Is Ground Said-in-Many-Ways?
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.12697/spe.2014.7.2.03Keywords:
Aristotle, ground, homonymyAbstract
Proponents of ground, which is used to indicate relations of ontological fundamentality, insist that ground is a unified phenomenon, but this thesis has recently been criticized. I will first review the proponents' claims for ground's unicity, as well as the criticisms that ground is too heterogeneous to do the philosophical work it is supposed to do. By drawing on Aristotle's notion of homonymy, I explore whether ground's metaphysical heterogeneity can be theoretically accommodated while at the same time preserving its proponents' desideratum that it be a unified phenomenon.
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