

THE WORD OF YAHWEH

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1. The meaning of the root *dbr*.

Though a precise discussion of the essence of *dāḅār* is nowhere to be found, nevertheless, one gets the opinion from scientific works that the conception is quite clear [e. g. Grether (Name und Wort Gottes im alten Testament, BZAW 64, Giessen 1934, p. 59) says: "Jede Sache hat eine dabar, aber keine Sache ist eine dabar"; but that too is not quite right, because the formula *'aḥar haddāḅārīm hā'ellē*—after these occurrences—is not taken notice of]. The word of Yahweh (*dāḅar iahūē*) is the word or the sentence which God has revealed to the prophets. Many scientists differ in the explanation of the revelation. But the only way to understand a prophet's soul, even a little, is to understand the expression *dāḅar iahūē*, because it is the very essence of the matter for a prophet.

Recently Grether has tried to explain the word but without any new result, for he only classifies its meanings according to outer criteria, e. g. *dāḅār* as a word of the Law, or *dāḅār* as the word of a prophet, or *dāḅār* as a factor in history as opposed to the similar use in relation to nature. Such a classification is as useless as a classification of trees according to things that are made of wood. Still less satisfying are some of the former attempts, where, first, the facts of the history of religion were not taken into account, and, secondly, the classification was undertaken on the basis of logical categories. It is comprehensible that by dividing a conception we cannot come nearer to its meaning. Therefore, the inner difference is to be noticed in every debate on a conception. If a word is translated into a modern language by several other words which have no associations for us (e. g. *dāḅār* is "word" and "thing" too), one has to find out how these meanings could be associated by those who used the living word. We cannot assume that the speakers were aware of these different meanings when they used the word. If they were, they would have expressed the differ-

ence by corresponding words. As it is not so, every philologist must know the primitive mentality, or the mentality of the time spoken of, otherwise he would interpret the old in the light of the new. There are two mistakes to be avoided: first, we must not suppose that the translation of a word by us gives the complete sense of the original, and, secondly, it must not be supposed that the associations and emotions awakened by a certain word are quite like those felt by us when we are listening to its substitute.

In order to understand *dāḅar iahūē* it is necessary in the first place to define the meaning of the root *db̄r*, which occurs in all the Semitic languages. A great many attempts have been made, but it is just the number of these that shows that not one of them is satisfactory.

Michaelis (Supplementa ad Lexica Hebraica, Gottingae 1792, p. 387 ss.) thinks that the original meaning of the root *db̄r* is preserved in Arabic *dabara* "pone fuit" (from which the hebraic *dāḅīr* is derived) and "insequi, insectari" (cf. 2 Chr. 22, 10). From that last meaning is derived "ducere gregem, pascere", because the shepherd went behind his flock, and from that again *miḏbār*. Afterwards the conception was widened and "regere, gubernare" was arrived at. Michaelis says that the question he will let others decide is, why the root denotes "to speak" too, but says that there were two possibilities: to presuppose either "persequi oratione" or "ducere vocem". *dāḅōrā* is "a persequendo dicta", and *dēḅer* "ab insequendo", and *diḅrā* in Ps. 110, 4 he thinks means the same as *dāḅīr*, and, therefore, he translates "sacerdos super adytum Melchisedeci".

Gesenius (Thesaurus philologicus criticus linguae Hebraeae et Chaldaeae Veteris Testamenti I, 1², Lipsiae 1829, p. 313) supposes the following semasiological development: the primary meaning was "seruit, ordinavit", from which there are two derivative lines, as follows:

- I. 1. ordine duxit (from which are derived the hebr. substantives *dōḅer*, *dōḅrā*, *miḏbār*).
2. dux fuit populi, rexit, administravit, coegit, subiecit (from this stage are derived hebr. *hiḏbīr*, ar. *dibrun* "examen apium" ductum a regina tanquam pastore, hebr. *dāḅōrā* as nomen unitatis).
3. sequutus est, pone fuit, for the shepherds go behind the flocks (from this is derived the hebr. substantive *dāḅīr*).

4. pone secutus est, insidiatus est (from which *dibber* in 2 Chr. 22, 10 and *dēḇer* = ar. *dabrun*).

II. A serendi ordinandique significatione proficiscitur . . loquendi, ita ut proprie sit verba serere.

This seems to be acceptable, but the fact that Gesenius finds two lines of derivation necessary, shows that the meaning "to speak" is not easily explained. And the act of the movement of the mouth becomes more important than the words.

Gerber (*Die hebräischen Verba denominativa, insbesondere im theologischen Sprachgebrauch des AT*, Leipzig 1896, p. 230) supposes that there were two roots, one of them retained in Arabic and Syrian and the other "to hum, buzz" (summen) from which *dāḇōrā* and *dāḇar* are derived and, from *dāḇar* as a verbum denominativum, the verb *dibber*, which he divides according to its contents: "1. Reden im Sinne von offenbaren, seiner Willensmeinung Ausdruck verleihen; 2. Gebieten, befehlen; 3. Voraussagen; 4. Verheissen; 5. Drohen; 6. Mahnend reden; 7. Als Richter sprechen." The subject in these cases may be God or more rarely some of His organs which represents Him. In the lastnamed case there occur the meanings: "1. Reden als Vermittler des Willens Gottes an die Menschen; 2. Befehlen; 3. Verheissen; 4. Zu Jahwe reden (only in a few passages)." Still more seldom is a man the subject in religious texts. The meanings are then: "1. Reden, meistens im sündhaften Sinne, selten vom sittlich guten Reden; 2. Lobpreisend, betend oder klagend reden; 3. Tröstend reden; 4. Belehrend reden." In profane use: "1. Reden; 2. Zureden; 3. Werben; 4. Forensischer Terminus."

Koenig (*Hebräisches und aramäisches Wörterbuch zum Alten Testament* ^{2. 3.}, Leipzig 1922, p. 65) assumes that the original meaning was "to push forth" (hervorstossen), from which of course *dāḇar* is easily derived, but not so easily the other words.

According to the opinion of Gesenius-Buhl (*Handwörterbuch* ^{17.}, Leipzig 1921, p. 153 a) the primary meaning is retained in Arabic and Aramaic, i. e. "hinter sein" and "vorwärts treiben, führen, leiten", from which, of course, the other words can be derived. He does not give his opinion about *dāḇar*, and according to his own definition also the etymology of *dēḇer* is not clear.

Procksch (according to Grether p. 61) supposes: "Dabar bedeutet zunächst den Hintergrund, den Nerv, den Logos eines Dinges (this is true, but therefore it means also the thing itself). Das Verbum dibber heisst dann: sich mit dem dabar einer Sache beschäftigen, einen dabar entwickeln. Aus der gleichen Wurzel (consequently again a second line of the semasiological evolution as by Gesenius) dbr "hinten sein" ist auch Hinterraum sowie Trift und Steppe (cf. das deutsche "Trift" von "treiben, von hinten vorwärts treiben") und endlich Biene und Flösse (eigentlich das, was seinen Stachel bzw. sein Steuer hinten hat) abzuleiten." This last attempt to define the meaning of the root is not quite impossible, but it is hardly credible that a human being would think important what the raft and the bee have behind them. The first line of the semasiological evolution is a concrete one, and primitive man may have thought so, but it is impossible to imagine such an abstract origin of the word as the second line supposes. The abstract conception of "hinten sein" without any emotional contents is certainly a very recent one. Originally a word with such a meaning may have depicted the fear of a man who had an impression that somebody was walking behind him with evil intentions. Later on the word must have been rationalised and secularized.

As nobody had any success in deriving all the conceptions from one original meaning (Procksch also), several homonyms have been suggested. Mandelkern (*Veteris Testamenti concordantiae hebraicae atque chaldaicae*, Lipsiae 1896, p. 277. 288) suggests two: *dāḅar* 1^o: "(al)loqui, pronuntiare", from which are derived: *dāḅār*, *dabbārā* (Dt. 33, 3), *diḅrā*, *dibber* (Jer. 5, 13), *miḅbār* 1^o; and *dāḅar* 2^o: "ducere, trahere, Pi. exitium parare, Hi. subicere, in potestatem redigere", from which are derived: *dēḅer*, *doḅer*, *doḅrā*, *dāḅōrā*, *dāḅīr*, *miḅbār* 2^o.

Ben Jehuda (*Thesaurus totius hebraicitatis* II, Berolini s. a., p. 873 ss.) nearly agrees but he has three homonyms: *dāḅar* 1^o, from which are derived all words meaning "word, sentence, etc."; *dāḅar* 2^o, which is assumed for the explanation of *dēḅer* and *dēḅri*; and *dāḅar* 3^o, from which are derived *doḅer*, *miḅbār* 2^o, *dabbār* and *hiḅbīr*. But it is hardly possible that the primitive language had so many homonyms as the dictionaries assume. The fact that a root has several meanings does not point to different homonymic roots, but means that the folk

experienced something which they named by one word; but we cannot have the same experience and must use many words for this one experience.

In order to attain new results there is nothing else to do but to expound shortly what derivatives this root has in all the Semitic languages. In Accadian there occur the following words (according to Bezold p. 109): "*dap/bāru* I 2: sich fernhalten, II 1: sich wegwenden (Dämon), wegnehmen (Gründungs-urkunde), wegtreiben, vertreiben (Feind, Dämon, Tier), *dabru* pl. *dabrāti*: gewaltig (Sturm), fem. Gewalttat." Bezold supposes that the original meaning of the root in Accadian was "zurückstossen(?)". Besides these, there occur as Western loan-words (?) *dibiru* = *dēṣer* and *mudaberu*, *maḷudbaru* = *miḏbār*. Probably *daḷuprānu* "Wacholder" too belongs here. If *dbr* means "was mighty, contained mana", we may conclude that the juniper was taken for a tree which had mana. The Arabian meanings let themselves be reduced to the meaning "pone fuit, successit > moderatus fuit, disposuit", but there are some exceptions less comprehensible. Namely, *dbr* may signify "ulceratus fuit in dorso" (*dabira*, nom. act. *daba'irun*, *madbūrun*), and almost the same words may mean also "opibus abundavit" (*dabira*, *'adbara*, *madbūrun*). The last perhaps was indirectly derived from the meaning "disposuit", so that he who leads is also rich, but the connection with the ulceration of the back remains unexplained. The nearest explanation is that the verb originally had the meaning "went behind the spoils of war" (cf. hebr. *hiḏbir*). The fact that the meaning "foulness" is generalised among the dialects of vernacular Arabic, is important, so e. g. in Malta (cf. Caruani: Vocabolario della lingua maltese, La Valetta 1903, p. 127: *dabbar*: "piagare, ulcerare", and all the derivatives from this have the same meaning). So we seem to have found the explanation for hebr. *dēṣer* and ar. *dabara* "mortuus fuit". But even this meaning is not primary enough, because the Maltese points in another direction and *'adbara* means "perverse se habuit", *dabrun* "examen apium (cf. Gesenius 1, 2), terrae pars dura insulae similis in mari sita (cf. eth. *dabr*), multae opes, mors (cf. Gesenius 1, 4), arvum, utilitas", and *'udaḷbirun* "species serpentis", so that, it seems, the going behind the spoils of war is not especially emphasised from the conqueror's point of view, but the situation and the feelings of a conquered prisoner

are emphasised. As to *dabrun* (cf. *miḏbār*), such a place possibly awakened an almost similar feeling.

The Syrian words are derivable from the presupposed original meaning "egit, duxit" (cf. Gesenius I, 2), but there are again some difficulties with *dəbbōrā* "vespa" and *dəḃō-rīḏā* "apis". *daḃrā* "ager, campus" (cf. hebr. *doḃer*, ar. *dabrun*, eth. *dabr* and hebr. *miḏbār*) and *dəḃar* "vagatus est" are also dubious. In Ethiopian the root is almost obsolete; from the derivatives there are left only *dabr* "mons, finis, terminus, monasterium" and *dābr* "territorium, villa, pagus", which were connected probably from the fact that most of the settlements were situated on the mountains. But it is a question why *dbr* got such a meaning at all. Perhaps they did not think of their feelings in such places (cf. above p. 7 to ar. *dabrun*) but thought that the backbone of the earth was a mountain or a mountainous district. There may also have been other reasons.

It is clear that, assuming some primary meaning or other, we are able to reduce all the derivatives to it. The only question is, which of them is the simplest and most natural? No doubt, the original meaning of *dbr* "was mighty", or as an historian of religion would say "contained mana" is sufficiently simple, and from it all the derivatives are easily explained, at any rate more easily than from all the former suppositions here discussed. The linguists have made but a choice among the meanings in use and have proclaimed what seems to be the most primary of them to be the absolutely first one. But they did not think that the primary meaning must contain something of the primitive way of seeing things. In the primitive language there were certainly more synonyms, because the purpose of a word was to give a name for a mighty and dangerous thing, the might of which should be subdued by naming it. Probably every word had a peculiar meaning depending upon the conditions in which it was used, or upon the way things appeared at certain times, or upon the speaker himself. E. g., we may suppose that especially with *dbr* the activity of mana and its assault on mankind was thought of, while with *'im* they particularly thought of its results. But these are only guesses which we cannot prove by any means.

2. The meanings of the Hebrew derivatives.

Some examples are necessary. We know that the meanings of *ḵatl* and *ḵatal* are very often the same. Therefore **dabr* > *dēβer* and **dabar* > *dāβār* ought to have nearly the same meaning. But *dēβer* is "pest, epidemic disease" and *dāβār* "word, thing, etc." A pest or an epidemic disease contains dreadful mana, more than any other occurrence; it is the expression of a power par excellence. The connection of both may be given so: something goes out of a human being and becomes a word; something goes out of a supposed demon or Yahweh and becomes a pest. As to the form, the two occurrences are the same, the difference is but in the degree of power that each of them possesses, and therefore one expresses himself more forcefully than the other because he has more mana. As a proof two facts may serve. First, the word of a man can effect a thing similarly to *dēβer* when he sees the thing or touches it: Num. 22, 6 23, 13 s. 27 s. 24, 1. Secondly, the LXX confounds the two words in Is. 9, 8 (7) putting *dēβer* instead of *dāβār* (θάνατον [λογον κ* Γ οί λοιποί λογον α' ρημα Q^{ms}] ἀπέσταλεν κύριος ἐπὶ Ἰακώβ), or *dāβār* instead of *dēβer* (Hab. 3, 5).

dāβīr is the room in which there was *dbr*; there was the ark of the Covenant, full of *dbr*; it killed when one touched it or gazed at it too intently (1 Sam. 6, 19).

miḏbār "desert" or "heath" (there is only one word for the two, consequently no clear distinction has been made) did not mean the "space where the cattle were driven" but the locality where the evil demons dwelt, those who had especially much *dbr* (Lev. 16, 8. 26 17, 7 Dt. 32, 17 2 K. 23, 8 Is. 13, 21 34, 14 Jer. 2, 6 Ps. 106, 37). Yahweh was originally the greatest of them and their ruler. Therefore, the sentences of Volz (Das Dämonische in Jahve, Tübingen 1924, p. 26) are comprehensible: "Der vormosaische Gott war also ein Wüstengott und das Grauen, das der fromme Mensch in der Erscheinung der Wüste erlebte, bleibt an ihm haften."

That *dāβōrā*, the bee, is a demonic being is also comprehensible. One compares enemies with bees (Dt. 1, 44 Ps. 118, 12), and the best demonstration is Is. 7, 18, where Yahweh whistles, calling the bee *'āšer bā'ereš 'aššūr*. Gesenius-Buhl 864 a gives the following explanation: "Jem. pfeifen, ihn durch

Pfeifen herbeirufen, z. b. Bienen (wie der Bienenwärter).” It is incredible that bees should answer a whistle like dogs, and Benzinger (Hebräische Archäologie², Tübingen 1907, p. 68) says: “Bienenzucht wird im AT nicht erwähnt”, hence it follows that there could not be any hivers. How the passage is to be explained, becomes clear from the sentences of Desparmet (Contes populaires sur les ogres recueillis à Blida I, Paris 1909, p. 118), where he says that when a Ghoul whistles the others assemble around him. And in a note: “Il est rare d’entendre un indigène siffler. Quand on siffle on appelle les génies, disent-ils et encore: Siffler et sonner les cloches attroupent les démons. Ils disent aussi: Les citadins ont pris trois choses au démon: l’habitude de siffler avec les doigts, etc.” Now we can explain Is. 7, 18: Yahweh calls the demons over Israel. Nearly the same idea is met everywhere in connection with whistling. In such cases as 1 K. 9, 8 the whistling may be an announcement to the demons that there is a place for them, or if the traveller whistles the demons can take him as one of themselves. In Zec. 10, 8 perhaps dead persons are meant (cf. Gressmann, Der Messias, Göttingen 1929, p. 382, note 1, IV Ezr 13, 39 ss.). As the bees are whistled to, they are or can represent demons. If not directly, however, the same thing is shown in the story of Yahweh’s appliance of hornets (*šir’ā*) when He expelled the people of Canaan before the Israelites (Ex. 23, 28 Dt. 7, 20 Jos. 24, 12 cfr. Num. 21, 24). The same thing, it is said, actually happened in Themiskyrai of Pontos (Appianus, Bell. Mithr. 78), and a similar story is told of West Africa (Frobenius, Atlantis IV, p. 286 (Togo): “The people of Emme fill their calabashes with bees and hang them out as beehives on the trees. When they have a battle with the people of Kani they cast the calabashes upon their enemies and then kill them with knives and stones.”). If a similar story were not told of the Santals (cf. Folklore of the Santal Parganas translated by C. H. Bompas, London 1909, p. 81), it might be possible that this one were really a Jewish one, as the Jews had great influence upon Northern Africa and many African folktales stand so near the OT that it is impossible to assume either a prehistoric connection or a common human foundation¹). Many tales natu-

1) Cf. Frobenius, Atlantis II, 16. 74 (Samson); VI, 61 (Jacob and Esau); Frobenius, Die Zeitalter des Sonnengottes, Berlin 1904, p. 126 (Unusa ben

rally come from an Arabian source, but not all. Therefore, the folk-tale which Gunkel, *Das Märchen im AT*, Tübingen 1921, p. 107, takes to be a parallel to the story of Ex. 14 might have been influenced by the OT. — According to the *Aeneid*, VII, 64 s., the appearance of a swarm of bees is a sign of the approach of enemies or strangers. Generally it was for the Romans and Greeks a bad omen (cf. Pauly-Wissowa, *Real-Encyklopädie* V, 1897, p. 448). They were thought to be holy beings (*Georgica* IV, 219), and therefore they could not bear anything impure such as rotten meat (*Artemidoros*, *Oneirocrit.* 112), beans (*Porphyrios*, *De antr. nymph.* 19) or men who come from sexual intercourse (*Plutarchos*, *Coniug. praecepta* 44), although the general opinion was that they were born of dead and decaying animals (*Ovid*, *Fasti* I, 377 s. *Porphyrios*, *De antr. nymph.* 15, 18; *Pliny* NH XI, 70).

Possibly also *doṣrā* "raft" was taken for something fantastic, but it may be that the word was connected with the meaning "to lead", comp. with Arabian parallels for raft: *bu/asṭatun* (*basāṭa*, "strew"), *ramadun* (*ramadva* "tied (?)"). Therefore, we possibly cannot infer that there was something fantastic in these things. Probably the Semites made acquaintance with the raft so late that *dbr* had already lost its primary meaning, or the word may be derived from some other stage of the semasiological evolution of the root *dbr*.

3. *dāḅār* in the OT, in the other Semitic languages and in the LXX.

Is the most general derivative: *dāḅār* "word, thing, event, occurrence" connected in any way with the primary meaning we assumed? First, it is necessary to remember that *duo si dicunt idem, non est idem*. Who speaks of talking, may think especially of the movements of the mouth, the voice, etc. We define a word as a complex of sounds which has a certain meaning, but it is obvious that a Jew might have had a quite different view. No doubt, a view which required that *dāḅār*

Mata); *Afrikanische Märchen* herausg. von Carl Meinhof, Jena 1921, p. 223 [(Jacob and Esau), according to Hollis, *The Masai*, Oxford 1905, p. 327]. And finally cf. the possibly non-historical stories in *Lobagola*, *An African Savage's Own Story* (Tauchnitz Ed. No. 4960, p. 44 ss.).

must mean "thing, event" (of course these words too are used otherwise than we can imagine). On the other hand, this fact shows that *dāḅar* never was used in the meaning of "word" as we understand it. If we try to investigate the connections between "word" and "thing", we find them in the sphere of mana. As everything contained mana, we may call them all mana, — at least theoretically. In the first place the influence a word had on the person who listened to it, and the magical power the word implied (cf. Jeremias, *Handbuch der altorientalischen Geisteskultur* ², Leipzig 1929, p. 33 s.), and the intention put in the power was considered. Every thing and every occurrence was a centre of some mysterious will, and therefore the most adequate translation for *dāḅar* may be "intention directed to activity, the product of activity: word, event, thing". The possibility of such a translation is also strengthened by the development of Syr. *ṣāḅā'*. *ṣāḅūḅā* denotes "will", but also "thing, occurrence" (Gen. 18, 14 Dt. 24, 1, used also in the same meaning as hebr. *'al dāḅar*). *ṣēḅiānā'* and *ṣēḅiānā'ūḅā'* signify only "will".

That the Israelites in ancient times thought so is seen also in the following facts. *'al dāḅar* means "for the sake of". *'al* would have been sufficient, and there were words enough to use, but seemingly they wanted to point out by such an expression that the reason for some act was not simple or common, but great and unlimited — the mana, e. g., Sarah's mana in the stories of Abraham (Gen. 12, 17 20, 11), or the mana of the money found by the brethren of Joseph in their bags (Gen. 43, 18), or that of the frogs which tortured the Egyptians (Ex. 8, 8), or Peor's mana (Num. 25, 18 31, 16). *'al dāḅar 'āšer* means "because of" (Dt. 22, 24 23, 5 2 Sam. 13, 22), in which cases the best translation of *dāḅar* would be "thing"; therefore, literally: "for the thing, which was as follows..." In these cases "that everything contains mana to some extent" certainly is meant, but the deeds here spoken of are full of evil mana like the transgressions of certain taboos: e. g., the violating of women (Dt. 22, 24 2 Sam. 13, 22), the fact the Ammonites and the Moabites had not received their own brethren, the Israelites, with bread and water (Dt. 23, 5). All such things caused a dismal hate to be born into the world. *'al diḅrē* (Dt. 4, 21 2 K. 22, 13 Jer. 7, 22 14, 1) may be translated "in things", which

in the primitive language meant: "single expressions of power", not only in the possession of single persons but also in books, in the burnt sacrifices or in drought. They, as the centres of a power, have not only one region and one purpose. Every thing, no matter whether it is very important, may have a great effect according to the primitive mystical view. But this discussion has no intention of arguing that everyone who used such a term, knew its previous meaning, although he might have been conscious that he could not use all the three expressions in every case. They fitted only into certain peculiar phrases.

Secondly, it is seen from the part that a written or spoken word had to play. This was so great that a few examples must suffice. E. g., the blessings and the damnations had power in themselves also after the death of the person who uttered them because he had emitted them together with his mana; therefore they were living beings too (cf. Fahlgreen, *Ṣadaḳā*, nahe-stehende und entgegengesetzte Begriffe im AT, Uppsala 1932, p. 190 ss.). The words might influence God (Num. 10, 35 s.; comp. also the term *bērax iahūē*) but also Nature (Jos. 10, 12 s.), and the whole world was created by the word (Gen. 1; cf. Dt. 8, 3). In these cases the word meant the shaping of the mana of man or God. It was the stabilisation of mana and the giving of a single direction to it — the shape through which mana became comprehensible and efficacious. Without the word, mana existed, but formlessly and chaotically. In fact, at the creation of the world we have to do with the transformation of two chaotic things — the mana of God and the elemental stuff. When God's mana became a clear shape He created the world and also ruled it afterwards. Grether is of the opinion that "Inbeziehungsetzung des dabar zur Natur die letzte Konsequenz typisch israelitischer Vorstellungen ist". Certainly, he may argue so, basing himself on Gen. 2, where God acts and does not create by a command, and because Gen. 1 is a later text. But that gives no reason to argue that there did not exist any other opinions of old besides Gen. 2; it is psychologically much more credible that God's *dāḅār* was connected with nature long before it was connected with history. As the Israelites had no such conceptions as nature and history, we cannot speak of these things in relation to the OT. There was hardly any difference

between nature and history; all the world was a region where God or foreign gods were active.

Obviously, the "recitations of mana" (the blessings and the damnations) were accompanied by certain movements. These might have been unconscious but also teleological, for instance, to separate the power of a word as a living being from the reciter and to send it somewhere, the task of the movement in this case being to give the right direction to mana. As far as they were not spontaneous and unconscious, they had to lead the mana, to teach it. They themselves did not always imply that importance (a certain power) which only *dāḅār* possessed.

dāḅār was a power, which everything originally contained either openly or latently. When it is spoken of as a human property it is the expression of every effect, every feeling or want, every outbreak, through which a human being becomes the object of attention and begins to exist for others. The most usual expression of the effect in the East is speech, not a deed. If men have no *dāḅār* expressed in words, they do not exist at all. Their fellowmen would not pay any attention to them. It is nearly the same in relation to God. But the speech was not the only expression of effects, and therefore *dāḅār* also may mean "event, occurrence", i. e. a deed, when it depended on human beings. But a thing too might have had *dāḅār*, and that is why several conceptions were combined in this variation of its meaning.

In the other Semitic languages *dāḅār* does not occur, but we can safely assume that it was used in each dialect of Canaan. In Phoenicia it was known, but not in the meaning of "word". In the inscription of Tabnith (Cooke, A Text Book of North-Semitic Inscriptions, Oxford 1903, No. 26, l. 6) quite surely *hdbr h'* means "this occupation", i. e. the opening of the sarcophagus and the disturbing of the dead king's peace, while Astarte declared the corpse to be taboo (*t'bt*, which even may be (?) the same word as **tamb/pu(h:l) > tapu*). Hence *dbr* is not simply an act, but an act which has something to do with an object containing mana. In the inscription of Eshmunazar (Cooke, No. 30, l. 2. 7) it is used as a verb in connection with *l'mr* as in Hebrew, and in l. 6 Cooke translates: "if men speak to thee (*idbrnk*)", but it would be better to translate: "if men try to persuade thee (do not listen to them)". In one inscription from

Malta (Cooke, No. 103) *kl dbri* probably is to be compared with Dt. 5, 25 Dan. 10, 9.

In the LXX there are a great many expressions corresponding to *dābār*, the commonest of which are *λόγος* and *ῥῆμα*. There occur as parallels (*ὁ*) *λόγος* (*τοῦ*) *κυρίου* and (*τὸ*) *ῥῆμα* (*τοῦ*) *κυρίου* and of course also the corresponding plural forms. On the one hand, these two words seem to have a certain difference, as the LXX translates *'ahar haddābārīm hā'ellē* (cf. p. 3) only by *μετὰ δὲ τὰ ῥήματα ταῦτα* (Gen. 15, 1 22, 1. 20 39, 7 40, 1 48, 1 1 K. 17, 17 21, 1 Esth. 2, 1 3, 1 Ezr. 7, 1 2 Chr. 32, 1), but, on the other hand, the difference appears to be illusive, as both words can be joined with *κύριος* and thus give: *ἐγενήθη (ἐγένετο) ῥῆμα κυρίου* (Gen. 15, 1 1 Sam. 15, 10 2 Sam. 7, 4 1 K. 17, 2 (var. *λόγος*!) 17, 8 18, 1 20 (21), 28 (+ *ἐν χειρὶ*) 2 K. 20, 4 Jer. 1, 1) or *ἐγένετο λόγος κυρίου* (2 Sam. 24, 11 1 K. 6, 11 12, 22 16, 1 (+ *ἐν χειρὶ*) 17, 2 (var. *ῥῆμα*!) 1 Chr. 22, 8 1 Chr. 17, 3 2 Chr. 11, 2 12, 7 Hos. 1, 1 Mi. 1, 1 Jo. 1, 1 Jon. 1, 1 3, 1 Zeph. 1, 1 Hag. 1, 1. 3 (+ *ἐν χειρὶ*) 2, 11 (10). 21 (20) Zec. 1, 1. 7 4, 8 6, 9 7, 1. 8 8, 1 Is. 38, 4 Jer. 1, 2. 4. 11. 13 13, 3. 8 14, 1 18, 5 24, 4). In both cases there generally follows such a construction as *πρὸς* c. acc. (rarely anything else). One may as well say *κατὰ τὸν λόγον κυρίου* (1 Chr. 10, 13 11, 3. 10 12, 23 2 Chr. 35, 6) as *κατὰ τὸ ῥῆμα κυρίου* (1 K. 12, 24z 14, 18 15, 29 16, 34 17, 5. 16 22, 38 2 K. 1, 17 4, 44 7, 16 9, 26 10, 17 14, 25 23, 16 24, 13), or *λόγον ἡμέρας ἐν ἡμέρα* (2 Ezr. 3, 4) and *ῥῆμα ἡμέρας ἐν ἡμέρα* (1 K. 8, 59). In particular it is shown by a comparison between the translations of the LXX and of Theodotion in the book of Daniel, where four facts are to be observed: first, the LXX and Θ both have *ῥῆμα* in 7, 28, secondly: they both have *λόγος* in 4, 28 6, 12 (13) 7, 11. 16. 28. But just those passages where (thirdly) the LXX uses *λόγος* but Θ: *ῥῆμα* are important:

1, 20: LXX: <i>ἐν παντὶ λόγῳ καὶ</i>	2, 9: LXX: <i>συνείπασθε γὰρ</i>
<i>συνέσει</i>	<i>λόγους ψευδεῖς</i>
Θ: <i>ἐν παντὶ ῥήματι</i>	Θ: <i>ῥῆμα ψευδές . . .</i>
<i>σοφίας</i>	<i>συνέθεσθε εἰπεῖν</i>

or on the contrary (fourthly) LXX: *ῥῆμα* and Θ: *λόγος*:

7, 25: LXX: <i>ῥήματα εἰς τὸν</i>	10, 12: LXX: <i>εἰσηκούσθη τὸ ῥῆμα</i>
<i>ὑψιστον λαλήσει</i>	<i>σου</i>
Θ: <i>λόγους πρὸς τὸν</i>	Θ: <i>ἠκούσθησαν οἱ</i>
<i>ὑψιστον λ.</i>	<i>λόγοι σου</i>

10, 12 : LXX : εἰσηλθον τῷ ὄηματί σου

Θ : ἐγὼ ἦλθον ἐν τοῖς λόγοις σου

As no principle is found, we may infer that there is no essential difference between these two words, and the same is confirmed by other facts: Θ uses both, *λόγος* as well as *ὄημα*, more frequently than the LXX, e. g.

2, 15 : LXX : τότε τὸ πρόσταγμα ἐσήμανεν Θ : ἐγνώρισεν δὲ τὸ ὄημα

2, 17 : LXX : ὑπέδειξε πάντα Θ : ἐγνώρισεν τὸ ὄημα

3, 16 : LXX : ἐπὶ τῇ ἐπιταγῇ ταύτῃ Θ : περὶ τοῦ ὀήματος τούτου

5, 26 : LXX : σύγκριμα τῆς γραφῆς Θ : σύγκριμα τοῦ ὀήματος

9, 23 (cf. 9, 2) : LXX : ἐξῆλθε πρόσταγμα Θ : ἐξῆλθεν λόγος

Πρόσταγμα in the LXX thus corresponds to *λόγος* and *ὄημα* in Θ, *πρόσταγμα* being a word with a more or less certain meaning; consequently, if there is a difference between the two words corresponding to *dāḅār*, it must be a very little one.

And finally, by a comparison of the frequency of their use it appears that *ὄημα* is more frequent in the first books of the Canon, *λόγος* in the later books. *Λόγος* occurs percentually seldom in the following books: Gen. 5,08% ; Ex. 21,3% ; Lev. 16,6% ; Num. 18,7% ; Dt. 46,9% (thus in the whole Pentateuch only 20,7%) ; Jos. 28,5% ; 1 Sam. 30,6% ; 2 Sam. 35,7% ; 2 Ezr. 36,8% ; Job 27,1% ; Lam. 0,00% (*ὄημα* too but once). On the contrary, *ὄημα* is very seldom used in the books of the prophets and is quite absent in Am. Mi. Jon. Hab. Zeph. Hag. Mal. (Ct. 2. 3. 4 Macc.), but *λόγος* occurs in Hos. 71,4% ; Zec. 95% ; Is. 72,8% (Protois. 79,5% ; Deuterois. 53,3%) ; Jer. 93,4% ; Bar. 71,4% ; Ezk. 96,3% ; Dan. LXX 75% ; Dan. Θ 63,8% ; Jdg. 58,3% ; 1 K. 56,8% ; 2 K. 76,1% ; 1 Chr. 89,2% ; 2 Chr. 95,4% ; 1 Ezr. 60% ; Neh. 85,6% ; Tobit 76,2% ; Judith 52,5% ; Esth. 89,2% ; Ps. 91,8% ; Ec. 86,9% ; Wisd. 88,2% ; Sir. 88,8% ; 1 Macc. 95,2%. How this is to be explained is another question. Perhaps in the older translations, for the Pentateuch certainly was translated first, they used almost only *ὄημα*, but afterwards *λόγος* became more common, *ὄημα* being dropped finally. But evidently such an argument cannot be absolutely correct, especially on account of 2 Ezr. Job. Lam. Probably there were many translators at work, and e. g. the minor prophets perhaps were translated by one person, who almost never used *ὄημα* at all. In any case these great differences cannot be explained by inner causes, as Gen.

and 1 2 Chr. are both works in a profane style; nevertheless, a difference exists.

In addition, it is important that both, *ῥῆμα* as well as *λόγος* are used as words corresponding to the same Hebraic words, such as: *'emer*, *'imrā*, *me'mar*, *dibber*, *millā*, *pē*, *piṭgām*. *'amar*, *ma'amar*, *dabbārā*, *diṣrā*, *dāḅar*, *ṭa'am*, *nəḅū'a*, *sefer*, *kōl*, *ṣāḡā*, *ṣeḅet*, *təḅūnā*, *tōrā* correspond only to *ῥῆμα*; *'omer*, *'emrā*, *maṣṣā'* correspond only to *λόγος*. And *dā'ar* is Jer. 49 (42), 16 translated by *λόγον ἔχειν*, *malisā* Prov. 1, 6 by *σοτεινός λόγος*, *dā'arā* Prov. 12, 25 by *φοβερός λόγος* and *dibbā* Num. 14, 36 by *ῥήματα πονηρά*. But the most common word corresponding to both of them is *dāḅar*. However there are many other translations for this word too, like: *ἀγγελία* (Prov. 12, 25), *ἄδικος* (Gen. 19, 8), *ἀναγγέλλειν* (*hesib dāḅar*: Gen. 37, 14, Sir. uses for it *ἀποκρίνειν*), *ἀντιλογία* (Ex. 18, 6), *ἀπόκρισις* (Dt. 1, 22 Job 32, 4), *βασιλικός* (*dāḅar malḫūṭ*: Ezr. 1, 9) *βασιλική βιβλιοθήκη* (*diṣrē haiḡāmim*: Ezr. 2, 23) *βιβλίον* (Dan. Θ 12, 4), *γραμματεὺς* (Job 37, 20), *γράμμα* (Ezr. 4, 3 (= **8**^c *πρόσταγμα*) 9, 1), *διαθήκη* (Dt. 9, 5), *δίκη* (Hos. 13, 14), *δόλος* (2 S. 14, 20), *εἰπεῖν-ερεῖν* (Gen. 45, 27 Ex. 8, 13 (9). 31 (27) 1 K. 2, 30 Prov. 15, 23 25, 11: *dāḅar*; 1 K. 20 (21), 17: *haiā dāḅar*), *ἐκθεσις* (Dan. LXX 1, 5), *ἐντέλλεσθαι* (1 K. 13, 17), *ἐντολή* (Dt. 28, 14 (A: *τῶν λόγων*) Ps. 118 (119), 57 (**8**^R: *τὸν νόμον*)), *ἐπερώτησις* (Gen. 43, 7), *ἔργον* (1 K. 18, 36 Sir. 47, 22), *τὸ καθῆκον* (Ex. 5, 13.19), *κρίμα* (Ex. 18, 22), *κρίσις* (Ex. 22, 9 (8)), *λαλεῖν* (Ex. 32, 28 1 S. 15, 13 2 S. 7, 7 1 K. 10, 7 21 (20), 4 22, 13 2 Chr. 18, 12 24, 5 Ps. 16 (17), 3 144 (145), 5 Ec. 1, 10 8, 4 Jon. 3, 3 Ezr. 1, 13. 21 Job 4, 2 15, 11: *dāḅar*; 1 K. 16, 7 18, 31 Hag. 2, 2 (1): *haiā dāḅar*), *λαλία* (Job 33, 1 Dan. LXX 10, 6.9), *μηδεῖς* (Gen. 19, 8 A), *νόμος* (Dt. 32, 45 Ps. 118 (119), 57.105 129 (130), 5 (A **8**^b R: *λόγον*) Jer. 8, 9 34 (27), 18), *ὄρισμός* (Ex. 8, 12 (8)), *οὐδεῖς* (frequently *dāḅar* with a negative), *οὕτω* (*kaddāḅārim hā'ellē*), *πράγμα* (very common for *dāḅar*: 34 times, the other correspondences *heḡes*, *millā*, *ma'ālāl*, *ma'asē*, *'āḅidā'*, *ṣāḅū* only 10 times), *πραγματεία* (1 K. 10, 22), *πρόσταγμα* (comparatively frequent, *πρόσταγμα κυρίου* occurs too: Jos. 8, 27 1 Chr. 26, 32 2 Chr. 29, 15 Dan. LXX 9, 23), generally corresponding to *hoḡ* and *hukḡā*, but in particular Dan. LXX likes it as corresponding to *dāḅar* (in Dan. LXX 13 times, elsewhere in the OT 10 times), *ῥῆσις* (Prov. 1, 6 4, 20), *ῥητός* (Ex. 9, 4 22, 9 (8)), *τὸ ἐξελεθὸν ἐκ τοῦ στόματος* (1 S. 1, 23), *συντάσσειν* (Ex. 12, 35), *τις* (Jer. 39 (32), 27), *τρόπος* (Num. 18, 7 Jos. 5, 4 Dan. LXX 1, 14), *φωνή* (Gen. 11, 1 15, 4), *χοῆμα* (Neh. 11, 24, **8**^b: *ῥῆμα*). These translations

were made with regard to the meaning of *dāḅār* in the given instances. But two facts are remarkable, namely, *hāiā dāḅār* can be expressed by *εἰπεῖν* and *λαλεῖν*, and, though such passages occur surprisingly seldom, they nevertheless indicate that it was really supposed by some translator (1 K. Hag.) that God spoke like a man. It is strange to us too that the LXX uses *προᾶγμα* in such cases where it seems to be unsuitable, e. g. Num. 22, 8: ἀποκριθήσομαι ὑμῖν προᾶγματα.

Through such a translation one still can recognise the old magical meaning of *dāḅār*. But not every manuscript of the LXX has it, for frequently there have been substituted *ῥῆγμα* or *πρόσταγμα* for *προᾶγμα* (while *προᾶγμα* can be taken for an abbreviation of *πρόσταγμα*).

Finally, a remarkable passage may be mentioned, namely Is. 45, 23: *iāṣā' mīppī ṣadākā dāḅār mēlo' iāṣāḅ* where *dāḅār* may mean "a thing"; but possibly it is identical with *ṣadākā* (cf. 55, 11). What the LXX has done with it, shows clearly how little sometimes the MT was understood, ἐξελεύσεται ἐκ τοῦ στόματός μου δικαιοσύνη (+ και N*) οἱ λόγοι μου (sic!) οὐκ ἀποσραφήσονται.

4. Parallels to *dāḅār* in Polynesia and Babylonia.

Consequently *dāḅār* has nearly the same meaning as the Polynesian-Melanesian *mana*. As E. S. Craighill Handy (Polynesian Religion, Bernice P. Bishop Museum Bulletin 34. Honolulu, 1927, p. 26. 34) says: "Mana was exhibited in persons, in power, strength, prestige, reputation, skill, dynamic personality, intelligence; in things, in efficacy, in "luck"; that is, in accomplishment. These qualities were not mana; they were the evidences of mana, which was itself but the focussing and transmission of the potency of nature." The question is, whether mana is an abstract power *eo ipso* to be found in everything like electricity, or do human beings and things receive it only by the transmission of gods and ghosts, or do they possess it because demons, centres of mana, dwell in them? It seems that in the opinion of the Polynesians "mana is all round in the world" (H. Beattie in the Journal of the Polynesian Society XXX, p. 16), the gods direct it in order to create and preserve the world. "It may be fairly assumed that one main purpose of the prayer, sacrifice

and other elements of the Polynesian rites was to increase the mana of the gods worshipped, that while they sought on the one hand to approach and draw on the strength embodied in their gods, these people were capable of, indeed requisite for, empowering the very gods on whom they believed themselves to be dependent"; consequently, a word contains mana as it was in Israel (cf. Mowinckel, *Psalmenstudien* V, 27 ss. and *beraḫ iahūē*). The most famous incantations might be quite simply called "mana".

This fact indicates a point in the change of the meaning of the word, but the Polynesians did not try to go further; they did not change "mana" to mean every spoken word or everything as the Israelites did. The transformation in Israel shows a certain profanisation. But the profanisation, to be sure, is not so profound, as it is presumed to be nowadays. The profanisation exists; the Polynesians have mana everywhere, the Israelites had it more in words though not exclusively; there is, however, a certain disproportion in such a use, only some prepositions as *'aldaḅar* indicate that they once thought like the Polynesians. On the other hand, perhaps, originally *daḅar* was mana in a much more limited sense? In other words, the only difference between the Israelites and the Maoris lies in the greater devoutness of the Maoris, as they see and feel mana everywhere.

That conception is known not only to the Polynesians but also to the American Indians, though a little otherwise, differing in name and form (comp. *wakonda* of the Sioux, *manitu* of the Fox Indians). But the impersonal power seems here to be more personified than in Polynesia. The Sioux call their *taku wakan* (the great spirit) also *wakonda* as the impersonal power, and for the Fox Indians (cf. T. Michelson, *Contributions to Fox Ethnology*, Smithsonian Institution, Bureau of American Ethnology, Bulletin 85 (1927), No. 1), "the great *manitu*" is very similar to a person; they even make sacrifices to the *manitu* or the *manitus* (ib. No. 3. 4). It seems that the impersonal power already is dividing itself into demons or the conception is connected with the idea of supernatural beings more inseparably than in Polynesia.

In the Sumerian litanies there frequently occurs a word *enem*, which Langdon derives from the root *nim* "utter a decision"; in the Accadian interlinear versions it is translated

by *amātu*, which is said to mean "word". But this meaning is as impossible as it would be for the Polynesian *mana*, as it is impossible that a word as a complex of sounds could make the grass grow or could create truth and righteousness (cf. Perry, *Hymnen an Sin*, Leipzig, 1906, p. 3 *Jeremias*, *Das Alte Testament im Lichte des Alten Orients*, Leipzig, 1930, p. 306 Ebeling, *Altorientalische Texte und Bilder*, p. 241 s. — IV R 9 Obv. 57-Rev. 10 and Langdon, *Sumerian and Babylonian Psalms*, Paris, 1909, passim). In that case one scarcely could translate otherwise than by "power". The fact that *enem* often stands parallel to *ud(de)*, which may denote "storm demon, stormy day" (originally "divine spirit or breath"), and especially that in the Sumerian Liturgies and Psalms (The University Museum of Pennsylvania, Public. of Bab. Section X, 4, Philadelphia, 1919, No. 11) *ud* occurs instead of the common *enem* (cf. Langdon ERE XII, p. 751) is very remarkable. "Storm = power" is quite comprehensible because storm was most dangerous to such an alluvial land as South Babylonia, for it caused deluges. But perhaps they thought that the uttering of a word by a deity and a tempest were so connected that the breathing of the deity was thought to be a tempest (cf. Bertholet, *Das Dynamistische im AT*, Tübingen, 1926, p. 17).

Usually the evil influences of *enem* are pointed to more than the good ones, but still it is not meant to be "an agent of god's wrath", and the definition "a formally spoken word of a great god as semi-personality" (Langdon ERE XII, p. 749) is also too narrow. Perhaps *enem* meant "word", but we cannot translate it thus, as we have a quite different conception of "word". At any rate, it was not taken for an hypostasis, because there is no deity whose name begins with *Enem-* (on the contrary comp. the hypostated servants of Šamaš). It is also questionable whether Acc. *amātu* means "word", for its derivation is very dubious (*ym*: Langdon, *mh*: Delitzsch, *huh*: Bezold). To me, the connection with Hebr. *'ājom* and *'emā* seems possible too (*ym* > *'im*), which denote the fear which is inspired by tabooed things. But there is nothing certain here except its being used quite like the Hebr. *dāšār*: *amāt limutti* "Böses", *la amātu* "nichts" (according to Delitzsch).

If there is a difference between the conception of "word" in the OT and in Babylonia, nevertheless it is not so great a

one as Grether, p. 144 thinks. "Dort (in the OT) dient es (the word) dazu, Gott in seiner Überlegenheit über die Welt zu verherrlichen und seinen Herrschaftsanspruch über die Natur zu sichern. Hier (in Babylonia) wird das Wort als eine magische oder naturhafte Größe oder als eine Emanation der Gottheit angesehen, so daß die Gottheit an die Natur gebunden oder mit ihr identifiziert wird" (cf. Szeruda, *Das Wort Jahves*, Łódź, 1921, p. 40 s). These sentences are constructions, but Grether, p. 136. 151 s. assumes that before the Dt. only "nebenbei hier und da einmal ein Beispiel davon erzählt wird, daß Gott auch der Natur und den Naturwesen befiehlt". All that is most primary must thus be the latest result in evolution.

The differences are much more indistinct. Langdon p. 752 says almost with right that the Israelites used *dāḅār* and *rūāḥ* in nearly the same meaning as the Accadians their *mummu*, and we have found that *dāḅār* = *amātu*. The difference does not lie in the fact that the Babylonians had no prophets who could give such specific meanings to the word as the prophets of the OT. There were also in Babylonia several kinds of prophets and prophetic priests in the temples, and Gressmann (*The Tower of Babel*, New York, 1928, p. 51) presumes also the presence of the same kind of prophets as in the OT (cf. Jeremias, *Handbuch der altorientalischen Geisteskultur*, Leipzig, 1929, p. 43 ss.). There were prophets in Byblos and in Egypt and all the deities spoke to their worshippers, Kamosh as well as Yahweh (Mesha inscription, l. 14. 32). It is of no importance whether the speech (as a revelation of the power) came through oracles, omens (in the OT named also *dāḅār* and often *dāḅār iahūē*), or through prophets.

It seems that in Babylonia *amātu* became a hypostasis in the same way as *dāḅār* in the OT after a long evolution returned to its starting point, and if the assumption of Grimme (*Orientalische Studien* Th. Nöldeke gewidmet, p. 453 ss. cf. Glaser *OLZ* 1906, p. 240) is right, namely, that in South Arabia *'mr* means *λόγος*, the differences are doubtful.

In the very beginning of the evolution, "word" seems to have been an impersonal power which all the gods or the one God had and could direct. Therefore it was something like an hypostasis, but, so to say, only in the first degree; it got a new life after the birth of Christ owing to the religious awakening in His

times, so that in the second degree it appears more distinctly separated from the point of emanation (cf. Philo). On the same tendency of course also depends the peculiarity of the Babylonian religion to consider one deity as the "word" of another. Polytheism was the form of the religion but through the act of uniting the gods the Babylonians were tending to become monotheists. The Israelites were monotheists. This is the principal cause for requiring a peculiar meaning for *dāḅār* in the OT. In Babylonia all the gods had *enem* but therefore really not one had it; in Israel, on the contrary, finally it became the possession of Yahweh only. Therefore the conception grew more and more homogeneous, distinct, and clear: in the second place, it was just that change that diminished the radius of its activity. In Babylonia the evolution in older times went along the way of separation, the priests having the intention clearly to declare what peculiarities the *enem* of Nergal had; in later times they could say that Nergal was the *enem* of Enlil.

Using this as a basis one should be able to compile the whole history of *mana*. Originally impersonal, during the period of polydemonism it was divided among numberless deities; then these bits of *mana* were ascribed anew to a single deity which became through evolution more and more transcendent, an unknown power behind all things. And from this point the circle started again and will start till the end of the world.

5. *Dibber* and the name.

The dictionaries have many words corresponding to the expression *dibber*; all these are connected with speaking, and it seems that no doubt exists about the meaning, although Gerber, p. 218 adds to "reden" — "im Sinne von offenbaren, seiner Willensmeinung Ausdruck verleihen", and Junker (Prophet und Seher in Israel, Trier, 1927, p. 71 ss.) says that the word *dibber* "ist nicht etwas was man mit "reden" wiedergeben kann". He also quotes some examples: 1. S. 24, 1 ss. "liegt das Sprechen Gottes in der günstigen Gelegenheit, die er für David zur Tötung Sauls geschaffen hat, Jdc. 2, 20 ist der providentielle Sinn des wirklichen Geschichtsverlaufes als ein Wort Jahves dargestellt, Gen. 24, 50 ist die beabsichtigte Willensentschließung Eliesers bzw. Abrahams auch mit *dāḅār jahūḡ* bezeichnet". There are very

many similar examples, where the word *dibber* is not "he spoke" in our sense, although the subject may be a man or Yahweh.

2 Chr. 22, 10 (where *tadabber* surely is not a verbum denominativum from *dēber* and is scarcely to be counted a mistake instead of *ta'abbed*, though the meaning is the same "to put out, to destroy"), and Ps. 18, 48, 47, 4 where *hidbir* means "he subdued", are still especially important. The difference between 2 Chr. 22, 10 and the general *dibber* is but a gradual one and if we had only these passages, *dibber rā'ā 'al* (1 K. 22, 23 Jer. 11, 17 19, 15 26, 19 35, 17), *dibber tōβōð* (2 K. 25, 28 Jer. 12, 6 52, 32) and *dibber 'al lēβ* (Gen. 34, 3 50, 21 2 S. 19, 8 Is. 40, 2 Hos. 2, 16) then nobody would have the idea that the verb means "to speak" but would probably translate "influenced, did something good or evil to somebody else". Or, if we take 1 K. 13, 3: *zē hammōqēð 'āšer dibber iahūqē*, then "produces" is the only way to translate. But really "to speak" denotes the same and, therefore, one may say that the Israelites while speaking did not think of the contents or sense of the word, but of the influence it had upon the listener. It is an absolutely different way of thinking, which, according to their opinion, proceeded from the idea of mana which man possessed. Gerber's classifications show that "speaking" in general is by no means the most primary variation of the meaning; on the contrary, the parallel expression which he puts besides "reden", is much more entitled to be considered so, because, for instance, between "to promise" and "to speak" there is no connection but both of them are expressed in words; on the contrary, "seiner Willensmeinung Ausdruck verleihen" may mean everything, both "befehlen" as well as "verheißen" etc. Obviously on this occasion, the conceptions differing with us are connected with *dibber* not because they are given words, but because they all are certain acts of will.

The only facts which might make us doubtful of this conclusion are those occasions where men "speak" to God. But, first, it is dubious whether in Ex. 34, 34 Num. 7, 89 the subject is not Yahweh. In Gen. 18, 27. 30. 31, Abraham excuses himself when he "speaks", for he really is not strong enough for that, being but dust and earth; in Ex. 6, 12 Moses "speaks" but not to Yahweh (not *l'iahūqē* but *liqanē iahūqē* stands in the text); in Dt. 3, 26 God says that Moses has "spoken" to Him (*'elai*). In Jer. 18, 20 the direct "speaking" to Yahweh is probably not

meant and Jer. 12, 1 is not quite certain. What remains is but Num. 27, 15 (Moses), but this is not a sufficient proof. The conclusion is: men "spoke" (*dibber*) to Yahweh very seldom and only in ancient times because they are too weak to do so.

It is an interesting fact that when a human being is the subject to *dibber* and the object is also a man, then they "say" something stupid or arrogant and insolent as *mirmā* (Jer. 9, 7 Ps. 34, 14) or *ṣeḳer* (Is. 59, 3 Jer. 9, 4 Mi. 6, 12), but seldom *ṣeḏeḳ* (Ps. 52, 5). The cause may be the opinion that the *dāḅār* or the mana of men expressed itself more in evil things than in goodness, for when a man does something evil, his nature is known more easily. In an act of charity he is impersonal, but not in an act of an evil character.

The synonyms such as *'amar* and its derivatives show that the meaning of *dibber* is really such. The primary meaning of *'amar* is: "was opulent, had many sheep". The opulence shows that a human being had mana (cf. Mowinkel, Psalmenstudien VI, 63). But this word is connected with speaking in a quite different way from *dāḅār*.

Secondly, where they believe in mana they also believe that a name contains mana. The Polynesians very often changed their names when something important had occurred, i. e. when they had got mana or mana of another form (Lehmann, Die polynesischen Tabusitten, Leipzig, 1930, p. 124. 205 ss.). The Arandas have besides their common names also particular ones which are used only when no evil person can hear, for they think that the name contains the quintessence of a man and acquaintance with it gives to others power over him (Strehlow & Leonhardi, Mythen, Sagen und Märchen des Loritja-Stammes, Frankfurt a. M., 1908, p. 75; Spencer & Gillen, The Northern Tribes of Central Australia, London, 1899, p. 139). There is no doubt that the Jewish synagogue names have the same meaning. The gnostics believed that the travelling soul had to know the names of all the archons and the Ethiopians still nowadays enwrap their corpses in so called *Lafāfa ṣadk*, which contains the names of demons, who must submit to a human being if the later knows their names.

Thus in the OT too¹). Adam's task is to give a name to each

1) And in Babylonia "according to Sumero-Babylonian philosophy the reality of anything consisted in its "form" (*ḥar*; semitic *uṣurtu*), i. e. the divine

creature; that which does not possess a name, does not exist at all (so Bertholet, *Das Dynamistische im AT*, Tübingen, 1926, p. 19, but, though he is in the right, the argument goes too far, for the animals existed before Adam gave names to them). The absence of a name means the absence of the contents, of mana. God's name as a well of power is especially significant. How great its importance is appears already from the fact that the expression *sem iahuē* is a constant quantity, nearly an hypostasis. It is quite impossible to find a parallel to this use of it anywhere in the whole world. The name of the deity is so significant that according to P a new name was given to the deity in each new historical period, till at last God revealed His secret name to Moses. For the purpose of comparison we may take from Andrian (*Correspondenzblatt der deutschen Gesellschaft für Anthropologie, Ethnologie und Urgeschichte* XXVII (1896), p. 119 s.) two examples: The North American Indians, especially their leaders, never told their real names to white men. The Hindoos give two names to their children, the common one is known by everybody, but the other name only by the parents and the person himself. In order to avoid being bewitched he never uses it. Likewise, when anyone utters the name of God such a quantity of latent energy is loosened that miracles can occur; even the written name is unusually powerful. By analogy, if the name contains all the mana of a person then every word this person utters must also contain it. And however mighty the mana of others may be, we can influence it in some degree, the extent of the influence not depending so much on the words used as on the mana of the speaker.

6. *dəḅar iahuē* and its parallels.

After that it is quite clear, that the primary meaning of the expression *dəḅar iahuē* does not mean "word of Yahweh" in our sense. It was not a complex of sounds which God had put into mental concept which was revealed to mankind by its name" (Langdon *ERE* XII, p. 752). The name cannot disappear before existence has ceased (Jeremias *HAOG*², p. 34; Kees, *Totenglauben und Jenseitsvorstellungen der alten Ägypter*, Leipzig, 1926, p. 81). The perishing of the name is the perishing of existence (Ex. 17, 14 Dt. 9, 14 29, 19 Ps. 9, 6), to change the name (Gen. 17, 5 35, 18 Jdg. 18, 29) is also to give a new direction and a new sense and, of course, better contents to existence. The Sumerians tried to do the same with the years, giving them good names on the first day of every New Year (*mu-an-na*).

the mouth of a prophet or revealed to him; it was the power which went out of Yahweh and when it reached a man, it subdued him and made him express the burden (*massā'*) he had to bear. Words were not necessary to express it; sometimes a symbolic action could show it and the meaning of this action was *dāḅar iahūē*. Of itself there was nothing impossible in the fact that the prophets heard Yahweh speaking, but even there the complex of the sounds was not important to them, but the mana it contained; the meaning of the words also was significant, but only so far as it was active (comp. p. 28).

The analogical constructions, especially *rūāḥ iahūē* and *iaḍ iahūē* show to which sphere *dāḅar iahūē* belongs. These are however such cognate conceptions that (e. g. Torge, *Seelenglaube und Unsterblichkeitshoffnung im AT*, Leipzig, 1909, p. 6) they are frequently declared to have the same meaning. According to the orthodox theory (Koenig TAT 3. 4 p. 121, cf. Haenel, p. 63) "die Hand Gottes" means "seine Wirksamkeit oder sein Eingreifen in die Geschichte". But, on the other hand, Koenig believes God to have really spoken, and if God has a tongue and a larynx, why should He not have hands? Or if *iaḍ* here does not denote "hand", why should *dāḅar* denote "word"?

It seems (comp. especially Ezk. 3, 22 37, 1 40, 1) that at first Yahweh's hand comes upon a man, then His word (but cf. Ezk. 1, 3); thus, e. g., Jacobi: *Die Ekstase der alttestamentlichen Propheten*, München u. Wiesbaden, 1928, p. 114 says: "Die Hand Jahves kam über mich — so nennen diese Propheten selbst ihren ekstatischen Zustand ein von Gott Ergriffensein", and in the ecstasy they hear Yahweh speaking¹). Nevertheless it remains dubious whether these two acts differ at all. The attitude is especially questionable on account of the verbs which are used to describe their arrival. They say: *hāiḍā iāḍ iahūē 'al* (2 K. 3, 15

1) As to the question of ecstasy, the more orthodox like Haenel, p. 149 s. Sellin, *Theologie des alten Testaments*, Leipzig, 1933, p. 48 s. deny its existence; they argue that "Gott den Propheten den alltäglichen Gedanken entnimmt, ihn in seine Welt zieht und ihm die Offenbarung schickt". However to deal with this question is to struggle with words in vain, for the prophets of the OT must have been ecstatics, all prophets were, when they felt *iaḍ iahūē* upon themselves or got *dāḅar iahūē*. But certainly the ecstasy of the Semites differs from the ecstasy of Europeans, and vice versa (cf. Eichrodt, *Theologie des Alten Testaments I*, Leipzig, 1933, p. 164, n. 4).

Ezk. 1, 3 (3, 14) 3, 22 (8, 1) 37, 1 40, 1), or: *hāiāḏā iad iahūē 'el* 1 K. 18, 46 Ezk. 13, 9 33, 22), or: *hāiāḏā iad iahūē bə* (Ex. 9, 3 Dt. 2, 15 Jdg. 2, 15 1 S. 5, 9 7, 13 12, 15 (Is. 25, 10) Ruth 1, 13). The most clear and obvious is the construction with *bə*, e. g. Ex. 9, 3 equals *iad iahūē* with a pestilence, which destroys the animals of the Egyptians, in Dt. 2, 15: *iad iahūē* is upon the Israelite trespassers to destroy them; in Jdg. 2, 15 *iad iahūē* is upon the Israelites who worship foreign gods *lārā'ā... uaiiešer lāhem mə'od*; in 1 S. 5, 9 *iad iahūē* is over the Philistines as *mahūmā γəḏōlā mə'od*, and the whole people of the town are therefore ill; in 1 S. 5, 6 it is said that "the hand of Yahweh" was heavy on (*'el*) the people of Ashdod and struck them with sickness; in 1 S. 7, 13 it is written that "the hand of Yahweh" was upon the Philistines all during the life of Samuel; 1. S. 12, 15 says if Yahweh's commands are not observed, then as a punishment "the hand of Yahweh" shall be upon them (*bāḫem*); in Ruth 1, 13 Naomi laments: *iāšə'ā βi iad iahūē*, i. e. her husband is dead and so are her sons too without any children. Is. 25, 10 is not quite clear, as "this mountain" upon which "the hand of Yahweh rests (*tānūāh*)" may be Zion as well as some part of Moab.

With reference to these passages it is clear that Yahweh's hand denotes an evil and destroying power, which acts amidst mankind or other creatures, and that *bə* can be used as well as *'el* (or *'al*). But it is not always thus: the constructions with *'el* or *'al* with respect to the prophets expose no paralysing or extirpating effect; in 1 K. 18, 46, it was just the coming of "the hand of Yahweh" that enabled Elijah to run before Ahab from Carmel to Jezreel; in 2 K. 3, 15, it came upon Elisha when he heard a stringed instrument, and then he spoke. It is just the same state in which a shaman finds himself on hearing the magic drum, i. e. ecstasy. A Polynesian would speak here perhaps of *matakite*, perhaps of *mana*. In Ezk. 1, 3 8, 1, "the hand of Yahweh" gave a vision to the prophet; in Ezk. 3, 22, it is said that after "the hand of Yahweh" had come the prophet heard something that was said to him; in Ezk. 33, 22 it opened the mouth of the dumb prophet. Ezk. 37, 1 probably is a corrupt text because there is no subject for *uaiiōš'eni bərūah iahūē*; perhaps there was *iad iahūē*. The subject of 40, 1 (*uaiiāβe' 'oḏi šāmmā*), who may be Yahweh himself who carries

the prophet to Jerusalem, likewise is uncertain, but it tempts one to treat *iaḏ iahūē* as the subject.

Considering all the above, the following conclusion may be made: *iaḏ iahūē* was a power, which destroyed those who could not bear it; either, they were His enemies or apostates (cf. Ezk. 13, 9: the pseudoprophets), to others it added energy and knowledge (in Ezr. 7, 23 *iaḏ iahūē* was a help to those who came from Babylonia). It was like lightning to some, shattering the non-conductors of electricity, and to others it gave a magnetic power and filled them with itself. This is the same way in which the influence of the mana of a Polynesian chief upon another person is described. It can kill a person differing very much from the possessor of the mana, but it may be transmitted to a person standing nearer to him.

The conception of *rūāh iahūē* (cf. Hoelscher, Die Propheten, Untersuchungen zur Religionsgeschichte Israels, Leipzig, 1914, p. 25; Haenel, Das Erkennen Gottes bei den Schriftpropheten, BZWAT NF 4 (1923), p. 161 ss.; Jacobi, p. 41) is almost the same, especially if we compare Ezk. 11, 5: *tippol 'alai rūāh iahūē uaiiō'mer 'elai*, and Ezk. 3, 22: *uattahi 'alai šam iad iahūē uaiiō'mer 'elai*; the most important reference is 2 S. 23, 2, where "the spirit of Yahweh" "speaks" (*dibber*).

As to *dāḅār*, there is no passage where it is compared with *rūāh* or *iaḏ iahūē*, but it appears from the speeches of the prophets, that *dāḅār* was a power, which forced one to do something, and even if a prophet did not want to, he had to "speak" (Am. 3, 8 Jer. 20, 9). Reference may especially be made to Jer. 23, 29: *hālō' ḡō dāḅāri ḡā'eš, nā'um iahūē, ūḡəḡattīš iəḡo-šəš sāla^c*; comp. Jer. 5, 14 6, 11 (cf. Haenel, p. 186) Is. 55, 11¹).

1) Although scientists assert that in these passages *dāḅār* is an hypostasis, dealing with *dəḅar iahūē* they try to give only classifications of its use. According to Szeruda, one may distinguish three: the word of the revelation, which later on turns into the commands of the Law; the word as a cosmophysical power; and the word as an hypostasis. Grether supposes that already before the time of Dt. *dāḅār* denoted the word of God, which represented not only a command, but also revelations to the prophets. Later on it was connected with history and nature and at last it was assimilated with the canon or hypostatized.

Beginning with the last opinion, Heinisch (Das "Wort" im Alten Testament und im alten Orient, Münster i. W., 1922, p. 16) denies the hypostatizing of Yahweh's word in the OT: "es werde nur dichterisch personifiziert".

Only the fact that *hāiā* with *al*, *'el* and *bə* is used both for *iaδ* as well as for *dāβār*, is important, so they must have something analogous.

The OT itself does not separate the "word of Yahweh" got by a prophet from that which the prophet speaks; it also is *dāβār iahuē*. The speeches of the prophets had the same power, which Jer. 23, 29 assigned to the "word" of Yahweh. An ordinary mortal would have been annihilated by "the word of Yahweh", but the prophet could transmit its power. One may ask, why such a transmission was needful at all. Probably it was because the mana of Yahweh should not be too high, too dangerous, and incomprehensible to the people.

One could say: *uāiāhi dāβār iahuē βāiaδ* (Hag. 1, 1. 3 2, 1. 10) or: *bāiaδ pəloni dāβār iahuē hāiā* (1 K. 16, 7) (besides these: *dāβār iahuē βāiaδ* (Mal. 1, 1), *dāβār iahuē 'āšer dibber bāiaδ* (1 K. 8, 56 12, 15 14, 18 15, 29 16, 12. 34 17, 16 2 K. 14, 25 24, 2 Jer. 37, 2 2 Chr. 10, 15, generally *kidāβār iahuē*), *kidāβār iahuē βāiaδ*

What the essential difference may be between these two ways of thinking is incomprehensible. Others suppose that the hypostatizing is represented in the later texts of the OT; at any rate, one can perceive its beginnings. Really it is seen first in Wisd. 18, 4 ss. Langdon ERE XII, p. 751 thinks it was brought forth by the influence of the Babylonian conceptions of *enem* — *amātu*. Grether 157 s. opposes this with a theory that sounds fantastic. But though Babylonian thought undoubtedly had much influence over Israel, here nevertheless it is not necessary to make such an assumption. Because those passages too, where we might speak of an hypostasis, lose their peculiarity if we explain *dāβār* as above; then they are natural and comprehensible, and so the Babylonian conceptions too. With other words: one must not speak so much of the Babylonian influence as of common Oriental mentality.

But then it seems strange how *dāβār* got the meaning "the word of the Law" (decatalogue or the precepts of the cult). It is significant that *dāβār* never is used for a civil law, but only for such laws which are directly connected with God; thus it is clear how this metaphorical use came to pass. When these single "words", the expressions of *dāβār iahuē*, were written down, the text of the Bible quite naturally got this name, not only because it contained things from Yahweh, but also because the book itself was a source of power and all power had its origins in God. Thus there is no necessity for classifying *dāβār iahuē* on such principles as Szeruda and Grether have given.

But to conclude: it is quite irrelevant if *dāβār iahuē* in the passages mentioned is an hypostasis or not, as one can say that *rūāh iahuē* and *iaδ iahuē* are hypostases too.

(1 Chr. 11, 3 2 Chr. 35, 6), *dibber iahūē βaiad* (Ex. 9, 35 Num. 17, 5 27, 23 1 K. 8, 53 2 K. 17, 23 Is. 20, 2)).

In all these cases the common translation for *baiad* is: "by, through", supposing that the use of this term itself is a later one (Szeruda, p. 22, Volz, *Der Prophet Jeremia*², Leipzig, 1928, p. 423).

As it is impossible to fancy that *iad* here signifies "hand", therefore it probably has the same meaning as in the connection *iad iahūē*, i. e. the power which a single person possesses (a similar use for "hand" exists in Estonian, one can say: "*päikse käes*" = "in the hand of the sun, in sunshine", etc.). The best example is 1 K. 16, 7: *baiad iehū . . . dāβar iahūē hāiā 'el ba'sā*. Jehu is but a medium which is not at all necessary. Hence it appears also that in such an expression *baiad* never could denote a speaker who was anybody else except the chronicler who looked back on an event; the only exceptions seem to be Is. 20, 2 and 1 S. 28, 17, but in the first passage the text is corrupt (cf. Haenel, p. 184), and the second passage (*uāiia'as iahūē lō ka'āšer dibber baiadi*) is certainly a very late one. We have no other passage in the OT where a prophet says *baiadi* but always *'elai*; *baiadō* too is not used in such a connection. As this expression occurs especially in Haggai, it is a sufficient mark that Haggai did not write his speeches down himself but a later chronicler who put himself in the position of the people. This chronicler was not a pupil of Haggai's as no pupil would have said of his master *baiad* but only *'el*. P likes to use *baiad* of the arrangements of Yahweh through Moses (cf. 1 K. 8, 53 2 Chr. 35, 6), afterwards it was used in regard to Samuel (1 Chr. 11, 3), etc.

hāiā dāβar iahūē βaiad is not a perfect parallel to *hāiā dā iad iahūē bā*, but *baiad* and *bā* have nearly the same meaning, as *iad* stands for "person".

The most general construction is *hāiā dāβar iahūē 'el*, which in most cases is followed by the name of the prophet, or *'elai* (this occurs only in Jeremiah, Zekariah and especially in Ezekiel, on which occasions the tradition must be a very correct one compared to the traditions in other books). *hāiā 'el* occurs with *iad iahūē*, but perhaps *'al* would be more correct.

Besides these cases it is questionable if *hāiā 'el* was used at all. Such passages as 1 K. 8, 59: *uāiithiū dāβarai . . . karoβim 'el iahūē* cannot be taken into account, for *'el* there stands because

of *ḵəroβim*. Really only the following are left to be considered: 2 S. 10, 9: And Joab saw, that “the ‘faces’ of the war were against him” (*hāiəḏā ’elāu pənē hammilhāmā*) from before and behind. Probably it meant the troops of the Ammonites moving on Joab from the one side, and the joined forces of the Aramaeans from the other.

Ezk. 7, 16 certainly is corrupt and we have to read *’al*, and so probably also in Ezk. 7, 26, but if *šāmū’ā ’el šāmū’ā tihīē* is correct, it denotes that the evil tidings of an approaching misfortune are immediately followed by other news. Ezk. 45, 16 also perhaps is a mistake, while in 45, 17 *’al* appears in the same meaning.

But in Ezk. 31, 7 (*kī hāiā šōršō ’el majim rabbim*) *’el* seems to be correct, for *’al* never would have given such an idea, unless the expression had denoted that “the roots are over water”, but “their growing towards the waters till they reach them and suck the needful power” is meant.

Ex. 36, 29: *uəiaḥdāu ihiū ḏammim ’el ro’sō ’el haṭṭabba’ad hā’əḥad* is not easily comprehensible, but so much is clear, that here two lines which meet at one point were thought of. This “to be directed to” probably is the most adequate translation for *hāiā ’el* in all those cases where *’el* seems to be correct.

In nearly the same way we have to translate *hāiā ḏəβar iahūē ’el*, as also the whole formula about: “The will filled up to the abundance of Yahweh’s power was directed to NN and arrived”, or, expressed in common language: “NN fell in ecstasy”. The frequent *le’mor* means “in order to command”. *hāiəḏā iad iahūē ’al* has also quite the same meaning.

As we can say *hāiəḏā iad iahūē ’al* so too we may say *hāiā ḏəβar iahūē ’al*. At any rate, the variants of the LXX confirm such a conclusion: 1 Chr. 22, 8 has A = MT: *ἐγένετο ἐπ’ ἐμὲ λόγος κυρίου* [B: *μοι = ἐπ’ ἐμε*], and Zeph. 2, 5: B = MT: *λόγος κυρίου ἐφ’* (A: *προς*) *ὑμᾶς*. *dibber* too occurs comparatively often with *’al* (cf. Gerber’s list), and finally there is *maṣṣā’ ḏəβar iahūē ’al*, which can be explained similarly.

Once in the OT *uəiaḥi ḏəβar* seems to be united with *lə*; this is the case in 1 S. 4, 1 (for Jer. 6, 10 15, 16 20, 8 are understandable with the general meaning of *hāiā lə*). In the first case the words are: *uəiaḥi ḏəβar šāmū’el ləḡōl iisrā’el... uəiiese’ iisrā’el* (the LXX has a different text). What it means is not clear; we

might assume that *laxol* is *liḏaβar kol*, i. e. that Samuel's will became the will of the whole of Israel. But the connection is absent between 4, 1 and 3, 21, where it must be spoken of, and the connection probably is all that the first part of the sentence intends to attain; therefore it is a gloss. Nevertheless, we have to explain it, but we have too many probabilities. If we interpolate something like *nōda*°, we may translate *dāβar šamū'el* either "what happened to Samuel" or "prominence, might, mana of Samuel", etc. Nothing certain can be said, but the glossator surely thought of "word".

7. The Verbs which have *dāβar iahūē* for their subject.

bā° is represented as verb for the subject *dāβar iahūē* in Dt. 30, 1, Jos. 21, 43 Jer. 17, 15 28, 9 and *iāβi'* with the object *dēβar iahūē* in Jos. 23, 15. In Jos. 21, 43 (cf. 23, 15) it is said that not a single good "word" was lost to Israel, but "all came" (*hakkol bā*). In Jer. 17, 15 (cf. Is. 5, 19) the enemies of the prophet ask: *'aijē dāβar iahūē? iāβō' nā!* From Jer. 28, 9 it follows that the prophet's word "of peace" (*lašālōm*) has "come" (*bā*°) when it is fulfilled. In Dt. 30, 1 it is said that the benedictions and the maledictions can "come upon thee" (*iāβō'ū 'alēxā*). Also Ps. 105, 19 may belong here (there it is said of Joseph: *'ad 'eθ bo' dēβārō 'imrad' iahūē šarāpāθhū*), if with *dēβārō* is thought of *dāβar iahūē*. But more fitly here *'eθ bo' dēβārō* might mean "the time when his importance came, when his mana appeared". In Jos. 23, 15 it is said that if the covenant is broken: *iāβi' iahūē 'alēxem 'eθ kōl haddāβār hārā'*.

Of course, "the coming of the word" may be some phrase as we find many of them. But, originally, it must have had an actual meaning. The word in our sense could not come but only the things it expressed. On the other hand, it is clear that they did not think so abstractly and therefore fancied *dāβar* (and also *təφillā*) to come from anywhere like a person. But when it came upon anybody, it could not be a distinct living creature but something like a mass of gas, which by its weight or by its inhalation could exercise an elevating influence or a pernicious one upon a man. But it is also possible to think of "the word" in such cases as of a living creature. — Jeremiah

said that somewhere there was a cruel "word of Yahweh", and his contemporaries ask him why it did not come upon them, but on the contrary they were quite well. — "The word" was always ready to go where it was dispatched by Yahweh, only sometimes Yahweh Himself went out and "the word goes before Him and the lightning comes out from under His feet" (*ləpānāy ijelex dāḅār* (LXX: λόγος) *uəieše' rešeq ləraylāy*: Hab. 3,5).

But "the word" not only walked, it ran (Ps. 147, 15: 'ad māherā iārūš dāḅārō). Szeruda, p. 44 translates here "sein Gebot" und Grether, p. 136 speaks about "einem die Natur durchwaltenden Prinzip". It seems to be very near to an hypostasis, but not more than on previous occasions, for if "the word" could walk why could it not run too? It might loiter on the way and therefore come panting and hurriedly (Hab. 2, 3: *iāpeāh... iḏmahmah*) to the mark. It may be near (Ezk. 12, 23: *ḱārāḅū... dāḅār ḱōl ḥāzōn*).

And as "the word" was a living being it might fall (*nāqal*) on the way, for to fall was not the privilege of things in the OT. It was represented as a traveller who stumbled and could not arise again having lost his strength, or it was like a magic arrow, which did not reach the mark because it hit something else or fell. It is the most general phrase used in cases when some prediction was not fulfilled — it had not energy enough. Nevertheless, the unfulfilled predictions too used to come from Yahweh (cf. Jos. 21, 43), because they did not distinguish so radically in olden times as in Jer. 28, 9 or Dt. 18, 22 where a conclusion was made from *bā'*, that "the word" came from Yahweh, but when it was *nāqal*, then it did not come from Yahweh. 1 S. 3, 19 (*lo' hippil* (sc. Yahweh) *mikkōl dāḅārāy 'arṣā*) obviously shows how they thought in older times. Probably they supposed in the case of unfulfilled prophecies that Yahweh Himself had let them "fall down". But two kinds of *nāqal* are to be distinguished. First, Jos. 21, 43 23, 14 1 K. 8, 56 (which seemingly depends on Jos. 23, 14) — Jos. 21, 43: *lo' nāqal dāḅār mikkol haddāḅār hattōḅ*; Jos. 23, 14: *lo' nāqal dāḅār 'eḥād mikkol haddāḅārīm hattōḅīm* or *dāḅārō hattōḅ* (cf. 1 S. 3, 19). Secondly, if the text is correct, it is represented by 2 K. 10, 10: *lo' iḥpoll middāḅār iahūē 'arṣā* (probably *lo' iḥpoll dāḅār middāḅār iahūē*). In the first case many "words" of which not one had "fallen down" were spoken of, 2 K. 10, 10 one single one, which had

not lost any part of its power, is referred to. But probably when in such cases *dāβār* was used it must be understood as a collective, as the manifold expressions of Yahweh's power are but one power.

"The word" met a human being like another person (*kārā*, *īkrē*: Num. 11, 23), it surprised him like great good fortune or a great calamity (Gen. 42, 38 Job 4, 14). If the text of Zek. 1, 6 is correct, it could overtake persons on the way when they were lingering (as in most cases) while "the word" came swiftly like a demoniac warrior and attacked everyone who could not escape. Szeruda speaks here of an hypostasis, but without any reason for doing so.

The Israelites said that Yahweh's "word" went out (*īāšā'*), and frequently it is said that it came from the mouth of Yahweh (*mippī iahūē*: Is. 45, 23 55, 11 Jer. 23, 16 2 Ch. 36, 12). But this does not at all show that it was a word in our sense; it might have been a breath, and this is power, for it is compared with a stock (Is. 11, 4, cf. Haenel, p. 32). In Jos. 6, 10 "the word" evidently is a source of power. The Israelites had to concentrate this power through silent processions around Jericho during six days in order to possess it on the seventh procession on the seventh day. Though in Is. 2, 3 it is parallel to *tōrā*, it contains mana too like all the precepts of taboo. In Gen. 24, 50 (*mīīahūē īāšā' haddāβār*), there is no possibility of explaining *haddāβār* in the usual way. "The word" here is the secret idea of a complex of accidents; in particular, "the word" certainly denotes the unknown power which made Rebecca act as Eliczer had thought. The best translation may be: "the power has come from Yahweh (which made Rebecca act so)". Dan. 9, 23, which Luther translates as "Befehl", is not at all clear, but it may be a power answering Daniel's prayer.

It may be questioned if *īāšā' mippī iahūē* really was correctly explained. That it was is shown by Is. 55, 11 (cf. Is. 45, 23), where it is said, that "the word" returns (*sūβ*) to Yahweh after performing its mission. How can a real word return? As it is impossible we must conclude that *dāβārī 'āšer iese' mippī*: Is. 55, 11) does not denote a real word. Only the power which went out from the mouth can return through inhalation. As God calls back His "spirit" (*rūāh*) (Ps. 90, 3 104, 29 Job 34, 14 s.), so He also calls back His "word". If for Deutero-Isaiah *dāβār* is an

hypostasis, then as early as Jeremiah it was so, while *bō'* and *šūβ* are dependent on each other.

Ps. 119, 89: *dəβārəχā niššāβ bašsamāim*, is a little strange. The Bible may possibly be meant here, but the psalmist had other words enough for it. At any rate it sounds very similar to the usual exaltations to the Accadian gods that their "word" or "command" had power in Heaven. Something like that was thought with regard to the angels, or that Yahweh's will was fulfilled in Heaven despite its uncertain state on earth (cf. *kām*, p. 40 s.).

For *'āsa* cf. p. 48.

Finally *ne'emān* is to be mentioned as used in the same sense as *niššāβ*. In 1 K. 8, 26 Solomon prays, that "the word" given to David may fulfil itself (*ie'āmen nā'*, 2 Chr. 1, 9 6, 17). The petition implies the eternity of the dynasty and *ne'emān* is a prediction only when it happens thus. Here "the word" is the power of God incorporated in a promise and Solomon prays that the power should remain in his dynasty for ever, that it should be just as obedient as a servant (1 S. 22, 14), as a witness before the court (Is. 8, 2), or a wife (Is. 1, 21) on whom one may lean, and not like Egypt, not like a reed unfit to be leaned on (2 K. 18, 21 Ezk. 29, 6). When the power diminishes the promise is not *ne'emān*, but if not it is like ground on which one may walk with confidence¹).

In 1 Sam. 3, 1 one finds: *ūdəβar iahūē hāiā iākār... 'ēn hāzōn niqrās*. It is not clear what this means; at any rate *hāzōn* and *dəβar iahūē* are parallel terms and *iākār* means "was rare" and, therefore, of course, "estimated". Here there exists no coordination between auditions and visions, but they are the same thing, the direct perception of Yahweh's power and will. It means that Yahweh was very far off from His people so that His power was felt very seldom.

From all these cases one cannot infer that *dəβar iahūē* means "the word, speech of Yahweh". It is the personified power which comes from Yahweh and reveals itself (cf. *niylā* p. 36).

1) Ps. 106, 24 there is written: *lō' he'emīnū lidəβārō*; here *dəβār* may mean not only the promise that Israel would easily get the country, but also Yahweh's power promised for help, but not believed by the Israelites. They did "not trust His power".

8. *dāβar iahūē* as an object for Yahweh.

The verbs which have Yahweh for the subject and *dāβar iahūē* or *dāβārō* etc. for the object denote the same thing. One may expect the use of verbs which are common for "speaking", but one does not find it so, and here too *dāβar* does not appear to be simply a word, not even for Yahweh Himself.

There are the following words to be found denoting the act of the expression of *dāβar*: *šalah*: Jer. 42, 5 Is. 55, 11 Ps. 107, 20 147, 18, i. e. just in those passages where one may speak of the hypostasis. But in Is. 55, 11 it is also impossible; there *dāβar* is spoken of as having emerged from Yahweh's "mouth" and "well accomplished all I sent it for" (*hisliāh 'āšer šalahtū*). The idea in Ps. 147, 18 is almost exactly the same, assuming that the expressions *rūhō* and *dāβārō* have more or less the same meaning. The "spirit" and the "word" are ordered to melt the ice. Ps. 107, 20: *išlah dāβārō uajirpā'em* by no means gives one an opportunity to think of the word in our sense, for it cannot heal, but there some prophecy or a word which has a magic power may be meant. According to that idea, the word is like an emissary sent to do something. With reference to the ambassador himself one, therefore, may say *bā'*.

higgīd is used with reference to the mediator and to God Himself. In Dt. 5, 5 Moses says, that he had been a mediator between God and the people — *lahaggīd lāxem 'ēd dāβar iahūē* — in which case the best translation for *dāβar iahūē* is "the will of Yahweh". Likewise in Ps. 147, 19 where Yahweh is styled *maggīd dāβārō* (or *dāβārāy*) *laja'ākōβ*. Though all this occurs through the spoken arrangements, *dāβar iahūē* here is not "word", for God can reveal His intentions also by dreams (*higgīd*: Gen. 41, 25).

If *niylā* is taken as a reflexive, it does not belong here, but possibly it must be taken in all these cases as a passive which has Yahweh for the subject. In 1 S. 3, 7 *terem iāda' 'ēd iahūē* and *terem iiggālē 'elāy dāβar iahūē* stand parallel; consequently, either Yahweh is identical with *dāβar iahūē* or the revelation of *dāβar iahūē* is the revelation of Yahweh. Dan. 10, 1 says: *dāβar niylā ladanijiel*; but there *dāβar* is simply a term for the following revelation or "thing". As regards 1 S. 3, 7, the expression in 1 S. 3, 21 — *niylā iahūē 'el šamū'el...*

biḏəβar iahūē — is a parallel, but probably it is but the addition of an editor, being preceded by *ioseqq iahūē ləherā'ō*. At any rate, Yahweh reveals (*ləherā'ō*) Himself through or by His "word". But it is very dubious whether only "speaking" is meant here, i. e. whether *niylā ḏəβārō 'ēl* means that Yahweh has spoken. It may signify also the appearance of the most comprehensible part of Yahweh. Otherwise, Yahweh is not quite active during the act of revelation; He only comes to Samuel and puts His covering aside. One may therefore even translate *dāβār* as "essence", but Yahweh's essence is His will.

dibber connected with *dəβar iahūē* occurs only in the Book of Kings and probably is always redactional. It occurs in 1 K. 14, 18 15, 29 16, 12. 34 17, 16 2 K. 14, 25 24, 2 in the form of *kiḏəβar iahūē 'āšer dibber bəiād*; in 1 K. 22, 38: *kiḏəβar iahūē 'āšer dibber* (the subject may be Yahweh, but not in 2 K. 1, 17 where to this formula is added *'elijāhū*); in 2 K. 10, 17 15, 12: *kiḏəβar* or *hū ḏəβar iahūē 'āšer dibber 'ēl*, certainly Yahweh is the subject (in 2 K. 15, 12 perhaps *'al* should be read); in 1 K. 2, 27: *dəβar iahūē 'āšer dibber 'al*; in 2 K. 9, 36: *dəβar iahūē 'āšer dibber bəiād*. 2 K. 10, 10 is very complicated: *middəβar iahūē 'āšer dibber 'al... 'eḏ 'āšer dibber bəiād*. These are the affirmative formulas of the compilers for the correctness of historical events which were not good; they would even say that those events came from Yahweh and sought evidence for them in the predictions of the prophets. The most curious is 2 K. 15, 12 depending on the similar 2 K. 10, 30, though certainly Jehu is not an adequate object for Yahweh, like Elijah, with reference to whom also there stands *'ēl*, as Yahweh had never spoken directly to Jehu. These passages all being redactional, their ideas do not settle the question. Possibly they indeed meant "speaking" in the cases mentioned, but it is too doubtful. Probably it is but a solemn paronymous formula, which meant only "such was the expression of Yahweh's will" and what we think of it is a matter of indifference to Him.

Besides these passages there is still the later one 2 K. 20, 19 = Is. 39, 8: *ṭōβ dəβar iahūē 'āšer dibbartā*, which probably is post-exilic and derived from the conception of *nāḏan bəqī*, as even 1 K. 22, 38 seems to be older, for on that occasion Yahweh Himself is the subject. At all events Is. 39, 8 seems to be a most phrase-like and empty connection. *kī pī iahūē dibber*

(Is. 1, 20 40, 5 58, 14 Mi. 4, 4 (Ob. 18); *pī iahūē*: Is. 30, 2 34, 16 45, 23 48, 3 55, 11 62, 2 Jer. 9, 11 19 23, 16 Ezk. 3, 17 33, 7 Hos. 6, 5 etc., of which Haenel, p. 31 s. too does not think that it really denotes "speaking") is much fuller of meaning. Although *dibber* is joined to mouth, there is as little opportunity to think directly of speaking here as in the case of *iāšā' mippī*. Perhaps there the power which emerges from Yahweh's mouth is also meant. But for all that, the earth also has a mouth (Gen. 4, 11 Num. 16, 30 Dt. 11, 6) and so has the sword (Gen. 34, 26 Dt. 13, 16 etc.); therefore Yahweh's mouth cannot be a real one.

Similarly, the connection with *šiyūā* seems to be a very late one; Num. 30, 2 signifies *zē haddāβār 'āšer šiyūā iahūē* — a precept of the cult, which of itself has the nature of a taboo; perhaps 36, 6 also is thought to be such, for it was certainly not a provision of the civil law to preserve the property of a certain clan by the endogamy of the women. The law of ban (*herem*) from which an exception is made in Jos. 8, 27, *kidāβār iahūē*, was certainly a religious one. *šiyūā dāβār* might mean "laid down a rule owing to the relation between Yahweh and the people" but, though not probably, *dāβār* in this connection may also mean "conduct".

Haenel already has written upon the formula of introduction — *uāiīō'mer iahūē* — stating that it does not mean speaking of God, as it is sometimes followed by the speech of the prophet or is used frequently during the speech, and, therefore, the most exact translation would be: "mitteilen", "beschliessen", or "denken". He says that it does not denote "die Art und Weise der Übermittlung der Offenbarung" (p. 25). It may be that the prophets used it as a reminder to their listeners.

In Jer. 42, 3 ss. the Jews beg Jeremiah to pray to God to get the ecstasy and ability to indicate to them "the way we have to go along and the *dāβār* we have to do". Jeremiah promises to do so and to let them know "every *dāβār* Yahweh answers (*ia'ānē*) you". Here the prophet already is the substitute of the oracle and the praying is like casting lots. The best translation of *dāβār* may be "expression of will", for in both cases "the word" does not render the idea exactly enough.

nāḏan bəqī refers to the prophet, who, according to the usual theory, utters the words dictated to him by Yahweh, who has commanded him to repeat them and has put them into his mouth. Though it occurs comparatively often, it seems to be a late formula; nevertheless, the usual conclusion cannot be made with regard to the passages where it happens, in spite of *dāḅār* being here always in the plural. In Dt. 18, 18 we find: "I shall awake them a prophet amongst their brethren like you — *uənāḏattī dāḅāraī bəqīū*, and he 'speaks' to them all I have commanded him"; in Jer. 1, 9: Yahweh has touched the mouth of the prophet with His hand and says: *hinnē nāḏattī dāḅāraī bəqīḫā*; in Jer. 5, 14 there is: *hinnānī nōḏen dāḅāraī bəqīḫā lə'eš ušhā'ām hazzē 'ešim uā'āḫālāḏām*. It is questionable whether the plural is correct in these passages, and if it were, no one could think of the translation "words", because in Jer. 1, 9 no words are transmitted, but only the power, with which Jer. 1, 10 deals. First Ezekiel went so far as actually to eat up the book of Yahweh's predictions and so *eo facto* contained them, but they were not in his mouth and the whole story (2, 8 ss.) must be an allegory. In Jer. 5, 14, too, "words" is hardly meant originally, but the power put into the prophet's mouth becomes a fire which blazes out of it (in the shape of powerful words) and consumes the people. And finally, if in Dt. 18, 18 "the putting of words into mouth" were meant, the end of the sentence would have been useless as understandable by itself. But the premise in Dt. 18, 18 is that although Yahweh's power is in the "mouth" of a prophet, he can nevertheless say what Yahweh has not ordered. He may misuse the power given him by Yahweh, as some of the prophets did. The characteristic of the future prophet is that he acts otherwise. Taking all the above into consideration we have to read *dāḅāri* in all these passages.

A very near parallel to this idea is *šām bəqī*, which occurs still more frequently. This expression means that the prophet does not exist any more. He says what Yahweh wants. In Ex. 4, 15 Moses says that, having a heavy tongue and an awkward mouth, he cannot speak before the great men and public, but to Aaron he could speak! And afterwards he always speaks himself! The idea is: Moses may let Aaron know the gist, the sense of the speech which he has to deliver (cf. 2 S. 14, 3),

but it cannot be meant that he dictated the words to him because he was not "a man of words" (*'is dāḅārim*). If Moses could dictate to Aaron the whole speech, Aaron would not be necessary at all. And this gist, this sense of a speech, is *dāḅār*. In Num. 22, 38 Balaam excuses himself: *haddāḅār 'āšer iāsim 'ēlohim bəqī 'odō ādabber*. He cannot do what he wants, but must be the canal of Yahweh's will. Is. 51, 16: *u'āsim dāḅārai bəqīxā* (parallel with: *ūḅəsel iādi kissīḅixā*) must be understood similarly. In Is. 59, 21 "This is my covenant with them, my spirit is upon you — *ūdāḅārai 'āšer samti bəqīxā* — will not be quenched out of your "mouth", nor out of the "mouth" of your children or children's children", "mouth" certainly is not an organ, and on the basis of *rūhī 'āšer 'alēxā*, which has the same meaning as "my words that I put in your mouth", we may draw the conclusion that the words were not meant, but rather the will or the power given to man by the existence of "the spirit". In my opinion, Num. 22, 38 shows that one has always to read *dāḅāri*. The punctuators and the LXX thought the plural more correct than the singular; they did not think *dāḅār* meant here "power, will".

If *nāḅal* meant the non-fulfilment of a prediction, *heḳim* "arose" or "raised up" in the opposite sense must be used. Num. 23, 19 points out that a prophecy or a promise (already expressed or not) at first lies on the earth, with its force latent till Yahweh makes it active, raising it up and giving it strength and permission to go. 1 K. 8, 20 is the clearest proof: Yahweh has promised something to David with regard to the later kings. As long as there was no successor the promise remained unfulfilled. But when Solomon celebrated his accession to the throne, the promise got the opportunity of fulfilment. The meaning of 1 S. 1, 23: *'aḳ iāḳem iahūē 'ēḅ dāḅārō*, is not quite evident; however *dāḅārō* cannot be Yahweh's own word here, but something in connection with Samuel, and, therefore, may denote "his task, his destiny"; but in view of Jer. 28, 6, in spite of the plural form there, it may mean also "his speech, his opinion". In Is. 44, 26 Yahweh is *meḳim dāḅār 'abdō*; the parallel *u'āsaḅ mal'āxāy iāšlīm* shows that *'esā=dāḅār*, Jer. 29, 10: *hāḳimodī 'alēxēm 'ēḅ dāḅāri hattōḅ* is quite peculiar, for in such construction *'al* does not commonly occur. This preposition shows that *dāḅār* must be "purpose, wish". Besides these pas-

sages there occurs also a construction with the plural in 1 S. 15, 11 where Yahweh says of Saul: 'eḏ dāḅāraḯ lo' heḱim, i. e. did not obey, and Jer. 28, 6, the words of Jeremiah to Hananiah: iākem iahuḡ 'eḏ dāḅāreḡā. It is almost questionable if the plural is correct here.

There are also three uses to be distinguished: Yahweh "raises up" His own, but also his prophet's "word", and man "raises up the word of Yahweh". The second seems to be the oldest usage, the third probably is the latest one. The *tertium comparationis* conjecturally is in Yahweh's giving His power to the "word" which is vivified by the prophet so that it can stand steadily without withering or fading. Only the idea of heḱim 'al is difficult to understand (perhaps it is a threat that "the word" stands like a sword over men, ready to fall on them), and also the idea that Yahweh "raises up" His own "word". The sense is, probably, that the word is fatigued from being on the way for a long time and is almost falling, but Yahweh gives new strength to it in order to make it go further (1 S. 15, 11; cf. mā'as and bāzā). But the use of heḱim perhaps is not predeuteronomic at all.

The pi'el (only Ezk. 13, 6: iḥālū ləḱaiem dāḅār, i. e. the prophets, cf. 1 S. 15, 11) of course has the same meaning as the hiḡ'il. The ḱal (Is. 40, 8 Jer. 44, 28) certainly shows the firmness and steadiness of "the word"; it lives like thistles and never dies; it is like the air which never vanishes, but exists forever and acts intensively, for, if not, there would be no existence for it at all.

But sometimes Yahweh does not let it go straight but makes it, or them, swerve and sends them, or it, somewhere else, cf. Is. 31, 2: uḏ'ēḏ dāḅārāu lo' hesir. This naturally is not a good act, particularly if the dāḅār is a good one (cf. hippil, p. 33).

A parallel to heḱim is kālā (Ezr. 1, 1 2 Chr. 36, 22): Yahweh awakens Cyrus in order "to fulfil the word of Yahweh from the mouth of Jeremiah" (liḡalōḏ dāḅar iahuḡ mippī iirmāiā), to make His "word" complete and perfect. For this late text the thinking, nevertheless, is very primitive. All the time "the word" was standing and there was but a foreboding of its completion which should have appeared at once; it was like a tiny round cactus which slowly began to grow great. And then it first was seen by men, but the prophets knew what "word"

Yahweh was going to plant or to send on the way before the others could perceive it.

A second parallel is *mille'*: 1 K. 2, 27, Solomon "fulfilled" the curse on Eli's family by expelling Abiathar; in 1 K. 8, 24 Yahweh "has spoken" from His mouth and "has fulfilled with His hand" (*təḏabber bəḳīḫā ūβəiāḏəḫā mille'ḏā*); in 2 Chr. 36, 21 Jerusalem was destroyed — *ləmallo'ḏḏ dəβar iahūḫə bəḳī iirməiāhū . . . ləmallo'ḏḏ šib'im šānā*, i. e. the word had its fulfilment like the years, and it continually approached fulfilment. Before that moment the word was an empty shell slowly increasing like a thundercloud which pours out a shower with lightnings and thunder when it reaches its full size. The fulfilment occurs in fact when some act required takes place or when they think it has happened.

A third parallel is in 1 Sam. 2, 17: *iahūḫə . . . biṣṣā' 'əmṛāḏḏ 'āšer šiūuā mīmē kəḏem*, i. e. He has done what He intended to do. Yahweh's "word" grows and ripens like a grape and then it is cut off. *mille'* is fulfilled by itself but not always; *biṣṣā'* needs a performer. The inhabitants of Jerusalem themselves have helped to finish *'imrā*, like weaving a web or building a house, and then Yahweh lets it fall over them, and the stroke is hard.

Finally it is necessary to mention here also the construction *dibber bə* (cf. *dibber bəiāḏ palonī*) which, except in Jer. 31, 19, is used only on the occasion of Yahweh's revelation to the prophets (2 S. 23, 2 Hos. 1, 2 Hab. 2, 1). It seems that we have to draw a parallel between *'amar bəleβ* and *dibber bə*. The difference lies in the fact that in the first case the human being is the subject, and in the second God is the subject, but the procedure and the result of the event is the same, so that we may translate "Yahweh reveals His power in the prophet, i. e. to the prophet himself". In other words, the prophet spiritually at once, or after a slow process, feels himself able to understand the power of Yahweh. That is a feeling of illumination lasting sometimes but a fraction of a second, during which the human being understands something so clearly and thoroughly, that he knows it and does not believe in the possibility of any other way of understanding it. When such a moment returns, it usually has the same effect if the person himself has not changed. Sometimes the illumination may come from outside,

in particular if the person intuitively catches the idea of some event or object. From the dogmatic point of view one firmly must deny such an interpretation of the prophecy, which is held to be much higher than something common like the inner illumination or vision (but cf. Jer. 1, 11. 13 18, 15 ss. Am. 8, 1 ss.). But this dogma is the product of pride and unbelief. The Israelites held that a similar intimation too came from God, whether it came as a subduing tempest or as a mild breeze. As it came from God it was a much greater affair than we suppose. We have profaned it; we call ourselves creators too, and the inspiration we take for a philosophical or psychological problem. In ancient times it had a connection with God, but not now in "modern times".

All these occasions on which *dāḅār* is presented as a subject to a verb or a direct object seem to show that *dāḅār iahūē* never means "word" in our sense. The same fact appears when we go over to "the word of Yahweh" in its relation to man. The Israelites believed that a prophet "has" (*ieš*) the "word". This expression is ordinarily explained so: the prophet has some revelation in reserve which he has not uttered yet, especially if we take into consideration Zedekiah's question to Jeremiah (Jer. 37, 17): *hāieš dāḅār me'eḏ iahūē*. But Jer. 27, 18 contains two parallel conditions: *'im nāḅi'im hem*, and: *'im ieš dāḅār iahūē 'ittām*; and in 2 K. 3, 12, Josaphat says about Elisha: *ieš dāḅār iahūē 'ōḏō* (l. *'ittō*). Although *ieš* does not indicate time, nevertheless it is impossible to translate "usually is", on account of Jer. 37, 17. There is but one explanation left: when *dāḅār iahūē* possesses anybody it means that the person is a prophet. There is no possibility of translating it as "word"; more truly, it means the ability for ecstasy. Zedekiah did not ask, whether Jeremiah had got a revelation but whether he was able to prophesy at that very moment. The term in such cases signifies nearly the same as *iaḏ iahūē*, for not only is what a prophet has to say "a word of Yahweh", but also the fact that he can say anything from Yahweh at all. The story of Elisha also proves that they did not think a prophet could have *dāḅār iahūē* always with him (2 K. 3, 12). He was only inclined to that and, at least, was able to prophesy now and then (cf. Jer. 42, 7); *ieš* therefore denotes the continuity, but only the continuity of the inclination. And *dāḅār me'eḏ iahūē* means the same as

dāḅar iahuē 'eḏ. One could also translate Jer. 37, 17: "are you a prophet yet?"

That this explanation is the correct one, is shown by 1 K. 17, 24, where the widow of Zareptah says to Elijah that she now knows and believes that *'is 'ēlohim 'attā uḏāḅar iahuē bəqīḅā 'ēmeḏ*. *'ēmeḏ* cannot be used as a substantive here, and, therefore, it is not a quality of "the word"; it has but an adverbial function meaning "really" (cf. Jer. 10, 10). How does the woman know that Yahweh's "word" actually is in the "mouth" of Elijah? Not because some prophecy of Elijah has been fulfilled, but because he revived her dead son. Perhaps Elijah not only cast himself down upon the boy thrice, but also blew his breath into the child's mouth, and this was "the word of Yahweh" given him by Yahweh, as the woman thought. "The word" here also is only the vivifying power as in the last case it was the power to prophesy.

9. *dāḅar iahuē* as an object for the people.

We cannot always make a sharp distinction between the prophet as a mediator of "the word" and his attendants, because there were certainly stages of transition between a prophet and a common mortal. The first one could treat "the word of Yahweh" as everyone could treat his "words". He could accept them, or it, not only formally, but with an ecstatic joy and submit himself; but he could also resist. Likewise his attendants. Therefore, the verbs which are used of the people in relation to "the word" are partly the same as those used of the prophet in relation to it. There is, too, the possibility that in this group of verbs, at least sometimes, *dāḅar* is not a spoken but already a written text, but through it one can see the original meaning, "which contains mana".

This fact is proved more directly by the verb *pāḅad* (Ps. 119, 161) denoting not only "was afraid", but also "was delighted". The primary significance of the verb was but a certain degree of emotion and intensesness, notwithstanding the contents; the motion of the soul, notwithstanding its purpose. If a poet says: *middāḅarəḅā pāḅad libbī*, he shows how primitive is his relation to God as a power, but he does not show from what source he knows God's "word". If the same man says: *lidāḅarəḅā iḥalti*

(Ps. 119, 74. 81. 114. 147), he might possibly mean the promises given by Yahweh not only to the single person but also to the whole people; but a promise too is a power. In Ps. 130, 5: *uāliḏaβārō hōhālti* (parallel with *kiuūḏi laiahuē*) the text is dubious, but the parallelism is evident and *dāβār* may be "help" or "promise" or "power", although it all can be written down in a holy book. Probably Ps. 119, 43 shows it, as there Yahweh's *mišpāt* is the object for *iāhal* and frequently for Yahweh Himself, so that *dāβār* and *mišpāt* (which may mean a written law or the justice of God) both were but usual moods of the revelation of Yahweh's power.

bātahtī biḏaβāreḡā (Ps. 119, 42) has the same meaning, and generally the object of this verb is Yahweh Himself (Ps. 25, 2 26, 1 28, 7 56, 4) or His *heṣeḏ* (Ps. 13, 6 52, 10).

iāre', the synonym of *pāhad*, occurs only in Ex. 9, 20, denoting there the treatment of "the word" by the servants of Pharaoh. It is obvious that the word itself is not feared, but Yahweh's power behind it, as to be afraid means to reckon with reality and to come to a conclusion from it. Yahweh's might appeared in the plague He swore would be sent over them, in the frightfulness and extent of that threat, for they believed that God did not threaten unless He could carry out everything He threatened. It was possible to think of a written word in the passages of Ps. 119, but here nobody can think of "word" in our sense.

Only in Ex. 9, 21 is *iāre'* 'eḏ *dāβār iahuē* placed in opposition to the person who "has given no attention to the word of Yahweh" (*lo' šām libbō 'eḏ dāβār iahuē*), whence it follows that *šām 'eḏ leβ* and *iāre'* are synonyms; therefore, we have to explain it almost as in the previous case.

The verbs *bikḡeš* and *dāraš* are connected with the seeking of an oracle, in order to ask Yahweh's intention on some occasion. In Am. 8, 12 it is said that men were strolling through the whole country *laβakḡeš 'eḏ dāβār iahuē*, but did not find one (8, 11 is an addition). Here the identity of Yahweh and *dāβār* is quite obvious, because men of course will not hear from an oracle what Yahweh says, but what He intends to do. More usually Yahweh Himself is the object of *bikḡeš*, only here His *dāβār* is the object. But the sentence is not to be understood as a metaphorical one, as "Yahweh's word" does not stand for

Yahweh but they are identical. Certainly, one may argue, that if *dāḅār* were power, there would be no necessity to seek it, as the starved and the thirsty feel it already. But *dāḅār* is a power having a *telos*, which partly may be understood by human beings, but they are anxious to know all that God plans, but Yahweh is silent. Only once does there occur *šā'al* with the same meaning, namely in 2 Sam. 16, 23: *μᾶ' ἄσαθ' ἄῆτιθοφῆλ... ka'ašer iis'al* (ʾis) *biḏāḅar iahūḫē*. It is unusual instead of *šā'al* *bā'iahūḫē* (Jdg. 20, 23. 27 1 S. 10, 22 23, 2 28, 6 30, 8 etc.) or *šā'al 'eḏ pī iahūḫē* (Jos. 9, 14 Is. 30, 2). Hence there follows the same conclusion as from the previous case: *dāḅār* is Yahweh, and we may translate it as "will". *pī iahūḫē* in such a connection clearly shows that we must not explain the conception purely organically, because here it may denote either the oracle-priest, or the oracle itself, which was the means Yahweh used to express Himself.

The object of *dāraš* usually (e. g. Gen. 25, 22 1 S. 9, 9) is Yahweh Himself. But in 1 K. 14, 5 22, 5 it is *dāḅār* or *dāḅar iahūḫē*¹⁾. In the first case, certainly, Jeroboam's wife comes to ask the fate of her son, and this inquiry is *daroš dāḅār*. *dāḅār* here is either "the case" or an abbreviation for *dāḅar iahūḫē*. Similarly in the second case. Josaphat says to Ahab: *darōš nā' kajjōm 'eḏ dāḅar iahūḫē*. *dāḅār* here cannot denote "word", but "will, intention". The oracle is never asked for any poetical speech or any explanation of a dubious dogma, but plainly for the future course of events. If the answer of the oracle was *dāḅar iahūḫē*, we have no reason to compare that expression with anything of ours, because the oracle was not a "prophetische Wortoffenbarung" but the determination of the acting power, i. e. "the word of Yahweh" and its intentions.

The verb *šāma'* very frequently occurs, especially as an imperative, as a summons to the Israelites to listen to the words of the prophets (Jos. 3, 9 1 K. 12, 24 22, 19 (2 Chr. 18, 18) 2 K. 7, 1 21, 16 (Is. 39, 5) Is. 1, 10 28, 14 66, 5 Jer. 2, 4 7, 2 9, 19 17, 20 19, 3 20, 11 22, 2. 29 29, 20 31, 9 34, 4 42, 15 44, 24. 26 Ezk. 6, 3 13, 2 16, 35 21, 3 34, 7. 9 36, 1. 4 37, 4 Hos. 4, 1 Am. 7, 16 8, 11; most passages in Jer. may be redactional). But in most

1) We may compare e. g. Neh. 5, 13, where LXX=MT, translates *ῥῆσαν τὸν Κύριον*, but **א**^a *τὸν λόγον Κυρίου*.

cases the prophets do not call the people to listen to themselves but to "the word of Yahweh". Nevertheless, there is no need to explain that people were called to hear the words, as with more right we may think they were summoned to attend to Yahweh's will, which was revealed and became comprehensible by the paraphrasing of a prophet. Not seldom we may translate: "Listen! Yahweh's *dāḅār*...". As regards listening itself, the prophets very often complain that the people do not listen (Is. 6, 9 Jer. 7, 13. 24 11, 8 17, 23 44, 5 Hos. 9, 17 Zec. 1, 4). It is possible that the people frequently paid no heed to them, as is at all times the case. But another explanation is possible too, namely, that *šāma'* is a synonym for *šām 'al leḅ* (to hear and to act are in these cases not synonymous, for very often the prophets ask for no actions). The prophets demanded that the people must consider and not ignore their summons. The prophet to whom *dāḅar iahūē* was an overwhelming experience naturally desired that it should be experienced also by others, and that is why he spoke. One may say that by such a request a prophet existed for the people instead of God, but we may as well compare the speech of the prophet to an expedient (for instance with the playing of the harp to Elisha) to give the people the opportunity to understand what Yahweh's *dāḅār* was, what He wanted. Therefore not only *šāma'* was used. For one may use *rā'ā*, as in Jer. 2, 31 with regard to the people: *haddōr 'attem rā'ū dāḅar iahūē*, introducing the following complaint: *hāmīdbār hāiūdi laišrā'el*. It is doubtful owing to the composition of the sentence, whether the text is correct. And if it were correct, there would be no opportunity of speaking simply of "seeing", but of an intuitive comprehension of the rebuke following. The best translation of *dāḅar iahūē* in this case would be: "the indignation of God" or something like that, the rightness of which a man must understand but does not. Haenel, p. 107 takes it for a word spoken by Yahweh to the Israelites by historical events. Many scholars change the text but there is scarcely a reason for this, because in Jer. 33, 24 Yahweh says: *hālō' rā'īdā mā hā'am hazzē dibbārū*, and in Gen. 42, 1 we find: *uajjar' ia'ākōḅ kī iēš šēḅer bamisrājim*. In both cases we cannot speak of actual seeing, but only of knowing. Jer. 38, 21 is not to be taken into account, for the "word" "shown" to Zedekiah by Yahweh was a real event (cf. Haenel, p. 53. 99), but one cannot explain

Ezk. 11, 25 so. Of course, it is not necessary to argue that in Jer. 38, 21 it must be explained thus, for Zedekiah might have imagined at the time how all the women were led captive. But it is important that *dāḅār* in Jer. 38, 21 means "event", and all passages with *hir'ā* may be explained according to that.

iāda' with *dāḅār iahūḗ* as the object occurs only in Zec. 11, 11: *uajjedā'ā xānā'āniiḗ haṣṣō'n . . . ki dāḅār iahūḗ hū'*. Here it is quite impossible to think otherwise than that *dāḅār iahūḗ* denotes something like punishment; of course, it may be also "will". But it is as possible that *dāḅār iahūḗ* appears in the breaking of sticks, as this action was the only way to make the sellers of sheep and goats perceive anything. The idea is so rude that there is no possibility of explaining it so that it might be understood; at any rate, the symbolic action is *dāḅār iahūḗ*, but one discerns it only by the results of the action named above, and knows that it loosened a power. Seemingly, in ancient times they supposed, enough would be done if they "listened" to "Yahweh's word", because the connection with *āṣā* was a later one than the construction with *šāma'*, which might have been prophetic. In 1 K. 17, 5 it is said of Elijah: *uajia'as kidāḅār iahūḗ*; in 2 K. 10, 10 Jehu says: *uajahūḗ 'āṣā'ēḏ 'āšer dibber bāiad 'abdō 'elijāhū* to Ahab's race; (2 Chr. 34, 21, the complaint of Josiah: *lo' šāmarū . . . 'ēḏ dāḅār iahūḗ la'āšōḏ kəḫōl hakkādūḅ* belongs to *šāmar*); in 2 Chr. 35, 6 the Passover is held "to make according to the word of Yahweh" (*la'āšōḏ kidāḅār iahūḗ bāiad mošē*); in Ps. 148, 8 it is said: *rūāh sē'ārā 'ōṣā dāḅārō* (cf. *ud=enem*, p. 20); in Ps. 103, 20 the angels are "the makers of His word", *'ōṣē dāḅārō, lišamoā' bəḫōl dāḅārō*; in Jo. 2, 11 stands: *ki 'āšūm 'ōṣē dāḅārō* (probably the passage is a gloss, as *'āšūm* is the explanation of *raḅ mə'od* and this depends in turn on *nāḏan kōlō*); in 1 K. 18, 36 Elijah prays before sacrificing on Carmel: *ūḅidāḅārəḫā* (or *-rəḫā*) *'āṣiḏi 'eḏ kōl haddāḅārim hā'ellē*; but in Is. 55, 11 *dāḅār* acts (*'āṣā*) itself. The oldest of these passages probably is Ps. 148, 8, for the manner of thinking is the most primitive one, although "word" here also may mean "will, command", as elsewhere. All the other passages are later as Is. 55, 11; only 1 K. 18, 36, where we may perhaps explain *ḅidāḅārəḫā* as "by the help of thy power" (comp. p. 37), may be older. To differentiate among power, will, and command was very difficult for an Israelite; he felt them to be the same or directly

connected with one another; the power, of course, had a purpose owing to which it changed into will requiring absolute obedience because the power was great and its extension unlimited. As will is absolute it had to be known and fulfilled everywhere. As regards later passages with *'āsā*, *dāḅār* may be already a written command.

šāmar also seems to be comparatively late, see Ps. 119, 17: *u'ēšmārā dāḅāreḡā*; Ps. 119, 101: hinder my feet from going along a wicked way to hold Thy "word" (*lāma'an 'ēšmor dāḅāreḡā*); the references to 2 Chr. 34, 21 mentioned, and 1 Chr. 10, 13: *uajīāmōḏ šā'ul bəma'ālō 'āšer mā'al bəiahuḡ 'al dāḅar iahuḡ 'āšer lo' šāmar*. According to this passage, which is not quite clear (possibly there are two variants) because of *'al*, *dāḅar iahuḡ* is nearly the same as Yahweh Himself or more exactly, it is the form of the covenant between Yahweh and man. The latter must do what he is commanded to. The commandments then might be unwritten, as in the case of Saul (but the Chronicler certainly thought that they had already been written down, as the person who had composed Ps. 119 too). Perhaps the difference from *'āsā* depends on whether *šāmar* does not require any activity. When one says *'āsā* he means that there are things to be done, when he says *šāmar* he thinks only of things not to be done.

Ps. 56, 5: *be'lohīm 'āhallel dāḅārō*, 6: *kōl haiiōm dāḅarai i'asḡebū*, 11: *be'lohīm 'āhallel dāḅār*, take a peculiar position. The exegetics say that the text is corrupt but the LXX translates: 5: ἐν τῷ θεῷ ἐπαινέσω τοὺς λόγους μου (*dāḅarai*), 6: ὅλην τὴν ἡμέραν τοὺς λόγους μου ἐβδελύσσοντο, 11: ἐπὶ τῷ θεῷ (= ? *'al 'ēlohīm*) αἰνέσω ὄημα (par. λόγον).

We may without any doubt translate *dāḅarai* as: "my affairs". But *dāḅār* here may also be a human quality and may mean "power", the idea being that the poet argues his power belongs to God, so that in praising God, he praises his own power. But it is interesting to note what the exegetics make of this text. Gunkel conjecturally reads: 5, 11 *bəiahuḡ 'āḡatkel* (or *'āḡalle*) *dāḅarī*, 6: *kōl haiiōm iiddāḅarū iūmā'āšū* (or *dibbārū 'ēḡēḡ*; *dibbādi iōḡi'ū*) and translates *dāḅār* "Sache". Koenig 533 translates 5: *bei Gott darf ich sein Wort rühmen* (11: *das Wort*), 6: *allezeit beschweren sie meine Wege (dārāḡai)*. But beyond a reference to Ps. 105, 12 (*bəriḡ*), he gives no explanation.

Wutz translates 5: *mit Gott rühme ich mich meiner Worte* (*dəβārai*, 11: *des Wortes*); 6: *allezeit verabscheuen sie meine Worte*. Baethgen explains that in 56, 5.11 a promise is meant (cf. Ps. 130, 5) and in v. 6 *dəβārai* are "meine Angelegenheiten, Interessen". Briggs: 5 = 11: *of Yahweh I boast with a word of song*, 6: *all day long with words (dəβārim) they vex me*. Probably the explanation given above is simpler than these: at any rate, it is possible, although one can translate "of Yahweh I especially praise His power".

Besides the positive relation to "Yahweh's word", the negative may occur also. It could be expressed by setting *lo'* before every verb mentioned, but there are also special verbs. The latest of these probably is *šāxah* (Ps. 119, 16) where the author says that he does not forget "Yahweh's word". One may also forget God (Dt. 8, 14 Is. 17, 10), but nevertheless *dəβār* here probably is a command written or learnt by heart as the manner of the poet makes it possible to assume this.

mā'as bə and *bāzā* seem to be older. They occur in 1 S. 15, 23: *ia'an mā'astā 'eḏ dəβār iahūē uajim'āsəxā mimmelex* (or *mihaiōḏ mēlex*); in Is. 30, 12: *ia'an mō'ōsəxem baddəβār hazzē*; in Jer. 8, 9: *hāxāmim . . . hinnē bidəβār iahūē mā'āsū uəhōxmad mē laxem*. 1 S. 15, 23. 26 *dəβār iahūē* certainly denotes the law of ban, in Jer. 8, 9 any of Yahweh's commandments or all, but Is. 30, 12 is dubious, because "this word" may be a sentence like Is. 7, 9, or the word of the seers in Is. 30, 10. The law in 1 S. 16, 23 is a kind of taboo; because Saul has broken the taboo God disregards the taboo of anointing. In the background stands the idea "will = power". *bāzā* occurs in Num. 15, 31: who sins "with a raised hand" (*bəjad rāmā*) must be executed, for he has ignored the "word of Yahweh" (*kī dəβār iahūē bāzā*); in 2 S. 12, 9: Nathan asks David after the latter has let Uriah be killed and has taken his wife; *maddūā' bəzīḏā 'eḏ dəβār iahūē* (but in 2 S. 12, 10 Yahweh says, that the punishment shall come upon him for he "has disregarded" Him (*kī bəzīḏāni*), also *dəβār iahūē = iahūē*). In both cases the commands of taboo are disobeyed, whatever they are, and sometimes they may change places with Yahweh Himself. Not the word is ignored, not the command, but the taboo, i. e. God's will formed anyhow, and Yahweh's omnipotent power is not taken seriously enough.

In the rest of the world similar occurrences are found

where taboos are attributed to the gods as their arrangements. All is taboo that has contact with a deity, but the fact that some things contain mana is not further discussed. A thing has mana but not because some god has arranged it thus. The Israelites later on attributed all events to Yahweh and so they merged several deities, demons, and spirits into one. Hence it was directly inferred that nothing had mana, that nothing was taboo, unless Yahweh had given it, or more exactly: there was no mana but one, which Yahweh had proclaimed to be mana. And finally, there was no mana but Yahweh's, and there was nothing taboo but what Yahweh had indicated. All precepts, moral, civil, or religious, have been commands of taboo (for Polynesia cf. Lehmann, p. 91 s. 146 ss.). And only by the profaning of all things and events have they lost their primitive character.

10. *dəβar iahuē* and the prophet.

The verbs are partly the same as in the former case, for instance *šama'*, *rā'a* and *iāda'* (for *iēš* see p. 43 s.). Very often no one is spoken of especially, only *šama'* is more frequent. But no prophet says that he has listened (*šama'*) to the "word of Yahweh", although it is not impossible that some prophets usually could see *dəβar iahuē*, though the others heard it.

The passages where the prophets speak of their *šama'* are the following: Is. 21, 10: *'āšer šama'ti me'ēv iahuē . . . higgadti lāḫem*; Is. 28, 22: *kālā uəneḥērašā šama'ti me'ēv iahuē*; Jer. 23, 18: *mī 'amad bəsōd iahuē uəiere' uəiisma' 'ēv dəβārō, mī hikšīβ dəβārō uəiisma'* (cf. 23, 22); Jer. 49, 14 = Ob. 1: *šamā'a šama'ti (-nū) me'ēv iahuē*; Ezk. 2, 8: *šama' 'ēv 'āšer 'āni mədabber 'elēxā* (Yahweh speaks); Ezk. 3, 17: *uəšama'tā mippi dəβar uəhizhartā 'ōdām* (= 33, 7); Ezk. 40, 4: *rə'e hā'ēnēxā uəβə'ōznēxā šamā' . . . ləxol 'āšer 'āni mar'ē 'ōdāx*; Hab. 3, 2: *ياهوē šama'ti sim'āxā*. The passages where the prophets speak of their ears: Is. 5, 9 22, 14 48, 8 50, 4.5 Ezk. 3, 10 9, 1.5 40, 4 44, 5 (cf. Koenig, Offenbarungsbegriff II, p. 158 Haenel, p. 33 s.) belong here also, but not so much those where they speak of *kōl iahuē*, for the expression may mean also the rumbling of thunder (which naturally might have given revelations to the prophets, as the thunder storm was a "word of Yahweh" too).

All these passages and the story of Micah (1 K. 22) are the main proofs for the theory that the prophets heard Yahweh speak, and, therefore, *dəβar iahuē* must be a word, spoken and heard. Although it might be so (Haenel, p. 30 ss. denies it for this verb), it is by far not proved that "the word" meant to the Israelites exactly what it does to us, i. e. a complex of sounds. The fact of *šama'* never being connected with *dəβar iahuē* except in Jer. 23, 18 shows also that this theory is not the right one. Even Ezekiel generally says: *hāiā 'elai dəβar iahuē*, and in Jer. 23, 18 *rā'ā* stands before. Therefore, "Yahweh's word" is a thing seen and heard at the same time! Probably therefore these two words were set side by side (in the LXX even *uāiisma'* is wanting, for *καὶ ἴκονσε* have only 41 88!) in order to show that *dəβar iahuē* is neither seen nor heard, but nevertheless perceived by the senses. The prophets certainly had auditions (cf. Haenel, p. 67 ss.) but in the cases mentioned they used *šama'* instead of sensual perception in general, just as in some cases for this purpose they used *rā'ā* (cf. Ezk. 11, 25: *uā'ādabber 'el haggōlā 'eḏ kōl diβré iahuē 'āšer her'ānī*; Hab. 2, 1: *uā'āšappē lir'ōḏ ma-ijədabber iahuē βi*), or on the occasions where the prophet suddenly saw the profound idea of a common thing. On the contrary, in Jer. 18, 1 ss., Yahweh says to Jeremiah: *'asmi'āxā 'eḏ dəβārāi*, and Jeremiah himself says (18, 5): *uajəhi dəβar iahuē*. But it is obvious that Jeremiah on observing the potter suddenly grasped what conclusion one could draw from such an occupation, and that was the "word of Yahweh". But Jeremiah did not hear it.

This is shown also by *hāzā*, which (according to Koenig, Offenbarungsbegriff II, p. 29 ss. 72 s.; ctr. Haenel, p. 7 ss. Grether, p. 102, note 4) is used only with reference to the pseudo-prophets! The derivative *hāzōn* is frequently used as the title when no vision follows but speeches only (Is. 1, 1 2, 1 Ob. 1 Nah. 1, 1 Hab. 1, 1 1 Chr. 17, 15), and in Lam. 2, 14, e. g., it is said: *nəβi'aiiḫ hāzū lāx šāu'*, where perhaps only their predictions are meant, as in Is. 30, 10 (cf. Ezk. 13, 16): *lo' deḫēzū lānū nəxoḥōḏ! dabbərū lānū hālākōḏ!* Therefore Haenel, p. 11 says with right, that *hāzā* means the action of seeing as well as hearing. If one could use *hāzā* with reference to *dəβar iahuē* [or *haddāβār*: Is. 2, 1; *maššā bāβel*: Is. 13, 1; *diβré 'āmōs... 'āšer hāzā*: Am. 1, 1; *hammaššā'*: Hab. 1, 1 (cf. Mi. 1, 1: *dəβar iahuē 'āšer hāiā 'el*

mīḫā or *'āšer ḥāzā 'al . . .*], then Yahweh's word must be something else than a word in our sense. It may mean only the power having a purpose which is perceived by the prophet, being either "heard" or "seen", but in each case understood through the senses.

The prophet too may know (*iāda'*) that the something that occurred to him was "Yahweh's word", although there is but a single passage, Jer. 32, 8. It is doubtful whether the sentences in the previous verses are *dāḅar iāhuḫē*, and it is also doubtful how Jeremiah could know it, or was Hanamel's coming to sell his field to Jeremiah at such a time of depression a "word of Yahweh"? In any case, Jeremiah felt that Yahweh's hand played a part there. For, looked at seriously, such a deed was only mocking a person who was imprisoned. Possibly *dāḅar iāhuḫē* is here the speech of Yahweh, for, according to 32, 1 or 32, 6, it seems that Jeremiah acted according to Dt. 18, 18; something was "the word of Yahweh" but after his accomplishment. But the speech consists naturally of Jeremiah's own thoughts, and, therefore, in the act of his countryman he sees something profound, a proof of his own theories (cf. Gen. 24, 50, p. 22. 34).

The relation of the prophet to the listeners is in most cases marked by *kārā'*. In Jer. 11, 6 Yahweh says: *kārā' 'ēḏ kōl haddāḅārim ḥā'elle* (what these are is not clear); in Jer. 3, 12: *uākārā' ḏā 'ēḏ haddāḅārim ḥā'elle* (i. e. the following call to Israel); in 2 K. 23, 16: *kidāḅar iāhuḫē 'āšer kārā' 'is ḥā'ēlohīm* (conjecturally a very recent text). It is important that Yahweh does not "preach" (*kārā'*) to the prophets, for instance, as Jeremiah to his secretary (Jer. 36, 18). Then such instances as Jer. 11, 16 20, 3 or Zec. 7, 7.13 (*kārā' βəiaḏ hannəḅvīm*) do not account. The only instance would be Ezk. 9, 1: *uajjīkrā' bə'ōznai kōl gādōl*, but it is dubious if the revelation of *dāḅar iāhuḫē* is meant there. But as said, if the prophet heard Yahweh, it is no proof of the theory that *dāḅar iāhuḫē* is His spoken word.

Finally, Job 4, 12: *uə'elai dāḅār iāyunnāḅ uattikkah 'ōzni šemeḅ menḫū* may be included here, though *dāḅār* may possibly mean "a thing". But it was no ordinary thing; it was something spectral, terrifying, so that Eliphaz began to tremble. And this *dāḅār* speaks, for *kōl 'ešma'* (4, 16) is not *dāḅār*, but *šemeḅ menḫū*. Why Eliphaz does not say *dāḅar iāhuḫē* we cannot tell; probably he intends to be more mysterious.

What *dāḅar iahūē* signified to the prophet we may guess by Jeremiah's lamentations to God (20, 7 ss. 15, 10 ss.). It was poison to them. And the words spoken by the prophet while under the influence of *dāḅar iahūē* were not words got from Yahweh but only the symbolic expression of the seizure. Yahweh perhaps spoke during the contact; nevertheless the prophet generally did not repeat these words, but explained their influence upon him. He was like a dumb person to whom an order to speak is given and who tries to do so with the purpose of releasing himself from the weight of that pressing power. Amos (3, 8) explains correctly: Yahweh's "speaking" is like the roaring of a lion which strikes a man with terror. Men express their fear by exclamations; they try to escape, etc. Yahweh's "roaring" turns a human being into a prophet. The internal connection of *dibber* and *nibbā'* is the same that exists between a lion's roar and a man's fear. The announcements of the prophets conceptually are comparable to one's fear of a lion; to prophesy is really to express one's fear, to flee and to rescue oneself from the destruction which God sends upon a mortal. But through expression the fear is transmitted to others too, and the prophet himself is not so heavily weighed down any more, for all men suffer with him, all are aghast with horror.

But to be poisoned is honourable as Jer. 5, 13 clearly shows. The adversaries of Jeremiah boast that they have *rūāḥ* "spirit", but Jeremiah argues that they have *rūāḥ* "wind" and there is no *dāḅar* in them. Here we have the most clear consequence: for Jeremiah too the possession of *dāḅar* and *rūāḥ* are synonymous; he himself first distinguishes them; *dāḅar* is weighty and significant, the *rūāḥ* of the pseudo-prophets is light and empty; *dāḅar* gives a certain mental direction, *rūāḥ* but a confused speech, from which everyone can find something agreeable for himself.

From the fact that Jeremiah was accused of drawing the evil day nearer by his speeches (Jer, 17, 16), we may infer what the people thought of the prophet's words. But also the prophets themselves ascribe to *dāḅar iahūē* (thinking either of that which was experienced by themselves and uttered, or of that which remained formless and threatening) a very extensive influence and a demonic power, as in Zeph. 2, 5: *hōī iōšāḅē ḥēḅel haijām gōī karedim, dāḅar iahūē ʾālēḅem kəna'an ʿereḅ pəlištim, ḡha-*

'āḇadtiḡā me'ēn iōšeḇ, or Zec. 9, 1: maṣṣā' dāḇar iahūē b'ereḡ ḡadrāḡ ḡadammēṣēk mānūḡāḇō, or Zec. 12, 1: maṣṣā' dāḇar iahūē 'al iisrā'el (cf. Mal. 1, 1, the difference is but 'el for 'al), or Is. 9, 7: dāḇar ṣālah 'ādonāi bāi'ākōḇ ḡanāḡal bāiisrā'el, or the passages with maṣṣā': Is. 13, 1 15, 1 17, 1 19, 1 21, 1.11.13 22, 1 23, 1 30, 6 Jer. 23, 33 s. 36. 38 Nah. 1, 1 Hab. 1, 1 (2 K. 9, 25 Is. 14, 28 22, 25) and particularly maṣṣā' dāḇar iahūē (Zec. 9, 1 12, 1 Mal. 1, 1), although the meaning of these passages is not quite clear, for dāḇar iahūē may be an orthodox correction for maṣṣā'.

And it is only because dāḇar iahūē is a creative power which can form the future also that the words of the prophets will be completely fulfilled. They are the exponents of dāḇar iahūē.

11. kiḇar iahūē and biḇar iahūē.

kiḇar iahūē stands after the narration of some action or event, representing a formula stating that all that had occurred was Yahweh's intention (Jos. 8, 8.27 1 K. 12, 24 13, 26 14, 18 15, 29 16, 12.34 17, 5.16 22, 38 2 K. 1, 17 4, 44 7, 16 9, 26 10, 17 14, 25 23, 16 24, 2 Jer. 13, 2 32, 8 Jon. 3, 3 1 Chr. 11, 3. 10 2 Chr. 35, 6). It is the favourite expression in the deuteronomic redaction; it seems to be the result of Am. 3, 7, viz. that Yahweh does not do or intend anything without revealing it to His prophets. In still later times (Ps. 119, 25.28.107.169) dāḇar, almost in the same connection, is already a written word of promise to those who keep the commandments of the Law. But in these passages one can translate "enliven me in the same manner as Thy word" etc.

Grether, p. 127 says: "Jahwes dabar gilt als der Nerv der Geschichte, auf den die einzelnen Ereignisse zurückgeführt werden". The Israelites had no word for "history" but, nevertheless, Grether's definition is correct, if we put "will" instead of dāḇar. Then the sentence is understandable and a commonplace to us. But it was not a commonplace to the people who saw something mysterious, unknown and dangerous in every event. They did not know whence it came, as men were but toys to the strange powers. The deuteronomic redaction, although the idea itself was older, certainly gave a reply: "All that occurs

Yahweh desires; all is the expression of His power, but His intentions are only known to the prophets". Therefore, this redaction is the last result of prophecy.

bidāβar iahūē also seems to be comparatively recent. It occurs particularly in the story found in 1 K. 13, which surely belongs to the time of Josiah and is not an invention of the deuteronomic redaction, cf. 2 K. 23, 15 ss. Elsewhere it occurs in 1 S. 3, 21 1 K. 18, 36 20, 35 Ps. 33, 6 (cf. 17, 4) and 2 Chr. 30, 12. Considering the profane use, we may translate *bə* as "through, after, according", but then arises the question why did they not always use *kə* as it means the same? Sometimes we may hesitate to read *kidāβar* (as in 2 Chr. 30, 12). The difference between these two expressions seems to be that in *kidāβar* we have to distinguish between *dāβar* and its fulfilment — they are only compared — while in *bidāβar* the *dāβar* is just the power which acts. In 1 S. 3, 2 Yahweh appears to Samuel *bidāβar iahūē*, i. e. Yahweh is the same as His "word" (cf. p. 37), or it means "in ecstasy"; in Ps. 33, 6 the heavens are made *bidāβar iahūē*, i. e. not by the word spoken by Him, although this way to explain it is possible. *dāβar* here is the creator himself. On 1 K. 18, 36 see p. 48. 1 K. 20, 35 is psychologically interesting. A prophet orders another prophet "by the word of Yahweh beat me" (*bidāβar iahūē hakkent*) and as the other does not obey, he says: As you have not heard the voice of Yahweh, a lion shall come and tear you into pieces. Perhaps this formula was generally used by the prophets in their own private conversation and the request following it was fulfilled without hesitation, as it was Yahweh's own request. Perhaps it may be translated as "it is in Yahweh's will or power" (*zē bidāβar iahūē*), i. e. I require it as Yahweh. *kōl iahūē* here must mean *hakkent*! It is totally impossible to speak here of "word", but the conception is not clear to me, for it may also mean "in ecstasy" (*bidāβar iahūē*), etc.

Finally, there is 1 K. 13, a text which we cannot quite understand. The man of God from Judah comes to Bethel "in the power of Yahweh", i. e. "in ecstasy", as His representative (13, 1: *bidāβar iahūē*), predicts there to the altar its destiny "in the power of Yahweh" (13, 2), and for proof, he promises a miracle, which happens as he has foretold "in the power of Yahweh" (13, 5). The king wants to take him into his house, but the prophet says:

ken šiḡuā (the subject probably is Yahweh, but the verb may be impersonal too) *'oḏi biḏāḅar iahuē* (13, 9, i. e. in the revelation, in the power which came over him, in the ecstasy) meaning that he has to go back straight away. In the same manner he says to the prophet who comes to allure him: *dāḅar* (l. ? *dibḅer*, i. e. Yahweh, but probably impersonal) *'elai biḏāḅar iahuē* (13, 17). But the other argues that an angel has said to him "in the vision" (*biḏāḅar iahuē*), that it was not true (13, 18). The prophet of Israel commands his sons to bury him in the grave of the prophet of Judah, for he knows that everything will happen as the man from Judah has prophesied "in ecstasy" (13, 32). This story, based on the biography of Amos, was invented to justify the horrible and despicable action of Josiah; therefore, Yahweh's will is emphasized during the whole story. It was the reason, but not the deuteronomic intention for demonstrating how the whole of the prophet's life depended on *dāḅar iahuē*. When Josiah did something, it was according to the will of Yahweh (*kiḏāḅar iahuē*) through a man whose actions all happened in ecstasy (*biḏāḅar iahuē*). Thus no one could say that he had not acted justly with the priests and Yahweh in Bethel.

12. Conclusion.

And so it follows from the use of the verbs also, which more or less should be all taken into account¹⁾, that our theory of the primary meaning of *dāḅar* was the right one. But, on the other hand, the conception did not retain its meaning through the centuries. *dāḅar* was *mana par excellence* and

1) The passages with a verb and (*had*)*dāḅarīm* (*hā'ellē*) etc. have been mentioned only occasionally, likewise the verbs with (*had*)*dāḅar* (*hazzē*) etc., as in these cases commonly the following speech is the object. Sometimes it is impossible to say if "word" in the Israelitic sense or "event" etc. is thought of. One cannot distinguish between those two because "word" and "event" penetrate one another. But the verbs used in such connections are the same as discussed in § 7—10. So far as I see only the following passages are not examined: *dāḅar iahuē* is the subject in Ezk. 12, 28 (*nimšay*) Jer. 15, 16 (*nimšā'*) Mi. 2, 7 (*hētīḅ*) Ps. 33, 4 (*iāšar*) 119, 130 (*he'ir*); an object for Yahweh: Jer. 1, 12 (*šāḅad 'al*) Ps. 105, 42 Neh. 1, 8 (*zāḅar 'eḡ*); an object for the prophets: Jdg. 3, 20 (*lā*) Jer. 23, 18 (*hiḅšīḅ*) 23, 28 (*'eḡ*); an object for the people: Is. 66, 2. 5 Ezr. 9, 4 (*hāreḅ 'al, 'el, bā*) Jer. 6, 19 (*hiḅšīḅ*) 11, 9 13, 10 (*me'en lišmoā'*) Ps. 50, 17 (*hišlīḅ*) 105, 28 (*mārā 'eḡ*).

dabr > *dāḅār* only a subsidiary form. Perhaps already at the time the conception was engendered *dabr* had become an aimless and formidable might, while *dabar* had its *telos*. *dāḅār*, determined by a *telos*, became synonymous for "will" (although the *telos* might appear only in the person who intended to do something). As *dāḅār* appeared anyhow and men felt able to interpret "the power", it could denote will, because the revealed power which has intentions can only be will. With the help of monotheism this evolution became still easier and simpler. Hence the conception was split, but later on the two branches met again. On the one hand, *dāḅār* got the meaning of a cultic rule, which determined God's relation to a thing or occurrence filled with mana. So the name *dāḅār* was transferred from the object which contained it to the commandment of the law which spoke of that object. On the other hand, *dāḅār* or *dəḅar iahuē* came to denote the prophetic word, as the prophets experienced the power of God, the force of His will and called their expression of it as well as the power itself *dəḅar iahuē*. Later both expressions were written down and therefore *dəḅar iahuē* became the meaning of the written word until finally, as it is for us, it became a synonym for the Bible and not a living "word" any more, because the "living word" for the Greeks was *λόγος* and not *λόγος Θεοῦ*.

But we must not suppose that the expression lost anything of its emotional contents during the long period of evolution. It might, perhaps, have lost something for the rationalists, but pious men understood the last form of *dəḅar iahuē* in the same way as their ancestors understood the original one¹⁾. The most suitable name for this ambivalent relation may be the word *pāḥad*.

1) We have some examples of the cult of books in Ethiopia to demonstrate that this was so. Littmann (Zar'a-Jacob, ein einsamer Denker in Abessinien, Berlin, 1916, p. 41, note 39) says: "Der Psalter wird bei den Abessiniern gewissermassen als Zauberbuch betrachtet und sein Besitz bringt Glück und Segen ins Haus. Daher haben auch viele Leute, die weder lesen noch schreiben können, ein solches Buch". Books about holy men are venerated in Ethiopia like their pictures because they contain the essence and the power of the saint. Comp. Andrian p. 113 (according J. Bois, Satanisme, p. 382): "Die Psalmen und die Evangelien schützen gegen Fieber, Pest, gegen Würmer . . . Mit Hilfe der Apokalypse hat man das Wetter in der Gewalt, lenkt Blitze ab, vertheilt die Wolken, vertreibt Regen und Hagel."

Likewise we must not suppose that the previous signification in the evolution of the conception had fully disappeared before the following emerged. They existed contemporarily for a long time, and if one had asked the prophet which was the *dāḅar iahuē*, what he spoke or what he experienced, he probably would not have understood the question. He certainly took them for the same like the mystics in the Middle Ages describing their ecstasy, i. e. *dāḅar iahuē*. But in fact every human being feels incapable of uttering anything ecstatic. Not only everything connected with ecstasy was said to be *dāḅar iahuē* but all the mediums too which afforded ecstasy, e. g. the harp which played for Elisha and the actions of the potter for Jeremiah.

The prophet was the mouth of God and the announcer of His mana, but he was not only the canal of God's effluence. Every prophet transformed his experience in a peculiar way, although the objective ground and the origin was the same. Therefore there was actually no revelation of God in spite of the existence of the term "prophetische Wortoffenbarung". Only the relation between God and man was made visible and known, the dependence was understood more profoundly, and this was the revelation which was *dāḅar iahuē*.

To give such a content to man and to live in such wise is something which seems ridiculous. One may smile at that, but it is a smile at things we cannot understand. It is obvious that men have caught more deeply the essence of the world, God, and themselves by the belief in mana than by the "laws of nature", whether they are represented in ritual codices or in some modern compendium of natural sciences. All modern theories of physics may exactly correspond to facts, nevertheless, they correspond much less to life and the world.

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