The Modest, or Quantificational, Account of Truth


  • Wolfgang Künne Department of Philosophy, University of Hamburg



truth, non-nominal quantification


Truth is a stable, epistemically unconstrained property of propositions, and the concept of truth admits of a non-reductive explanation: that, in a nutshell, is the view for which I argued in Conceptions of Truth. In this paper I try to explain that explanation in a more detailed and, hopefully, more perspicuous way than I did in Ch. 6.2 of the book and to defend its use of sentential quantification against some of the criticisms it has has come in for.


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How to Cite

Künne, W. (2008). The Modest, or Quantificational, Account of Truth. Studia Philosophica Estonica, 1(2), 122–168.