Abstract. The idea that translation involves revealing and discovery of information from the source has been discussed in a few fields of study, especially creative translation and intersemiotic translation. These operations are fundamentally dependent on iconic properties. An operational criterion detrivializes the common description of the icon as a sign of similarity to define more precisely iconic processes as a sign through which it is possible to discover or reveal new information about its object. This idea becomes particularly interesting when we think about multiple translations of the same source, each revealing such distinct traits that some may consider as opposing one another. As an example to be discussed in our case study, we have selected Lewis Carroll’s *Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland*, and *Through the Looking-Glass and What Alice Found There*, both of which have been widely translated. Until now there has been no systematic analysis in the field of intersemiotic translation studies of the relationship between one source and multiple targets. We compare two intersemiotic translations of the *Alice* novels: a 1980 TV episode from *The Muppet Show* by Jim Henson and the 1988 feature film *Něco z Alenky* by Jan Švankmajer, both displaying distinct characteristics of their own and revealing different information about the works of Carroll.

Keywords: intersemiotic translation; iconicity; *Alice in Wonderland*; Lewis Carroll; Jim Henson; Jan Švankmajer.

1. Introduction

Translation is an iconic semiotic process (Petrilli, Ponzio 2010; Gorlée 2005, 1994: 10; Marais 2018). As is well known, the icon is a type of sign inseparably connected to its object. It *stands for* its object through its form, structure or material constitution. When an *operational criterion* is adopted, the icon is defined as anything whose manipulation can reveal more information about its object,
which is why algebra, syntax, graphs and formalizations of any kind must be recognized as icons (Atã, Queiroz 2014; Hookway 2002). It can be characterized as a sign that reveals information through a procedure followed by manipulation and observation (Hookway 2002). The manipulation of icons can be described as an experimental phase of discovery and a “wide class of thought processes” (Stjernfelt 2007: 15). By using the operational criterion of the icon, we can appreciate its role in modelling and discovery processes. What implications could this criterion have in the translations studies domain?

To approach this problem, we have selected Lewis Carroll’s *Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland* and *Through the Looking-Glass and What Alice Found There* – probably the most intersemiotically translated literary classic of the 19th century. The most influential biographer of Carroll’s life, Morton N. Cohen (1989), asserts that *Alice in Wonderland* is the third most adapted work in existence, preceded only by the Bible and Shakespeare. The Internet Movie Database alone lists 92 movie titles with Lewis Carroll as a co-writer, meaning works based on his writings.

Based on the operational criteria of the iconic process, multiple intersemiotic translations reveal distinct properties, events and facts about the source. One translation can show an obscure tale of a nightmare, while another may be a reunion of funny, talkative, singing animals. While in one case Alice becomes an explorer of a quantum world, delivering accurate information curated by a renowned scientist as happens in Robert Gilmore’s *Alice in Quantumland: An Allegory of Quantum Physics* (1995), in another she appears in a visually stunning work of fantasy about a girl who needs to defeat the Jabberwocky monster – not quite the plot of either *Alice in Wonderland* novel – which occurs in Tim Burton’s film *Alice in Wonderland* (2010). Most translations will include major characters, such as Alice and the White Rabbit, but sometimes they will be replaced by similar ones, for instance in Max Fleischer’s animated short film *Betty in Blunderland* (1934), where the protagonist is the cartoon character Betty Boop. More radical experiences need not include Alice at all, as is the case with books, sketches and

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3 There are, of course, indexical and symbolic aspects, as well as intermediate (such as proto-symbolic) ones actively in action. Our attention here, however, is focused on the iconic aspects. Other authors have been stressing the predominant role of iconic processes in interlingual and intersemiotic translation, in comparison with indexical and symbolic processes. To explore a current approach to this matter, see Petrilli 2003: 24 and Petrilli 2010.

4 Most of the time, the intersemiotic translations consider both novels as one story and sometimes even name it after the first one only. Henceforth, both novels will be considered together under the title of *Alice in Wonderland*.

comic books that only concern the poem “Jabberwocky” that is included in Alice in Wonderland.

To describe the semiotic processes involved in multiple translations of the same semiotic source, we associate (i) a triadic model of semiosis by Peirce;\(^6\) (ii) the operational notion of iconic process according to which an icon is defined as a sign whose manipulation reveals some information about its object; and (iii) the idea that intersemiotic translation operates on several levels of description.\(^7\) In the following sections we describe the theoretical framework briefly presenting the topic of intersemiotic translation, followed by the notion of semiosis as sign-action and the fundamental classes of sign. The ensuing sections will analyse the case studies: an episode of Jim Henson’s The Muppet Show and Jan Švankmajer’s movie Něco z Alenky.

2. Semiosis as sign-action and fundamental classes of sign

Semiosis is defined as the ‘action of the sign’ and is represented by a triad of indecomposable related terms (CP 2.274). It relates a sign (S) to its object (O) to an interpretant (I) or to its effects on an interpreter (CP 2.242). A logical property is derived from its irreducibility: the sign process must be regarded as associated to the interpretant as an ongoing process of interpretation (Hausman 1993: 9), and it is not decomposable any further – “A sign is anything which determines something else (its interpretant) to refer to an object to which [it] itself refers (its object) in the same way, the interpretant becoming in turn a sign, and so on ad infinitum” (CP 2.303). Peirce (De Tienne 2003; Hulswit 2001; Bergman 2000) also defines a sign as a medium for the communication of a form or a habit embodied in the object to the interpretant, so as to constrain (in semiotic systems and processes) the interpreter’s behaviour:

[…\)] a Sign may be defined as a Medium for the communication of a Form. [...]. As a medium, the Sign is essentially in a triadic relation, to its Object which determines it, and to its Interpretant which it determines. [...] That which is communicated from the Object through the Sign to the Interpretant is a Form;

\(^6\) The application of Peirce’s triadic model of semiosis to the relationships between translated-translator-interpreter was initially proposed by Stecconi (1999), and more recently by Queiroz and Atãâ (2018, 2019), and Queiroz and Aguiar (2015). Among the authors who consider Peirce’s model of semiosis appropriate for translation studies in general are Marais (2018), Gorlée (1994, 2005, 2007), Damiani (2008) and Jeha (1997).

\(^7\) For more details on semiotic processes as multi-structured processes, see Queiroz, El-Hani 2012, 2006.
that is to say, it is nothing like an existent, but is a power, is the fact that something would happen under certain conditions. (MS 793:1–3. See EP 2:544, n.22, for a slightly different version)

According to De Tienne (2003), Peirce is emphatic in pointing out that ‘form’ here is nothing like a thing. It is something embodied in the object (EP 2: 544, n.22) as a habit, a ‘rule of action’ (CP 5.397, CP 2.643), a ‘disposition’ (CP 5.495, CP 2.170), a ‘real potential’ (EP 2: 388). The form transmitted from the object to the interpretant through the sign is not the particular shape of the object, but a regularity, a habit (Atã, Queiroz 2016). In short, a sign is for Peirce both “a Medium for the communication of a Form” and “a triadic relation, to its Object which determines it, and to its Interpretant which it determines”. If we consider both definitions, we can say, then, that semiosis is a triadic process of communication of a form from the object to the interpretant through sign mediation (Fig. 1).

![Figure 1. The three irreducibly connected terms: sign–object–interpretant (S–O–I).](image)

Considering intersemiotic translation as semiosis, it should also be formally described as a triadic process of communication of a form (or a habit) from the object to the interpretant through sign mediation. This also means that this irreducible triad should be able to describe how a source is translated into a different system of signs, resulting in a target. As being previously described, there are at least two possible ways of relating a translation source and a translation target to the S–O–I triad (Queiroz, Atã 2019; Queiroz, Aguiar 2015): either the source is the sign (S) and the target is the interpretant (I) (Model 1, see Fig. 2), or the source is the object (O) and the target is the sign (S) (Model 2, see Fig. 3):
Figure 2. Model 1 of intersemiotic translation: the source is a sign which mediates an object so as to determine the translation target as an effect. Note that this model graphically represents the object of the source, but not the effect of the target on its interpreters. The translation target is determined by the object of the source through the mediation of the translation source (I is determined by O through S).

Figure 3. Model 2 of intersemiotic translation: the sign is the translation target, which mediates a translation source (viewed here as another semiotic process), so as to determine an effect on an interpreter (cognitive system, or the audience). This model represents the effect of the target on a cognitive system as determined by the translation source through mediation of the translation target.

In each model a different sign communicates the form from the object to the interpretant: in the first model, the form is communicated to the semiotic target as a habit embodied in the object of the semiotic source; in the second model, the form communicated from the semiotic source to the interpreter (effect on the audience's mind) is mediated by the semiotic target. The choice of approaching translation as a triadic process bears some important consequences: (i) in such a relation, ‘sign’, ‘object’ and ‘interpretant’ are not fixed entities, but functional roles that are relative to each other (see Savan 1987). As a consequence, in intersemiotic translation, sign and object can involve entities possessing a highly diverse nature, such as artworks, scientific models, properties, procedures, etc. In the same way, the interpretant of an intersemiotic translation can be the effect that is produced in a single individual mind, or in the mind of a community (such as, for example, programmers, audience, artists or art historians). The interpretant can also be another sign, or another grown sign – “the interpretant acts as a further sign of
the object, and so as a development of the ‘original’ sign” (Atkin 2016: 1318); (ii) since the triad is an irreducible relation between sign, object and interpretant, that cannot be resolved into any pairs, an intersemiotic translation will always take into consideration the interpreter and the context of interpretation (as e.g. in interpretative conventions); (iii) meaning, in such a relation, is not something fixed, or “located” in any of the three terms of the relation, but a dynamic and relational property of the process as a whole. Thus, meaning in an intersemiotic translation is a habit which can lead to the emergence of other potentially unlimited meaning relations (though not any meaning relation, because of the regular nature of the habit itself).

An important consequence related to our premises, as was specified above, is that an intersemiotic translation is a triadic (S–O–I) relation, not a dyadic-bilateral one. According to Model 2, the sign is the semiotic target (translated work); the object of the sign is the semiotic source (piece to be translated); and the interpretant is the effect produced on the interpreter (cognitive system).

As is well known, sign-mediated processes show a notable variety. According to Peirce, there are three fundamental kinds of signs underlying such processes – icons, indexes, and symbols (CP 2.275). Icons relate to the object by similarity or shared qualities, without regard to any spatial-temporal presence of the object (CP 2.299; Ransdell 1986). Indices are signs that refer to objects due to a direct connection (CP 1.372), and symbols are signs that relate to their objects by a relationship of agreement or convention (CP 2.307). This paper focuses on the properties of iconic signs. Generally speaking, an iconic sign communicates a habit embodied in an object to the interpretant as a result of a certain quality that the sign and the object share. As previously stated, an icon can also be characterized as a sign that reveals information through a procedure followed by manipulation and observation. For Christopher Hookway (2000: 102),

[the key of iconicity is not perceived resemblance between the sign and what it signifies but rather the possibility of making new discoveries about the object of a sign through observing features of the sign itself. Thus a mathematical model of a physical system is an iconic representation because its use provides new information about the physical system. This is the distinctive feature and value of iconic representation: a sign resembles its object if, and only if, study of the sign can yield new information about the object.

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According to this definition, the icon is not the only kind of sign that involves a direct presentation of characteristics pertaining to its object, but it is the only sign through which, by direct observation, we can discover something about its object. This definition distinguishes the icon from any psychological approach: it does not matter if the sign and its object look similar at first sight – the actual proof is the possibility of manipulating the icon so that new information appears.

Applying this approach to our case, in Model 2 sign in question is each intersemiotic translation of *Alice in Wonderland* as a semiotic target; the semiotic source, or the work to be translated, *Alice in Wonderland*, is the object; and the interpretant is the effect produced on the interpreter, the audience.

**3. Case studies**

In this section, the theoretical framework provided above is used to analyse an episode from Jim Henson’s *The Muppet Show* and Jan Švankmajer’s *Něco z Alenky*, two different intersemiotic translations of *Alice in Wonderland*.9

**3.1. Jim Henson’s *The Muppet Show*, Alice-themed episode**

*The Muppet Show* is a TV show that aired between 1976 and 1981. Directed by Jim Henson, it consists of independent episodes in each of which a celebrity is invited to be a guest who interacts with the puppets. In the sixth episode of the fifth season Brooke Shields interprets Alice from *Alice in Wonderland* in a series of sketches inspired by excerpts from the novels, interacting with characters from the show dressed as characters from the books.

**3.1.1. Rhetorical devices on *The Muppet Show***

Both the novels and the show extensively resort to language-based humour. The exploration of this resource occurs in relation to different events in each medium, but a similarity of strategies can be mapped following some specific linguistic resources found in both of them. First, we demonstrate a sample of those occurrences in *The Muppet Show*, and then a correlation of the same linguistic resources at different points of the narrative in *Alice in Wonderland*.

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9 There is not, in our approach, any reference to “agency” from the part of the translator, since the semiotic process is distributed and self-organized. It remains outside our scope to develop an extensive discussion on this idea; for an approach to this matter, see Atã, Queiroz 2019, Queiroz, Loula 2011.
We are observing the use of the following rhetorical devices employed in *The Muppet Show* (and, as later shown, in *Alice in Wonderland*) that can initially be divided in five sub-categories: (i) pun, or paronomasia; (ii) portmanteau; (iii) change of grammatical class; (iv) shift of meaning from connotative to denotative, or *vice versa*; (v) an audio-visual image behaving as a verbal sign. A concise definition of terms runs as follows (see also Table 1): (i) paronomasia, popularly known as pun, is the use of similar-sounding verbal signs surprisingly alternating their meanings, or, as Jakobson (1959: 131) defines it, “phonemic similarity sensed as semantic relationship”; (ii) portmanteau is a term coined by Carroll himself \(^{10}\) to express the morphological merging of two words, having the two meanings combined; (iii) change of grammatical class, usually associated with a paronomasia, occurs when a word is first used in one grammatical class and then in another, sometimes with added affixes; (iv) loss of the usual, pragmatic sense of a word and adoption of a strictly denotative one, or *vice versa*; (v) an image behaves as a verbal sign when it starts to display phonemic characteristics which are necessary for the purpose at hand, e.g. in a paronomasia.

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### Table 1. Rhetorical devices.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DEVICE CATEGORY</th>
<th>PROPERTIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I Paronomasia</td>
<td>Similar sound but different meaning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II Portmanteau</td>
<td>Combination of words and meanings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III Change of grammatical class</td>
<td>Change from noun to adjective and others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV Connotative to denotative or <em>vice-versa</em></td>
<td>Change between literal and figurative meanings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V Audio-visual image as verbal sign</td>
<td>Image purposely used as verbal sign</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Next, we provide examples of the use of some of the rhetorical devices in the Alice episode of *The Muppet Show*:

(i) *Looking for a hole* (device category: paronomasia and change of grammatical class):

Dialogue between Alice and the Rabbit:

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– Hi, I’m Alice, who are you?
– Oh, no time for that, I’m looking for a hole.
– Looking for a hole? A whole what?
– I hate smart Alices.

In the first sentence ‘hole’ is a noun meaning a cavity. Alice’s answer transforms it into an adjective, ‘whole’, changing its spelling, morphology and meaning, but keeping the sound. Orthographically, the letter ‘w’ has been added to the beginning of the word, turning it into another one. Morphologically speaking it changes from noun to adjective. An adjective needs to qualify something, but a noun is missing from the second sentence, giving rise to the question ‘A whole what?’, with the pronoun ‘what’ substituting the noun that would be qualified by ‘whole’. The change makes the verbal sign ‘hole’/‘whole’ practically meaningless since it qualifies an interrogative pronoun, without an answer. By the end, there is a joke about Alice being annoyingly smart, making a pun with the expression ‘smart alec’, commonly used to describe someone “who tries to appear clever or who answers questions in a clever way that annoys other people”.

(ii) Jam session (device categories: paronomasia, change of grammatical class, audio-visual image behaving as verbal sign):

An animated bottle of jam asks Alice:

– Hi dear, we’re having a jam session, wanna sit in?

Here, two words spelled in the same way have different meanings: (i) ‘jam’ as a preserve of fruit in an edible jelly, and (ii) ‘jam’ as a mix of musicians playing improvised music. The first jam is related to the visual image of a bottle of jam (Fig. 2) which is a thing and, grammatically, would be referred to by a noun. The second jam is spelled in the same way, but in this case it is a verb. Humour is created by the transformation of the visual image into a verbal sign, and then the transformation of the verbal sign into another one that has the same sound and spelling but a different meaning.

(iii) *A piece of cake* (device categories: audio-visual image behaving as verbal sign)

When Alice realizes she is too big to go through a door, she says:

- I can't get through the door.
- It's easy, have some dessert.

(Alice eats some cake from the table, gets smaller and says)
- He's right, it is easy, actually, It's a piece of cake.

‘A piece of cake’ is an expression in English meaning that something is very easy (sweet and pleasant). When the audiovisual image shows an actual piece of cake, it brings the verbal sign back to the denotative sense. Alice is both having some cake, denotatively, and doing an easy task.

(iv) *Mushrooms/Much room* (device categories: paronomasia)

Alice and the Caterpillar:

- And you wouldn’t know where I could find one of these growing mushrooms, I don't suppose.
- Hm, help yourself (*Points to the mushroom.*), but mind you take it off the bottom.
- Why off the bottom?
- Cause it ain’t ‘mush’ room on top. (*Laughs.*)

Here we have a decomposition of the word ‘mushroom’ into the two-word expression ‘much room’. An ordinary word is morphed into a paronomasia, making
a single word/expression contain two different verbal signs - (a fungus) and (a lot of space).

(v) **shrink** (device categories: paronomasia, change of grammatical class)

Alice grows so much she gets stuck in the dressing room. The doctor arrives and she says:

– Thank goodness you are here, doctor, are you a shrink?

The verbal sign ‘shrink’ has two meanings, a ‘psychiatrist or mental health doctor’ or ‘to reduce in size’, the former being a noun and the latter a verb. The question ‘are you a shrink?’ would mean, denotatively: ‘are you a mental health doctor?’ The structure of the sentence implies shrink as being a noun, mostly because it comes after an article. It would then mean a mental health specialist. The context, however, shows a big Alice, needing a doctor to reduce her size, to ‘shrink’ her. If she meant shrink as a verb the sentence would be grammatically incorrect. Since the sentence uses both meanings of the verbal sign, she, in one of the meanings, makes a grammatical mistake in order to have a semantical hit, surprising the audience.

### 3.1.2. Rhetorical devices in *Alice in Wonderland*

Linguistic games are abundantly found in Lewis Carroll’s Alice stories. The logic of grammar is constantly played with, in many ways, so it is easy to provide examples of all the five aforementioned types.

(i) Paronomasia:

‘I couldn’t afford to learn it,’ said the Mock Turtle, with a sigh. ‘I only took the regular course.’

‘What was that?’ inquired Alice.

‘Reeling and Writhing, of course, to begin with,’ the Mock Turtle replied; ‘and then the different branches of Arithmetic – Ambition, Distraction, Uglification, and Derision.’ (Carroll 1999[1865]: 229–230)

All the Mock Turtle’s subjects represent cases of paronomasia: reeling is reading, writhing is writing, ambition is addition, distraction is subtraction, uglification is multiplication, and derision is division.
(ii) Portmanteau:

'Twas brillig, and the slithy toves
Did gyre and gimble in the wabe:
    All mimsy were the borogoves,
    And the mome raths outgrabe.'

'That's enough to begin with,' Humpty Dumpty interrupted: 'there are plenty of hard words there. 'Brillig' means four o'clock in the afternoon – the time when you begin broiling things for dinner.'

'That'll do very well,' said Alice: “and 'slithy'?''

'Well, 'slithy' means 'lithe and slimy.' 'Lithe' is the same as 'active.' You see it's like a portmanteau – there are two meanings packed up into one word.' (Carroll, 1999[1871]: 471–472)

In this passage, Humpty-Dumpty explains to Alice the meaning of the nonsense poem “Jabberwocky”, which appeared earlier in the novel and from which she recites the first stanza, pointing out the meaning of ‘slithy’ – a neologism created by the junction of ‘lithe’ and ‘slimy’.

(iii) Change of grammatical class:

Alice did not wish to offend the Dormouse again, so she began very cautiously:

'But I don't understand. Where did they draw the treacle from?'

'You can draw water out of a water-well,' said the Hatter; 'so I should think you could draw treacle out of a treacle-well – eh, stupid?'

'But they were in the well,' Alice said to the Dormouse, not choosing to notice this last remark.

'Of course they were;' said the Dormouse: 'well in.' (Carroll 1999[1865]: 185–186)

Paronomasia concerns the verbal sign ‘well’ as a noun that refers to a deep hole used to draw water and the verbal sign ‘well’ as an adverb of intensity. The two verbal signs are visually similar and have the same sound, but are considered two different words. Paronomasia involving the two words is created by a change of grammatical class, and also entails collocation: while the first ‘well’ a noun, is preceded by the definite article 'the', the second ‘well’, an adverb, is placed right before the adverb of place it is qualifying, ‘in’.

(iv) Shift of meaning from connotative to denotative, or vice versa:

'Sit down, all of you, and listen to me! I'll soon make you dry enough!' They all sat down at once, in a large ring, with the Mouse in the middle. Alice kept her eyes
anxiously fixed on it, for she felt sure she would catch a bad cold if she did not get
dry very soon.

‘Ahem!’ said the Mouse with an important air. ‘Are you all ready? This is the
driest thing I know. Silence all round, if you please! “William the Conqueror,
whose cause was favoured by the pope, was soon submitted to by the English,
who wanted leaders, and had been of late much accustomed to usurpation and
conquest. Edwin and Morcar, the earls of Mercia and Northumbria – ”.’ (Carroll
1999[1865]: 92)

A shift occurs here from a connotative meaning to a denotative one: after becoming
soaked in the pool of tears, everyone needed to get dry. The Mouse uses the “driest
thing he knows”, which is an academic lecture. While both words are adjectives,
the former usage refers to the absence of moisture, as in the opposite of ‘wet’, while
the latter refers to an absence of a ludic element in a speech.

(v) Audio-visual image behaving as a verbal sign:

‘Mine is a long and a sad tale!’ said the Mouse, turning to Alice, and sighing.

‘It is a long tail, certainly, ...but why do you call it sad?’ And she kept on
puzzling about it while the Mouse was speaking, so that her idea of the tale was
something like this: l – (Carroll, 1999[1865]: 98)

In “a long and sad tale”, the Mouse tells Alice his story in a poem. First, there is a
case of paronomasia involving ‘tale’ and ‘tail’ – both words sound similar, which
creates humour when they are confused with each other, especially when Alice
mistakes a ‘sad tale’ for a ‘sad tail’, immediately before the poem. ‘A long and sad
tale’ talks about the mouse’s tail as it is written in the shape of a tail (Fig. 3). It
would be impossible for the semiotic source’s medium, which is a book, to work
with signs other than printed elements and, proceeding from this, Carroll uses a
visual resource as well, as the poem is shaped like a tail.
Fury said to a mouse, That he met in the house, ‘Let us both go to law: I will prosecute you.— Come, I’ll take no denial; We must have a trial. For really this morning I’ve nothing to do,’ Said the mouse to the cat. ‘Such a trial, dear Sir, With no jury or judge, would be wasting our breath?’ The judge, I’ll be jinny, said coming off Fury; ‘I’ll try the whole case, you see, There’s no one else.’

Figure 3. A Long and sad tale. (Carroll 1999[1865]: 34)

3.1.3. A change of pace by the use of music or poetry

Every episode of The Muppet Show contains a number of songs. There are five songs in the Alice-themed episode, all sung by characters. The Mad Tea-Party scene has many lines transposed directly from the book, including its name, which is the title of one of the chapters. The lyrics of the song sung in this scene originally appear in the novel:

Twinkle, twinkle, little bat! How I wonder what you’re at!’ [...]

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Revealing Alice in Wonderland through intersemiotic translation
'Up above the world you fly
Like a tea-tray in the sky.
Twinkle, twinkle – ’”
Here the Dormouse shook itself, and began singing in its sleep “Twinkle, twinkle, twinkle – ” and went on so long that they had to pinch it to make it stop. (Carroll 1999[1865]: 182)

The poem, as many of Carroll’s poems in the novels, is a parody, in this case, of a poem by Jane Taylor:

Twinkle, twinkle, little star,
How I wonder what you are!
Up above the world so high,
Like a diamond in the sky.

Carroll’s novels do not contain many songs, while several poems do appear in them. There is one at the beginning and the end of both books, and many characters sing or recite verses to Alice. Poems, which in this case also employ metre and rhyme, work in the same way as songs, as they change the pace of the narrative.

3.1.4. “Jabberwocky”

The famous poem by Carroll is recited and enacted on this show in its entirety. It is considered a nonsense poem and contains many invented words. It tells the story of a young man who goes out to fight an evil creature and manages to cut off its head. Before the curtains rise there is a dialogue about the craziness of the scene, in which its hero, the Beamish Boy, asks Kermit the Frog to make a good intro, because “the scene needs as much help as it can get”, and there are a few puns on its lack of sense: “Have you seen the scene? Even when you know what it is you don’t know what it is.” In the end they say it was the weirdest thing they have ever done on the show.

When the first stanza is explained by Humpty Dumpty later in the novel (see p. 357 above), he describes three kinds of creatures that inhabit that place, named by Carroll with the help of neologisms and portmanteaus. The first one is the ‘tove’: “Well, ‘toves’ are something like badgers – they’re something like lizards – and they’re something like corkscrews” (Carroll 1999[1871]: 472). The second is the ‘borogove’: “And a ‘borogove’ is a thin shabby-looking bird with its feathers sticking out all round – something like a live mop” (Carroll 1999[1871]: 473), and finally, there is the ‘mome rath’:
'And then “mome raths”?' said Alice. 'I’m afraid I’m giving you a great deal of trouble.’

‘Well, a “rath” is a sort of green pig: but “mome” I’m not certain about. I think it’s short for “from home” – meaning that they’d lost their way, you know.’ (Carroll 1999[1871]: 473)

John Tenniel has illustrated them according to the descriptions (Fig. 4):
The Muppet Show went for a very similar visual approach (Fig. 5):

![Figure 5. The Muppet Show’s ‘toves’, ‘borogoves’ and ‘mome raths’.](image)

Another trait of the choices made in this translation is concerned with the audio-visual translation of neologisms, such as the verb ‘galumph’ used in the poem. The term is probably another portmanteau, mixing ‘gallop’ and ‘triumph’:

He left it dead, and with its head.  
He went galumphing back. (Carroll 1999[1871]: 144)

There are three elements to the on-screen translation of the verb. First, since a verb denotes an action and actions occur in time, the first part of the translation consists in repeating ‘galumph, galumph, galumph’ a few times, as time elapses. If someone is repeating the word, they may be said to be ‘galumphing’. Second, there is the onomatopoeic effect of the repetition of the word, resulting in a sound that is similar to a horse’s gallop. And, third, there is a visual component as the characters theatrically move up and down while walking, similarly to the movement one’s body makes when one is riding a horse.
3.2. Jan Švankmajer’s *Něco z Alenky*

Jan Švankmajer’s *Alice*, or *Něco z Alenky* (Something from Alice, in a loose translation from Czech) employs a completely different approach. The 86-minutes-long film was released in 1988 and mixes live-action filming with stop-motion animation. A brief analysis of two of the most relevant properties of this intersemiotic translation follows.

### 3.2.1. Oneiric environment

Perhaps the most evident aspect of *Něco z Alenky* is its dreamy-nightmarish environment. When compared with the fact that both *Alice* novels end with the protagonist waking up – hence, the stories must have happened in a dream – a very plausible interpretation emerges: the film is also about dreams.

> At this the whole pack rose up into the air, and came flying down upon her: she gave a little scream, half of fright and half of anger, and tried to beat them off, and found herself lying on the bank, with her head in the lap of her sister, who was gently brushing away some dead leaves that had fluttered down from the trees upon her face.

> ‘Wake up, Alice dear!’ said her sister; ‘Why, what a long sleep you’ve had!’

> ‘Oh, I’ve had such a curious dream!’ said Alice, and she told her sister, as well as she could remember them, all these strange Adventures of hers that you have just been reading about; and when she had finished, her sister kissed her, and said, ‘It WAS a curious dream, dear, certainly: but now run in to your tea; it’s getting late.’ So Alice got up and ran off, thinking while she ran, as well she might, what a wonderful dream it had been. (Carroll 1999[1865]: 280)

At the beginning of the film, Alice is outside, throwing stones into a brook. With a close-up on the stones the setting changes into that of her room as Alice is throwing stones into a cup of tea. This is one of the abrupt transitions that resembles a dream-like environment, but it might pass unnoticed if not for the next, stronger, nonsensical transition reinforcing the idea: while Alice is in her room, her stuffed rabbit comes to life, breaks the glass of his bell jar and walks towards the outside world. One wall of the room disappears and the rabbit can proceed into the open just by walking a straight line. There are shots in which half of the ground is the room’s floor, while the other half is soil (Fig. 6). Alice sees him out there, while she herself is inside, and when she decides to follow him, she just has to do the same.
This kind of transition is also present in the *Alice* books, for example when Alice is talking to the Queen in the woods, and the world becomes a shop while the Queen morphs into a sheep:

‘Then I hope your finger is better now?’ Alice said very politely, as she crossed the little brook after the Queen.

‘Oh, much better!’ cried the Queen, her voice rising into a squeak as she went on. ‘Much be-etter! Be-etter! Be-e-e-etter! Be-e-ehh!’ The last word ended in a long bleat, so like a sheep that Alice quite started.

She looked at the Queen, who seemed to have suddenly wrapped herself up in wool. Alice rubbed her eyes, and looked again. She couldn’t make out what had happened at all. Was she in a shop? And was that really – was it really a sheep that was sitting on the other side of the counter? (Carroll 1999[1871]: 129)

Even though Jan Švankmajer’s movie need not necessarily follow the same moments to express the same things, it is clear that it shows Alice’s story as one of a dream, shown not only by the fact that she will wake up. This means it is not only a device to finish the book, it is a statement about the book as well as the movie – both are about dreams, and everything this implies, namely that there is no need for a moral, or a chronological, structured narrative with consistent characters.
3.2.2. Violence

After the inside-outside scene in which Alice follows the White Rabbit out of her room, she sees him get into a drawer of a decaying desk, but when she opens it, he is not there. The drawer contains wooden rulers and other old tools. Trying to reach him by putting her hand deep inside the drawer Alice gets her finger cut, but she decides to go inside the drawer anyway. With some stop-motion animation, she is shown to get inside a space that is much smaller than she is, with the last shot being her legs and feet visible as they reach out of the drawer into the air. Once inside, Alice crawls over the tools, and there is a continuous sensation of danger. She hits her head and falls into a bucket, which leads to her falling into an old warehouse-like elevator, in a reference to Alice’s fall into the rabbit-hole in *Alice in Wonderland*. She descends between shelves full of bottled specimens – ancient animal bones, pharmacological substances, jams, etc. None of the food looks tasty and sometimes there are inedible components in it.

In a famous scene from *Alice in Wonderland* Alice cries so much when she is big that finally there is a puddle of water on the ground. Later, she falls into it while she is small and the pool becomes an entire ocean. It is in this scene that she meets the Mouse and many other talking animal characters. In *Něco z Alenky*, Alice sheds so many tears that the small room becomes a pool and when she starts to swim the walls disappear. The film Mouse is silent and small; it swims around her and acts as if she is a patch of dry land, staking out territory upon her head. In a very disturbing sequence he hammers two pieces of wood into her head to make his fire, and a close up of her face is shown, moving up and down with the pounding. Afterwards, we see him preparing his food on the top of her head. After some wandering around, Alice encounters the Caterpillar. It gives Alice some very important advice both in the novel and in the movie, “Keep your temper”; also, it tells her the secret of how to control the constant changes in her size by using opposite sides of the mushroom it is sitting on. In *Něco z Alenky* the Caterpillar is a stuffed sock, with a denture for its mouth and realistic glass eyes in two holes. At the end of its interaction with Alice, it goes to sleep by sewing its own eyes shut (Fig. 7). This looks grotesque and leaves an unsettling feeling, as does much of the film.
Něco z Alenky’s view of Wonderland is stripped of its subtle veneer of gentle Victorian romanticism and decorum. It is separated from its fairytale atmosphere and thrown into the land of nightmare, seen from which the characters and the novel itself look dark and haunted, rather than fantastic. This uneasy feeling that prevails throughout the entire movie is, in a sense, violence inflicted on the spectator who is always being surprised and unsettled. There is a subtle sense of violence found also in the novels, whose characters are mostly disguised versions of people whom both Lewis Carroll and Alice Liddell knew in real life. Many of these were adults who were either too busy, gloating in their own self-importance, or occupied with Alice’s education in a very severe manner. The characters in the novels usually feel superior to her and do not consider her important or capable of having valuable opinions, intellect and input in general.

According to Cohen (1989), the characters hide the rigid foundation of Victorian society, its motifs, class hierarchies, habits, conventions, etiquette, taboos, and above all, maybe, its flaws and insanity. The mouse and the birds in the first chapter constitute a prelude to the insolence Alice suffers, that she will also criticize a bit further. Almost every character she meets treats her poorly: the White Rabbit mistakes her for the maid and sends her on errands; the Caterpillar keeps contradicting her; the Duchess reprimands her; the Hatter criticizes the length of her hair; the March Hare corrects her language; the Griffon humiliates her; and the Queen of Hearts screams “Off with her head!” Bad behaviour is one
thing, but violence is another matter and it is present in both novels, sometimes even triggered by the heroine. Alice's fall into the rabbit hole is not violent in itself, but it certainly evokes the terror of a violent fall. When Alice grows in size and becomes stuck in the White Rabbit's house, she kicks Bill the Lizard who is sent in to investigate, and hurls him out of the chimney like a rocket. Later, she meets the complete chaos in the Duchess's kitchen where the cook is throwing plates and pans at the Duchess and her baby, as the Duchess orders Alice's head to be chopped off. While singing a nursery rhyme about punishing babies who sneeze, she shakes the baby violently up and down and then throws him to Alice. A pigeon who mistakes Alice for a serpent flies into her face and beats her with her wings. The Queen's croquet ground offers some cruel incidents as well: the team playing use flamingoes and hedgehogs instead of mallets and balls. The Duchess is arrested for boxing the Queen's ear, and the Queen's order to cut everybody's heads off becomes a veritable chorus. In the sequel, the Jabberwocky has jaws and teeth, the oysters become eaten, the Lion and the Unicorn battle, and the red pieces of chess are threatening.

When Alice appears to be surprised at the Cheshire Cat because she has never seen a cat able to grin, she is shut down: “'You don’t know much,’ said the Duchess; 'and that’s a fact’” (Carroll 1999[1865]: 154). Characters constantly argue with her and act superior, which is a subtle form of violence exercised over those who do not usually receive the right to talk back such as children, especially under the formality and rigour of the Victorian era.

There are also many jokes about death, starting from Alice's never-ending fall into the rabbit-hole:

‘Well!’ thought Alice to herself. ‘After such a fall as this, I shall think nothing of tumbling down-stairs! How brave they’ll all think me at home! Why, I wouldn't say anything about it, even if I fell off the top of the house!’ (Which was very likely true). (Carroll 1999[1865]: 56)

up to Alice being sentenced to death by the Queen of Hearts:

‘How should I know?’ said Alice, surprised at her own courage. ‘It’s no business of mine.’

The Queen turned crimson with fury, and, after glaring at her for a moment like a wild beast, began screaming ‘Off with her head! Off with – ’. (Carroll 1999[1865]: 204)
Some creatures are so surprised by the human child that they consider her a monster, for seeing such a strange creature they are not entirely sure if she is capable of talking, thinking properly, etc.

The Lion looked at Alice wearily. ‘Are you animal – or vegetable – or mineral?’ he said, yawning at every other word.
‘It’s a fabulous monster!’ the Unicorn cried out, before Alice could reply.
‘Then hand round the plum-cake, Monster,’ the Lion said. (Carroll 1999[1871]: 504)

A threat of physical violence appears in the scene where Alice is trapped in the White Rabbit’s house, grows too big inside the house and has to stretch her arm out of the window. The Rabbit and the Lizard combine forces to evict her at all cost, finally reaching the point at which they decide to burn the house down (Carroll 1999[1865]: 117).

4. Revealing Alice in Wonderland

Even though they both agree on some primary aspects, such as a chronological narrative and the presence of some main characters, the two analysed examples of intersemiotic translation differ greatly in terms of the properties translated. Thus, each translation reveals different properties of the semiotic source:

1) The Alice-themed episode of Jim Henson’s The Muppet Show focuses on the use of linguistic games and logic inversions found in the source. It contains several songs, both original and adapted from the book, and there is also a direct adaptation of the Jabberwocky poem into an audiovisual act. It can be claimed that there is a focus on the ludic aspect of Alice in Wonderland in Jim Henson’s work. It is light-toned and meant for a family audience, safe for kids and humorous. The characters are visually inspired by John Tenniel’s illustrations of Carroll’s books, but with a cute tone. Even the dramatic beheading of the Jabberwocky is followed by a humorous floating, talking head.

2) Jan Švankmajer’s Něco z Alenky reveals the subtle dimension of violence found in the books as it morphs the latter into disturbing visual images. There are very few spoken lines in the entire movie, which removes all the wordplay and, consequently, all the linguistic games. The film relies mostly on intense audiovisual imagery, with very little verbal input. The focus lies on the aggressive undertone of Alice in Wonderland and on the fact that the novels reveal themselves as a dream as the movie recreates the atmosphere with dream-like scenarios and events.
Despite the opposing tones, both translations have the same semiotic source, *Alice in Wonderland*. Considering the object, the translations have chosen particular elements and properties to recreate. If the semiotic target translates only select properties of the semiotic source, the interpretation of the semiotic source through the translation alone will give just some clues to what the semiotic source is, like a piece of an incomplete puzzle\textsuperscript{12} (Fig. 8).

![Figure 8. Triad with the source as the puzzle (object) and the target as pieces (sign).](image)

In such a triad, the source would be the puzzle (object) and the target would be incomplete pieces (sign). The interpreter would only be able to interpret some selected properties of this object. However, as each property does not have clearly defined boundaries, the pieces will not be so clearly cut from one another. There would also be a significant overlap between the pieces, since two or more translations can use the same resources from the semiotic source differently. If we consider the group of intersemiotic translations known to us, each brings to the surface specific properties of the novel.

\textsuperscript{12} The puzzle metaphor should not be understood as a fixed group of pieces. Instead, it should be seen as some kind of dynamic and open system, like a historically-dependent toy that has ill-defined shapes, ever-changing and overlapping, as we shall explain further.
The circles in Fig. 9 (above) represent targets from the same source, while the drawing of the book represents *Alice in Wonderland*. Each translation comprises properties and structures of the novel and properties of the translation itself – outside of the novel. Properties of the novel, as pointed out above, will sometimes overlap and sometimes be very different with only a minimal intersection – as is the case of the two examples studied here. Even though the image of the Caterpillar in *Něco z Alenky* can be regarded as a metaphor of the subtle violence that does exist in *Alice in Wonderland*, there is no actual character made of a sock in the semiotic source. However, the unsettling feeling it creates is a reproduction of the similarly unsettling yet hidden violence inherent in the source. This is represented by the part of the circle outside the drawing of the book. The interpretant is the effect of the translations.

In the novels, Carroll’s motifs are deeply rooted in elements deriving from real-life events, persons, and circumstances such as his child friend Alice Liddell with whom he took boat rides, and Carroll’s interest in mathematics. Those real-life elements are the object of the *Alice in Wonderland* sign (Fig. 10).

The sign of the object, then, is the novels, represented in Fig. 10 by the drawing of the book with circles reaching outside it and drawn in dotted lines as *potential translations*. The interpretant becomes the intersemiotic translations, represented by the image of the book and the circles, each circle being a translation expanding the book.
It is possible to create yet another triad (Fig. 11). Considering that Alice in Wonderland is an example of a semiotic source that has a number of diverse intersemiotic translations, each revealing distinct properties of the semiotic source, and the fact that new translations can still emerge, revealing even more diverse properties, we could say that the novels in principle carry a large number of potential translations. In this triad, the object would be the sum of the novels plus the translations – existing and potential ones; the sign would be only the translations, also including both the existing and potential, but not the semiotic source, since the translations are in principle independent; the interpretant would be the effect of a large number of translations on previously existing material, expanding the semiotic source to a point where it no more has its initial boundaries. The novels are now not just the novels, but also the effect of all the translations that have expanded the semiotic source into a new work (Fig. 11).

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13 This matter could also be approached by the notion of immediate interpretant, proposed by Peirce when looking at some instability that is pertaining to the sign process. Peirce distinguishes three kinds of interpretants, immediate, dynamical and final: the immediate interpretant is the ‘range of interpretability’ (effects) that a sign is able to cause; the dynamical interpretant is the actual effect of a sign, or, the manifestation of one of the possible effects of the immediate interpretant; and the final interpretant is a tendency (not determined nor bound to happen) realized when a chain of triads is triggered, temporarily solving the instability. (For a review of these topics, see Savan 1987–1988; Liszka 1990; Short 1996.) A valuable approach to this matter could use the notion of the immediate interpretant to describe the numerous potential and actual translations of a given source.
This graphic model (Fig. 11) represents a clearer diagram of intersemiotic translation, considering each interpreter could have had access to any number of translations of the same semiotic source and that the same interpreter could, but need not, have read the semiotic source. Still, there is a general effect of expansion of the semiotic source. The lack of direct access to the translation source by an agent or a community of agents does not prevent the source from expanding itself. This is a process that does not require individual agents or communities of agents. Its sign produces new interpretants, and that is precisely the reason why it expands itself.

If the iconic sign reveals properties of its object and if intersemiotic translation is an iconic process, intersemiotic translation should consequently also reveal properties of its source. Considering that the novels allegedly carry a large number of potential intersemiotic translations, as well as existing ones, the semiotic source naturally expands with each intersemiotic translation, represented by the dotted circles on the object.

5. Final comments

The idea that translation involves revealing and discovery, and the idea that these operations are fundamentally dependent on iconic properties have been developed by many authors. The fact that an ‘operational criterion’ used to define iconic processes detrivializes the common description of the icon as a sign of
similarity, to define it instead as a sign through which it is possible to discover or reveal new information about its object has been thoroughly reinforced here. The idea is that the icon is the only type of sign “from which information may be derived” (CP 2.309). This article includes a development of these ideas focusing on intersemiotic translations of *Alice in Wonderland*. One of the consequences of such approach is related to the idea of translation as creation and critique, which reminds the viewpoints suggested by Haroldo de Campos.\(^\text{14}\)

The choice of examples that represent seemingly opposing views on the semiotic target highlights the fact that each translation can reveal their specific properties, expanding the semiotic source. Jim Henson’s TV show pictured *Alice in Wonderland* as a fun, family-friendly, non-linear narrative. This show values the well-elaborated linguistic aspects of the source, even if they are so simple as to be intuitively understood and laughed at. The rhythm of the episode constantly gets interrupted by song, just as the rhythm of the novel is changed by the presence of poems, which have a rhythm of their own. The show is made up of sketches, and the novels, although having a linear build-up, consist of almost independent episodes marked by various characters whom Alice encounters, their relationship and interactions with her, which differ from those she has with other characters. Each episode presents its own development. On the other hand, Jan Švankmajer’s film portrays the same semiotic source in a darker light, without any of the linguistic resources, focusing on a linear narrative of a disturbing dream. There are no jokes, no paronomasias, no characters singing, yet it recreates important aspects from the novels, such as the underlying themes of violence, aggression and contempt. The general nightmarish ambience points to the novel’s many references to dreams, but also reminds us that this dream occurs in a violent, unwelcoming setting disguised as a colourful fantasy. It may sound unexceptional today that a story for children has no moral lesson, but Cohen (1989) and Gardner (1999) remind us that in the Victorian Era such a story was revolutionary in the field of literature for children. The film makes a point in that direction too. However, the two intersemiotic translations also have a small intersection of important aspects chosen from the source: mostly, they agree on the existence of Alice and other characters in a nonsensical environment.

Also, a large number of intersemiotic translations, when given a slightly closer look, points to the fact that there is little to no intersection in all of them taken

\(^{14}\) For the poet, translator and scholar Haroldo de Campos (1972), “translation is a privileged way of critical reading”, capable of investigating the “core of artistic text, in its most intimate mechanisms and gears”. Campos used different notions to describe the creative practice of interlinguistic translation, aware of the *materiality*, or the *physicality*, of the semiotic target: transcreation, creative transposition and reimagining.
together. Consequently, it is hard, or maybe even impossible, to define *Alice in Wonderland* in intrinsic, unchangeable, definite terms as the boundaries of the semiotic source become even less tangible. Yet all of these have the same source and, by choosing relevant aspects and highlighting them, each one expands the elements found in the novels, by revealing and putting them under a clearer, more visible light. The variety of interpretations of the ideas found in the novels expands them to a potentially greater content than found before. The very materiality of the semiotic target, as well as the time and place, interferes with the result. The consequence of this perspective is the realization that the semiotic source is not a fixed, immutable structure: intersemiotic translation expands its own semiotic source.

Possible continuation of this research could take many paths. Future researchers could investigate the essential ideas presented here when mapping the correlation between the semiotic source and the semiotic target, narrowing the research to the question of whether or not an intersemiotic translation can be thoroughly described. Another path could lead to investigating if the Peircean triad could be manipulated to describe intersemiotic translation in relation to other processes, and, if so, what would be the consequences of such manipulation. Finally, it is possible to ask if the processes of intersemiotic translation can be separated and organized into specific categories, with essential differences between these.

On a brief note of a meta-theoretical nature, we must say this paper suggests that a very robust inter-theoretical link between the domains of Peircean pragmatic semiotics and translation studies is capable of providing a new theoretical scenario of explanations and problems, such as, (i) the nature of – causal or semiotic – determination between the source and the target in case of multiple intersemiotic translations from the same source; (ii) the development of concurring models to explain intersemiotic translation processes; (iii) the identification of the logic-semiotic processes that operate in cases of intersemiotic translation. The most recent academic discussions on the phenomenon of intersemiotic translation are not interested in the matter of clearly Peircean modelling. A main contribution of this study may be to draw attention into the modelling of a clearly Peircean perspective that has not been addressed in the discussions on the phenomenon of intersemiotic translation.

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Revealing Alice in Wonderland through intersemiotic translation

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Revealing Alice no País das Maravilhas através
da tradução intersemiótica

A ideia de que a tradução revela e descobre informações do signo-fonte tem sido discutida em algumas áreas, especialmente tradução criativa e tradução intersemiótica. Essas operações são fundamentalmente dependentes de propriedades icônicas. Um critério operacional destrivializa a definição corrente do ícone como signo de similaridade, para definir mais precisamente os processos icônicos como signos através dos quais é possível descobrir ou revelar novas informações sobre seu objeto. Essa ideia torna-se particularmente interessante quando pensamos em múltiplas traduções de uma mesma fonte, cada uma delas revelando traços tão distintos que alguns podem considerar como opostos entre si. Como exemplos, discutidos em nossos estudos, selecionamos As Aventuras de Alice no País das Maravilhas e Através do Espelho e o que Alice Encontrou Lá, ambos de Lewis Carroll, amplamente traduzidos. Não há, até agora, uma análise sistemática, no campo dos estudos de tradução intersemiótica, da relação entre uma fonte e múltiplos alvos. Comparamos duas traduções intersemióticas dos romances de Alice — um episódio de TV, de 1980, de The Muppet Show, de Jim Henson, e o longa-metragem, de 1988, Něco z Alenky, de Jan Švankmajer. Ambos exibem propriedades distintas e revelam informações muito diferentes sobre as obras de Carroll.

“Alice imedemaal” ilmsikstoomine intersemiootilises tõlkes