Ascribing Minds and Knowing What You Think
In Mind Ascribed Bruno Mölder works out a powerful and subtle view according to which the ascription in mental states in folk psychology constitutes mental phenomena. I discuss two issues raised by his account. The first is the relation of the mind, so understood, to other phenomena, and in particular the sciences of the mind. If the mind is constituted by folk psychological ascription, can that ascription be constrained by the results of empirical investigation, or is folk psychology autonomous, if not a priori? Second, I suggest that the transparency view of introspection works very well as a supplement to the ascriptivist position.
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