Essence, Essence, and Essence

  • Ryan Christensen Brigham Young University
Keywords: essence, necessity, temporal essence, Aristotelian essentialism

Abstract

I argue that three different notions of essence—temporal, definitional, and modal—are all distinct notions, and are all philosophically useful. After defining the different notions, I discuss the philosophical problems each addresses.

Author Biography

Ryan Christensen, Brigham Young University

Department of Philosophy

Assistant Professor

References

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Published
2015-07-05
How to Cite
Christensen, R. (2015). Essence, Essence, and Essence. Studia Philosophica Estonica, 7(2), 72-87. https://doi.org/10.12697/spe.2014.7.2.05