Vis-à-vis: Signification does not necessitate backward causation

Abstract

The following paper examines the metaphysics of signification in John Deely’s work and presents two arguments: (1) that Deely’s metaphysics sanction backwards causation in signification, and (2) that there may be a more parsimonious view that can be defended. The paper briefly examines the background of Peirce’s metaphysics and then addresses his specific notion of semiotic causality, including the relevance of the vis a prospecto in his work. I will argue, however, that in accounting for signification, appealing to past states changed by future states can only be done in a weak, epistemological manner, as opposed to what I see as a modal view in Deely. As Deely’s metaphysics has profoundly influenced the philosophical discourse of current semiotics, it is important to assess the ontological commitments made in order for signification to take place. His account of semiotic causality as a teleological phenomenon may offer a powerful explanatory framework for how signification takes place (and with it, how signs come to be), but its consequences may result in counterintuitive ways of thinking about meaning-making. I offer a positive deflationary account of how to preserve a weaker sense of semiotic causality to avoid the risks posed by the vis a prospecto in Deely’s proposal.