Meta-Semantic Moral Encroachment: Some Experimental Evidence

  • Alex Davies Department of Philosophy, University of Tartu
  • Lauris Kaplinski Institute of Molecular and Cell Biology, University of Tartu
  • Maarja Lepamets Estonian Genome Center, University of Tartu
Keywords: context-sensitivity, experimental philosophy, moral encroachment

Abstract

This paper presents experimental evidence in support of the existence of metalinguistic moral encroachment: the influence of the moral consequences of using a word with a given content upon the content of that word. The evidence collected implies that the effect of moral factors upon content is weak. The implications of this for Esa Diaz-Leon's recent attempt to show how Jennifer Saul can legitimately reject an empirical semantic hypothesis on political grounds are described. Directions for future research are also described.

Published
2019-12-20
How to Cite
Davies, A., Kaplinski, L., & Lepamets, M. (2019). Meta-Semantic Moral Encroachment: Some Experimental Evidence. Studia Philosophica Estonica, 12, 7-33. Retrieved from http://ojs.utlib.ee/index.php/spe/article/view/16285