(Anti)Hermeneutical Philosophy for Science
Keywords: hermeneutical philosophy of science, neopragmatism, philosophy of scientific practices, Heelan, Ginev, Rouse
AbstractPhilosophical hermeneutics claims that human understanding, while being contingent and historical, is likewise universal and bears within itself some pervasive features detectable via hermeneutical analyses of historically imparted tradition and language. Similarly, hermeneutical philosophy of science is confident that hermeneutical methods are the only proper tool to adequately assess, reconstruct, explain or give a meaning to historical but universal scientific knowledge and its various forms. I point out two versions of hermeneutical philosophy of science and argue that whenever philosophical hermeneutics pursues rescuing "scientificity", human rationality, human rights, common values, and so forth under the pretence of its universality and competence, it necessarily transcends and violates the tenets of its own. I conclude in the favour of moderate interpretation of practical hermeneutics, perhaps in the very essence of it rest postmodern concepts of historicality, transparency and tolerance, without which there is no possibility of extricating oneself from hermeneuticism.
How to Cite
Juozelis, E. (2013). (Anti)Hermeneutical Philosophy for Science. Studia Philosophica Estonica, 95-107. https://doi.org/10.12697/spe.2012.5.2.07