Interpretivism and “Canonical” Ascriptions
The following paper investigates the crucial notion of a “canonical ascription statement” in Bruno Mölder’s Mind Ascribed, and argues that the reasons given for preferring the book’s approach of canonicality to a more common understanding of canonicality in terms of the ascriptions we would “ideally” make are not only unpersuasive, but also leave the interpretivist position more open to skeptical worries than it should be. The paper further argues that the resources for a more compelling justification of Mölder’s conception of canonicality are already in Mölder’s book itself.
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