EESTI ENERGIAJULGEOLEKU TAGAMINE KUI MEREVÄE ÜKS PÕHIÜLESANDEID

ENSURING ENERGY SECURITY – PROPOSED PRIMARY GOAL OF THE ESTONIAN NAVY

Abstract

This article focuses on the concept that energy security should be one of the main objectives of the Estonian Navy. The article is divided into three parts. The first part argues that the main maritime resource of Estonia are cables that keep us connected to other energy grids besides the one of Russia. These connections increase Estonian energy security. The second part provides an overview of the current energy situation in Estonia and the third part will provide insight on the close bond of energy security and the navy. Sustainable defence requires significant resources and energy is one of the most important resource. Currently, the main energy supplier in the North-Eastern region of the Baltic Sea is Russia. The international relations between the Baltics and Russia are contested, and in addition to that, the relations between NATO and the Russian Federation are somewhat substandard. This has created a situation where the countries on the Baltic Sea that are adjacent to Russia have to try to disconnect from Russian energy grids and move towards the Western ones to create a stable balance of power between actors. It is reasonable to assume that during an armed conflict between Russia and Estonia, one of the main targets would be the Narva Power Plants due to their proximity to the Russian-Estonian border and operational importance. If the power plant is compromised, a large part of Estonia would be left without power, which would hinder military defence. However, it would be possible to use underwater resources, more specifically, Estlink and Balticconnector cables to mitigate this. For this reason, the priority of the Estonian Navy should be to defend these cables and ensure energy security during a conflict. My argument is that the Estonian Navy and Estonian energy security are strongly tied, and a similar argument could be made about the Russian Navy and energy security at the Baltic Sea. I argue that the most important maritime resource for Estonia is situated between Tallinn and Helsinki: the cables and gas pipelines. For this reason, I propose that this area should be a priority and, during wartime, working control should be established in that specific area. Sea denial should be established in adjacent areas to support the main goal of energy security. This would, in turn, ensure the sustainability of defence, both at sea and on land.