Intuitions in Epistemology: Towards a Naturalistic Alternative

  • Kristoffer Ahlstrom
Keywords: methodology, intuitions, conceptual analysis

Abstract

The present paper revisits the main methodological problems with conceptual analysis and considers two attempts to rectify them in terms of prototypes and reflective equilibria, respectively. Finding both wanting for the purposes of epistemological analysis, a naturalistic alternative is then sketched that explores the positive implications of aforementioned problems for the demarcation of the respective roles of intuitions and empirical investigation within three epistemological domains, viz., the evaluation of epistemological hypotheses, the amelioration of epistemic practices, and the construction of a theory of epistemic value.

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Published
2010-02-18
How to Cite
Ahlstrom, K. (2010). Intuitions in Epistemology: Towards a Naturalistic Alternative. Studia Philosophica Estonica, 15-34. https://doi.org/10.12697/spe.2009.2.2.02