Resemblance: From a complementarity point of view?


  • Floyd Merrell



Three premises set the stage for a Peirce based notion of resemblance, which, as Firstness, cannot be more than vaguely distinguished from Secondness and Thirdness. Inclusion of Firstness with, and within, Secondness and Thirdness, calls for a nonbivalent, nonlinear, context dependent mode of thinking characteristic of semiosis — that is, the process by which everything is always becoming something other than what it was becoming — and at the same time it includes linear, bivalent classical logic as a subset. Certain aspects of the Dao, Buddhist philosophy, and Donald Davidson’s ‘radical interpretation’ afford additional, and perhaps unexpected, support for the initial set of three premises.


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How to Cite

Merrell, F. (2010). Resemblance: From a complementarity point of view?. Sign Systems Studies, 38(1/4), 91–129.