

# GERMANY AND EUROPE AFTER THE UKRAINE WAR IN 2025: THREE SCENARIOS

*Hans-Georg Ehrhart*



**Abstract.** As the dynamics of war tend towards escalation, it has to be politically hedged with the goal of war termination and prevention. This is especially valid if, as in the case of the Ukraine war, nuclear powers are directly and indirectly involved. Therefore, it makes sense to think about possible war termination and the period after it has ended, allowing us to analyse trends, challenges, and options. This will be done via three scenario analyses analysed in relation to the following aspects: What happens in and with Russia, in and with Ukraine, and what does this mean for NATO, Europe and Germany?

The conclusion outlines the various security policy options available to Germany, depending on the outcome of the war in Ukraine. First, the outcome of the war will have decisive effects on German and European security. Second, a Ukrainian victory comes with a very high risk of nuclear escalation. Third, Russia will remain an important Eastern European neighbour for Germany and EU-Europe in terms of geography and potential. Fourth, the USA will remain an indispensable player in European security for the foreseeable future. Fifth, that China plays a significant role in this conflict. Finally, regardless of the scenario, Berlin will have to spend more on its own and European defence.

**Keywords:** War, Ukraine, Germany, Europe, Russia

## 1. Introduction<sup>1</sup>

As we should have known before Clausewitz, war is a chameleon; it constantly changes its forms of appearance (von Clausewitz 2022). When, how and why often stay hidden in the fog of war, while chance can play a major role in quickly making prior plans and strategies irrelevant. Therefore, one should heed Alexander Kluge's conclusion that the demon of war eludes the

---

<sup>1</sup> This essay is a slightly modified version of my German contribution with the title "Deutschland und Europa nach dem Ukrainekrieg in 2025: Drei Szenarios" in the Journal of Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (ZFAS), Vol. 4/2023. Translated from German into English by Elli-Maria Luud with the permission of the author. At the request of the author an in-text referencing style is used.

control of those who instigate it, as well as the wishes of those who fight it (Kluge 2023). This is why it would be best not even to start war in the first place. Avoiding war also aligns with the norms of international law in which article 2, paragraph 4 prohibits the use and the threat of the use of force between states. The Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine on the 24<sup>th</sup> of February 2022 shows once again how this mistake is made time and again. While the nature of warfare is constantly changing, the consequences of war remain horrific (Ehrhart 2017).

In response to this recent attack, Ukraine has no choice but to defend itself. Since war, due to its internal dynamics, has a tendency to escalate into extremes, war must be politically contained with the aim of ending it as soon as possible and preventing it in the future. This is particularly relevant when, as in the case of Russia and Ukraine, nuclear powers are directly and indirectly involved. Therefore, it makes sense to hypothesise the possible outcomes of the war, which allows us to determine the possible course of events, challenges, risks, and options for action. This will be accomplished below by means of three scenario analyses.

Scenario analyses are not forecasts as they merely sketch the possibilities for future developments by considering the influences of changing situational variables. I employ the criteria of plausibility, differentiability, and a variety of possibilities for my scenario analyses. My starting assumption is that the US presidential election in November 2024 will have a decisive influence on the course of the war until 2025. I assume three possible election outcomes and derive three scenarios from this:

1. The Republicans win the elections and drastically reduce the US' Ukrainian commitments, where Russia then wins the war.
2. The Democrats win, and President Joe Biden continues his policy of providing substantial support to Ukraine. Ukraine then wins the war.
3. Both parties, in the election campaign, promise to work towards a ceasefire with the aim of ending the war and continue to implement this promise after the election. The conflict then remains in an unstable stalemate.

I analyse these three scenarios under the following aspects: What happens in and with Russia, in and with Ukraine, and what does this mean for NATO as well as Europe and Germany? As a result, this paper is to sketch out possible developments in the European security landscape and draw political conclusions for Germany and Europe.

## 2. Scenarios

### *Scenario 1: Russia wins*

In order to drastically reduce their involvement in Ukraine, the USA and Russia agree to recognise the annexed territories. In doing so, Ukraine remains a sovereign state and receives a non-aligned status, with its security guaranteed by Moscow and Washington. The Western sanctions imposed on Russia will be reduced. Additionally, bilateral negotiations between Russia and the USA on the New START agreement will begin. Moreover, multi-lateral negotiations on conventional security in Europe within the framework of the OSCE will commence. Russia, in terms of domestic and foreign policy, emerges stronger from the conflict. Georgia, Moldova, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Serbia are closely aligned with Moscow, whilst Belarus joins Russia. Within the Russian political sphere, Putin's role is unchallenged while the Russian economy begins to recover. Moscow will concentrate on integrating and rebuilding the annexed territories of Crimea, Luhansk, Donetsk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhya and on consolidating its extended sphere of influence.

Ukraine suffers greatly from the high number of military and civilian casualties, as well as massive destruction of infrastructure and loss of territory. Following President Zelensky's resignation, nationalist, pro-Russian, and liberal political blocs compete for power in an unstable Ukrainian political environment. The economic situation in Ukraine is catastrophic. Millions of Ukrainians will have fled to other European countries, and numerous internally displaced persons will need support, as well as tens of thousands of those physically and mentally disabled from the war. There is a lack of direct Western investment because there is no prospect of NATO and EU membership. Ukraine is dependent on international support in the long term. Nevertheless, this support is drastically declining as the US is no longer prepared to provide 70 percent of total Western aid to Ukraine (as it did in the first year of the war). Additionally, the EU member states are not prepared to provide similar levels of aid either (Institut für Weltwirtschaft 2023). As a consequence, Kyiv falls back into Russia's sphere of influence.

NATO ends its open-door policy, and now borders the Russian sphere of influence from Northern Europe to the Black Sea. The alliance is politically weakened but continues to serve as an instrument of American influence in Europe. The European members of the alliance will have to take on a far greater share of the transatlantic burden-sharing as the US turns its focus towards China and the Pacific. This is associated with a significant reduction of the US military presence in Europe. Germany and France, in particular, are

forced to step up their commitment to European security and defense due to external pressure. While Berlin is taking on increased conventional burdens and giving up its resistance to a European financial union in the face of latent fears of German hegemony, Paris is Europeanising its national nuclear deterrents. The more the USA concentrates on its strategic rival China, and the more Russia consolidates itself and expands the “Russian World” (MFA Russia 2023), the closer Poland moves to integrating into the emerging EU security and defense union.

### ***Scenario 2: Ukraine wins***

Russia’s use of tactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine leads to US military intervention and to the escalation of nuclear-strategic tensions between Moscow and Washington. The world is on the brink of a nuclear war between the two largest nuclear powers and, therefore, at risk of annihilation. Simultaneously, Moscow is under increasing military pressure. Accurate and long-range artillery (HIMARS, MLRS), US AEGIS missiles and the superior military of Ukraine, which the West massively supports with modern weapons, lead to Moscow withdrawing from all annexed territories. Moscow offers peace negotiations due to heavy losses in Crimea and internal power struggles. Russia is characterised by a period of internal unrest and political instability. More than two hundred thousand soldiers are killed, and many more are injured. Numerous frustrated and demobilised soldiers represent a major political and social challenge. The safety of thousands of nuclear weapons is no longer guaranteed. Russia’s internal weakness is a major new security policy challenge for the West. In Moscow, a nationalist hardliner replaces the previous President Putin. Supported by China, he pursues the primary goal of consolidating his own power internally, stopping the impending collapse of the country and slowing down rapid economic decline. Moscow and Beijing enter into a security alliance, while Kazakhstan and the other Central Asian states lean closely towards China.

Ukraine pays a very high price in terms of human lives and material damage for the liberation of the occupied territories. Parts of the national territory are radioactively contaminated. The country is liberated, but completely exhausted. With Western help, it has won a Pyrrhic victory. Massive international support is needed to rebuild Ukraine. Demands for reparations from Russia are correspondingly high, although the West is in a position to mitigate them due to the historical experience of the two world wars. Kyiv is aiming to accelerate its membership acquisition into NATO and the EU but is having problems with the lengthy reconstruction process, military demobilisation,

and the fight against corruption and judicial reform. Incorporation of the liberated areas and integration of the ethnic Russian population are causing difficulties as irredentist resistance groups continue to operate on Ukrainian territory. Furthermore, Ukrainian nationalism, strengthened by the war, is not only directed against Russia but also against the ethnic Russian population in Ukraine. Despite massive support from international financial institutions and Western partner states, stabilising the country remains a major challenge.

Nevertheless, NATO decides on a “fast track” and declares its willingness to accept Ukraine as a new member by 2027. It expands its military structures to Crimea. Georgia and the united Moldova become members of the alliance at the same time as Ukraine. President Lukashenka’s regime in Belarus falls.

The EU accession date is set for 2030, as long as the simplified requirements are met by then. However, the implementation of this endeavor jeopardises the internal processes of the EU both in terms of distribution policy and ideology as another illiberal and corruption-prone country is set to join. All EU states have made a binding commitment to spend at least two and a half percent of their gross domestic product on defense. They also commit to sustainably supporting the economic development of future members. Berlin is closely aligning itself with Washington and assuming the role of “partners in leadership” in Europe already offered by George Bush Sr. in 1989 (Bush 1989).

This role undermines the project of European strategic autonomy. Also, it leads to tensions with France, which fears German supremacy. Moreover, tensions rise with Poland who wants to, alongside Ukraine, become the strongest conventional military power and to form a counterweight to Germany.

### ***Scenario 3: Nobody wins***

The war in Ukraine continues with fierce intensity, without any of the warring parties clearly gaining the upper hand. Despite immense Russian efforts, the front-line changes only partially and temporarily. Even full mobilisation, a complete war economy, and increased arms deliveries from abroad (esp. from North Korea and Iran) will not enable Moscow to achieve a decisive breakthrough. On the home front, the few remaining political opponents opposed to the war are eliminated and Russian society conforms to the state’s will. In view of the tangible costs of the war and the high casualties on the battlefield, Putin’s critics, who conform to the system, cannot prevail with their far-reaching imperial demands for escalation. Stronger nationalist-conservative forces support Putin’s calculation that time will ultimately work in Russia’s favour because Western resistance will wane, the Russian economy will

recover, and military strength will increase. In addition, the claimed “permanent threat from the West” has a stabilising effect on domestic politics. In this light and the corresponding American signals, Putin agrees to negotiate a ceasefire with Ukraine and the West.

The Ukrainian offensives in 2023 and 2024 will have only led to marginal and temporary territorial gains. Resistance from Russian defensive tactics causes high losses of soldiers and equipment. The original objective of liberating all Ukrainian territories militarily is proving impossible to realise for several reasons. First, the Russian positions are too well fortified and Moscow’s military potential is too great. The second reason is that Ukraine’s human and material resources are too weak. Finally, the West recognises that sustained military, economic, financial, and humanitarian support for Ukraine at war levels is difficult to maintain. China and the Middle East take center stage due to domestic political resistance, production and supply problems and other challenges. In this light and in view of Western promises of reconstruction and security policy support, President Zelensky agrees to ceasefire negotiations.

After tough negotiations, Moscow and Kyiv subsequently conclude a six-month ceasefire in the summer of 2025, which is automatically extended by six months until a final peaceful settlement is reached. The US and the European Quad, consisting of Germany, France, the UK and Poland on the one side and China and Belarus on the other, are also involved in the ceasefire negotiations. The key points of the ceasefire are: first, an end to all fighting; second, a freeze on the conflict at the line of contact; third, the establishment of a demilitarised zone along the line of contact; fourth, a de-escalation centre consisting of Russian, Ukrainian and UN military personnel; fifth, the deployment of UN blue helmets, particularly from the mediating states in order to monitor the ceasefire in accordance with Chapter VI of the UN Charter; and sixth, the exchange of all prisoners.

The line of contact is becoming a highly militarised new *de facto* border between Ukraine and Russia. Moscow will neither succeed in bringing all four annexed territories beyond Crimea completely under its control nor will Kyiv manage to push Russia back to the borders of 23 February 2022. Neither of the protagonists will give up their territorial claims, but both will refrain from using military force for the time being. Their respective positions remain unchanged. The USA is promising Ukraine security cooperation of a similar quality to that with Israel but is not providing the security guarantee desired by Kyiv, not least for domestic political reasons. Due to the precarious overall situation, membership of NATO is just as impossible as membership

of the EU. This is why Poland, the UK, Germany and France are concluding bilateral security agreements with Kyiv, although without automatic assistance clauses. In view of the new Cold War, the European members of NATO have committed to keeping their defense contributions to three percent of GDP on a permanent basis. At the US' insistence, they are also covering the majority of the reconstruction costs.

### 3. Possible effects on Germany, the EU and NATO

The first scenario is unlikely but entails a high risk. The consequences for the international order would be enormous because not only would the Russian aggression have paid off, but the breach of international law would also be officially sanctioned. Whether the imperial urge of a strengthened Russia would really stop at the border of NATO is uncertain. In addition, NATO would lose importance in this scenario. Also, as its leading power, the USA would focus on China which would see itself strengthened by a Russian victory. From now on, the Europeans would have to focus intensively on their security against a more powerful Russia and at the same time seek a *modus vivendi* with it. In this case, Germany would have to assume very high military and security costs as well as a leading role in shaping European security. Defense spending could rise to 25% of the federal budget, i.e. to a level of around 4% of GDP, which was last achieved during the Cold War in the 1960s.

The domestic and socio-political impact of such a change would be immense because major cuts in the social budget would accompany it. Simultaneously, climate and energy policy challenges would require high levels of investment, meaning that tough battles over distribution would characterise domestic policy. As a dominant German leadership role in Europe is not acceptable to the other states, a close alliance with France and the other European partners would have to be established by completing the security and defense union as well as a financial union. On this basis, EU-Europe could establish itself as one pole of an emerging new international order. If this step proves unsuccessful, the EU could break apart and Germany could become isolated.

The second scenario is less unlikely but is also associated with a high risk due to the assumed use of tactical nuclear weapons. It is questionable whether a nuclear escalation would really be politically controllable. If not, this could mean the end of the world. Nonetheless, the damage caused by tactical nuclear weapons could have catastrophic consequences for Europe (Ehrhart et al. 2015). Without a doubt, the reconstruction of Ukraine and the

integration of the new Eastern European member states would place a huge economic and political burden on Germany, its European partners, and the EU. Europe would have to bear at least half, if not 70 per cent of the financial, humanitarian and military support costs for Ukraine, instead of 30 per cent as in the first year of the war (Institut für Weltwirtschaft 2023).

Berlin's value-orientated foreign policy would have to deal with a larger number of illiberal partners and a conservative Poland which, in addition to its anti-Russian orientation, is also committed to gaining strength to counter Germany. Simultaneously, the German defense budget would increase due to the unstable situation in Russia and the stronger prioritisation of China by the USA. If it were to permanently remain at the high level of 17 percent of the federal budget, i.e. around 85 billion euros, this would roughly correspond to Russian military spending in the war year 2022 (SIPRI 2023). As Washington's closest ally, Germany would assume the European leadership role as a US-aligned, continental-based defense force. The project of a strategically autonomous Europe could not be continued due to fears of hegemony in Paris and Warsaw. In its dealings with Russia, Berlin would attempt to pursue a policy of cooperation. This would be aimed at preventing war and fostering stabilisation in close cooperation with the USA. Also, it would be based on assured defense capabilities and deterrence within the framework of NATO. It would endeavour to reduce political tensions with Moscow and Russia's heavy dependence on China, but would encounter resistance from Eastern Europe.

The third scenario is more likely and is associated with a comparatively lower risk. The situation would remain tense and there could be a threat of the emergence of two poles with the West on the one hand and Russia and China on the other. However, it would be less likely to escalate and more likely to be managed in terms of a war prevention policy. In the event of a military stalemate, NATO would remain the central security organisation, with the USA as the indispensable leading power. German defense spending would amount to 20% of the federal budget in the long term, while the costs of rebuilding Ukraine would remain high. The EU states would strengthen their security and defense policy cooperation with the aim of forming a European Caucus within NATO in order to relieve the burden on the US which would be expanding its involvement in Asia. In view of the internal and external pressures to act, EU institutions would be under considerable pressure to reform. In order to manage the strong political tensions between the system opponents and the risk of a renewed military confrontation on the line of contact, Berlin could advocate a dual strategy within NATO that relies on military strength and cooperative diplomacy, including arms control.



## 4. Conclusions

The scenarios presented are only approximate projections with many possible variations. For instance, I have disregarded the extreme scenarios of a prolonged war without end or an all-out nuclear war. The three chosen scenarios seem more plausible to me. They differ from each other distinctly, identify different challenges and options for Germany and Europe, and highlight the corresponding risks. Taking each of these scenarios into account, we can reach the following conclusions.

First, Germany has various security policy options depending on the outcome of the war in Ukraine: the completion of a fully integrated EU defense, economic and financial union; the assumption of a quasi-hegemonic leadership role as the primary American mainland sword in Europe; the formation of a European Caucus in NATO and close security policy cooperation between NATO and the EU. It would not actually take the Ukraine war to implement these options in one form or another. However, so far, the political will and the corresponding framework conditions have been lacking. The war in Ukraine could produce both.

Second, the outcome of the war in Ukraine will have a decisive impact on German and European security. In this respect, the term “turning point” used by the German Chancellor Olaf Scholz is appropriate (Scholz 2022). The possibility of a Russian victory is not even considered in the mainstream of Western analyses. While such an outcome is unlikely from our current perspectives, it cannot be ruled out. It would entail high security risks for Germany and Europe and would have far-reaching consequences for Ukraine and the stability of the continent. It should, therefore, be prevented. However, it could also, out of necessity so to speak, lead to a boost in EU integration in the areas of defense and finance. However, Germany would then have to invest massively in its own defense and European integration. The state could run the risk of losing its own internal stability if a significant proportion of the population were to disagree with such an action.

A Ukrainian victory in line with the official Ukrainian war aims may be desirable, but it is associated with a very high risk of nuclear escalation, which could lead to the destruction of Ukraine, or Europe, or even the world. Putin’s psychological disposition and his worldview speak in favor of his willingness to, under certain conditions, escalate to nuclear power (McDermott R., Pauly, R., Slovic, P. 2023). Even if the probability of a nuclear escalation is estimated to be low, the expected damage remains so high that it should be avoided at all costs and not ignored in favor of maximalist objectives. Furthermore, a

Ukrainian victory could create normative, integration, and economic challenges for Germany and Europe. If Berlin were to take on the role of the main American continental defense ally, it would not only have a permanently high defense burden but would also jeopardise the process of European integration. As the strongest economic and military power on the continent, it would assume a hegemonic position closely linked to the USA, which could trigger counter-reactions from France and Poland.

A stalemate would probably result in a new “Cold War” which at best could be transformed into a “Cold Peace” in the form of non-violent competition between antagonistic systems. At worst, it would mean permanent tensions and the threat of war in the sense of a permanent struggle for the right order (Son/Herberg-Rothe/Förstle 2017). In any case, a policy of war prevention through deterrence and diplomatic conflict management, including confidence-building measures and arms control, would be necessary. The stalemate would probably only be resolved when the system-level antagonism disappeared.

Third, the scenario analysis confirms three common truths. One is that Russia remains a very relevant Eastern European neighbor for Germany and the EU in terms of geography and potential. After the attack on Ukraine, it is mainly up to Russia whether it is seen as an opponent, a rival, or a partner in the future. Nevertheless, Europe must put itself in a position to persuade Russia to adopt a policy of war prevention and stabilisation through negative (deterrence, sanctions) and positive incentives (offers of cooperation, removal of sanctions). This is the only way to avoid the risk of direct conflict and permanently high defense costs. Relying on the total defeat of Moscow and *regime change* as a prerequisite for ending Russian imperialism would be careless (Cohen 2023).

The other common truth is that the USA will remain an indispensable player in European security for the foreseeable future. Germany and Europe thus have an interest in appropriate US involvement in and for Europe. However, the question is whether and to what extent the USA will become involved in Europe in the future. If Washington were to drastically reduce its involvement, as assumed in the first scenario, Russia could win the war and Europe would face social burdens difficult to bear. If US dominance in Europe were to increase, as would be expected in the event of a Ukrainian victory, the Europeans would possibly be left with nothing more than a vassal role, which could be particularly costly for Germany in its role as the US' main continental military partner. In the event of a stalemate, the USA would be essential for maintaining a credible deterrent. Depending on the situation,

Berlin must therefore seek an appropriate path between transatlantic ties and European engagement.

The third common truth is that China plays a significant role in this conflict. In the event of a Russian victory, revisionist autocracies would be strengthened and China would be encouraged to use force to achieve its goals concerning Taiwan. A Russian defeat would compromise Chinese ambitions regarding Taiwan and allow the US to focus on Beijing. That is why China has no interest in a defeated Russia and would do everything in its power to support an autocratic government in Moscow. A stalemate in the Ukraine war would tie the US more closely to Europe and enable Beijing to play the role of mediator, whose influence in Europe and Russia would increase. However, it is questionable whether the US is prepared to deal with China in such a manner (Lieven/Werner 2023).

Fourth, regardless of the scenario, Berlin will probably have to spend more on its own and EU defense. The more US involvement in Europe decreases, the greater the German and European defense burden will be. Moreover, Germany's share of support costs for Ukraine is likely to increase. At the same time, Berlin must advance the European integration project and ensure the economic and political stabilisation of Eastern Europe. This is expected to lead to increased national budget conflicts in Germany. In order to minimise such conflicts, possibilities for peaceful coexistence with a Russia that remains imperialist must be explored.

Whether it wants to or not, Germany must assume a political leadership role in shaping European security. To achieve this it should organise its foreign, security, industrial, energy and climate policies more strategically at national and European levels. The US government's "New Washington Consensus" could serve as a model (Sullivan 2023). However, political leadership in Europe must always be joint leadership. Germany must never isolate itself (or allow itself to be isolated).

What the European peace order will look like in 2025 could not and should not be worked out here. From today's perspective, there would already be progress if the main protagonists in the Ukraine war were to conclude a ceasefire. This is the only way to rule out the risk of a nuclear escalation. No matter how the Ukrainian counter-offensive turns out, there will be no way around the need for a ceasefire afterwards (Lieven 2023, New York Times 2023). If the Ukrainian army were to break through to the Isthmus of Perekop, the territories gained would have to be secured and attempts to recapture Crimea would have to be prevented due to the associated risk of nuclear escalation. If the offensive were to stall, a protracted war of position would have to be

prevented. If Moscow were to succeed in going on the offensive, a ceasefire would be necessary to avoid even greater territorial losses and direct intervention by the West.

Since a victorious peace is unlikely for any of the protagonists and costs continue to rise not only for the direct opponents of the war but also for their supporters and the not inconsiderable number of states that are staying out, Berlin should strive for a settlement along the lines of the third scenario. This combines a territorial compromise acceptable to both opponents with the maintenance of Ukraine's legal position and postpones a final settlement to the future.

Germany should be aware that the *bon mot* attributed to the first Secretary General of NATO, Lord Hastings Ismay, still applies in a modified form: NATO is there to keep the Russians out, the Americans in and the Germans involved (instead of "down", as in the original quotation) (NATO 2023). It continues to be in Germany's interests to work towards restoring the Harmel formula of 1967 according to which sufficient defense capability and détente can enable security between system opponents. After all, Russia will not disappear from the scene and will one day be interested in co-operation again. In the end, Berlin should be careful not to grow into a hegemonic role. This means investing in European integration more than ever.

## Bibliography

- Bush, George H. W.** 1989. Partner in Leadership Speech. [https://www.ruhr-uni-bochum.de/gna/Quellensammlung/12/12\\_partnersleadership\\_1989.htm](https://www.ruhr-uni-bochum.de/gna/Quellensammlung/12/12_partnersleadership_1989.htm) (24.05.2023).
- Clausewitz, C. von** 2022. Vom Kriege. Vollständige Ausgabe. 14. Auflage. Hamburg: Nikol Verlag.
- Cohen, E. A.** 2023. Es reicht nicht aus, dass die Ukraine gewinnt – Russland muss verlieren. – Neue Züricher Zeitung, 31. Mai. [https://www.nzz.ch/meinung/es-reicht-nicht-aus-dass-die-ukraine-gewinnt-russland-muss-verlieren-ld.1739507?ga=1&kid=nl164\\_2023-5-30&mktcid=nled&mktcval=164\\_2023-05-31](https://www.nzz.ch/meinung/es-reicht-nicht-aus-dass-die-ukraine-gewinnt-russland-muss-verlieren-ld.1739507?ga=1&kid=nl164_2023-5-30&mktcid=nled&mktcval=164_2023-05-31) (31.05.2023).
- Dekoder** 2023. Die imperiale Formel ist: Russland hat keine Grenzen. – Russland-Analysen. Ausgabe 434. <https://laender-analysen.de/russland-analysen/434/die-imperiale-formel-ist-russland-hat-keine-grenzen/> (24.05.2023).
- Ehrhart, H.-G.** (Hrsg.) 2017. Krieg im 21. Jahrhundert. Konzepte, Akteure, Herausforderungen. Baden-Baden: Nomos.
- Ehrhart, H.-G.; Reinke de Buitrago, S.; Schmid, J.** 2017. Kurz- und mittelfristige militärische Bedrohungen. – Ehrhart, H.-G.; Neuneck, G. (Hrsg.). Analyse sicherheitspolitischer Bedrohungen und Risiken unter Aspekten der Zivilen Verteidigung und des Zivilschutzes. Baden-Baden: Nomos, pp. 80–112.

- Institut für Weltwirtschaft** 2023. Ukraine Support Tracker. <https://www.ifw-kiel.de/topics/war-against-ukraine/ukraine-support-tracker/?cookieLevel=not-set> (24.05.2023).
- Kluge, A.** 2023. *Kriegsfibel 2023*. Berlin: Suhrkamp Verlag.
- Lieven, A.** 2023. Paths to a ceasefire in Ukraine: America must take the lead. – Quincy brief, No. 40, May. <https://quincyinst.org/report/paths-to-a-ceasefire-in-ukraine-america-must-take-the-lead/> (20.11.2023).
- Lieven, A.; Werner J.** 2023. Yes, the US can work with China for peace in Ukraine. – Responsible Statecraft. [https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2023/05/12/how-the-us-can-work-with-china-for-peace-in-ukraine/?\\_ga=2.154057403.201624820.1685528290-396609611.1685528290](https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2023/05/12/how-the-us-can-work-with-china-for-peace-in-ukraine/?_ga=2.154057403.201624820.1685528290-396609611.1685528290) (31.05.2023).
- McDermott R.; Pauly, R.; Slovic, P.** 2023. Putin and the Psychology of Nuclear Brinkmanship. The War in Ukraine Hinges on One Man's Thoughts and Feelings. – Foreign Affairs, 30 May. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/putin-and-psychology-nuclear-brinkmanship> (01.06.2023).
- MFA Russia.** The Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation. [https://mid.ru/en/foreign\\_policy/fundamental\\_documents/1860586/](https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/fundamental_documents/1860586/) (24. May 2023).
- NATO** 2023. Lord Ismay. [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/declassified\\_137930.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/declassified_137930.htm) (24.05.2023).
- New York Times** 2023. Ukraine's Top Commander Says War Has Hit a 'Stalemate'. – The New York Times, 2 November. <https://www.nytimes.com/2023/11/02/world/europe/ukraine-zaluzhny-war.html> (20.11.2023).
- SIPRI** 2023. World military expenditure reaches new record high as European spending surges. – Sipri.org, 24 April. <https://www.sipri.org/news/2023/world-military-expenditure-reaches-new-record-high-european-spending-surges-0> (24.05.2023).
- Scholz, O.** 2022. Wir erleben eine Zeitenwende. Rede im Deutschen Bundestag. – Bundestag.de. <https://www.bundestag.de/dokumente/textarchiv/2022/kw08-sondersitzung-882198> (24.05.2023).
- Son, K.; Herberg-Rothe, A.; Förstle, M.** 2017. Order wars – wie der Aufstieg der "Anderen" die Weltpolitik verändert. – Ehrhart, H.-G. (Hrsg.). *Krieg im 21. Jahrhundert. Konzepte, Akteure, Herausforderungen*. Baden-Baden: Nomos, pp. 114–137.
- Sullivan, J.** 2023. Remarks by National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan on Renewing American Economic Leadership at the Brookings Institution. – The White House. <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2023/04/27/remarks-by-national-security-advisor-jake-sullivan-on-renewing-american-economic-leadership-at-the-brookings-institution/> (24.05.2023).

**HANS-GEORG EHRHART**, PhD, is a senior research fellow of the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy (IFSH) at the University of Hamburg, Germany.