Loogikavigade lubatavusest

Authors

  • Jüri Eintalu

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.12697/spe.2008.1.3.04

Keywords:

vasturääkivus, tõelähedus, contradiction, truthlikeness

Abstract

Loogikavigu on kahte liiki: (1) vastuolud; (2) kehtetud järeldused. Sooritada kehtetu järeldus on üldiselt väiksem viga kui väita vastuolu. On kaks erinevat printsiipi: (A) teadaolevalt väära väidet ei tohi esitada; (B) ei tohi esitada väidet, mille tõeväärtus pole teada. (A) keelab sooritada esimest liiki loogikavigu; (B) ka teist liiki loogikavigu. Printsiibi (B) lükkame me tagasi. Oletusi saab genereerida näiteks: (1) dedutseerides neid teadaolevalt vastuolulisest teooriast; (2) saades neid induktiivsete järelduste tulemeina. Ent ka printsiipi (A) tohib eirata. Võib esitada teadaolevalt vastuolulise teooria kui ligilähedaselt tõese ning seda kasutada - kui paremaid pole käepärast. Popper esitas tõesarnasuse teooria. Samuti nõudis ta vastuoluliste teadusteooriate elimineerimist. - Ent paremate teadusteooriate leiutamine võib ebaõnnestuda. Wittgensteini vaated tema Märkmetes matemaatika alustest on usutavamad. Implitsiitselt rakendas Witttgenstein mitteformaliseeritud tõesarnasuse mõistet vastuolulistele teooriatele, lubades selliseid teooriaid kasutada.

 

There are two kinds of logical mistakes: (1) contradictions; (2) invalid inferences. Generally, to commit an invalid inference is a lesser mistake than to assert a contradiction. There are two principles: (A) it is prohibited to present a proposition one knows to be false; (B) it is prohibited to present a proposition one does not know to be true. (A) prohibits to commit logical mistakes of the first kind; (B) of the second kind as well. We reject the principle (B). One can generate guesses e.g. (1) by deducing them from a theory one knows to be contradictory; (2) as the conclusions of inductions. It is allowable to violate the principle (A) too. One can present a theory one knows to be contradictory as approximately true and to use it - if no better ones are at hand. Popper presented a theory of truthlikeness. He also demanded to eliminate contradictions from our theories. - However, one may fail to invent better theories. Wittgenstein's views in Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics are more plausible. Witttgenstein implicitly applied a non-formalized concept of truthlikeness to contradictory theories and allowed to use them.

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Author Biography

Jüri Eintalu

Ph D

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Published

2008-12-29

How to Cite

Eintalu, J. (2008). Loogikavigade lubatavusest. Studia Philosophica Estonica, 1(3), 29–42. https://doi.org/10.12697/spe.2008.1.3.04

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Articles