Sõjateadlane. The Estonian Journal of Military Studies

INTRODUCTION – DIFFERENT ASPECTS AND CHALLENGES OF THE WAR

Vladimir Sazonov — 2024-06-06

The current volume entitled “Putin’s War in Ukraine. Volume II. Different Aspects and Challenges of the War” is the continuation of the first volume “Putin’s War in Ukraine. Volume I. The Background and Anatomy of Russian Aggression” which was published in late 2022. Since the first volume was published, another year of open Russian military aggression against Ukraine has passed, started by Putin’s aggressive and revanchist regime on 24 February 2022 when the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation launched a massive military invasion of Ukraine.

RUSSIAN-UKRAINIAN WAR: 500 DAYS OF CHALLENGES AND CHANGES

Yevhen Mahda — 2024-06-06

500 days of the full scale Russian Ukrainian War allow us not only to ana lyse the course of hostilities but also to determine the tendencies in the development of the situation in the world. In the current article the author will grasp the main dimensions of the biggest challenge to global stability in the 21st century, including the international dimension of the war and the influence of it on other countries, especially bordering ones; the information tools used during the war and what their impact has been on ongoing military activities; and internal political changes which happened after the beginning of war. The author also discusses the future of the international relations system as it became obvious that it has to be reformed after the end of the hostilities.

REACTION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION TO THE RUSSIAN AGGRESSION IN UKRAINE IN 2022

Tomasz Marcinkowski — 2024-06-06

Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine in February 2022 demolished the previous order in Europe. From the beginning of the war, the European Union condemned the Kremlin’s actions and expressed support for defending Ukraine. Various measures like humanitarian, economic and political aid were also taken from the beginning. Restrictions (sanctions) have also been imposed on Russia and Belarus that supports it. However, the EU policy also brings costs to the people of the member states. Despite these costs, support for the EU’s pro Ukrainian policy is high. However, it varies from country to country. Ukraine’s further struggle depends, among other things, on help from the West (including the EU) and in democratic countries this also depends on public support. This article presents the actions of the EU towards Russia in connection with the aggression against Ukraine and the scale of public support for this policy.

PEACE POLICIES IN THE SHADOW OF THE WAR IN UKRAINE AND THE LIMITED POSSIBILITIES OF NON-VIOLENT POLICIES

Egbert Jahn — 2024-06-06

The ceasefire in eastern Ukraine agreed in 2015 in Minsk did not put an end to the war in Europe. On 24 February 2022, Russia launched a full scale mili tary offensive aimed at “demilitarising” and “denazifying” Ukraine, i.e. establishing a regime closely aligned with Russia and ceding Ukrainian territories to the aggres sor. Ever since, a military direction in internal politics has dominated in both the aggressor state and victim state, as well as the supportive policies of NATO, the EU, and other democratic partners of Ukraine. The vehement resistance of the Ukrainian army and population prevented the rapid capture of Kyiv and other large parts of the country. Since the sixth week of war, Russia has focused on conquering eastern and southern Ukraine. A very long war is now to be expected, in which neither side is likely to achieve its most lofty military aims. The peace policy (Friedenspolitik) has two aims. First and foremost, a ceasefire must be reached, and only then can a new international security apparatus and order of peace be conceivable. We can only expect to see any kind of fatigue in either party after hundreds of thousands of people fall victim to the war, and only then could we expect a ceasefire along the southeastern frontline in Ukraine – which line exactly is, today, impossible to determine. Such a ceasefire will likely be achieved by strong national conservative politicians, while only a small contribution can be made by the peace movement. Thus, once again, a “frozen conflict” is expected along a changed line of military demarcation. It is unlikely that a democratic, peace demanding popular movement would change the regime in Russia. The removal of Putin from the presidency by the Russian power elite is conceivable but would not fundamentally change the Putinist autocratic system, i.e. Russia will certainly not give up its posi tions in Crimea, nor is it likely in the Donbas either. The assumption that all post communist countries will gradually become demo cratic after being integrated into the capitalist world economy and its institutions has proven to be wrong. Some countries have spawned new autocratic regimes and consider themselves threatened by Western democracies, which is why they ally with other autocracies. This will lead us to a new global conflict between political sys tems, which will be somewhat different from the historical East West conflict. In it, new military demarcation lines are being drawn between democracies and autocra cies. International politics is once again faced with the task of establishing a peaceful coexistence between them. To this end, this text will present a few seemingly feasible proposals.

TANKS IN THE RUSSO-UKRAINIAN WAR

Anton Paier — 2024-06-06

The Russo Ukrainian war, after the initial Russian advance following the invasion in February 2022, has turned into a stalemate characterised by grinding trench and urban warfare which in some instances has been compared to WWI. Despite the relative absence of fluid operations by massed mechanised formations, armoured vehicles and tanks in particular have been intensely employed by both opponents, resulting in heavy losses. When properly used in combination with other arms, tanks have been a key factor on the battlefield. During the first year of hostilities the Russian army often suffered from a tactical mishandling of their armoured units, leading to disproportionate losses of tanks and other AFVs compared to their opponent. The great majority of the tanks employed in Ukraine so far are upgraded late Cold War models, even if deliveries by NATO countries have introduced modern Western models into the Ukrainian arsenal. The aim of this article is to give a summary of the key characteristics of the main MBTs employed in Ukraine and to provide a brief analysis of their role and impact.

NATIONALIST SAKHA WARRIORS FOR THE KREMLIN THE CASE OF YS TYMSY

Aimar Ventsel — 2024-06-06

Since the start of the full scale war between Ukraine and Russia, both commentators and people who follow the war have paradoxically increasingly acknowledged the multicultural nature of Russian society. There are two non Russian ethnic groups who are associated with the ongoing war more than others: Chechens and Buryats. Nevertheless, with approximately 200 ethnic groups, members from more or less each one are represented in the Russian armed forces. There is the popular assumption that most non Russians in Russia oppose the war, oppose the Kremlin and are potential separatists. This chapter demonstrates that nothing can be further from the truth. This is a presentation of the analysis of Ys Tymsy, a Sakha pro Kremlin nationalist popular male movement. The movement is anti immigrant, conservative, anti Western and homophobic. This ideology helps to find common ground in the Kremlin’s anti Western conservative world view. Moreover, the con cept of masculinity in the movement is rooted in a perception of the mythical Sakha warrior. This makes all members of Ys Tymsy supporters of Putin’s war to the extent that young Sakha men join the Russian army voluntarily.

DISINFORMATION NARRATIVES OF HATE AS A TOOL OF ESCALATING RUSSIA’S WAR AGAINST UKRAINE (BASED ON STOPFAKE FACT-CHECKING PROJECT MATERIALS)

Viktoriia Romaniuk — 2024-06-06

Since 2014, Russian propaganda has been aggressively using narratives of hate as a tool to deprive Ukrainians of their human qualities, denying their right to self determination and sovereignty. Following the Soviet tradition of discrediting Ukrainian culture and history, Russian propaganda is trying to create an image of Ukraine as a global evil to justify the war and killings of Ukrainians. Based on the archives of StopFake, a Ukrainian fact checking organization, this ar ticle analyses Russian disinformation narratives intended to dehumanise Ukrainians. The article illustrates this narrative framework analysis through cases spotted and debunked by Ukrainian fact checkers during the period of 2014–2022. As well as dehumanising Ukrainians, we also examined how Russian disinformation has manipulated and distorted the concepts of fascism and genocide to form a negative image of Ukrainians and justify a war of aggression as a ‘humanitarian inter vention’. The report also examines the key arguments of Russian disinformation used to intimidate the audience. Among the main theoretical concepts we refer to in this research are dehumanisation and genocide.

SOME NOTES ABOUT THE NATURE OF RUSSIAN INFLUENCE ACTIVITIES AND STRATEGIC NARRATIVES IN THE CONTEXT OF THE RUSSIAN MILITARY INVASION OF UKRAINE 2022–2023

Vladimir Sazonov — 2024-06-06

In this article the authors look at Russia’s information influence activities in the context of the first two years of the Russian military invasion in Ukraine (2022– 2023). The specific focus of this study is on analysing some examples of Russian strategic narratives created and disseminated by the Russian Federation, pro Russian media outlets and social media channels (e.g. Telegram) in 2022–2023, targeting Western audiences, including examples of Russian influence activities targeting Estonian, Ukrainian and more generally Western audiences.

ONLINE ANALYTICS PORTAL AS AN INFORMATION WARFARE TOOL OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION AND ITS IMPACT AFTER 24 FEBRUARY 2022. CASE STUDY – RUBALTIC.RU

Juliusz Sikorski — 2024-06-06

The article attempts to analyse the information warfare tool of the proxy source. This was done using the example of the RuBaltic.ru portal, also showing it against the background of two other tools of warfare: news front.info and Geo politica.ru. The study shows that after Russia’s assault on Ukraine began, the portal essentially became a tool for internal propaganda in Russia, as well as among the Russian diaspora in countries that did not identify it as a proxy source. Thus, it is not currently fulfilling the role for which it was intended. Nevertheless, it should be monitored, and democratic countries in Europe that have not done so to date should consider restricting access to it due to the possible negative social effects of its impact in the context of the still ongoing war.

GERMANY AND EUROPE AFTER THE UKRAINE WAR IN 2025 THREE SCENARIOS

Hans-Georg Ehrhart — 2024-06-06

As the dynamics of war tend towards escalation, it has to be politically hedged with the goal of war termination and prevention. This is especially valid if, as in the case of the Ukraine war, nuclear powers are directly and indirectly involved. Therefore, it makes sense to think about possible war termination and the period after it has ended, allowing us to analyse trends, challenges, and options. This will be done via three scenario analyses analysed in relation to the following aspects: What happens in and with Russia, in and with Ukraine, and what does this mean for NATO, Europe and Germany? The conclusion outlines the various security policy options available to Germany, depending on the outcome of the war in Ukraine. First, the outcome of the war will have decisive effects on German and European security. Second, a Ukrainian vic tory comes with a very high risk of nuclear escalation. Third, Russia will remain an important Eastern European neighbour for Germany and EU Europe in terms of geography and potential. Fourth, the USA will remain an indispensable player in European security for the foreseeable future. Fifth, that China plays a significant role in this conflict. Finally, regardless of the scenario, Berlin will have to spend more on its own and European defence.