Post-Truth as a Procrastination of Enlightenment


  • Jens Lemanski Institute of Philosophy, FernUniversität in Hagen


post-truth politics, argumentum ad passiones, Sweden argument, appeal to emotion, rational representationalism


In recent years the cultural pessimistic position has become known, according to which we live in an “age of post-truth.” This thesis is supported by the observation of an increasing use of argumenta ad passiones in politics. In contrast to this view, I believe that “time” and “representation” play a more decisive role in individual post-truth arguments than the appeal to passiones. By analysing typical post-truth arguments, I arrive at a much more positive view on the present age: the designation of individual arguments as “post-truth” is already an expression of a process of enlightenment.


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How to Cite

Lemanski, J. (2018). Post-Truth as a Procrastination of Enlightenment. Studia Philosophica Estonica, 11, 117–127. Retrieved from