Tõe ja vale vahel. Arusaamatuse epistemoloogia
Keywords:
tõeteooriad, kontekst, teadmine ja allikad, tunnistuslik teadmine ja kuuldus, doksastilised hoiakud, teadmatus, arusaamatus, theories of truth, context, knowledge, sources of knowledge, testimony and hearsay, doxastic attitudes, ignorance, misunderstandingAbstract
Essees põhjendan kolme teesi. (1) Lihtsatele küsimustele tõest—nt mis on tõde või mida tähendab millegi tõesus? — ei ole lihtne vastata. Tõde on keerukas mõiste nii teoreetiliselt kui ka praktiliselt. Filosoofiliste tõeteooriate paljusus on üks paljude tegurite hulgas, mis tekitavad segadust tõe küsimuses. (2) Enamik vestlustes ja arutlustes kasutavatest lausetest ei ole sellised, mille kohta saaks öelda „tõene“ või „väär“ (ja muid võimalusi pole). Praktiliste vestluslausete hulgas moodustavad mustvalge tõeväärtusega laused vähemuse. Neid ümbritseb suur hulk mitte-singulaarseid ja mitte-primitiivseid lauseid: esiteks, enamasti on lihtväited kombineeritud omavahel, ja teiseks, sageli on lihtväited kombineeritud modaalsete ja normatiivsete lausetega. Ometi kiputakse ka selliselt keerukaid lauseid hindama lihtsa mustvalge mõõdupuuga. (3) Eelmisega seoses — esineb suur hulk tõe küsimuses segaduse tekitajaid, mida vestlejad oskamatuse või tähelepanematuse tõttu eiravad. Taolistest teguritest vaatlen lähemalt: (a) konteksti, mis „tõe tegijana“ nõuab vestlejatelt taustateadmisi või täiendavat süvenemist; (b) tunnistust ja kuuldust, mis vahendatud (propositsioonilise) teadmisena evib ridamisi (inimlikke) veatekitajaid; (c) episteemiliste seisundite „maatriksit“, mis kolmevalentset tõeväärtust doksastilistiliste uskumishoiakutega kombineerides käsitab ligi paarikümmet episteemilist seisundit. Episteemilised veatekitajad on „väljaspool lauseid“: inimese ja elamismaailma suhete iseloomus. Tõe(suse) probleemidel on kaks triviaalset allikat: (a) inimese tunnetuslikud, sh tõendamise võimed on piiratud; (b) maailma „tõendite salvestamise võimed“ on piiratud. Vestlustes põhjustavad ülalmainitud tegurid vigu kahel üldisel põhjusel. Esiteks, vestlejad asuvad lause tõeväärtust hindama enne, kui nad on aru saanud või välja selgitanud, mida lause (antud kontekstis) tähendab või mida kõneleja sellega öelda tahab. Teiseks, vestlejad ei mõista või eiravad modaalsusi ja allikaviiteid, mistõttu ei hooma otsese ja kaudse kõne mõju kõneluse tõeväärtusele. Lõpetuseks pakun välja üheksa filosoofilis-praktilist soovitust, mis võiksid hõlbustada hakkamasaamist tõe (või „tõe“) keerukustega.
The article defends three theses. (1) The simple question of truth - e.g. what is truth or what does it mean for something to be true? - does not have a simple answer. Truth is a complex concept, both theoretically and practically. The multiplicity of philosophical theories of truth is one factor among others which leads to confusion regarding the question of truth. (2) Most sentences we use in our conversations and discussions are not such that we could say they are either 'true' or 'false' (and no other possiblity exists). Among practical conversational sentences, sentences with two possible truth value are a minority. They are surrounded by a large set of non-singular and non-primitive sentences: first, usually simple statements are combined with each other; second, simple statements are combined with modal and normative statements. Still people tend to evaluate even those more complex sentences as if they were simply true or false. (3) Related to the second thesis---there is a large number of factors which create confusion when it comes to truth but owing to ignorance and inattention, they are ignored. From these factors, I will focus upon: (a) context, which, as a "truth-maker", requires background knowledge from interlocutors or digging a little deeper; (b) testimony and hearsay, which, as mediated (propositional) knowledge, have numerous (human) error-makers; (c) a "matrix" of epistemic states, which by combining three-valued truth with doxastic attitudes includes tens of epistemic states. Epistemic error-makers are "outside the sentence": in the character of the relationship between humans and their lifeworld. The problems of truth have two trivial sources: (a) the cognitive abilities of humans, which include the ability to prove, are limited; (b) the ability of the world to "save evidence" is limited. These factors cause errors in conversations for two general reasons. First, interlocutors start evaluating the truth of a sentence before they have understood or made sense of what does this sentence means (in the given context) or what the utterer wanted to say. Second, interlocutors do not understand or ignore modality and references to sources, which in turn leads them to overlook the impact direct and indirect speech have on the truth value of a conversation. Finally I will propose nine philosophical-practical suggestions which could make it easier to cope with the complexities of truth.
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