravitation is also seen in close-ups, or in the image of the face of the actor on the screen. Deleuze devotes a whole chapter in the first volume of his book on cinema to the face and the close-up; the chapter bears the title “The affection-image. Face and close-up”. Deleuze begins the chapter with the definition of affection-image: “*The affection-image is the close-up, and the close-up is the face...* [...] There is no close-up of the face, the face is in itself close-up, the close up is by itself face and both are affect, affection-image” (Deleuze 1986: 87–88, original emphasis). It is conventional to believe that the face performs three functions: individualization, socialization, and communication. Deleuze, however, says that all the three functions are getting lost in close-up. Further, he concludes: “There is no close-up of the face. The
close-up is the face, but the face precisely in so far as it has destroyed its triple function. […] The close-up turns the face into a phantom, and the book of phantoms. The face is the vampire […]” (Deleuze 1986: 99). Deleuze considers the close-up as a variation of affection-image. Affection, for Deleuze, is a mutation of essence (sense as mutability) (Aronson 2015: 35). Deleuze defines this mutation as “man’s non-human becoming” (Deleuze, Guattari 1996: 173). The very idea of becoming, as “becoming being”, he borrowed from Nietzsche. Deleuze explains that “Sensory becoming is the action by which something or someone is ceaselessly becoming other (while continuing to be what they are)” (Deleuze, Guattari 1996: 177).

Undertaking the analysis of the face, Deleuze poses two questions: “[…] what are you thinking about?” and “[…] what is bothering you, what is the matter, what do you sense or feel?” (Deleuze 1986: 88). Watching a close-up, one identifies oneself with the perceived image that represents itself as a kind of icon: as if the spectator put on a “mask” of the perceived character. Lotman adds that the face on the screen becomes the proper name which is characterized by its own individuality, mythography, and even intimacy (Lotman 1998: 658). A close-up becomes the icon, nadindividual’naya [superindividual] mask of the desired cliché-image, and becomes a mythological image (Deleuze 1986: 97; Barthes 1981: 34; Lotman 1998: 658).

It is conventional in semiotics to consider the close-up wholeness in classic cinema as undermined, since the close-up shows a particular object, lifted out of the plurality that it (initially) belonged to: it is a synecdoche. Deleuze disagrees with this interpretation of the close-up. Referring to Béla Balázs and Jean Epstein, he states that the close-up does not have anything in common with an object’s part, but abstracts the object from any spatio-temporal coordinates in order to emphasize pure and expressive affection. However, in contrast to Balázs, Deleuze says that any close-up (not only the face) bears abstracting characteristics (Deleuze 1986: 96–97). Deleuze provides an example from G. W. Pabst’s film Pandora’s Box (1929): “There are affects of things. The ‘edge’, the ‘blade’, or rather the ‘point’ of Jack the Ripper’s knife, is no less an affect than the fear which overcomes his features and the resignation which finally seizes hold of the whole of his face” (Deleuze 1986: 97). Deleuze calls such a close-up of the thing a faceified object. Things can be as expressive as a human face. Deleuze concludes that the affection-image (close-up) “[…] is abstracted from the spatio-temporal co-ordinates which would relate it to a state of things, and abstracts the face from the person to which it belongs in the state of things” (Deleuze 1986: 97). As the close-up appears as a face a horrible (self-)becoming of the spectator as Jack the Ripper with the sharpened blade of a knife simultaneously happens. The close-up, according to Deleuze, is not an enlargement of the object or the face, and is not merely an important
element of the affection-image, but it is also evidence of the philosophical potency of the cinema, its reflection.

I can single out a few aspects in the Lotmanian approach to the close-up: the image of the actor and the image of the object as a mythological representation of reality (Lotman 1976: 90–92), which is close to the virtual; the actor’s face as a mask of mythological representation which is nadindividual’noe [superindividual] (Lotman 1998: 658); the close-up as an enlargement (Lotman 1976: 27) that is the preservation of spatio-temporal relations (synecdoche): the semiotic approach. The first two aspects stand in conformity with Deleuze’s approach to the close-up, while the third goes contrary to it.

Sight and sound: The relationship between visual images and sound images in film

Deleuze (1995a: 64) says that in classic cinema preceding the Second World War the sound supplements the visual image in order to create the fourth dimension of the visual image. Deleuze distinguishes two aspects of the cinematographic image in the silent or written film: the visual image itself and the intertitle; the latter performs the speech function, i.e. being the readable discourse and a non-visual. As soon as sound had been introduced into cinema, the talkie was intended also for listening, although in this case the film sound becomes a new component within the visual image (see Deleuze 1989: 226–227). A distinctive feature of the visual image in the silent film in comparison with the visual image with sound appears to be the latter’s ability to represent interaction among people through an intermediary of dialogues that is the interaction (Deleuze 1989: 230). In the sound cinema, the speech acts fill space in a certain way. In time, the speech acts become diverse and more complex, bringing together talking speed and the visible (see Deleuze 1989: 231). The heard speech, as a consistent part of the visual image, clarifies the image and contributes something to it. Thus, the talkie constitutes a fourth dimension of the visual image, supplementing the third – the depth of the field. Deleuze (1989: 233) observes that the speech-act becomes seeing on the same basis: “And, more generally, the heard speech-act is itself in a sense seen. It is not just its source which may (or may not) be seen. In being heard, it is itself seen, as itself tracing a path in the visual image.”

There appears a tendency to the reversal in relation between the visible and the sound continuums. The speech act becomes visible and audible, having replaced the seen image and the read speech. At the same time, the visual image as such (the speech-act is the fourth dimension of it) becomes legible (Deleuze 1989: 233–234).
The sound in cinema is differentiated as concerns its significations: speech, music, and noises play different functions, switching their roles. As a result, one sound continuum appears (Deleuze 1989: 235). Although the present continuum does not contain separable elements, it is nevertheless continually differentiated with respect to two vectors, which express the relation of the sound continuum to the visual image. Deleuze indicates that “this double relation passes through the out-of-field, even though the latter is fully part of the cinematographic visual image” (Deleuze 1989: 235); further, he writes: “The out-of-field refers to what is neither seen nor understood, but is nevertheless perfectly present” (Deleuze 1986: 16). The sound cinema strengthens the role of the out-of-field, and also fills the visual not-seen with a specific presence. Here Deleuze refers to the 1928 Manifesto of Eisenstein, Pudovkin and Alexandrov “A statement on the sound-film” (Eisenstein, Pudovkin, Alexandrov 1977), and to the Contrapuntal Method that was stated there, saying that the sound-component of the cinematographic image is not to double the visual component, which appears on screen, but to refer to a source out-of-field. Deleuze calls the out-of-field voice ‘voice off’, and the out-of-field sound ‘sound off’. The French philosopher speaks of two aspects of the out-of-field: the relative and the absolute. The relative aspect indicates a sound-off source (which is soon to appear on the screen). This out-of-field space is of the same nature with the image, it simply extends it. The absolute aspect refers to the out-of-field, which is of a different nature: in this case, it refers to the Whole, “[…] which is expressed in sets, to the change which is expressed in movement, to the duration which is expressed in space, to the living concept which is expressed in the image, to the spirit which is expressed in matter” (Deleuze 1989: 236). In this case, the sound-off and voice-off usually appear in music, and very particular speech acts which are not interactive anymore, but reflexive: “[…] the voice which evokes, comments, knows, endowed with an omnipotence or a strong power over the sequence of images” (Deleuze 1989: 236). In the absolute aspect, there is the virtual relation with the Whole. These two types of relations of the out-of-field (the relative aspect and the absolute aspect) are inversely proportional, but they are both inseparable from the visual image.

Deleuze says that external (illustrative) correspondence between the visual and sound continuums is unable to form the single cinematographic image. An internal correspondence is required so that the whole might be formed in it by the visual and sound components, going beyond themselves in a higher unity (Deleuze 1989: 238–239). The achievement of the sound cinema consists in expressing the whole in two dissimilar and unrelated ways: using Apollonian visual images and musical Dionysian image (here Deleuze refers to the Nietzschean distinction between two types of consciousness and culture).
Since the cinema is primarily a visual art, music “will be thought to add the immediate image to mediate images which represented the whole indirectly” (Deleuze 1989: 239). The visual image expresses some changes of the whole, but does this indirectly. Therefore, it cannot be said that the variability as a property of the whole is precisely reflected and coincides with some visual change: a movement of persons or things, the affective movements that belong to a character or a group. In music, the changing whole expresses itself immediately through contrast or even conflict, and inconsistency with the movement of the visual image (see Deleuze 1989: 240).

Deleuze’s understanding of the sound in classic cinema does not contradict Lotman’s understanding of the sound in cinema. Lotman says that the sound has radically altered all the “navigation” in the cinematographic space (Lotman, Tsiv’yan 2014: 166). For Lotman, the sound, as any other technical device, should be submitted to the filmmakers’ creative objectives. As a theoretical foundation for such an approach, Lotman mentions Eisenstein, Pudovkin and Alexandrov’s 1928 manifesto “A Statement on the sound-Film” (1977[1928])11, that proposed the sound counterpoint as the major approach in submitting the cinema sound to filmmaker’s creative objectives. Lotman defines this counterpoint as “[…] artistically motivated, and that the motivation is revealed by the use of displacement” (Lotman 1976: 15). Here it should be observed that Lotman, like Deleuze, indicates the correlation between the out-of-field space and visual space. Like Deleuze, Lotman indicates that the sound strengthens the third dimension, which he calls illuziya ob’emnosti [the illusion of extensionality] (Lotman, Tsiv’yan 2014[1994]: 199), that enables the considerable complicating of semantic composition of the film, making the picture (image-information) more complex. This complexity is the complexity of the external connections, but not the internal relations (in the

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11 Lotman and Deleuze share the same understanding of the Contrapuntal Method of the manifesto, but Deleuze relates it only to the first period of sound cinema (classic cinema), when the sound complemented the visual image. The Contrapuntal Method pointed to a sound-off source (soon to appear on the screen) located in the out-of-field space. At the same time, the sound image correlated with the visual image, and the image and out-of-field space had one nature. In the second period of sound cinema, according to Deleuze, the visual and sound images are asynchronous. Therefore, the Contrapuntal Method no longer works in cinema (Deleuze 1989: 250). Lotman does not make such a separation in the understanding of the Contrapuntal Method. After his introducing of the concept of bipolar asymmetry into his scientific approach, the Contrapuntal Method still remains relevant. True, sound has become somewhat autonomous from the image, but it continues to indicate an out-of-field space just as before (Lotman, Tsiv’yan 2014[1994]: 168–169). Therefore, a similar understanding on this topic by Deleuze and Lotman in contemporary cinema does not relate to the contents of the manifesto itself.
picture itself: in the image) (Lotman, Tsiv’yan 2014[1994]: 176). In this, Lotman sees the essence of sound cinema; and not in that that the sound film is more similar to real life (Lotman, Tsiv’yan 2014: 169–171). The relation between the sound and the visual image is radically different: it does not appear on the level of plot or the subject as in the silent film (Lotman, Tsiv’yan 1984: 49–51). Lotman, like Deleuze, does not agree that music, noises, and speech acts should perform strictly different functions in a film. For him, art takes into account the functions of the elements of cinematographic language, but this does not make art follow them blindly (Lotman, Tsiv’yan 2014[1994]: 173). According to Lotman, music, noise and speech appear to be in dynamic relations with one another, replace one another, share one another’s functions. Lotman provides examples in which music performs the function of speech; the speech act performs the function of music or noise; the noise performs the function of music (Lotman, Tsiv’yan 2014[1994]: 174–175). Also Deleuze (1989: 234) points out these complex relations of speech acts, music, and noises (Deleuze 1989: 234). The voice-off of the speaker or Deleuzian voice of reflexive speech acts (see Deleuze 1989: 236) sounds with omnipotence, claiming to be the absolute truth. Thus the voice-off appears in montage as the third element of the construction: two shots and the voice-off (see Lotman, Tsiv’yan 2014: 181). The voice-off and the voice-in are equal elements of cinematographic language. All these statements by Lotman intersect with what Deleuze has been saying on the interrelations of the visual and sound components in the cinematographic image.

I have already said that the visual and sound components of the cinematographic image together express the heterogeneity of the image. Lotman, (1998: 576) called such heterogeneity the synthetic, ensemble character of the cinema. According to Herbert Eagle (2006: 229), the use of the verbal and the visual codes in a cinematographic language creates the situation of Lotmanian bipolar asymmetry of conventional and iconic semiosis. In the model of bipolar asymmetry, its two (constituting) images are equal and exist without any contradiction: they are heautonomous (Deleuze 1989: 251), and also untranslatable between themselves. These two elements form the third, common element, which cannot be reduced to the two initial elements. A complex interaction takes place between them: conventional sign systems in cinematographic image impact the interpretation of the iconic sign, which constitutes the text (the visual image) as a whole. They may encourage certain implications of the iconic sign, or they may contradict it. In the latter case the cinematographic text has a paradoxical meaning, or multivalency (Eagle 2006: 234). The model of bipolar asymmetry between the visual and sound components of cinematographic image as such expresses how Deleuze understands modern cinema that started in the post-war period.
Deleuze performs his analysis of the visual and sound components of the cinematographic image in modern cinema, starting with an examination of modern cinema. Deleuze says that ‘the modern’ implies “[…] a new use of the talking, sound and the musical. […] The speech-act tended to extricate itself from its dependencies in relation to the visual image, and assumed a value for itself” (Deleuze 1989: 241–242), and the cinematographic image is formed. I define this situation as Lotmanian bipolar asymmetry. Deleuze also indicates this asymmetry, but he uses the word ‘disymmetries’ instead: “[…] basic disymmetries between the aural and visual that allow the eye to read images, but also allow the ear to imagine the slightest noise” (Deleuze 1995b: 70). Deleuze compares this model with Bakhtin’s ‘free indirect discourse’ (‘quasi-direct discourse’ in Bakhtin’s book) (Voloshin [Bakhtin] 1973: 125–159), which was introduced to cinema by Pasolini (Deleuze 1986: 72–73). Since modern cinema implies the collapse of the sensory-motor schema, the speech-act is no longer inserted in the linkage of actions and reactions and no more reveals a web of interactions as was the case in classic cinema.

It turns in on itself; it is no longer a dependant or something which is part of the visual image; it becomes a completely separate sound image; it takes on a cinematographic autonomy and cinema becomes truly audiovisual. (Deleuze 1989: 243)

In modern cinema, speech ceases to be visual and visible, since it is not directly connected to the visual image. This visual image allows a new reading, which enables the appearing of a new sense, and the speech-act becomes an autonomous image (see Deleuze 1989: 246). The visual image acquires a potency which did not exist in the silent cinema, and the sound image acquires a new potency which it did not have in the first stage of the sound cinema. This is why Deleuze calls the new whole image ‘audio-visual image’. These new images require a new pedagogy so as to be able to read them (Deleuze 1989: 247).

Deleuze says that the asynchrony or counterpoint of the Soviet manifesto no longer means what was once meant by its authors. Thus it excludes the doubling of the visual content. This does not yet belong to the visual image. Voice-off becomes heterogeneous to the visual image, entering into a rivalry with it. It is now full of doubt, unsteady, ambiguous, and has lost the ability of seeing. Nevertheless, the voice-off gains autonomy and independence. As a result, the out-of-field disappears, as does the voice-off, since they were components of the visual image. The new images become perfectly independent sound images, which originate from the break with the visual images. From autonomous images, they have been transformed into heautonomous images, with desynchronisation, with an interstice,
and an irrational cut between them. The visual image has also lost its exteriority and set itself free from what depended on it. At the same time, the sound-image has become *heautonomous*, meaning that it “has mastered its own framing” (Deleuze 1989: 251). This is different from the framing of the visual image (see Deleuze 1989: 250–251). Still, the visual image will never be able to express what the sound image does. Sound framing consists in freeing a pure music or speech act in the creative process of filmmaking (the cinema), which is the “properly cinematographic utterance or enunciation” (Deleuze 1989: 252).

Approaching the topic of audio-visual image, Deleuze (1989: xiii) writes, “The relations and disjunctions between visual and sound, between what is seen and what is said, revitalize the problem and endow cinema with new powers for capturing time in the image”, and the cinema “is just beginning to explore the relations between sound and image, which are temporal relations” (Deleuze 2006a: 291), and these relations determine the time-image (Deleuze 1989: 277–278).

At first sight, the Deleuzian approach to the study of visual and sound components in the cinematographic image (the audio-visual image) looks much more complex than Lotman’s approach to the same problem. However we should not be in such a hurry to jump to conclusions. Across 46 pages, Deleuze explains in detail the evolution of the audio-visual image from the silent film to modern cinema. However, in Lotman’s approach we can find conceptions that intersect with the pivotal conceptions of the Deleuzian analysis of the subject, including the development of the audio-visual image in modern cinema: the principle of *Lotmanian bipolar asymmetry*.

**Conclusion**

Despite scientific, philosophical and other differences between Lotman and Deleuze, both thinkers understand the nature of the cinema in a similar way. Despite the fundamental internal differences (structuralism and post-structuralism) between them, this indicates the acceptability of both approaches. This study showed some features of Lotman’s and Deleuze’s approaches to the cinema: the relationship between space and time, illusion and virtuality, mythology and virtuality in cinema, the role of clichés in the virtuality, as well as audiovisual relations in cinema, which are heterogeneous forms in on-screen works of art. All these topics are relevant for contemporary digital audiovisual arts.

A characteristic feature of contemporary audiovisual arts is the creation of a virtuality which is built on the principles of the mythological worldview and is also hyper-realistic. Hyperrealism causes a strong immersiveness and escapism for a screen viewer. Speaking of hyperrealism, Jean Baudrillard (1993: 69–72). points
out that it is characterized by multiple meticulous duplication of reality and its replication, as a result of which the sign is freed from its referent and its meaning, and refers to a new reality that has nothing to do with reality [Baudrillard 1993: 69–72]. As a result of this multiple copying and replication, which takes place in many audiovisual works of art, clichés are formed that are narrative cultural archetypes: John G. Cawelti’s (1976: 5–6) formulas or mental images of Gilles Deleuze (1986: 203–205). The author believes that these two concepts of Cawelti and Deleuze are close in meaning12.

The results of the analysis of the above topics in Lotman’s and Deleuze’s approaches to the cinema provide tools for studying contemporary digital audio-visual arts characterized by the prevalence of mythology, virtuality and the use of clichés.

References


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12 “The role of the formula-cliché in contemporary digital audiovisual art” is the topic of an upcoming study, which is also based on the author’s research on Juri Lotman’s and Gilles Deleuze’s approaches to the cinema. This research constitutes part of the author’s post-doctoral study at the University of Haifa, Israel.
Точки соприкосновения между Юрием Лотманом и Жилем Делезом в их исследованиях искусства кино

Методы изучения современного цифрового аудиовизуального искусства являются доминирующей темой в современных теориях искусства. На этом фоне в статье предлагается взгляд на некоторые аспекты исследований Юрия Лотмана и Жиля Делеза о кинематографе.

Как правило, современные исследования цифрового аудиовизуального искусства проходят в контексте междисциплинарных исследований. Один из методологических принципов таких исследований состоит в применении структурно-семиотического подхода. В настоящее время этот подход к изучению аудиовизуального искусства наиболее применим в семиотике кино, поэтому в данной статье визуальная семиотика рассматривается через призму работ Юрия Лотмана и Жиля Делеза о кинематографе.

Эти два автора были современниками, но представляли различные научные парадигмы. Юрий Лотман был сторонником структурализма, а Жиль Делез постструктураллистом, критиковавшим структурализм. Тем не менее, несмотря на это принципиальное различие, оба исследователя пришли к схожим выводам по ряду вопросов, касающихся понимания кино и самой его природы. В статье рассматриваются особенности авторского подхода этих исследователей к отношениям времени и пространства в кино, к аудиовизуальным отношениям в кино как гетерогенной форме художественного произведения, виртуальности и мифологизму в восприятии кино зрителем.
Различия и сходства академических подходов Лотмана и Делеза к кино указывают на общее и перспективное направление в развитии теории кино и аудиовизуальных искусств.

Juri Lotman, Gilles Deleuze ja nende lähenemised filmikunstile: lõikumispunkte

Tänapäevase digitaalse audiovisuaalse kunsti uurimismeetoditega tegelemine on üks domineerivaid teemasid nüüdisaegsetes kunstiteooriates. Sel taustal pakub artikkel sissevaadet mõnedesse Juri Lotmani ning Gilles Deleuze'i kinouurimustesse.

Reeglina leiab tänapäevane audiovisuaalsele digikunstile pühendatud teadustöö aset interdistsiplinaarsete uuringute kontekstis. Üks selliste uuringute metodoloogilisi põhimõtteid seisneb struktuuriala ja semiootilise lähenemise rakendamises. Tänapäeval on see metodoloogiline lähenemine audiovisuaalse kunsti uurimisele enim arenenud filmisemiotikas, mistõttu vaadeldakse käesolevas artiklis avaramat visuaalsemiootika filmisemiotika kaudu, lähtudes Juri Lotmani lähenemisest. Ka filmikunsti olemuse filosoofiline mõistmine, mille pakub välja Gilles Deleuze, on osutunud fundamentalseks tänapäevase audiovisuaalse kunsti uurimisel.


Erinevused ja sarnasused Lotmani ja Deleuze'i välja töötatud akadeemilistes lähenemistes kinole osutavad ühissuunaline kino ning visuaalkunstile teooria arengus, mis tundub olulisena tänapäevaste audiovisuaalsete kunstide uurimisel.