Psychology and the Use of Intuitions in Philosophy

  • Brian Talbot
Keywords: intuitions, psychology, experimental philosophy, conceptual analysis

Abstract

There is widespread controversy about the use of intuitions in philosophy.  In this paper I will argue that there are legitimate concerns about this use, and that these concerns cannot be fully responded to using the traditional methods of philosophy.  We need an understanding of how intuitions are generated and what it is they are based on, and this understanding must be founded on the psychological investigation of the mind.  I explore how a psychological understanding of intuitions is likely to impact a range of philosophical projects, from conceptual analysis to the study of (non-conceptual) "things themselves" to experimental philosophy.

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Published
2010-02-18
How to Cite
Talbot, B. (2010). Psychology and the Use of Intuitions in Philosophy. Studia Philosophica Estonica, 157-176. https://doi.org/10.12697/spe.2009.2.2.09