First-person Folk Psychology: Mindreading or Mindshaping?


  • Leon De Bruin University of Nijmegen



McGeer, Moran, first-person folk psychology, mindshaping, mindreading


Proponents of mindshaping argue that third-person folk psychology (i.e., the ascription of mental states to others) is not primarily about "reading" mental states for the purpose of behavior prediction and explanation. Instead, they claim that third-person folk psychology is first and foremost a regulative practice -- one that "shapes" mental states in accordance with the norms of a shared folk psychological framework. This paper investigates to what extent the core assumptions behind the mindshaping hypothesis are compatible with an account of first-person folk psychology (i.e., the ascription of mental states to ourselves) that is based on the notion of "self-regulative agency."


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How to Cite

De Bruin, L. (2017). First-person Folk Psychology: Mindreading or Mindshaping?. Studia Philosophica Estonica, 9(1), 170–183.