Alexander of Aphrodisias' Lazy Arguments against Stoic Determinism
Keywords:
Alexander, De fato, Lazy Argument, Stoic determinism, fateAbstract
Scholars generally agree that Alexander of Aphrodisias' objections to Stoic determinism in De fato are unconvincing. I show that there is one argument, however, that is more successful than Alexander's other arguments. This argument is an innovative version of the so-called "Lazy Argument". Traditional versions of the Lazy Argument claim that actions and deliberations would not matter in a deterministic world and that for this reason Stoic determinism cannot be true. By contrast, Alexander's new version asserts that it is too risky to believe in Stoic determinism because it can give average rational agents good reasons to be lazy. Since we cannot know whether Stoic determinism is true, it is safer not to believe it.
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