„Noorsõdureid, kes ei oska vene keelt, ei tohi laevastikku määrata.“ Keele- ja rahvusküsimus Vene sõjalaevastiku komplekteerimisel impeeriumi lõpuperioodil

Abstract

“Raw recruits who don’t know Russian must not be assigned to the navy.” The issue of language and nationality in supplying the Russian Navy with men in the period of the end of the Russian Empire

The Russian navy and regular army were supplied with men based on the obligation to supply recruits in the period from the start of the 18th century until the implementation of universal conscription in 1874. After the obligation to supply recruits had been extended to the Baltic governorates (in 1796), the navy (more precisely the Baltic Fleet) also started being supplied with recruits taken from Estland, Livland, and Courland. During the reign of Tsar Nikolai I (1825–1855), more than 25% of the recruits taken from Livland and altogether over 60% of those taken from the Governorate of Estland were sent to serve in the Baltic Fleet. Yet after the Crimean War, no recruits at all were sent to the navy any more from Livland and Courland and the proportion of recruits sent to the navy from the Governorate of Estland had declined to 38% (a drop of over 25%) in the 1860s. The proportion of raw recruits taken from the Baltic governorates to supply the navy remained relatively small after the implementation of universal conscription (in 1874) until World War I.
The reasons for why the relative proportion of Estonians (and similarly Latvians) in supplying the navy declined so drastically in the periood of the end of the Russian Empire are analysed in this article. It similarly analyses the role of the nationality and language of the recruits and later of the conscripts in this process. The article also examines the more critical junctures in supplying the Russian Navy with men starting from the mid-19th century until World War I.
As a general rule, until the end of the reign of Tsar Nikolai I, the principle applied in supplying men to the Russian Army that the first choice of recruits was sent to the Guards units, grenadier units, special forces, and also partially to the cavalry. The navy received its recruits only after the first choice, which meant that physically weaker men ended up in the navy. Even more importantly – they had no previous experience or exposure whatsoever in seafaring.
It was not until 1853 that attention started being paid to taking men who had previous exposure to the sea to serve in the navy. Fixed recruit supply regions (governorates and counties) were established from where recruits started being sent to the navy. Since the authorities lacked more precise information on the occupations of the residents of coastal areas, such information started being gathered purposefully in localities. The navy’s recruit supply regions were adjusted based on the information obtained. In 1867, the Maritime Ministry gained the right in supplying men for the navy to specifically indicate the regions (governorates or counties) from where recruits were to be taken into the navy as the first choice.
The transition to supplementing the navy based on certain recruit supply regions had important consequences for the Baltic governorates. Recruits stopped being sent to the navy from the governorates of Livland and Courland starting in 1853. After the Crimean War, recruits were taken for the navy only from the Governorate of Estland and even that was done only in 1864–66. The men sent into military service from the Governorate of Estland in those years accounted for 3.2% of the total number of recruits taken into the navy in 1864–74. The recruits sent to the navy accounted for 58% of the governorate’s recruit quota in 1865 and 34% in 1866. Hence the relative importance of recruits from the Baltic governorates in supplying the navy with men declined manyfold in the 3rd quarter of the 19th century compared to the first half of that century.
After the implementation of universal conscription in 1874, raw recruits from Estland, Livland, and Courland once again started being sent to the navy. In 1874, raw recruits were taken into the navy from Livland only, more precisely from Saaremaa. Later, raw recruits from Livland started being sent to the navy from the counties of Pärnu, Tartu, and Riga in addition to Saaremaa. The governorates of Estland and Courland were included in the supply of men to the navy in the conscription of raw recruits in 1875. Raw recruits mainly from Lääne County were sent to the navy from the Governorate of Estland. Yet at the end of the 19th century, specific regions for supplying men to the navy were abandoned and the navy started being supplemented on a state-wide basis. That also meant that men could be sent to the navy from all counties in Estland and Livland as well.
At the end of the 19th century, roughly 6% of all the governorate’s raw recruits from Livland and Courland were sent to the navy, while slightly less than 4% of all the governorate’s raw recruits from Estland were sent there. On the eve of the First World War, more men from the Baltic governorates were sent to the navy compared to the preceding period: nearly 13% from Estland, slightly more than 11% from Courland, and nearly 8% from Livland. Raw recruits from the Baltic governorates accounted for only a small proportion of the rank and file of the entire fleet of the Russian armed forces.
Such a drastic decrease in the relative proportion of Estonian and Latvian recruits/conscripts supplied to the navy resulted from several causes. One of the primary reasons was the exceedingly high mortality rate of Estonian and Latvian recruits in the naval service. Most of the men taken from Estland and Livland into naval service did not adapt in the navy. The transition from civilian life to military service was such a radical change in life that the mental and physical health of many men did not withstand it. As a result of that, many men died in their first years of military service. The naval office considered most Estonian recruits/conscripts to be physically unsuitable for naval service. For that reason, the number of Estonian men sent to serve in the navy was considerably reduced.
Yet alongside physical unsuitability, an even more important reason for reducing the relative proportion of Estonian and Latvian recruits/conscripts in supplying men to the navy was the language problem – they did not know Russian. Starting from the mid-19th century, the focus in supplementing the navy was placed primarily on the so-called Slavic triad – Russians, Ukrainians, and Byelorussians. In the view of the military authorities, all nationalities did not have the same kind of military ‘quality’. Thus, the question of nationality and language became an important key factor in supplying men to the armed forces.
The principle that a fixed ratio between the core nationalities (Russians, Ukrainians, and Byelorussians) and other nationalities had to be maintained in the various military units of the armed forces took root in the transition to universal conscription. The relative proportion of other nationalities in the rank and file was not allowed to exceed 25% as a rule. That was achieved by establishing a rather complicated system of annual distribution of conscripts. That system, however, did not apply to the supplying of men for the navy. As a result of that, the composition of the navy’s rank and file quickly ‘became Slavic’. At the start of the 1870s, Russians, Ukrainians, and Byelorussians already accounted for over 93% of the composition of the navy’s rank and file. By the eve of the First World War, the relative proportion of the Slavic triad among the navy’s rank and file was at the same level or had even increased. Prior to World War I, the navy was actually supplied with representatives of only eight nationalities – Russians, Ukrainians, Byelorussians, Germans, Tatars, Latvians, Estonians, and Bulgarians. The relative proportion of Estonians in supplying the navy with men was only 1.2%.