Normatiivsuse mitu tahku

  • Bruno Mölder Department of Philosophy, University of Tartu

Abstract

Tänapäeval peetakse tähenduse, sisu ja vaimu normatiivsust sageli takistuseks nende naturaliseerimisele. Samas saab normatiivsust ennast mõista mitmel moel. Artikli eesmärgiks on tutvustada väitlusi normatiivsuse üle. Rõhutatakse, et normatiivsuse filosoofilises analüüsis on oluline vältida 'normatiivsuse' mitmemõttelisust ning et tuleb teha vahet eri nähtuste normatiivsusel. Tuuakse esile olulisemad normatiivsuse määratlemise viisid ning vaadeldakse, kuidas tuleks mõista tähenduse ja intentsionaalsuse konstitutiivset normatiivsust. Filosoofiliselt on iseäranis oluline selline normatiivsus, mis on niihästi kategooriline, ettekirjutuslik kui konstitutiivne. Artiklis vaadeldud käsitluste suhtes näidatakse, et väited sedalaadi normatiivsuse esinemise kohta tähenduse ja intentsionaalsuse vallas pole põhjendatud.

 

It has become increasingly common to invoke the normativity of meaning, content and mind as an obstacle to their naturalisation. At the same time, one can understand normativity itself in various ways. The aim of this paper is to shed some light on the debate about the nature and the scope of normativity. It is emphasised that it is important to prevent the ambiguity of 'normativity' and that it is crucial to distinguish between the normativity of different phenomena. The paper covers the most important characterisations of normativity and concentrates on the alleged normativity of meaning and intentionality. The normativity that has a philosophical import is categorical, prescriptive and constitutive. With respect to the accounts scrutinised in this paper, it is argued that there are no good reasons to claim that meaning and intentionality are normative in this sense.

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Published
2012-02-01
How to Cite
Mölder, B. (2012). Normatiivsuse mitu tahku. Studia Philosophica Estonica, 52-82. https://doi.org/10.12697/spe.2011.4.1.03
Section
Articles