Interpretivism and the Meaning of Mental State Ascriptions


  • Marc Slors Faculty of Philosophy, Theology and Religious Studies, Radboud University


mental states, mind-body problem, interpretivism


Interpretivism is often seen as the theory according to which mental state ascription is useful, even though mental states do no really exist. this “as if” theory is widely held to be untenable. In this paper I argue that in order to avoid an “as if” reading of interpretivism, we should embrace the strongest version of this theory.


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How to Cite

Slors, M. (2015). Interpretivism and the Meaning of Mental State Ascriptions. Studia Philosophica Estonica, 10(2), 18–27. Retrieved from